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During the long eighteenth century in England many thousands of men and 
women became bankrupts, but little is known today about what they 
experienced as bankrupts.  This study seeks to redress this imbalance by giving 
an account of the social experience of a wide and varied sample of English 
bankrupts from between the years 1732 and 1831. 
Through the employment of twenty-four case studies this study introduces the 
reader to some very different members of the English middling sort, all of whom, 
however, were engaged in a trade at which they failed.  Some of these 
bankrupts were the predictable tropes of bankers and merchants who risked too 
much, but others were small provincial businessmen and shopkeepers.  This 
study therefore challenges notions that bankruptcy was largely an event 
affecting only speculators and the extravagant. 
Each case study is supported by a variety of sources, for example, law court 
and bankruptcy commission records, personal correspondence, private 
journals, self-published exculpatory pamphlets and press reports.  Together the 
sources reveal bankrupts’ personal experience, their beliefs, attitudes, 
anxieties, reflections and introspections.  The social and cultural climate that 
surrounded bankrupts is represented by a range of polemical pamphlets and 
treatises, newspaper columns, advice literature, novels, verse and plays. 
Bankruptcy was not always the soft-option choice of the privileged.  There was 
a larger overlap between the regimes of imprisonment for debt and bankruptcy 
in England in the long eighteenth century than is often supposed.  This study 
will show that it was because all traders faced the real prospect of being 
summarily flung into debtors’ gaol, that bankruptcies were triggered. 
The study explores bankrupts’ relationships with family and friends and finds 
how these connections continued to represent the most vital safety net against 
poverty, and how dire the consequences were when these affinities failed.  
Space and time were transformed for bankrupts as the law deprived them of 
freedom to move and trapped them in proceedings of indeterminate duration. 
Finally, the study assesses how bankrupts and their families experienced 
sudden financial and personal loss, and how they responded to, and came to 
terms with, downward social mobility.  They lost property, public roles, status, 
often their health, and even their lives.  However, as this study shows, not all 
bankrupts were equal in the degree to which their experience was unpleasant or 
tragic.  Some sank, whilst others rose to the surface again to lead, often 
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Because most bankrupts in the long eighteenth century were men, I use the 
pronouns ‘he’ and ‘his’ and ‘they’ and ‘them’ when referring to all bankrupts, 
male or female.  When I discuss specific cases of male or female bankrupts, I 
use their respective gendered pronouns. 
 
Because marked variations in eighteenth-century spelling and capitalisation are 











































Introduction, Literature Review, Discussion of Sources and Subjects 
Anne Scott, a widow, and her son Isaac were business partners in the City of 
London in the 1760s.  They had been trading as merchants and dry-salters in 
Cousin Lane off Upper Thames Street ‘upon a very reputable Footing’, when 
financial problems hit.1 As a consequence, Anne and Isaac were wrongly, so 
they both believed, made bankrupts.  They were also adamant that they were 
being cheated by the assignees who were in possession of their estate and 
empowered to liquidate it.  There ensued a very bitter correspondence between 
bankrupts and assignees with each party refusing to comply with the petitions or 
demands of the other, such that at least one party was put ‘in a most violent 
Passion’.2 
On Friday 18 September 1767 Isaac Scott received an unsettling letter from the 
leading assignee, Mr Hague. It came in response to Scott’s refusal to attend a 
meeting at Rolls Coffee House in Chancery Lane where his creditors wished 
him to sign a document.  The letter read as follows: 
Mr Hague presents his Compliments to Mr Scott, and is very sorry to 
inform him, that if he persists in this absurd, obstinate Behaviour, he will 
never meet the Indulgence that he expects; the Affidavit requested is 
what the Creditors have a Right to demand from him, and if he don’t 
comply, must not complain of the Treatment he will certainly 
experience…3 
What ‘Mr Scott’ was to experience at the hands of the assignees, as a pamphlet 
published by his mother revealed, was disagreeable and protracted.  Scott was 
not alone.  In England throughout the long eighteenth century all bankrupts 
experienced some form of ‘Treatment’ at the hands of their creditors.  However, 
what each bankrupt experienced varied greatly.  Some barely experienced a 
change to their circumstances, whilst others were reduced to poverty; very few 
went to the gallows.  This study is an account of the experience of English 
people, who like Isaac and Anne Scott, became bankrupts. 
 
1 Anne Scott, The Case of Anne and Isaac Scott, Bankrupts, Late Merchants and Dry-Salters 
(London, 1768), p. 2. 
2 Ibid., p. 38. 






When in 1694 Thomas Goodinge, a Serjeant-at-Law, published a manual for 
lawyers, merchants and tradesmen on the ‘Law against Bankrupts’, he 
declared: ‘I have often wondered, that so little hath been written on a Subject 
which made so great a Figure amongst Men of Business’.4 If Goodinge felt that 
there had been insufficient commentary in England on bankruptcy in the century 
and a half since the creation of the first English bankrupt laws in 1543, then how 
it might have pleased him if he could have foreseen the quantity of advice 
literature, commentary and scholarship on the laws that was published over the 
following century and into the nineteenth.  By the late twentieth century, with 
four centuries of bankruptcies and many new and revised statutes on the 
subject to look back upon, a scholarship on the history of English bankruptcy 
had truly emerged.  However, it has always been the ‘Subject’ that has received 
most attention, unsurprisingly in the most part from legal historians.  Yet a 
second glance at Goodinge’s observation will register that he regarded 
bankruptcy as a phenomenon that mattered much to ‘Men of Business’ because 
it was members of this social group who were not merely personally exposed by 
law to the risk of bankruptcy because of the legal stipulation that a bankrupt 
must be deemed to be a trader, but also that thousands of them actually 
became bankrupts.  The subjects of this thesis are these ‘Men’ who became 
bankrupts.  Goodinge neglected to mention women ‘of Business’, and they too 
are subjects in this thesis.  Pertinently, he did mention the ‘thousands of 
Families’ upon whom the effects of bankruptcy were ‘derived down’, and they 
too feature in this thesis.5 Goodinge may have written a book about the law, but 
he was not insensible to the wider social consequences of bankruptcy.  These 
are the principal objects of this study. 
If much has been written about the subject of bankruptcy since 1694, the 
contrary remains the case about bankrupts themselves.  We largely only know 
them by their names and trades which were published in the London Gazette.  
We know even less about their experience as bankrupts.  This is because 
historians, excepting legal historians, have been mostly interested in 
bankruptcies as a source from which to extract evidence for historical studies of 
 
4 Thomas Goodinge, The Laws Against Bankrupts: Or a Treatise wherein the Statutes Against 






economics, trade and finance.  However, bankruptcy as an event in itself has 
more to offer.  Only recently Antunes and Münch Miranda have expressed the 
need ‘to study bankruptcies as a historical category’.6 So why not also study 
bankrupts as a historical category?  A 2011 sector study of the English cotton 
spinning industry by Solar and Lyons is replete with data from bankruptcies 
because it is useful, but information about individual bankrupts is superfluous.7 
However, some sector studies provide more extensive information about an 
individual bankruptcy.  A recent example that gives some insight into an 
individual bankrupt’s financial relationships occurs in a study of commercial 
gardeners in Middlesex which, while addressing the structure and development 
of their trade, includes a short account of the bankruptcy in 1821 of John Rutt, a 
gardener in Hammersmith.8 
An objection to treating bankrupts as a group is that given most individuals in 
trade fell within the broad parameters of the eighteenth-century middling sort, 
individual bankrupts can more usefully provide evidence to support analysis in a 
variety of themes in social history, for example household possessions or 
consumer practices as bankruptcies generated inventories and accounts.  Yet 
this is still simply squeezing bankruptcies for their data while the bankrupts, the 
human subjects, remain incidental.  An opportunity is missed here as bankrupts 
can tell us about many aspects of social experience in long eighteenth-century 
England, not least about how relationships around money were structured and 
how those relationships changed when things went wrong. 
This study will attempt to redress the imbalance in scholarship between 
bankruptcy and bankrupts by treating bankrupts as a discrete category and 
finding out more about them as individuals and what it was like to be them.  In 
exploring the lives of English bankrupts, in an inversion of how they usually 
figure in research, this study will also endeavour to ask how bankrupts’ 
experience fitted into a wider historical context, and how that wider context in 
turn influenced bankrupts’ experience.  The thesis will also try to shed additional 
 
6 Cátia Antunes and Susana Münch Miranda, ‘GOING BUST: Some Reflections on 
Colonial Bankruptcies’, Itinerario, 43 (2019), 47–62, p. 48. 
7 Peter M. Solar and John S. Lyons, ‘The English Cotton Spinning Industry, 1780–1840, as 
Revealed in the Columns of the London Gazette’, Business History, 53 (2011), 302–23. 
8 Barbara Anne Rough, ‘The Structure and Development of Commercial Gardening Businesses 
in Fulham and Hammersmith, Middlesex, c. 1680–1861’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, 





light on how issues around debt in the long eighteenth-century impacted on 
middling-sort personal experience and relationships. 
To assess the little that has so far been revealed about bankrupts and their 
experience, and that of their families and other affected parties, I will review the 
existing literature on eighteenth-century bankruptcy, in so far as it contributes to 
arriving at an understanding of bankrupts.  This is an important caveat because 
it is not the aim of this study to take forward the very specific work done on 
bankruptcy law by legal historians.  Neither is it my aim to take forward other 
fields of research that have used bankruptcy data to support broader arguments 
about changes in business, markets and economies.  However, this prior 
research is invaluable in building the historical context within which an 
exploration of bankrupts’ experience is possible. 
Before continuing, it is necessary to clarify what was meant by bankruptcy and 
terms relating to finance and law in eighteenth-century England, as these terms 
are used continuously throughout the thesis.  I make every effort to avoid 
modern historiographical ambiguity so that the reader may understand the 
terms as they were used by contemporaries.  This is important because today 
as in the eighteenth century some terms have precise meanings in law, others 
are popular and imprecise and may be understood in different ways according 
to context, speaker and audience. 
Firstly, ‘insolvency’ needs to be understood in two ways: as a broad category 
heading for all matters related to the inability to pay debts and meet obligations 
(such that creditors are taking steps to recover what they are owed) and into 
which are subsumed all debt-related circumstances and regimes; secondly, it 
has a further, narrower, application which is elaborated below.  Bankruptcy is 
the name of the legal regime that could be imposed on insolvent persons who 
had debts above a minimum threshold; ‘bankrupt’ was a legal identity or state of 
being imposed on people who met the criteria for bankruptcy.  Then ‘insolvency’ 
makes a reappearance through its relationship with ‘insolvent debtors’: 
‘insolvent debtor’ is the term usually employed to distinguish between persons 
who were bankrupts, and persons who could not pay their debts but who did not 
qualify for bankruptcy; insolvent debtors were more likely to be imprisoned if 
they did not pay their creditors whilst bankrupts were usually spared 





usually meant bankruptcy.  This is the sense in which ‘break’ and ‘broke’ are 
understood and used here. 
‘Failure’ and ‘failed’ are used frequently.  The terms refer to both the failure of 
businesses and to the failure of persons in business.  The terms are frequently 
used in speaking of merchant houses or banks but can be applied to any 
business and its proprietor.  Although failure in business need not have resulted 
in bankruptcy (alternative settlements with creditors were possible), generally in 
this thesis I use ‘failure’ synonymously with bankruptcy.  Usually, if a bank or 
merchant house was said to have failed, it was highly likely that its partners had 
become bankrupts.  This meant that the business had failed, and that the 
proprietors or partners had personally ‘failed’.  It is important to remember when 
reading this study that under eighteenth-century English law ‘failure’ and 
bankruptcy were always personal (sometimes, very personal).  Strictly 
speaking, however, when a bank stopped payments (i.e. when customers could 
not redeem notes for specie or be paid the balance of their accounts in cash) it 
was clearly failing, but it had not necessarily failed.  If other banks rescued it, it 
might resume business and payments.  If it was not rescued and its partners 
became bankrupts, then the bank had definitively failed, and so had its partners. 
Finally, the above terms should be understood separately from the more 
technical question of ‘solvency’, that is whether a bankrupt or an insolvent 
debtor was really ‘solvent’ or ‘insolvent’ in the strict financial sense that could be 
demonstrated by properly kept books which would have displayed a trader’s 
true position regarding assets and liabilities.  There is a helpful discussion of 
these distinctions by Cordes and Schulte Beerbühl in Dealing with Economic 







9 Albrecht Cordes and Margrit Schulte Beerbühl (eds), Dealing with Economic Failure: Between 





1.1 Bankruptcy in popular literature 
Before this study tests readers’ knowledge and understanding of bankrupts, I 
will assume that the reader possesses an impression of eighteenth-century 
bankrupts because examples, albeit sometimes misleading, abound in 
eighteenth and nineteenth-century fiction.  Literary representations of bankrupts 
are not necessarily unrepresentative and uninformative.  Similarity with the 
content of authentic sources explored in this study suggests the events related 
in contemporary fiction were drawn from, or influenced by, real events.  
Novelists, Daniel Defoe (bankrupt in 1692) probably being the most notable in 
the eighteenth century and Charles Dickens in the nineteenth, had first-hand 
experience of financial problems and measures employed against debtors.10   It 
is also reasonable to suppose that authors witnessed, or had related to them, or 
read in the press, the debt-related problems of others.  Novelist Clara Reeve 
wrote in 1785 that the novel ‘gives a familiar relation of such things, as pass 
every day before our eyes, such as may happen to our friend, or to ourselves’.11 
Relatives, friends, neighbours and trade acquaintances of most eighteenth-
century English people would at some point have experienced failing credit, 
debt, material distress, imprisonment, bankruptcy and ruin (both financial and 
personal).  Tawny Paul notes, for example, that in eighteenth-century England 
‘[o]ne in four middling men experienced the debtor’s prison during their 
lifetimes’.12 
In eighteenth and nineteenth-century fictional narratives (‘histories’, novels, 
verse, plays) a ‘bankrupt’ is a recurring trope.  He, for usually it is a ‘he’, makes 
scattered, but not infrequent appearances throughout in the recognisable roles 
of malefactor, fool, or victim of misfortune.  Usually a bankruptcy, or a bankrupt, 
serves as a plot device to pose a threat to the security of a character who is 
inextricably and calamitously bound to the bankrupt, examples of imperilled 
characters are: Moll in Defoe’s Moll Flanders;13 the Vicar in Goldsmith’s Vicar of 
 
10 Paula R. Backscheider, ‘Defoe, Daniel (1660?–1731)’, ODNB (Oxford, 2008); Michael Quilter, 
‘Daniel Defoe: Bankrupt and Bankruptcy Reformer’, Journal of Legal History, 25 (2004), 53–73, 
pp. 54-6; Michael Slater, ‘Dickens, Charles John Huffam (1812–1870)’, ODNB (Oxford, 2020). 
11 Clara Reeve, The Progress of Romance (Colchester, 1785), quoted in Markman Ellis, The 
Politics of Sensibility: Race, Gender and Commerce in the Sentimental Novel (Cambridge, 
1996), p. 16. 
12 Tawny Paul, The Poverty of Disaster: Debt and Insecurity in Eighteenth-Century Britain 
(Cambridge, 2019), p. 238. 





Wakefield;14 old Edwards in Mackenzie’s Man of Feeling;15 young Mr Belfield in 
Burney’s Cecilia;16 Emma in Hays’ Memoirs of Emma Courtney;17 and a 
character who is caused the loss of her fortune in Edgeworth’s Love and Law.18 
Tawny Paul has highlighted the constant climate of financial insecurity that for 
many prevailed in the eighteenth century.19 Given this, it is little surprising that 
the anxieties of contemporaries about the threat of misfortune loomed large in 
literary texts and thus bankrupts came to occupy enduring and useful structural 
positions in popular contemporary fiction.  However, the bankrupts in these 
eighteenth-century novels are secondary characters and their stories are little 
developed, which imposes limits on the insight that might be gained into the 
lives of real bankrupts. 
A difficulty I encounter seeking insight into the experience of English bankrupts 
in the work of literary scholarship is that the presence of bankruptcy and 
insolvency in the structures of fictional works has been identified by literary 
scholars as residing largely in the Victorian novel.  So identified has it been that 
John McVeagh observes of the commonplaceness of bankruptcy in the work of 
nineteenth-century writers that to try ‘to compile a full account of bankruptcy in 
Victorian fiction would mean listing every other novel of the age, so the task 
would be pointless’.20  However, up to a point such a project was attempted by 
Barbara Weiss with The Hell of the English: Bankruptcy and the Victorian Novel.  
Weiss’s selection of Victorian novels in which bankruptcy is a major structural 
element are notable, being: Dickens’ Dombey and Son and Little Dorrit, 
Charlotte Brontë’s Shirley, Gaskell’s North and South, Thackeray’s The 




14 Oliver Goldsmith, The Vicar of Wakefield, 2 vols (Salisbury, 1766), I, p. 15. 
15 Henry Mackenzie, The Man of Feeling (London, 1771), pp. 179–80. 
16 Fanny Burney, Cecilia, Or Memoirs Of An Heiress. By The Author Of Evelina, 5 vols (London, 
1782), II, p. 82. 
17 Mary Hays, Memoirs of Emma Courtney, 2 vols (London, 1796), II, p. 157. 
18 Maria Edgeworth, ‘Love and Law: A Drama in Three Acts’ (1817), in Maria Edgeworth, Tales 
and Novels, 18 vols (London, 1833), XVI, p. 262. 
19 Paul, Poverty of Disaster, pp. 2–5, 10, 12–13. 
20 John McVeagh, Tradefull Merchants: The Portrayal of the Capitalist in Literature (London, 
1981), p. 205 fn.7. 






Weiss explicitly states that she chooses to focus on bankruptcy rather than 
insolvency and makes the useful observation that confusion has reigned in 
literature with cases of bankruptcy that do not meet the criteria for actual legal 
bankruptcy.  However, she also acknowledges that the novels she examines 
contain bankruptcies in an ‘untechnical’ sense, not a strictly legal one.22 For 
literary purposes it only matters that the structural role of a bankruptcy or a 
bankrupt is instrumental in the narrative.  Historians are sometimes confused 
too with ‘bankrupt’ and ‘bankruptcy’ applied to circumstances that are more 
likely to be ones of personal insolvency.  There is further muddiness in that 
events, both fictional and real, that arose from debt recovery actions, such as 
the seizure and sale of goods and possessions by public auction, were also 
events triggered by bankruptcy.  The striking title of Weiss’s study and the 
novels selected would seem to situate bankruptcy primarily as a phenomenon 
and experience of nineteenth-century England.23  
That bankruptcy continued to be a social and economic issue in the nineteenth 
century and that it was reflected in cultural production, is acknowledged.  
However, I would argue that bankruptcies and bankrupts were sufficiently 
evident in long eighteenth-century fiction, not to mention long eighteenth-
century reality, to warrant giving them as much attention as their Victorian 
counterparts.  In the meantime, the problem remains of how to reliably learn 
about bankrupts.  The tropes found in contemporary fiction and subsequent 
literary scholarship are popular and have an immediacy, but they are not reality.  
More substance is needed then if we are to construct an account of the real 
experience of English bankrupts drawn from ‘authentic’ primary sources.  
Recently help has been at hand with the publication of E. J. Clery’s Jane 
Austen: The Banker’s Sister.24 In this case we learn a lot from a novelist, and 
from Clery’s study, about the experience of a real bankrupt: the bankrupt was 
the novelist’s brother, banker Henry Austen.  Although the subjects of Clery’s 
study were exceptional, I draw on Henry Austen’s bankruptcy at various points 
in my study because of the wider relevance of his experience.  There remains, 
however, the question of how to construct an account of the experience of 
 
22 Weiss, Hell of the English, pp. 15–16. 
23 For bad experience related to finance in Victorian novels, see Nancy Henry, ‘“Rushing into 
Eternity”: Suicide and Finance in Victorian Fiction’, in Nancy Henry and Cannon Schmitt (eds), 
Victorian Investments: New Perspectives on Finance and Culture (Bloomington, 2009). 





English bankrupts that will be valid for the thousands of more obscure 
individuals who became bankrupts in the long eighteenth century.  To help do 
this, this chapter will place bankrupts in their legal, economic, and social 
context. 
 
1.2 Bankruptcy in legal history 
By the first decades of the twentieth century an academic interest in the history 
of English bankruptcy law had emerged.  Levinthal and Treiman wrote key 
texts, still useful today as introductions to the subject, and as accounts of 
ancient, medieval, and early modern debt and bankruptcy laws.  Levinthal was 
concerned with definitions, the origins and evolution of the statutes, the 
incessant problems with interpretation, and ultimately the slow process of 
reform.  Treiman highlighted the extraordinary actions and contrivances which 
were necessary before a person could ‘become’ a bankrupt before the 
nineteenth-century reforms.25 Although essentially preoccupied with bankruptcy 
statutes rather than bankrupts, this scholarship remains an important resource 
for grasping the idiosyncrasies of the law.  Although others periodically tackled 
bankruptcy as the century progressed, the subject remained largely the law, 
whilst bankrupts still attracted little interest and remained obscure.26 A small 
shift in focus in the legal analysis occurs in the 1960s when Cadwallader 
recognised that many debtors and bankrupts were unfortunate and endured real 
sufferings and discomforts, but there is little detail of bankrupts’ broader 
experience.27 Cadwallader did include an appendix with stories of notable 
criminal bankrupts taken from contemporary published accounts (e.g. Newgate 
Calendar), yet he draws us little nearer to ordinary bankrupts as bankrupts 
convicted of fraud were a minority. 
 
 
25 Louis Edward Levinthal, ‘The Early History of Bankruptcy Law’, University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review and American Law Register, 66 (1918), 223–50; Levinthal, ‘The Early History of 
English Bankruptcy’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review and American Law Register, 67 
(1919), 1–20; Israel Treiman, ‘Acts of Bankruptcy: A Medieval Concept in Modern Bankruptcy 
Law’, Harvard Law Review, 52 (1938), 189–215. 
26 See also Edward Welbourne, ‘Bankruptcy Before the Era of Victorian Reform’ in Cambridge 
Historical Journal, 4 (1932), 51–62.  Welbourne is problematic and is discussed further in the 
chapter on law and practice. 
27 Francis John James Cadwallader, ‘In Pursuit of The Merchant Debtor and Bankrupt: 1066–





The 1970s and 1980s saw a small expansion in the attention given to 
bankruptcy by a broader range of historians and a degree of cross-disciplinary 
interest emerges.  W. J. Jones, a legal historian, wrote a detailed and lengthy 
account of the development of English bankruptcy law in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. The article, which traces the development of bankruptcy 
law from the first statute under Henry VIII, aids understanding of how the legal 
regime came into being and why eighteenth-century bankrupts were still subject 
to it.28 Ian P. H. Duffy followed with a broader historical overview of English 
bankruptcy in which his focus, as the parameters of his study suggest, was the 
Elizabethan stipulation that a person be adjudged a ‘trader’ before they could 
derive any benefit under bankruptcy legislation.29 This requirement vexed 
bankruptcy proceedings for centuries until abolished in 1861.  Duffy’s analysis 
may not accommodate individual experience, but he does introduce the 
inextricably related legal and economic factors. 
In 1985 M.S. Servian threatened to shake up a dry field with his study of the 
conflicting views of judiciary and merchants on the ends of bankruptcy law, and 
the gradual process of adaption of the law to the changing nature of trade.30  
Servian did not intend yet another history of the statutes, in his own words he 
intended his study to ‘contribute to a growing literature within what is coming to 
be nominated “critical legal history”’.  Servian argues that previous studies of 
the legal history of bankruptcy had left ‘a dearth of contextually-sensitive 
research’ and he believed ‘critical legal history’ would oppose mere descriptions 
of ‘doctrinal legal development’ which took little account of the ‘social, 
economic, political, philosophical or institutional context’.  Servian proposed to 
draw upon theoretical models from other disciplines including Philosophy of 
Science, Jurisprudence, Social Anthropology and Ethno-methodology’; he 
further proposed to ‘investigate the ideological dimensions of bankruptcy law’ 
and assess ‘how the very stability of a reputation-based system of credit was 
symbolically recreated in the drama of a debtor's bankruptcy’, and to ‘enter a 
debate within social history as to the nature of 18th century civil society’.31 
 
28 W. J. Jones, ‘The Foundations of English Bankruptcy: Statutes and Commissions in the Early 
Modern Period’, Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, n.s., 69 (1979), 1–63. 
29 Ian P. H. Duffy, ‘English Bankrupts, 1571–1861’, American Journal of Legal History, 24 
(1980), 283–305. 
30 M. S. Servian, ‘Eighteenth Century Bankruptcy Law: From Crime to Process’ (unpublished 
doctoral thesis, University of Kent, 1985). 





Although radically different from most legal histories, this unpublished thesis 
has become an oft cited work in the small canon of bankruptcy literature.  
Essentially, Servian is concerned with the process of reconciliation between a 
more static judiciary leaning upon the statutes, and an increasingly dynamic 
merchant class in need of a stable credit system.  Contemporary attitudes are 
well drawn, but the experience of bankrupts never emerges.  The clearly 
unsatisfactory state of the English bankrupt laws that changed little in the long 
eighteenth century is covered by V. Markham Lester’s study which, whilst 
mostly addressing nineteenth-century law reform, gives a clear and succinct 
history of the eighteenth-century debt and bankruptcy regime.32 
The twenty-first century reveals only a little evidence that legal scholars have 
shifted in focus from bankruptcy to bankrupts.  David Milman, writing about the 
present-day state of English insolvency and bankruptcy law revisits all the 
statutes and earlier debates, just as his predecessors who followed Goodinge 
did, and he therefore provides a useful summary resource for the social 
historian.33 Nothing here is remarkable but for the fact that it becomes apparent 
that Milman would like to give an account of the experience of bankrupts!  He 
frequently includes anecdotal references to experience and individual cases in 
his footnotes; but his main sources are works of fiction and Weiss’s literary 
criticism, and as a result references to Dickens and other nineteenth-century 
novelists dominate.  Milman’s professional objective does not allow him to 
illuminate the experience of bankrupts and their families to the extent he might 
wish, but the recourse to works of fiction does seem like an appeal for 
bankrupts’ voices to be heard, to know more about them, what they did, and 
what befell them.  As a shortcut to such an end literary texts provide dramatic 
content in a condensed form.  One wonders whether Milman would have used 
real accounts of bankrupts’ experience had they been more readily available. 
Milman’s curiosity sits well with David Graham and John Tribe (also scholars of 
present-day English insolvency) who produced the series Bankruptcy in Crisis – 
a Regency Saga between 2004 and 2009, which is a commentary on early 
 
32 V. Markham Lester, Victorian Insolvency: Bankruptcy, Imprisonment for Debt and Company 
Winding-Up in Nineteenth Century England (Oxford, 1995). 





nineteenth-century reform and reformers, notably Montagu.34 Graham and Tribe 
in providing some insight into the characters and behaviours of key players in 
the bankruptcy process such as the newly appointed Vice-Chancellors and 
‘eccentric barristers specialising in bankruptcy’ and ‘some of the scandals 
surrounding bankruptcy commissioners’, put a little flesh on the dry bones of 
insolvency lawyers.35 But this is still ‘lawyer on lawyer’ and we learn little about 
those who were disempowered by becoming bankrupts, yet had to experience 
being processed by the empowered agents and arbiters of the law.  However, 
Graham and Tribe’s research is helpful to this study in building the profiles, 
attitudes and behaviours of the wider group of participants in the bankruptcy 
process. 
The elusive experience of bankrupts begins to emerge when scholars shift from 
exploring the merely legal, to the criminal. Here a very human, albeit darker, 
side to bankruptcy is uncovered.  Emily Kadens, in seeking to draw parallels 
with, and to illuminate, recent cases of major fraud in the United States, has 
used Old Bailey records to examine the actions and behaviour of eighteenth-
century English bankrupts who crossed the line into felony.36 In choosing the 
bankruptcies of Thomas Pitkin (1704) and John Perrott (1757) she warns 
against ‘assuming a past commercial golden age populated by trustworthy 
merchants and bankers’.37 In ‘The Pitkin Affair: A Study of Fraud in Early 
English Bankruptcy’ she says of Pitkin ‘everyone was so anxious to extend him 
credit’, and his ‘deliberate bankruptcy brought home the frightening reality of the 
changing times: more credit meant more risk, a message not lost on 
contemporary commentators’.38 Thus by drawing such parallels Kadens also 
brings eighteenth-century bankruptcy closer to our understanding. 
Here and there in Kadens’ anatomy of Pitkin’s fraudulent bankruptcy are a few 
scattered voices whose snatches of discourse at last allow us to glimpse the 
 
34 David Graham and John Tribe, ‘Bankruptcy in Crisis – a Regency Saga’, Part 1, Insolvency 
Intelligence, 17 (2004), 85–89; Graham and Tribe, ‘Bankruptcy in Crisis’, Part 2, 17 (2004), 
134–38; Graham and Tribe, ‘Bankruptcy in Crisis’, Part 3, 20 (2007), 38–41; Graham and 
Tribe, ‘Bankruptcy in Crisis’, Part 4, 22 (2009), 132–40. 
35 Graham and Tribe, ‘Bankruptcy in Crisis’, Part 1, 8th page (un-numbered downloadable pdf). 
36 Kadens has in mind scandals of the stature of Enron and Bernie Madoff. 
37 Emily Kadens, ‘The Pitkin Affair: A Study of Fraud in Early English Bankruptcy’, American 
Bankruptcy Law Journal, 84 (2010), 483–570, p. 487. 





experience of his victims.  Pitkin’s fraud brought down the banker John Dann 
whose wife we hear lamenting in a letter: 
I am sorry to heare by Mr Dann [that] ye trustees will not be so kind as to 
give me some small consideration ... in case I Should survive Mr Dann, it 
might be of some help to me, considering I have lost my all by him…39 
In ‘The Pitkin Affair’ we learn about the mechanics of fraud, but in Kadens’ 
article on the fraudulent bankruptcy of John Perrott ‘The Last Bankrupt Hanged: 
Bankruptcy Procedure in Eighteenth Century England’ we learn something of 
the bankrupt and his life, although overall the lives and experience of those 
involved are secondary to uncovering the legal process of Perrott’s bankruptcy.  
Kadens compares what actually happened in Perrott’s case with what might 
have been expected to happen under the prevailing statutes.  Not surprisingly 
Kadens’ examination of the case leads her to the conclusion that the 
eighteenth-century system of bankruptcy law was dysfunctional, especially 
when faced with criminal acts like Perrott’s in which a requirement for a capital 
sanction precluded any further cooperation in the recovery of money; Perrott in 
his death cell remaining silent as to its whereabouts.40 Kadens affirms that while 
fraud in many forms was common, high profile cases such as Perrott’s that 
ended on the gallows were rare and not representative of the majority 
experience.  Due to the extreme criminal nature of their activities records of 
their cases have survived.  Unfortunately, the ‘majority experience’ has left little 
trace in historical records.  Kadens, like other legal historians, draws 
conclusions about the shortcomings of eighteenth-century bankruptcy law.  By 
using court records she reveals something of what these bankrupts were like 
and how they had lived.  For example, we learn a little about Perrott’s 
relationships with women.41 
Writing about bankruptcy from a legal perspective is understandable, as being a 
bankrupt was a legal state, and bankruptcy proceedings were regulated by 
statute and overseen by commissioners, who were often lawyers.  So inevitably 
legal history constitutes both the majority content and the backbone of 
 
39 Ibid., p. 555. 
40 Emily Kadens, ‘The Last Bankrupt Hanged: Bankruptcy Procedure in 18th-Century England’, 
Jay L. Westbrook Bankruptcy Conference November 15–16, 2007 Austin, Texas, 1– 43, pp. 
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bankruptcy historiography.  Yet the relative narrowness of the legal history of 
bankruptcy is markedly expanded when it is joined with other historical fields.  
Given that bankruptcy, in Julian Hoppit’s words, ‘was an eighteenth-century 
growth industry’ it is to be expected that bankruptcy has attracted interest from 
economic and business historians.42 The next section will consider how 
bankruptcy as a problem for ‘Men of Business’ has been approached by 
historians. 
 
1.3 Bankruptcy in economic and business history 
Duffy returned to the subject of bankruptcy in 1985 with a monograph on 
bankruptcy in London.43 His summary of the legal and institutional framework of 
bankruptcy is comprehensive: examining the bankruptcy laws, the insolvency 
laws, and the law on small debts.   Duffy seeks to clarify the causes of financial 
collapse during the industrial revolution through investigating cases of failed 
businesses using evidence found in the documentation collected and generated 
by bankruptcy commissions.  This is a significant move towards greater 
knowledge of bankrupts, because almost for the first time we hear voices of 
bankrupts and other individuals as they stood before bankruptcy 
commissioners.  Whiffs of acrimony between business partners can be heard.  
But this is as far as it goes as Duffy’s main focus is the failed business, rather 
than the bankrupts and other sufferers.  Duffy is principally preoccupied with 
describing the intricately complex and inter-related holdings of bills of exchange 
between the failed firms, and as a result what he calls the ‘house of cards’ effect 
after the 1810 failure of bankers Brickwood & Co.  Duffy’s unravelling of the 
economics and the mechanics of credit and debt that surround a bankruptcy is 
useful, but if the experience of those bankrupts is to be understood, then there 
should also be an unravelling of the personal and the private, the social and the 
psychological.  This same class of neglected historical records used by Duffy 
will, in some cases, serve to make this possible. 
 
 
42 Julian Hoppit, Risk and Failure in English Business 1700–1800 (Cambridge, 1987), p. 176. 






If any single historical work has made English bankruptcy a plausible field for 
historical enquiry, then it has been Julian Hoppit’s Risk and Failure in English 
Business 1700 – 1800, published in 1987.  Whilst this is a work of economic 
history and as the title suggests addresses risk and failure in English business, 
it provides, even as a by-product, the most rounded and comprehensive study 
of bankruptcy in England.  It has, along with Duffy, endured for the last three 
decades as the principal work of reference for anyone wishing to address 
eighteenth-century English bankruptcy.  It provides political, economic, and 
cultural contextualisation, as well as being a very detailed and comprehensive 
piece of primary research on credit, risk and the causes of the growing number 
of business failures throughout the eighteenth century.  Beyond this, if we were 
to judge the book by its cover which bears Thomas Rowlandson’s satirical and 
somewhat grotesque representation of a meeting of creditors, we might be 
forgiven for thinking that it would also give an account of the kind of experience 
depicted by Rowlandson, but it does not.44  Like Duffy, Hoppit is interested in 
businesses that failed (and why they failed), rather than the great successes 
that have predominated in accounts of eighteenth-century commerce and the 
Industrial Revolution in England.  Hoppit adheres to Schumpeter’s view that 
understanding success is better achieved by studying failure, and why those 
failures came about.45 Hoppit wants to understand the reasons for failure but 
maintains that bankruptcy records rarely provide explanations for why people 
failed, and therefore he uses his understanding of the credit environment and 
his assessment of business risk taking, in order to arrive at the likely causes of 
failure.46 Overall Hoppit’s is a work on eighteenth-century economy, credit 
control systems, and business decision making, punctuated by investigations of 
specific cases of failure, and therefore it is still a study of bankruptcy and not 
bankrupts.  However, Hoppit still helps those who seek a more social and 
cultural insight into the experience of bankrupts because of the quantity of 
research on, and descriptions of, the social and moral climate that surrounded 
credit, speculation, and failure. 
 
 
44 Thomas Rowlandson, A Meeting of Creditors, c. 1785–1790, The Fitzwilliam Museum, 
Cambridge. 
45 Hoppit, Risk and Failure, p. 11. 





Before continuing to a discussion of case-study methodology, it is important to 
mention research that sits at the intersection of legal and economic accounts of 
insolvency and the socially embedded culture of early modern and long 
eighteenth-century credit and debt.  Key studies are Craig Muldrew’s The 
Economy of Obligation: The Culture of Credit and Social Relations in Early 
Modern England and Margot Finn’s The Character of Credit: Personal Debt in 
English Culture, 1740–1914.47 Both Muldrew and Finn give centrality to the 
cultural position of credit and debt and the implications for social relations.  I 
draw on both texts, along with other works by the same scholars, later in this 
thesis.  More recently the importance of bankruptcy’s alter ego, namely 
imprisonment for debt, has been the subject of fresh research in Tawny Paul’s, 
The Poverty of Disaster: Debt and Insecurity in Eighteenth-Century Britain.48 
Paul’s study is important for this thesis because it highlights the structural 
causes of eighteenth-century financial insecurity and the susceptibility to 
downward social mobility of the middling sort.  Paul helpfully describes the 
experience, that of debt incarceration, which potential bankrupts were so 
desperate to avoid.  I draw on detail from her study at various points in this 
thesis. 
 
1.4 Bankruptcies as case studies 
Duffy and Hoppit both include case studies of bankruptcies in their work.  Hoppit 
has four short case studies of bankruptcies, but their scope is limited to how the 
bankrupts’ credit relationships were structured in order to speculate about the 
causes of their failures.  More recently Margrit Schulte Beerbühl has included 
case studies of bankruptcies as part of her study of German merchants in 
eighteenth-century England.49 To construct the cases she uses bankruptcy 
 
47 Craig Muldrew, The Economy of Obligation: The Culture of Credit and Social Relations in 
Early Modern England (Basingstoke, 1998); Margot C. Finn, The Character of Credit: Personal 
Debt in English Culture, 1740–1914 (Cambridge, 2003). 
48 Tawny Paul, The Poverty of Disaster: Debt and Insecurity in Eighteenth-Century Britain 
(Cambridge, 2019). 
49 Margrit Schulte Beerbühl, ‘The Risk of Bankruptcy among German Merchants in Eighteenth-
Century England’, in Karl Gratzer and Dieter Stiefel (eds), History of Insolvency and 
Bankruptcy in an International Perspective (Södertörn, 2008), 61–82, p. 79; Schulte Beerbühl, 
Deutsche Kaufleute in London: Welthandel und Einbürgerung 1660–1818 (München, 
2007)/German Merchants in London: World Trade and Naturalization 1660–1818 (Munich, 
2007); an English language adaption of Schulte Beerbühl’s 2007 German text is The 
Forgotten Majority: German Merchants in London, Naturalization, and Global Trade 1660–





commission records.  Her use of examinations of bankrupts at meetings of 
London bankruptcy commissioners enables us to hear the voices of bankrupts 
answering questions about their business behaviour and decisions.  
Testimonies from these examinations reveal much more than just what was on 
the ledgers, they give insight into relationships and attitudes that existed 
between the participants in the bankruptcy process.  Although Schulte Beerbühl 
largely concentrates on merchants’ business trajectories she provides valuable 
biographical information on bankrupts which help attempts to construct full 
biographies of bankrupts.  For example, Schulte Beerbühl has brought to light 
the business activities of ‘forgotten’ merchants and bankrupts of German origin 
who traded from London.50 Another recent bankruptcy case study with an 
emphasis on the economic and financial is provided by Mina Ishizu in a study of 
the 1811 bankruptcy of John Leigh & Company.51 Most existing case studies of 
bankruptcies emphasize legal or business aspects of bankruptcies, rather than 
the social experience of bankrupts and their families.  However, these studies 
help to provide a model for structuring a study of individual bankrupt’s 
experience as the legal aspects, and absolutely anything to do with money, 
inevitably overlap with personal experience. 
In this study, in addition to numerous small items of historical evidence about 
debtors and bankrupts, I employ twenty-four case studies of bankrupts ranging 
on the social spectrum from small-town tradesmen to major London merchants 
and bankers.  All the cases, bar two, have bankruptcy commissions at their 
centre and are therefore highly structured.  Structurally bankruptcy commissions 
bear a remarkable resemblance to criminal investigations, and indeed many 
contemporaries regarded bankruptcy as a crime and bankrupts as criminals.  
This is not, however, the reason for the resemblance.  Anne-Marie Kilday and 
David Nash maintain: ‘Crimes and criminals, as well as their policing and 
detection, are themselves rooted firmly in narrative.’52 Similarly, an eighteenth-
 
50 Henry Nantes, for example, see Forgotten Majority, pp. 212–19. 
51 Mina Ishizu, ‘Boom and Crisis in Financing the British Transatlantic Trade: A Case Study of 
the Bankruptcy of John Leigh & Company in 1811’, in Thomas Max Safley (ed.), The History of 
Bankruptcy: Economic, Social and Cultural Implications in Early Modern Europe (Abingdon, 
2013). 
52 Anne-Marie Kilday and David Nash (eds), Law, Crime and Deviance since 1700: Micro-
studies in the History of Crime (London, 2017), p. 3.  For use of case studies with a business 
history focus, see Christine Wiskin, ‘Businesswomen and Financial management: Three 






century bankruptcy and bankrupt, and the episodic proceedings of 
commissions, were rooted firmly in a narrative that began with an insolvency 
and the committing of an act of bankruptcy then progressed through many 
enquiries until a kind of resolution was reached and the bankrupt was finally 
discharged.  Bankruptcy commission records therefore lend themselves well to 
a case-study approach.  Commissions also provide the core evidence for this 
study.  However, commission records are not enough alone to gain a sense of 
what English bankrupts were like as people and what the nature of their 
experience was.  There are also difficulties in attempting to compare bankruptcy 
cases.  Most surviving bankruptcy commission files are incomplete and 
depleted of useful records, which is why it has been necessary to employ over 
twenty cases in order to encounter common recurring features.  Then to put 
together relatively comprehensive cases it has been necessary to complement 
commission records with a variety of other sources.  An example of this is 
Kadens, who, for the case of the fraudulent bankrupt Perrott, relies heavily on 
the Old Bailey case and the outcome is unsurprisingly bleak.53 
Only rarely is there a richness in a variety of sources such that a 
comprehensive profile and narrative around the experience of a bankrupt can 
be constructed.  A rare example is Clery’s account, mentioned above, of Henry 
Austen.54 Whilst still substantially a biography and analysis of the literary output 
of Jane Austen, it brings to readers in biographical style an account of the 
experience of a bankrupt.  Clery’s account brings us much closer to the private 
experience of an early nineteenth-century bankrupt and goes beyond their 
business affairs.  Nevertheless, Austen the banker with his elite connections 
(e.g. Warren Hastings and the Earl of Moira) can only be partially representative 
of the many thousands of minor and now forgotten middling bankrupts who filled 
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1.5 Discussion of sources: In search of the English bankrupt 
This section will review the nature of the sources I have employed, my reasons 
for selecting them, and the issues that arise with them.  In England, many 
thousands of bankrupts were named in the London Gazette throughout the long 
eighteenth century; during the eighteenth century alone, there were 33,000 
according to Hoppit.55 From the Gazette it is possible to know the names, 
locations and trades of almost all English bankrupts since the 1680s until the 
present day.  Bankrupt notices in the Gazette also contain very useful 
chronological information on key stages in the proceedings of bankruptcy 
commissions, but other than this very basic information, the Gazette tells us 
nothing about the bankrupts as individuals nor offers insight into their 
experience.  Where further traces of these bankrupts survive in archives the 
records are only a fraction of those created, most of which are now lost. 
To begin to find these traces of bankrupts it is necessary to locate bankruptcy 
commission records.  Fortunately, an Act of Parliament in 171856 required 
bankruptcy commission proceedings to be written down: these records from 
bankruptcy commissions provide details about how bankruptcies unfolded, who 
the parties were, and how those involved interacted with the legal process and 
with one another.  Bankruptcy commission records can be found in bankruptcy 
or Chancery series in the National Archives or, usually, as part of law firm 
collections deposited in county record offices.57 Nowhere is there a greater 
quantity of English bankruptcy records for the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries than in TNA where thousands of case files are held, although they 
hold little from before the last quarter of the eighteenth century (a few records 
go back to 1759).  Furthermore, in Sheila Marriner’s words, the ‘many 
apparently contradictory series’ pertaining to bankruptcy commissions (B series) 
do not lend themselves to ease of use, but relative to records buried in various 
Chancery series (C series) the B series (especially B3) provide relatively easy 
access to bankruptcy case material.58 However, the records are only useful up 
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to a point, evidence that gives insight into the experience of the people involved 
is very limited.  Hence, I have only made significant use of a few NA B3 records 
and the odd Chancery C series records (all are London cases).59 This study 
includes other London bankrupts, but records of their commissions have not 
been preserved in TNA, and I rely on other sources (discussed below). 
TNA B3 records contain, according to Marriner, ‘files for individual bankruptcies 
containing records of the proceedings before commissioners’.60 They offer, in 
theory, a complete chronological account of bankruptcies.  However, having 
examined many such files, I concur with Marriner in that they really are no more 
than ‘proceedings’, and they tell us relatively little about the bankrupts 
themselves.  Precisely the kind of information required to give a deeper and 
more nuanced account of bankrupts’ experience is mostly omitted.  
Nevertheless, commission records are a start: they are often chronologically 
ordered and bound in volumes; they give names and some details of all the key 
actors (bankrupts, family members, servants, solicitors, commissioners, 
creditors, witnesses), which is far more than the Gazette gives; they contain 
essential legal and administrative information; they contain witness statements 
for proofs of acts of bankruptcy (discussed later), which often provide details of 
the distribution of the physical spaces occupied by bankrupts (home and 
workplace); they include business and financial information through the 
inclusion of lists of creditors, their debts, sets of accounts and dividends paid 
over the years from bankrupts’ estates; they sometimes tell us what bankrupts 
possessed through inventories of domestic contents and trade stock and 
utensils; they even occasionally provide explanations for why a trader failed; 
finally, they sometimes tell us whether bankrupts were discharged.  They rarely, 
however, give a hint of what became of bankrupts.  TNA files for London 
commissions are relatively comprehensive regarding holding the above 
information, whereas commission files held by provincial archives are frequently 
incomplete, but sometimes offer useful additional material.  Overall, the 
structural and procedural information in commission files helped me to create a 
framework around which to build more individualised bankruptcy case studies. 
 
 
59 They are: Fordyce (1772); Nantes (1797); Von Doornik (1810) is held in C 217. 





There is a marked contrast between TNA and county record offices in the 
number of bankruptcy records held, and in what has been retained.  We would 
expect to find far more cases of bankruptcy in London than anywhere else.  
According to Marriner, B3 contains the files of 4,350 bankruptcies occurring 
mostly between 1780 and 1842, representing about five per cent ‘of total 
bankruptcies’ for the period.61 Why particular B3 files have survived, and others 
not, is unclear.  Marriner attributes it to ‘the element of chance’ or that ‘the 
Court’ did not consider the case files belonged to it.62 On this question my own 
explorations of the files are inconclusive: the presence of some large 
bankruptcies is evident from the number of physical volumes and the scale of 
the debts owed, which from the point of view of economic and financial history 
must surely make sense.  Alexander Fordyce (1772) and other major bankrupts 
are present; but equally smaller single volume cases are present.  My perusals 
of the contents of a selection of the files largely found only the routine formal 
proceedings of commissions.  I would only hazard to suggest that scale and 
complexity may have been a factor in the files’ preservation, but that in TNA 
historical interest or problematicality was not. 
Even when the records for only this small proportion of total cases have been 
retained, they still vastly outnumber the files in county record offices on 
provincial bankruptcies.  Some of the county archives I visited contained next to 
nothing related to insolvency and bankruptcy.  Frequently, only single 
documents survive against the name of a bankrupt; these are often petitions for 
the issue of a bankruptcy commission, or assignments of property on 
parchment – ornate historic documents, but not sources upon which this study 
can be built.  For example, Dorset’s record office contains only one 
comprehensive commission file (John Slade, 1830), and I was unable to locate 
a single commission file at all in Devon, although there are a few other 
documents that relate to bankruptcies.  The record office in Bristol, England’s 
 
61 Ibid., p. 361.  The five per cent ‘of total bankruptcies’ may in fact apply largely to London 
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called to London Guildhall.  Given the dominance of London in the overall figures, an 
adjustment for the provinces may not greatly change the proportion. 
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second city in the eighteenth century, has far more commission files than any of 
the other counties that feature in this study, but the numbers are still only in the 
dozens and therefore dwarfed by the London numbers. 
Nevertheless, despite the pool being tiny relative to London, some of the 
provincial commission files contained very useful material.  In most cases they 
form part of solicitors’ collections in which, not only have files of essential 
proceedings before the commissioners been retained, but also other bundles of 
related documents are present.  These bundles may contain, for example: 
additional affidavits of debt and creditors’ accounts with bankrupts; legal 
opinions and documents relating to causes in other courts (usually Chancery); 
correspondence between lawyers about how to proceed with the bankruptcy; 
and sometimes letters to and from bankrupts.  It is from this final category that it 
is possible to hear the voices of bankrupts preserved in their own hand.  
Although commissions sometimes recorded bankrupts’ detailed responses 
during examinations, the highly structured format was sometimes less than 
revealing, whereas bankrupts’ letters reveal them reflecting on their experience 
and commenting on their treatment. 
Cases in point are, from Wiltshire and Bristol archives respectively: David 
Kennedy (1752), and David Brigstock (1774).63 It seems that only rarely did 
anyone think it important to preserve traces of bankrupts’ participation in their 
own affairs; Kennedy’s letters can be found amongst those of his creditors 
because they had Kennedy on their own agenda, and during his commission he 
had to give an account of his efforts to get in debts.  This also gave him the 
opportunity to describe his circumstances and voice his frustrations.  Brigstock 
bet on a creditor taking out a friendly commission against him, only to find his 
pleas ignored and his desperate letters exhibited at the Bristol Quarter 
Sessions.  Fortunately for this study, preserved in the incriminating letters is the 
voice of the bankrupt.  The conflicts caused by Hampshire bankrupt Thomas 
Lodge (1775) brought wrangles over his estate to Winchester Assizes.  The 
records were preserved, and they recite much of the background to Lodge’s 
bankruptcy.  Lodge’s bankruptcy was one of many that have, as a result of 
being problematic, generated richer historical content for this study.  There 
 





remains, however, the question of the representativeness of these problematic 
bankruptcies, which is discussed below. 
Further scattered references to bankruptcies and bankrupts exist across 
archival manuscript collections in single documents, typically amongst estate 
papers. However, often these are no more than passing comments about the 
inconvenience caused by a debtor becoming a bankrupt.  In addition to 
manuscript sources contemporary printed texts are helpful.  I refer not to the 
many polemical commentaries on bankruptcy that circulated in the eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries, or to ‘histories’ of the few high-profile felonious 
bankrupts who went to the gallows or successfully absconded with creditors’ 
money, but to a handful of pamphlets published by aggrieved bankrupts or 
creditors.  I use a pamphlet by Anne and Isaac Scott (bankruptcy and pamphlet: 
London, 1768) who were motivated to militate against what they felt was shabby 
and dishonest treatment by those in control of their estate.  The text contains at 
length both the voice and experience of a bankrupt and family.  This is unusual 
as pamphlets were more often vehicles for levelling charges of dishonesty 
against bankrupts.  Dated 1768 the Scott commission pre-dates TNA B3 1780–
1832 period to which most surviving London commission files pertain.  
Therefore, it is little surprising there is no trace of it in TNA, although TNA holds 
records of petitions made to extradite Isaac Scott after he absconded to France.  
This corroborates the account of early events in the pamphlet.64 Further 
credibility for it as a reliable source is lent by a law court report of an action 
heard before Lord Mansfield which was taken out by the Scotts’ assignees.65 
My point with the Scott pamphlet is simply that being tied to London Gazette 
and bankruptcy commission records or similar ‘official’ documents may serve a 
legal, economic or business history well, but they will never get the flesh on the 
bones for a history of lived experience, making recourse to correspondence and 
life-writing essential.  This study is very much about getting to the voices of 
bankrupts and sources like these contribute greatly because they allow us to 
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hear bankrupts’ voices directly.  Legal sources often only record third parties 
making sworn statements about what bankrupts did or did not do; words were 
not recorded verbatim, they were only reported; the sources also omit the more 
private and personal unless, as with David Kennedy’s file, they consist almost 
exclusively of letters. 
It is not unusual to find passing references to bankrupts in people’s journals or 
in the correspondence of more elite figures, and I make use of some of these 
anecdotes.  However, more importantly introspective evidence from bankrupts 
themselves is mustered for this study by the inclusion of several journal or 
biographical texts in which bankrupts recorded their experience.  Journals or 
autobiographies written by bankrupts permit an engagement with the private 
and personal reflections of the subjects, although the writers usually expected 
their texts to be read eventually by, at least, a close circle.  Locating texts of this 
nature has largely been a matter of chance made possible only by interrogating 
all the databases of every and any archival collection that I could reach within 
the constraints upon my research.   An example is Thomas Pyott (1763), who 
kept copies of his correspondence (sent and received), and towards the end of 
his life used these along with his own commentary to assemble an 
autobiographical journal in which he endeavoured to explain and justify his 
actions.  Thomas Pyott never became a bankrupt in law, but his difficulties 
which began in 1763 and the circumstances that ensued made him in effect a 
bankrupt.  His journal, in which many fears about impending bankruptcy were 
recorded, sits unaccompanied by remotely similar texts in an ‘Archives & 
Manuscripts’ collection.66 
A bankrupt who started a journal too late, that is, after his bankruptcy, was 
Joseph Fry (1828), but fortunately for this study his wife had been keeping a 
journal before, during, and after the bankruptcy.  Her journal entries relate the 
experience of the impact of bankruptcy on her and her family.67 His wife was, of 
course, reformer Elizabeth Fry.  She was born into the Gurney banking family 
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which means her representativeness of and typicality as an average English 
bankrupt’s wife is an issue which is addressed later in this thesis. 
One former bankrupt who chose to turn his autobiography into a printed volume 
and place it on the book market was Joseph Brasbridge (1800).68 His memoir is 
an example, along with Pyott’s and the Scotts’, of life-writing that complements 
the more unwitting traces left by bankrupts in legal records.  At the same time 
these sources centre accounts of bankruptcy on the subjects rather than on 
legal proceedings.69 Of course, there are issues with the representativeness 
and reliability of these sources with their authors’ bias and their constructed 
nature, but as Margaret Hunt recognised in her study of the eighteenth-century 
middling sort, sources like these ‘are as close as we are likely to get to the 
voices’.70 Bankrupts’ voices are complemented, or contradicted, by comments 
about bankrupts in the publications and correspondence of eighteenth-century 
English people of letters.  Their observations help to locate bankrupts within 
prevailing discourses on debt, risk, luxury, and misfortune. 
Whilst I aim with this study to give an ‘authentic’ account of the experience of 
English bankrupts in the long eighteenth century, I recognise that I must make a 
case for the credibility and representativeness of my sources.  If an important 
objective of this thesis is to get nearer the truth about the experience of English 
bankrupts, then a major question remains about the reliability of some, if not all, 
the historical records employed in this study.  Records created in a legal context 
e.g. depositions sworn before commissioners have a certain authority, whereas 
a slice of autobiography or an accusatorial pamphlet can be exercises in bias 
and personal agendas.  Yet, can even the bankruptcy commission records be 
entirely relied upon?  Edward Welbourne’s essay on the collusion, 
incompetence, corruption and ‘farce’ that surrounded English bankruptcy 
commissions although written more than eighty years ago still casts a shadow 
over the prima facie credibility of the records generated by events in which he, 
not mistakenly, saw much collusion and artifice.71 Emily Kadens, who 
 
68 I am grateful to Professor Jonathan Barry for drawing my attention to Brasbridge’s memoir. 
69 For a discussion of the issues around using life-writing as evidence see Sarah Ailwood, ‘“The 
True State of my Case”: The Memoirs of Mrs Anne Bailey, 1771’, Law, Crime and History, 1 
(2016), 37–58. 
70 Margaret Hunt, The Middling Sort: Commerce, Gender, and the Family in England, 1680–
1780 (Berkeley, 1996), pp. 8–9.  Hunt sets out her reservations about her own sources. 





researched the case of infamous bankrupt Thomas Pitkin, expresses caution on 
evidence that might equally be applied to much evidence in this study: 
Driven by greed or vengeance or fear of punishment, the people 
generating the documents often had reason to mythologize their own 
actions and those of the other participants.  And yet, while complicating 
the story, the lying humanizes the whole affair. […] The creditors, who 
had extended too much credit, did not want to admit to their poor 
judgment or gullibility.  These were real people unwilling to take 
responsibility for the onerous results of their actions.  In attempting to 
piece together such a story, the historian can only weigh the evidence 
critically and try not to be too badly deceived.72  
This then raises the question of how representative the case studies in this 
study are of typical bankruptcies in eighteenth-century England, that is of the 
ninety-five per cent for which no records, other than Gazette notices, survive?  
In response to this I argue there is no reason to assume that most commissions 
for which records do not survive were timely, straightforward and unproblematic; 
probably some were, but probably many others were not. 
From the many provincial bankruptcy commission records I have examined, 
their content suggests their survival in archives is probably due to the 
bankruptcies being problematic, for example: the bankrupts absconded 
permanently or could not gain their discharge; civil disputes were triggered and 
prosecuted in the courts; or there were instances of fraud, real or alleged.  In 
the absence of evidence affirming that most bankruptcy commission 
proceedings were unproblematic I think it likely that many bankruptcies were not 
entirely smooth and painless experiences, and I suspect each account of 
bankruptcy related in this study will probably contain elements that also shaped 
events and experiences in most bankruptcies in England between 1732 and 
1831. 
The cases of bankruptcy employed in this study were largely self-selecting.  
They were not selected primarily for their scale (i.e. neither size of failure nor 
quantity of records generated), nor were they selected for geographical location, 
trade sector, or social status.  They were selected primarily for the nature of 
 





their content, by which I mean whether that content would provide evidence for 
an account of the experience of bankrupts in their own words or failing that in 
the words of their families and other close observers.  Most archival records that 
I examined did not answer this purpose; a very few did, and hence they were 
selected.  Because the period covered by the study is quite long (1732–1831) I 
tried to identify at least one suitable case per decade, not so much to 
demonstrate change, but more to show how little the laws, processes, and 
experience of English bankrupts changed over the period.  That said, there is 
some evidence of material and organisational change in commission records 
across the study period.  There is some evidence that by the early nineteenth 
century solicitors to bankruptcy commissions were making greater use of pre-
printed forms for memoranda of commission meetings and affidavits of debt, for 
example in the 1817 case of Romsey brewer John Latham, there are printed 
form for each stage of the commission.  Contrastingly, the hand-written 
commission records for Sherborne maltster John Slade set down in 1830, 
barely differ from those of George Clay in Kings Lynn and Richard Hutchings in 
rural Somerset set down in 1739 and 1744 respectively.  The records from 
across the period of study show widespread structural and stylistic similarities.  
This lack of change in the format of commission records across the period of 
this study was probably because bankruptcy advice manuals which told lawyers 
and bankrupts alike exactly how to proceed and how to word documents, barely 
revised their instructions; it was also because there was no need to change 
anything when the statute law that underpinned practice remained almost 
completely static. 
 
1.6 Locations, trades, social status 
The sources selected show a marked bias towards the southern half of 
England, but this is merely the result of constraints upon research resources, 
rather than a calculated choice; one subject, Thomas Pyott, traded from Hull in 
Yorkshire before fleeing the area.  In fact, in terms of geographic 
representation, if any part of England is under-represented in this study it is 
London.  In the eighteenth century almost half of all bankruptcies occurred in 





but at 4.4 per cent of the total it was not significant relative to London.73 
Included are several London based cases, but they in total represent only about 
a quarter of the total in this study.  If I follow Hoppit’s cartographical 
representation of counties with the most and the least bankrupts in the 
eighteenth century, most of my cases are taken from the counties with higher 
bankruptcy numbers, and which are located mostly below a line running from 
the Severn to The Wash.74 Yorkshire and Lancashire are the main exceptions.  
As my study includes the first third of the nineteenth century, I acknowledge that 
the numbers and significance of bankruptcies above that line would have grown 
in relative weight.  As previously emphasised this study is not an economic 
survey, it is primarily concerned with finding good experiential accounts of 
bankruptcies.  However, this priority has not precluded the assembling of a 
broadly socially representative collection of cases. 
With regard to business sectors, cases of bankruptcy in this study occur in all of 
the five sectors in which bankruptcies were most frequent in eighteenth-century 
England, accounting for 70 per cent of the total (NB Some cases in my study fall 
between 1801 and 1831, so strictly Hoppit’s data does not apply to the last third 
of my period.): textiles and clothes (Richard Hutchings, David Kennedy, Ann 
Harding); wholesale, including ‘merchants’ (George Clay, Havilland Le 
Mesurier, Henry Nantes); food (Ann and Isaac Scott, John Kempster); drink 
(Thomas Pyott, Thomas Lodge, Joshua James, Edmund Townsend, John 
Latham, John Slade); and retail (David Brigstock, Joseph Brasbridge, William 
James, but some of the others may also have retailed directly to customers).75  
Furthermore, it is a very inexact science to attempt to place eighteenth-century 
traders into exact trades or even sectors, as they invariably operated other 
trades or had business interests that fell into several categories.  In addition to 
these sectors there were the bankers: Alexander Fordyce, Matthew and John 
Brickdale, and the Wakeford brothers.   
In bankruptcy commission records where reasonably definitive statements of 
debts, or valuations of stock, are available we get a sense of the financial scale 
of businesses.  Lists of creditors proving debts or receiving dividends with their 
locations recorded, tell us about the geographical reach of traders’ networks.  
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The businesses on the spectrum in this study vary widely in scale.  Most 
modest was the small one-household business of David Brigstock and his wife 
in rural Wales.  They traded a variety of goods, mostly from their shop in one 
location and transactions were not of great value, but his debts were sufficient 
to qualify Brigstock for bankruptcy.  Minor Wiltshire trader though he was, David 
Kennedy had important business relationships in London.  George Clay of 
Kings Lynn traded with Scandinavia; his Nordic creditors had their affidavits of 
debt translated into English and proved under power of attorney at Clay’s 
commission.  Not all provincial traders’ businesses were modest in scale: 
Romsey brewer John Latham, in addition to his brewery, owned a chain of 
public houses, underpinned by such unsustainable levels of debt that it 
eventually broke him.  Country bankers the Brickdales of Taunton and the 
Wakefords of Andover had substantial balances on their banks’ books.  
Wakefords’ exceeded £200,000 in 1826; they also owned other assets such as 
land and houses.  Not surprisingly, the London cases in this study have 
amongst them the largest businesses.  Ann and Isaac Scott (dry salters) and 
Edmund Townsend (wine and spirits merchants) probably fell into a broad 
category of small to medium sized businesses in the Metropolis.  Unfortunately, 
as in so many cases, their commission records have not survived and therefore 
most details about their finances are unknown.  They are most likely to have 
fallen somewhere, along with most bankrupts, into a very broad category of 
owing between £1,000 and £30,000.  In Hoppit’s sample of bankruptcy sizes, 
once debts were above £10,000, ninety per cent of bankrupts were from 
London.76 Beyond this, major London bankruptcies go off the scale with banker 
Alexander Fordyce and the merchant house Richard Muilman & Co (surviving 
partner Henry Nantes after Muilman’s suicide) with debts of £300,000 and 
upwards.  It should be observed that when debts are stated in commission 
records what is generally meant is gross debts on the overall balanced account.  
There are usually credits on the balance sheet too, so the totality of debts does 
not necessarily translate into irrecoverable losses. 
Given the diversity of the subjects described above, choosing the most 
appropriate social descriptor for the subjects in this study is problematic.  Before 
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an individual could be made a bankrupt that person needed first to be deemed 
to have been engaged in trade, hence it might seem self-evident that I would 
refer throughout the thesis to a ‘tradesman’.  However, the evident diversity in 
sector, trade and scale makes a blanket use of the descriptor ‘tradesman’ seem 
clumsy when speaking of all bankrupts.  There was anyway an imprecision in 
understanding of the term in the eighteenth century, Defoe remarked the ‘term 
tradesman is understood by several people, and in several places, in a different 
manner’, neither did he intend his Complete English Tradesman for merchants 
who he viewed as distinct from tradesmen.77 I have resisted the temptation to 
give a wider sense to tradesman by employing anachronistic sounding terms 
like ‘businessman’ or follow Grassby’s employment of ‘merchant’ as a non-
anachronistic synonym for ‘businessman’.78 Defoe also employed the term 
‘trader’ which suggests wider applicability than ‘tradesman’, but I have 
reservations because of its current connotations of both street market and 
global exchanges.79 I will not use the term ‘dealer’ for obvious reasons, although 
it was meaningful in the eighteenth century because all bankrupts were 
classified in commission records and Gazette notices with the catch-all ‘dealer 
and chapman’ in addition to their principal trade.  However, in the absence of a 
satisfactory catch-all term I will primarily use ‘trader’ because of its relevance to 
the trader/non-trader ‘distinction’ and it captures the scale of some of the 
businesses in this study better than ‘tradesman’ would, but I sometimes: use 
‘tradesman’ when it seems more appropriate; use the name of a trade or sector 
when clarity requires; and use ‘bankrupt’ for all subjects when they are close to, 
or after, failure.  Until discharged, bankrupts had no professional identity only a 
legal one, that of being a bankrupt. 
Returning to this very diverse sample of traders, we already know something of 
the scale of their bankruptcies, but what of their social status, personal wealth, 
and lifestyle?  Again, the range is considerable. The availability of family history 
and background information on the subjects varies greatly, but in general the 
subjects appear to have entered trade through their trading family backgrounds.  
In a few cases parents belonged to the professions and set up their children in 
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78 Richard Grassby, The Business Community of Seventeenth Century England (Cambridge, 
1995), p. xxx. 





trade.  According to Grassby the most likely route into trade was via an 
apprenticeship.80 Clearly in some cases there was pre-existing wealth and trade 
success in the families and therefore the subjects were placed into the family 
businesses or set up with new businesses as gentleman traders, as Grassby 
maintains: ‘Younger sons of the gentry would inevitably find their way into trade.  
Gentility preferred to eschew work for profit, but the need to maintain the levels 
of consumption that gentility required, necessitated earning a living.’81 
All subjects in this study had domestic servants (in addition to any trade 
servants), although some, David Brigstock for example, may have had no more 
than one domestic servant.  We can suspect this because one of Brigstock’s 
principal creditors made reference to ‘the hussy he calls his maid’ in a letter to 
another creditor, which could be understood to imply, amongst other things, that 
the girl or woman was his one and only domestic servant.82 Brigstock’s shop 
along with his dwelling house were part of the same building; he had a field and 
a few animals, and there is nothing in the records to suggest that he enjoyed 
more than life’s decencies.  Other bankrupts had clearly availed themselves of 
luxuries: country seats and/or estates (Muilman, the Brickdales, the Wakefords); 
suburban London villas (Fordyce, Nantes); income-generating real estate 
assets such as farms, plantations in the West Indies, tenements and 
messuages; income-generating financial assets such as annuities, mortgages, 
bonds, bank deposits, shares in ships, insurance, turnpikes, tontines, even 
theatres, etc.  Where inventories were taken, we also gain insight into the 
domestic comforts the traders had enjoyed prior to their bankruptcies: the 
numbers of rooms in their homes, the fittings and furnishings, quantities of plate 
and other valuables.  Records sometimes reveal whether the traders had elite 
family members or connections.  Two who were likely to have been well-
connected were Richard Muilman and Matthew Brickdale, who were, or had 
been, Members of Parliament.  All of Thomas Pyott’s cousins seemed to be 
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baronets, and Joseph Fry (of Fry tea merchants and nephew of the founder of 
Fry’s chocolate) had married Elizabeth Gurney of the Norwich banking family.  
However, high-status contacts were not always friendly, especially if they were 
creditors or in some way riled by the bankrupt, as brewer and untrustworthy 
steward Thomas Lodge found when he got on the wrong side of Sir Henry 
Paulet St John, whose Hampshire seat he was supposed to be overseeing. 
The subjects of this study possessed not only very different degrees of wealth, 
they also differed greatly in their trade skills and their levels of education.  
Technical skills can be assumed for some of the trades, especially those 
involving technical or chemical processes, such as Somerset yarn washer 
Richard Hutchings, or Bristol distiller Joshua James, or Sherborne maltster 
John Slade.  Merchants and bankers will have possessed an ability to 
understand and employ financial instruments, how to work the debt markets and 
make legally binding contracts.  Furthermore, it should not be assumed that 
because the subjects became bankrupts that they were incompetent or 
reckless.  They may have been, but bankruptcy alone was not proof of this.  
There is certainly evidence in the sources that some were competent and 
conscientious, as this study will reveal in the chapters that follow. However, 
there is also evidence that mistakes were made, practices were sloppy, too 
much debt was loaded, and risks assumed were too great.  Reasons for failure 
are discussed in greater detail in chapter three. 
Beyond the requisite trade skills some of the subjects in this study possessed 
far more than basic literacy.  Occasionally it is possible to know from inventories 
or creditors’ bills the kind of literature bankrupts had in their homes.  Examples 
of bankrupts’ possible reading are provided by Bristol cheesemonger William 
Somerton, bankrupt in 1772, who had two Bibles and twenty-five books of 
unknown title valued at £1 1s in his home; money scrivener James Bunn the 
younger, bankrupt in 1771, had in his possession Hume’s Essays, Goldsmith’s 
Essays as well as several volumes on law.83 From this study London merchant 
Henry Nantes, bankrupt in 1797, saw an auction of his books, in which were 
included volumes of Bell’s Poets, Cooke and Hawkesworth’s Voyages, Grose’s 
Antiquities, Hill’s Vegetable System, and Swammerdam’s Insects amongst 
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other works.84 More meaningful than bankrupts’ libraries, the contents of which 
they may or may not have digested, are examples of their own writing.  All the 
subjects in this study were able to write about their business affairs.  Generally, 
the presentation, organisation, spelling and grammar of the humbler traders 
lacked the precision and rhetoric of the gentleman traders whose families’ 
wealth had afforded them finer educations.  For example, amongst the subjects 
Thomas Pyott peppered his memoir with classical and literary quotes,85 
Alexander Fordyce was educated by major Scottish Enlightenment figure 
Thomas Blackwell,86 and John Brickdale gained a BA whilst at Christ Church 
Oxford, and a Bachelor in Civil Law whilst at All Souls Oxford.87 We know 
nothing of the education of Anne Scott, but a pamphlet to give her family’s side 
of events and to defend their reputation bears her name.  She declared that she 
had taken the ‘greatest Care in compiling the CASE’ and challenged her 
addressees to point out any errors.88 
The records used for this study show that all subjects were able to adequately 
convey their concerns, fears and distress in writing, and it has been this ability 
to write about themselves that has permitted this study to relate the experience 
of a wide range of bankrupts.  The better educated subjects had substantial 
command of spelling and textual organisation; even their application of 
contemporary conventions in eighteenth-century capitalisation and spelling was 
largely systematic.  Others produced texts which had unstable spelling, random 
capitalisation, scarce punctuation, and little organisation.  Some subjects clearly 
struggled to express themselves when their problems deepened and as the 
legal constraints they were under became more complex.  This will be apparent 
in the chapters that follow. 
Finally, before this study commences it remains to set out the main research 
questions:  How was the experience of bankrupts shaped and determined by 
the constraints and demands of the law? To what extent did bankrupts’ actual 
experience of proceedings differ from their expectations?  What did the process 
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do to the individual, their lives, their families, and their relationships with others?  
How did they experience and cope with loss of status and downward social 
mobility?  What was bankruptcy’s legacy for those affected?  Did some pick 
themselves up, or did some never recover?  The question of why the traders in 
this study failed and became bankrupts is important, but as the question often 
cannot be satisfactorily answered it is not allowed to overshadow the 
experiential account.  
At present there are few answers to the questions posed above.  The reality is 
that the experience of many thousands of bankrupts, whether bankers, 
merchants, or shopkeepers, is almost entirely unknown.  This study proposes to 
address this gap in our knowledge by bringing real experience to light through 
the study of relatively neglected historical records and thus bring to the fore the 
personal, and often painfully private, experience of those subjected to the 
idiosyncratic regime created by the English bankrupt laws.  Although an 
understanding of the laws will be important in this thesis, the overall study is an 
attempt to wrest bankruptcy from the domains of law, business, even fiction, 
and to give centrality to the real people subject to, in Adam Smith’s words, the 
‘greatest and most humiliating calamity’.89 The next chapter will set out the 
English bankrupt laws and practices that so determined and influenced the 
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Laws, Proceedings and Practice 
 
Figure 1.1.  Example of a bankruptcy commission file drawn up by Bristol solicitor Daniel Burges 
in 1811. The names of the commissioners appear in the centre, below them are the names of 
the assignees (a banker and a mercer).90 
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the word Bankrupt is odious to the law…91 
In order to make reading this study easier and for it to be possible to make 
sense of events this chapter provides the reader with a basic understanding of 
the history and intent of the English bankrupt laws, the form they took during the 
period of this study (1732–1831), and how they were applied in practice.  
Making sense of the bankrupt laws has never been a simple undertaking, in fact 
in the House of Lords in the early nineteenth century Earl Stanhope and Lord 
Chancellor Eldon accused each other of not understanding the laws.92 Little 
improved over the next hundred years such that early in the twentieth century 
Louis Edward Levinthal complained about historical accounts of English and 
American bankruptcy legislation, saying scholars had ‘uniformly considered an 
historical treatment of the subject as unnecessary, uninteresting, or 
impossible.’93 Levinthal’s commentary on the laws, although now a century old, 
are remarkably clear and useful. 
By the 1970s misunderstanding and confusion over exactly what a state of 
bankruptcy was during the long eighteenth century caused W. J. Jones to 
observe: 
A major problem for the historian is that the word bankruptcy has been 
used in two senses. The first is provided by general usage, literary or 
vernacular, covering people who have become destitute or insolvent, or 
in which we may, for example, speak of a king or a country as being "on 
the verge of bankruptcy." The general impression is one of financial 
calamity. The word is also used to support adverse comment on the 
intellectual, moral, or political standing of a government, institution, or 
person … This range of meaning can be legitimate for many periods and 
countries: for Scotland, an authority has noted that "the word by itself has 
no place at all in the formal language of the law." In England, on the 
other hand, the terms bankrupt and bankruptcy have represented a legal 
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concept for over four centuries. This second understanding can be 
explained by reference to one definition of a bankrupt: 
One who has done some act or suffered some act to be done in 
consequence of which, under the laws of his country, he is liable 
to be proceeded against by his creditors for the seizure and 
distribution among them of his entire property.94 
Duffy takes issue with historians, observing that they ‘have frequently used the 
term "bankrupt" inexactly, disregarding the technical division of debtors into two 
categories’.95 I argue in this thesis that although made decades ago now, these 
observations are confusions which still arise not infrequently amongst scholars 
from a variety of disciplines.  I use the form ‘bankrupt laws’, rather than 
bankruptcy law, as the former is how many contemporary commentators 
referred to the statutes.96 When I refer to the English common law regime 
applied to debtors who were not, or could not be, bankrupts, I refer to the ‘debt 
laws’ and ‘insolvent debtors’.  Where clarity allows it, before traders became 
bankrupts, I identify them as ‘traders’, and after bankruptcy just as ‘bankrupts’.  
Non-trader debtors who cannot be bankrupts, I refer to as ‘insolvent debtors’, or 
just debtors.  There are issues around the use of the terms ‘insolvent’ and 
‘insolvency’ and this is discussed more in the chapter on credit and finance.  In 
so far as I can, I avoid using the term ‘insolvency’ because of its ambiguity in 
being, on the one hand an over-arching descriptor for the generalised problem 
of not being able to meet obligations (inclusive of bankrupts), and on the other 
hand being the branch of debt law that primarily employed imprisonment for 
debtors. 
The bankrupt laws formed part of English civil law, that relatively dull but 
essential companion to criminal law.  According to C. W. Brooks ‘[I]t is arguable 
that the civil law is even more important than the criminal law in maintaining the 
social and economic relationships in any society.’97 Therefore, an understanding 
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of the somewhat idiosyncratic English bankrupt laws will be an aid to 
understanding the highly tested social and economic relationships between the 
subjects in this study. Furthermore, understanding the bankrupt laws can aid 
insight into the motivations, decisions, behaviours and even ‘mentalities’ 
encountered in the subjects of this study.  If later in the study more 
understanding of the way in which bankrupt laws were interpreted and applied 
is required, then further explanation is given in the relevant chapters. 
In keeping with the central thesis of this study, which is to give an account of the 
social experience of bankrupts, this chapter will endeavour to position 
bankrupts, and to a lesser extent the other actors involved, at the centre of my 
explanation of the laws.  In order to avoid an over preoccupation with simply the 
legislative and jurisdictional aspects, an attempt is made to explain the laws 
from the respective points of view of the subjects.  This study commences in 
1732 which was the year in which an important new bankruptcy statute came 
into effect.98  This statute was, with little amendment, to govern all English 
bankruptcies examined in the period of this study until the inception of a series 
of Victorian reforms that followed the Bankruptcy Court (England) Act 1831 
which brought about a species of nationalisation of bankruptcy jurisdiction and 
process.99 
Chronologically the first case study in this thesis is the bankruptcy of George 
Clay, a merchant from King’s Lynn in Norfolk, who became a bankrupt in 
1739.100 We do not know whether he gave any thought to the bankruptcy 
statute that had recently passed into law, but he will certainly have known that 
his creditors had at their disposal a variety of legal options, amongst which 
bankruptcy was only one.  He may have known little or nothing about the history 
of the English bankrupt laws, but he will have had some knowledge of the 
personal stories of other indebted or bankrupt traders.  He may have possessed 
a law book or business manual or two and there will have been other traders 
and local lawyers he could consult.  In his moment of financial crisis, he will only 
have been thinking about how the prevailing bankrupt laws applied to him and 
whether they might save or damn him.  Briefly, however, before setting out the 
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bankrupt laws and the associated proceedings that Clay would have 
encountered in the 1730s, to aid the reader I give an account of how these 
English laws came into being and how the laws that applied to the period of 
study were to a great extent inherited from earlier centuries, which as stated 
above also influenced attitudes.  This chapter is divided into two parts: part one 




2.1.1 Early Debt and Bankrupt Laws 
Laws for dealing with recalcitrant debtors have their origins in the ancient and 
classical worlds.101 The English debt laws developed throughout the medieval 
period, but for the purposes of this study my overview commences in sixteenth-
century England.102 In the first four decades of sixteenth-century England 
individuals unable, or unwilling, to satisfy their creditors were dealt with by debt 
laws which were a part of common law; ‘bankrupts’ as a category of debtor did 
not yet exist.  Under the existing debt laws creditors, as a means of recovering 
what they were owed, simply seized goods on a first come, first served basis.  
Therefore, as there was no legal requirement for a rateable distribution of 
debtors’ assets, slow-moving creditors risked receiving nothing.  However, the 
seizure and sale of assets to recover money owed could be problematic 
because of the legal costs, and it was therefore more common for creditors to 
use the quicker, easier and cheaper action of imprisonment for unforthcoming 
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debtors.  The complicated medieval and early modern origins of imprisonment 
for debt, and importantly, why debtors’ bodies rather than property and land, 
were proceeded against, are discussed in greater detail by Joanna Innes, Jay 
Cohen, Margot Finn and others.103 
Under common law debtors who wished to thwart their creditors were not 
without stratagems.  They could avoid paying their creditors indefinitely by, for 
example: entering a sanctuary, where they might continue to live well if they had 
previously concealed assets; they might flee the country (although at the risk of 
being outlawed and their assets seized by the Crown); or simply staying at 
home and bolting the doors whereupon common law prohibited forced entry in a 
civil cause.104 It was because of these means of frustrating the designs of 
creditors that the first English bankrupt laws were introduced in the sixteenth 
century.105 Before 1543, when the first bankruptcy statutes became law, there 
existed an impression that debtors were avoiding their creditors by remaining in 
their houses.  At that time the law permitted a debtor to shut himself up in his 
own home with his assets, or more to the point with assets he had taken only on 
credit and which were therefore arguably still the property of his creditors.  
Meanwhile, a sheriff’s officer who might otherwise on gaining entry to a house, 
force inner barriers in search of seizable goods, was thwarted because he was 
not empowered to break down the outer door, which the debtor would have 
bolted securely. The debtor might also have gone into hiding somewhere other 
than his own residence.  The inaccessibility of the debtor was cause for anxiety 
amongst creditors, as each one could not be certain that a more advantageous 
accommodation might be struck by another creditor with the debtor.106 
Out of concerns like these grew bankrupt laws intended to deal with debtors 
who employed cunning tactics to avoid paying their debts.  Failing to pay debts 
had always been regarded as a dishonest action, as indicated by the title of 
England’s first bankrupt statute of 1543: ‘An Act against such persons as do 
 
103 Innes, ‘King’s Bench Prison’, p. 253; Cohen, ‘History of Imprisonment for Debt’, pp. 154–55; 
Duffy, Bankruptcy and Insolvency in London, pp. 58–63; Finn, Character of Credit, pp. 109–
11. 
104 For a discussion of how sanctuaries were used by debtors see James R. Hertzler, ‘The 
Abuse and Outlawing of Sanctuary for Debt in Seventeenth-Century England’, Historical 
Journal, 14 (1971), 467–77. 
105 Cohen, ‘History of Imprisonment for Debt’, p. 155. 





make Bankrupt’.107 Note the language: ‘do make bankrupt’, this meant at the 
time little other than the committing of a criminal act.  The preamble to the Act 
sets out the offence thus: 
Where divers and sundry persons craftily obtaining into their hands great 
substance of other men's goods do suddenly flee to parts unknown or 
keep their houses, not minding to pay or restore to any their creditors 
their debts and duties, but at their own wills and pleasures consume the 
substance obtained by credit of other men, for their own pleasure and 
delicate living, against all reason equity and good conscience.108 
Under the statutes enacted in the sixteenth century there was no intention to 
create a more benign regime for debtors.  What the Acts of Henry VIII did was 
to introduce the principle of rateable distribution of assets, which was intended 
to benefit all the creditors equally in proportion to what they were owed.  The 
Acts aimed to put in place a summary proceeding which would permit 
immediate seizure of fraudulent debtors’ property to achieve an equitable 
distribution for all creditors.109 A bankrupt was still basically a fraudulent debtor.  
Under the 1543 statute an insolvent debtor’s property belonged to all his 
creditors, the first-comer could no longer simply grab all there was of value.110 
Levinthal identifies two enduring principles in the 1543 statute, that assets could 
be summarily collected or sold, followed by a distribution intended to benefit all 
creditors.111 These principles were not particular to England, as Levinthal further 
elaborated: 
All bankruptcy law, however, no matter when or where devised and 
enacted, has at least two general objects in view. It aims, first, to secure 
an equitable division of the insolvent debtor's property among all his 
creditors, and, in the second place, to prevent on the part of the insolvent 
debtor conduct detrimental to the interests of his creditors. In other 
words, bankruptcy law seeks to protect the creditors, first, from one 
another and, secondly, from their debtor.112 
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Such was the new law in principle at least, but in effect the statute was lacking 
in definition as to the who, and how, of executing the law, with the result that 
effectiveness was limited.113   
The inadequacy of the law’s provision for extracting debtors from their 
residences, even following the first bankruptcy statute, gave rise to the following 
complaint in the reign of Elizabeth from some French merchants: 
The English merchant . . . has this privilege, that when he has bought 
goods and intends to become a bankrupt, he can retire into his house, or 
even into his shop, provided that the door is closed with a lock or some 
barrier; and the bailiff cannot touch his goods, nor can anyone disturb 
him nor demand any account from him, nor arrest him or even talk to 
him, even though the poor ruined creditors may see the bankrupt in his 
house, with his wife, his factors and servants, publicly selling their goods 
in front of their eyes, without being able to attach these goods or any of 
the debtor's real or personal property.114 
The statute did, however, recognise the problem of collusion between debtors 
and others, and pecuniary sanctions were to be applied to those that hid 
debtors’ assets or falsely purported to be creditors.  Importantly the power to 
summon and examine persons suspected of collusion with the bankrupt was 
created.115  However, the difficulties of applying the Henrician statutes gave rise 
to further Acts. 
The important Act of 1571116 set in statute principles that, whilst on the one 
hand furthering the modernising of legislation, established conditions that 
bedevilled the interpretation and application of the law until the middle of the 
nineteenth century.  What the 1571 Act did, that the 1543 had not, was to 
designate a category of persons, only those engaged in buying and selling, to 
whom the statute would exclusively apply.  Strictly applied rules defined the 
category of person thus: 
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Any merchant or other persons using or exercising the trade of 
merchandise, by way of bargaining, exchange, rechange, bartry, 
chevisance, or otherwise, in gross or by retail, or seeking the trade of 
living by buying and selling…117 
The distinction, however, was not about leniency towards those engaged in 
trade who might be victims of misfortune, rather it was introduced precisely 
because merchants were regarded as being especially well placed to evade the 
claims of their creditors, or wilfully to commit frauds.118 It is worth noting in 
passing that at the same time the essentially punitive bankruptcy law did not 
apply to landed gentlemen.119 
Inevitably, once an attempt had been made to define a trader and make 
distinctions between people, there ensued arguments over whether a person 
was a trader within the meaning and intentions of the statute; in Jones’s words, 
‘[A]ll sorts of men were debtors, but only a tiny fraction could be bankrupts’.120  
Simply being engaged in some kind of business or profession did not qualify a 
debtor to become a bankrupt, although by the early nineteenth century the 
trader/non-trader distinction had been steadily eroded by periodic enlargements 
of the list of qualifying trades.  Professions such as doctors, lawyers and 
schoolmasters, although they charged for their professional services, did not fit 
the bankruptcy rules because they did not trade in goods.  However, 
establishing the nature of a person’s trade was often not clear cut, and lawyers 
and judges would be exercised for centuries in their deliberations about how a 
person gained their living. 
This trader distinction was also peculiar to England.  Levinthal observes that 
‘confusion surrounding the application of the state of being bankrupt is 
understandable given that throughout the greater part of the last two millennia 
under Roman, Jewish and Germanic law all debtors could be bankrupts.  It was 
only between 1570 and 1861 [in England] that the law of bankruptcy was 
applied exclusively to tradesmen’.121 According to Hoppit the reason for the 
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trader distinction was to ensure the landowning and farming community did not 
fall under the jurisdiction of bankruptcy.122 Merely doing some buying and 
selling did not qualify.  A farmer, working his own land, sold much more than he 
bought, therefore he could not be a bankrupt.123 The problem Jones finds with 
the statutes is that they provided labels, but with inadequate definition.  He 
sums it up thus: 
[I]f a person could be construed as living by buying and selling, and if he 
committed an act which had been specified by the bankruptcy statutes, 
then his prospects were governed by procedures which did not apply to 
others. A peculiar department had been created within the varied laws 
and rules of debt. It was a legal distinction, but it was also a social 
one.124 
As will become apparent in this thesis it was often the attempts of heavily 
indebted traders to secure protective membership of this ‘peculiar department’ 
that was the cause of much of what they experienced, anticipated or not.  If 
successful they became ‘bankrupts’, but they also became socially distinct as 
they could not be anything else. 
A trader could not become a bankrupt by dint of proving themselves a trader 
alone, they also had to commit a pseudo crime, an ‘act of bankruptcy’.  What 
the law required was that certain acts, which were really performances, be 
acted out, the totality of which could be construed to be the committing of the 
act of bankruptcy that the law required.  By the eighteenth century any notion 
that these ‘acts’ were crimes had become a nonsense, yet they still had to be 
committed because the antiquated law of English bankruptcy was still rooted in 
these early modern criminal statutes.  The 1571 statute had endeavoured to 
define these behaviours that could then be construed as committing ‘acts of 
bankruptcy’; and it also recognized ‘a bankrupt’ as a discrete category of 
miscreant.  The statute ruled that if a trader: 
departs the realm, or keeps his house, or takes sanctuary, or suffers 
himself willingly to be arrested for any debt not justly due, or suffers 
himself to be outlawed, or yields himself to prison, or departs from his 
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dwelling-house, with the intent to defraud or hinder any of his creditors, 
he shall be taken for a bankrupt.125 
By the beginning of the nineteenth century there were technically seventeen 
such ‘acts’.  The three in most frequent use were: ‘staying indoors for an 
unusually long time, leaving home for a similar time, and lying in gaol for two 
months after having been imprisoned for debt’.126 Examples of the performance 
of these acts will be seen in the following chapters. 
Any margin available to creditors to come to an arrangement with debtors 
privately was circumscribed as soon as a commission of bankrupt was set up.  
From that point on all creditors were subject to the proceedings of a 
commission.  However, Jones regards the 1543 statute as almost ‘unworkable’, 
and that of 1571 as ‘so restricted that it unbalanced the English law of 
bankruptcy for generations’.127 These statutes had not created bankruptcy law 
as we understand it today, or indeed as it came to be understood in the 
eighteenth century.  In sixteenth-century England there was not yet a distinction 
between ‘a bankrupt’ and ‘an insolvent debtor’; that distinction emerges later.  
The early legislation was primarily preoccupied with control and deterrence, as 
Levinthal affirmed: 
It is true that in the modern view of the institution of bankruptcy the Act of 
Henry VIII can hardly be spoken of as a true bankruptcy law, for it is in 
fact little more than a criminal statute directed against men who indulged 
in very prodigal expenditures and then made off.128  
Although indebted traders could ‘enjoy’ the new status of being a bankrupt, they 
were still considered criminals, and under the statute of 1571 a bankrupt could 
still be imprisoned as well as see their assets seized.129 Commissioners could 
sell almost everything to benefit the creditors.130 So at this stage bankruptcy still 
did not offer insolvent debtors the kind of protection that many would readily 
seek in later centuries. 
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During the seventeenth century the line against bankrupts hardened.  An Act in 
1623131 added the pillory and the loss of an ear if debtors could not prove 
bankruptcy had been caused by misfortune alone.132 Keeping to one’s house 
and bolting the outer door was no longer tolerated as commissioners were 
empowered to break down doors.  There were also important procedural 
developments.  When an earlier Act under James I133 was amended the 
procedure of formally examining a bankrupt before a bankruptcy commission 
was established.  The activities of bankrupts had been regarded as opaque, 
and therefore the examination was required so the bankrupt would have to 
explain how he had conducted his affairs.  Bankrupts were offered incentives to 
be forthcoming and threatened with penalties if they were not.  Failing to 
cooperate with a full inquiry could land the bankrupt in prison.134 Perjury or 
concealing goods could land the bankrupt in the pillory, or cost the 
aforementioned ear.135 Bankrupts, or at least the idea of ‘a bankrupt’, seemed to 
provoke a moral anxiety which found its outlet in calls for ever more draconian 
sanctions.  Fortunately for bankrupts they had some defenders: to proposals 
that bankrupts be whipped to death Sir Edward Coke is recorded in 1621 
expressing his dislike to Parliament of ‘laws written in blood’.136 
By the end of the seventeenth century there existed a bankruptcy regime that 
was intended to benefit creditors yet remained harsh to bankrupts, who were 
still considered fraudulent.  In 1697 Daniel Defoe, who had been a bankrupt, 
said of the bankrupt law that it stripped the debtor ‘of all in a moment, but 
renders him for ever incapable of helping himself, or relieving his Family by 
future Industry’.137 However, a change in attitudes was emerging towards the 
end of the seventeenth century.  John Cary expressed this view: 
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Misfortunes may and often do befal industrious Men, whose Trades have 
been very beneficial to the Nation, and to such a due Regard ought to be 
had.138 
A ‘due Regard’ was had and the framing and intention of the law did change.  
By the early eighteenth-century England had evolved a set of bankrupt laws and 
procedures which were markedly different from the mechanisms employed 
against insolvent debtors, who were merely imprisoned.  What made the early 
eighteenth-century laws ground-breaking was that, for the first time, a compliant 
bankrupt could be discharged.  It was the absence of discharge that had so 
vexed Defoe.  The statutes of 1705, 1706 and 1711 suggested that changing 
attitudes to bankrupts were being enshrined in law.139 The crucial shift came 
about from the recognition, in some quarters at least, that a debtor could 
become insolvent by no fault of his own, and furthermore that a discharge was 
more appropriate than a sanction.  According to Levinthal the statutes of 1705 
and 1711 were regarded by some as essentially the first laws of English 
bankruptcy.140 Given that bankrupts could still be imprisoned until the early 
eighteenth century, the 1705 statute was suddenly very trusting of bankrupts, as 
V. Markham Lester explains: 
a bankrupt could be discharged from all debts due and owing when he 
became bankrupt, without approval of his creditors, provided the 
bankrupt surrendered himself to his creditors in the time allowed in the 
Act and ‘in all things conform as in and by this act is directed…141 
The introduction of this discharge was no small matter.  It meant a bankrupt had 
no need to fear being imprisoned again for debts arising from the same 
bankruptcy.  With a discharge the honest bankrupt, who did as the law directed, 
could resume useful industry, as Defoe had desired.  However, this new trust 
placed in bankrupts soon proved misplaced.  After ‘many notorious frauds and 
abuses’ a new statute in 1706 required a discharge to be approved by four-fifths 
of creditors.  Severe measures for dishonest bankrupts were now included in 
the ‘modern’ statutes.  Concealing property was punishable by a £100 fine plus 
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twice the value of what had been hidden.142 Also under the 1706 statute 
concealing goods of greater value than £20 became a capital offence, although 
few bankrupts ever went to the gallows. A bankrupt to whom the capital 
sanction was applied is discussed in Emily Kadens’s account of the fate of John 
Perrott.143 
Despite the severity of the sanctions, the new statutes were still modernizing.  
In Levinthal’s view, the new law was also about a growing understanding that 
trade depended on credit; and those in trade assumed risks which were in the 
interests of both creditor and debtor.  No longer at stake would be what a trader 
might earn in the future, let alone the freedom of his person.144  Or as Duffy puts 
it ‘the trader could return to business without fear of future assets being liable 
for payment of past debts’.145 The early eighteenth-century reforms, according 
to Duffy, ‘eradicated the dread which bankruptcy may have previously instilled, 
by reducing the consequences of failure’. In his view if the draconian legislation 
had not been reformed, there would have been greater nervousness around 
entering more volatile trades and markets.146 Once the system of granting a 
certificate of discharge had been established, in Levinthal’s words ‘English law 
had all the elements of modern bankruptcy’.147 
The reforms of the early eighteenth century formed a crucial juncture after 
which two clearly distinct legal processes could be applied to a trader.  An 
inability or an unwillingness to pay debts could, as ever, result in imprisonment.  
On the other hand, debtors who could avail themselves of the bankruptcy 
regime because they were traders and owed over £100, could be discharged 
from their debts and avoid prison.148 The prospect of a discharge also served to 
facilitate agreement on composition with creditors, as the bankrupt could be 
confident of no further liability beyond the amount he agreed to pay.149  
Unfortunately traders who did not have a debt exceeding £100 with a single 
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creditor were denied the protection of bankruptcy; for them imprisonment for 
debt remained the most likely action that would be taken against them.150 
Naturally, if pressure from creditors was overwhelming and traders saw they 
qualified for treatment under the bankrupt laws, then they were highly likely to 
want to take this less onerous path given that incarceration and ‘gaol fever’ 
could be a death sentence.151  Bankrupts who conformed to the bankruptcy 
process were not only spared prison, they could also be discharged from their 
debts.152 Moreover, an Act of Parliament in 1718 had already spared bankrupts 
the onerous liability to arrest for debt whilst travelling to meetings with 
bankruptcy commissioners.153 Or so in theory, because as this study will show, 
when contemplating attending meetings, bankrupts often remained in fear of 
arrest by creditors acting under rival authority and jurisdiction.  Law and practice 
were not one and the same. 
There were various minor adjustments to the law before the Act of 1732 
consolidated all the previous laws in ‘An Act to Prevent the Committing of 
Frauds by Bankrupts’.154 It was the 1732 statute that, according to one 
eighteenth-century commentator ‘has ever since been the great directory in all 
proceedings relative to Bankrupts’.155 And so it remained, largely unaltered, 
essentially governing English bankruptcy for the next one hundred years.  Note 
that the title of the Act still frames bankruptcy as fundamentally a crime.156 The 
pace of reform did accelerate somewhat in the early nineteenth century 
although the laws did not undergo any notable change until Lord Eldon’s 
consolidation in 1825.157 However, the reader should note that new reforms 
sometimes applied only to bankruptcies in London, whilst country bankruptcies, 
which constitute a number of the cases in this study, remained under earlier 
statutes.  Lester states that under the 1825 statute a debtor could self-declare 
bankruptcy, but this only applied in London.  Even when major innovations were 
enacted, they often initially applied only in London where the greatest numbers 
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of bankruptcies were occurring.  Lester notes that even after the 1831 Act that 
created the ‘Court of Bankruptcy’, the counties continued with the pre-1831 
part-time commissioner system.158 
Under the 1732 statute from the date of a bankruptcy commission being issued 
a bankrupt had forty-two days within which to surrender to the commission and 
complete a full disclosure of his assets.  The commissioners would sit at a 
minimum of three meetings within the forty-two days.  Bankrupts were also to 
be free from arrest during the forty-two days. If four-fifths of the creditors who 
were owed more than twenty pounds agreed, a bankrupt could receive a 
certificate of discharge, provided that the commissioners certified to the Lord 
Chancellor that the bankrupt had conformed to all the legal requirements.  As 
an incentive to bankrupts to cooperate, bankrupts could receive an allowance 
from their liquidated assets ranging from three percent if the bankrupt estate 
salvaged less than ten shillings in the pound, up to ten percent (with a 
maximum of £300) if fifteen shillings were paid out to creditors.  Commissioners 
fees were also specified.159 The 1732 statute consolidated the position of the 
assignees as the managers of the bankrupt’s affairs and estate.  Assignees 
were themselves creditors and were chosen by creditors owed £10 or more.  
The Lord Chancellor kept the authority to remove assignees.160 Bankrupts 
relationships with these assignees would sometimes prove problematic as the 
subsequent chapters in this study will show. 
We return now to George Clay the King’s Lynn merchant who was facing 
financial problems in the 1730s and who would inevitably have been pondering 
his limited options.  As a merchant he met the trader requirement, and the 
volume of his debts meant that it was not difficult for him to owe a single creditor 
a sum that met the £100 and upwards threshold.  In fact, to some creditors he 
owed sums in excess of £300.161 Given the state of provincial debtors’ gaols in 
the 1730s we can be reasonably confident that Clay would have preferred to be 
treated under the recently enacted 1732 bankrupt laws, rather than as an 
insolvent debtor. 
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Imprisoning a debtor was an action intended to coerce debtors to pay, and it 
continued to be used against debtors until its abolition in 1869.  According to 
Paul ‘by the eighteenth century, recent changes in legal procedure made 
arresting a debtor one of the cheapest and most expedient ways for creditors to 
pursue what they were owed’.162 Cohen maintains that this type of confinement 
was anomalous in that ‘penal imprisonment is usually associated with criminal 
proceedings’, but where unpaid debts were concerned imprisonment was 
employed as a device of private law.163 Creditors truly believed imprisonment of 
debtors not to be a strange and unusual practice, but to be a self-evidently 
effective and entirely reasonable measure against a serious problem.  As the 
early modern economy grew in complexity, and reliance on credit became not 
only more extended, but fundamental to the furthering of trade, the risk of 
debtors defaulting became an ever-greater concern.  Such anxiety encouraged 
vigilance, and a disposition to recover debts by any means available in law.  C. 
W. Brooks gives the example of a ‘solicitor and town clerk of Bath, John 
Jeffreys’, who in 1778 ‘warned a man who owed him money that he was 
”resolved…to be trifled with no longer, for I will use the means that the Law has 
given me for recovering money, let the consequences be what it will”’.164 This 
widespread and enthusiastic employment of this aspect of English civil law 
meant that by 1776 there were more insolvent debtors in the gaols of England 
and Wales than criminals.165 
Furthermore, under these debt laws, with neither proof nor warning, a creditor 
could demand a debtor be arrested.166 Thus Clay could be picked up as soon 
as he stepped out of his house and onto the streets of King’s Lynn.167 As a 
debtor in a gaol in the 1730s the trader inmate might, as one contemporary 
complainant put it, ‘starve by slow Degrees, even to Death, in a noisome Jail, 
and possibly, in Company with the most Profligate of the human Race’.168  
Because there circulated a substantial literature containing emotive accounts of 
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cruel creditors and the sufferings of those imprisoned for debt, the impression 
can be given that creditors were eager to imprison those indebted to them, 
whereas in fact people were rarely gratuitously litigious or given to unpleasant 
summary actions out of malice.169 Margot Finn maintains that failure to make 
payment in full was common in the eighteenth century, and not unnaturally, 
there was a desire to resolve issues before resort to the law.170 At the same 
time there was a general awareness among creditors that excessive harshness 
on debtors was not necessarily prudent, given that creditors knew they could 
run into trouble themselves.  Finn notes there was only a ‘thin and permeable 
boundary that separated the status of debtor from that of creditor’.171 The law 
was only resorted to with some reluctance.172 In fact, efforts to find more 
neighbourly and less draconian resolutions were often made.173 Joanna Innes 
points out that debt actions were not usually taken out against people who had 
nothing or whose liabilities exceeded their assets, but just against an individual 
who did not meet an obligation.  It was usual, only when all other methods of 
persuasion had proved fruitless, that a creditor would initiate proceedings to 
gain ‘an enhanced coercive negotiating power’.174 The principal ‘coercive power’ 
was the threat of imprisonment, rather than actual imprisonment.  Clay would 
have felt this threat and have known that as a bankrupt he stood a better 
chance of remaining at liberty. 
In Clay’s case, as with many other bankrupts, it is not easy to tell unequivocally 
from the historical records whether it was primarily the trader who wanted the 
bankruptcy, or whether it was his creditors.  As external factors beyond the 
control of both trader and creditors were often involved, the decision to seek the 
relative ‘protection’ of bankruptcy may also have been a joint enterprise, 
especially as a trader could only be made a bankrupt as a result of a creditor’s 
petition.  A trader could not declare himself bankrupt, which is something often 
misunderstood.  Many traders got themselves made bankrupts by colluding with 
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one or more of their creditors in ‘friendly’ bankruptcies.  The case studies in this 
thesis suggest that the triggers for bankruptcy were either arrest and 
imprisonment of a trader as discussed above, or an execution levied on the 
trader’s goods and property.  Sometimes it was both as different creditors 
employed different actions. 
Under the debt laws there was no orderly and equitable distribution of a debtor’s 
assets.  The first creditors to move sometimes employed ‘executions’, which 
were writs that only permitted the seizure of moveable assets: chattels (interior 
furnishings and plate) and trade stock.  It was not difficult to obtain writs to seize 
goods.175 However, the immoveable assets, like property, land, and financial 
instruments were untouchable.  Coin, bank notes, bills of exchange, bonds, 
book-debts, and any other securities such as stocks, were all safe from the 
sheriff’s officer.176 Distraining or distressing the moveable goods of a trader was 
a common debt recovery action.  It was often a creditor’s move on the 
household goods and stock in trade that convinced a trader that they had no 
alternative but to prevail upon a friendly creditor to make them a bankrupt, as 
arrest was often likely to follow.  Although moveable goods were the easiest 
assets that could be quickly turned into specie, goods sold at auction rarely 
realised much, creditors were more likely to believe they would get results from 
arresting their debtor.  Even if the first creditor were satisfied by the assets he 
had seized, if there was nothing left to turn into cash for the next creditor then 
that second creditor would use imprisonment.  Whereas as a bankrupt who 
surrendered all his worldly assets and possessions which were distributed pro 
rata amongst the creditors, he stood a good chance of being discharged from 
any future liability arising from his debts at the time of his bankruptcy.177 The 
non-trader debtor, even if released from gaol, would not be discharged of his 
debts if any remained pending.178 To the stricken trader then, a ‘Commission of 
Bankrupt’ was evidently the lesser evil.  ‘Commission of Bankrupt’ is a form 
 
175 For step by step details of the process see Duffy, Bankruptcy and Insolvency in London, pp. 
61–65.     
176 Margot Finn, ‘Debt and Credit in Bath's Court of Requests,1829–39’, Urban History, 21 
(1994), 211–36, pp. 213–14; Peter Earle, The Making of the English Middle Class: Business, 
Society and Family Life in London 1660–1730 (London, 1989), p. 124. 
177 Cohen, ‘History of Imprisonment for Debt’, p. 161. 





used in contemporary literature and many legal records.179 For brevity, I usually 
refer to a bankruptcy commission or just commission. 
 
2.1.2 The bankruptcy commission and its proceedings 
Prior to the 1831 Act that created the Court of Bankruptcy, which put 
bankruptcies much more under central and official supervision in England, the 
most crucial and instrumental entity in the process of bankruptcy was the 
bankruptcy commission, essentially an outsourced institution.  Its 
commissioners were independent and held their authority from the Lord 
Chancellor whose authorisation was required before a commission could be 
issued.  The duty of the commissioners was to serve the interests of the 
creditors; a bankrupt merely got an account and was informed about the 
disposal of his goods and lands.  The commissioners had powers to summon 
and examine people, but they were not law courts in a way that to us would be 
recognisable.180 Yet commissioners had powers comparable to magistrates and 
justices. 
An afflicted trader like Clay, quite possibly encouraged by some of his friendlier 
creditors, might make the first move in getting himself made a bankrupt.  
Bankrupts like him naturally cast about for help and guidance in their 
predicament.  As will be discussed in chapter five their principal recourse was 
always to friends and family, whilst others consulted lawyers.  Some, however, 
were not without their own resources and did attempt to use their learning to 
understand and interpret the bankrupt laws themselves.  Different traders had 
different understandings of the bankrupt laws and varied in their adeptness at 
interpreting and applying them.  Inevitably, some might have done well to heed 
the words of Francis Bacon, who declared ‘I could wish that every citizen knew 
as much of law as would enable him to keep himself out of it’.181 However, with 
imprisonment looming they had no choice but to engage with the law. 
Advice manuals for tradesmen had long existed, and very specific texts aimed 
at debtors or bankrupts were available throughout the eighteenth century.  The 
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literature largely fell into two camps: manuals that sought to explain the 
bankrupt laws in depth; and manuals that concentrated more on the practical 
application of the law.  Their accessibility and ease of usefulness was probably 
always more to lawyers than to traders facing bankruptcy; the latter, the 
evidence in this study suggests, relied more on direct advice from their solicitors 
than trying to interpret manuals themselves.  These solicitors in turn often 
sought highly specialised opinions from London barristers.  We cannot be 
certain if many or few bankrupts read manuals, as only rarely do we find them 
referring to them; and only rarely do we discover what books bankrupts had in 
their homes.  However, one author of a manual aimed directly at bankrupts 
clearly hoped that bankrupts would enlighten themselves by reading his text ‘so 
that the inquirer will have no further trouble than to ascertain in what stage of 
the commission his business is, and immediately to refer thereto to satisfy his 
doubts’.182 
There is some evidence of possession of law books by bankrupts.  Because in 
1775 a London bookseller swore to a debt for books he had not been paid for 
we know that a money scrivener by the name James Bunn of North Walsham, 
Norfolk (bankrupt in 1770) had volumes in his possession which were identified 
as Law of Bankrupts, and Blackstone’s Law Tracts.183 As discussed in the 
introduction some subjects in this study had the benefit of longer and more 
privileged educations.  This is borne out by their evident command of language 
in the sources, and it is therefore probable that they were able to access and 
interpret legal advice manuals. 
Generally, however, as the chapters in this study will show, there is little 
evidence to suggest that bankrupts were in command of the law.  In fact, as this 
study will endeavour to demonstrate, eighteenth-century bankruptcy law and 
proceedings could be a minefield for traders with little grasp of the law.  They 
made poor decisions that they believed, or desperately hoped, would serve their 
interests.  One contemporary commentator summed it up: 
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It appears that under a commission great errors and inconveniences 
often arise, from people being ignorant of the power and operation of the 
laws made for and against bankrupts…184 
No matter how well a trader understood his options under the bankrupt laws he 
could not declare himself a bankrupt and therefore needed the assistance of a 
friendly creditor to petition for the issue of a bankruptcy commission.  Were the 
trader to be the object of a ‘hostile’ bankruptcy, a petitioning creditor would be 
commencing proceedings regardless of the trader’s inclination for a commission 
or not.  The trader would receive a much rougher ride from hostile creditors if 
they got the upper hand in a commission, as cases in this study will show.  
However, regardless of whether a bankruptcy was trader driven, or creditor 
driven, the requirements for issuing a commission were the same.    
Not unlike the initiation of a debt action under common law, a bankruptcy 
commission could be initiated by one single creditor acting independently with 
the assistance of a lawyer.  The creditor, who became known as the petitioning 
creditor, swore that he was owed a debt above £100 and which had remained 
unpaid for an unreasonable period.  This petition was submitted to the Lord 
Chancellor, who granted a commission and appointed commissioners.185  A 
bond of £200 had to be placed with the Lord Chancellor to deter malicious 
petitions; these were legal fees that initially the petitioning creditor had to 
shoulder.   
If a petitioning creditor was successful in getting a commission issued and 
commissioners appointed, the procedural framework of the commission came 
into being and immediately determined the formal proceedings to which the 
bankrupt would be obliged to submit.  As soon as the commissioners met, they 
had to determine whether the bankruptcy statutes applied to the debtor: if he 
was a trader and if he had committed an act of bankruptcy.  In friendly 
bankruptcies these steps were formalities and were effected by the examination 
of witnesses, usually servants.  The bankrupt would have been abreast of 
events. 
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If, however, the trader had not sought a commission himself, he might learn of 
his bankruptcy by notification from the commissioners, or the commissioners’ 
messenger, or from a notice in the London Gazette.186 The latter would also be 
read by his friends, neighbours and business contacts.  If notification was sent 
by the commissioners then the commissioners’ messenger, or messenger’s 
assistant, sometimes installed himself in the bankrupt’s home with the aim of 
preventing the removal of items of value.187 
Once established a commission advertised meetings of creditors in the London 
Gazette.  At the outset three meetings were always declared (often in practice 
many more were held): the first for the surrender of the bankrupt and the 
proving of debts (in practice debts could be proved at any of the meetings); the 
second for the choosing of assignees to liquidate the estate; the third and final 
for the bankrupt to complete their examination (in which they revealed the 
extent and whereabouts of all their assets), and for creditors to assent or 
dissent from granting the bankrupt a certificate of discharge.  The liquidation of 
bankrupts’ estates and the drip-feed of dividends to creditors often continued for 
many years after individual bankrupts had been discharged. 
Throughout this study I will use the terms ‘proceedings’, ‘administration’, and 
‘liquidation’.  Proceedings will refer to the work of commissions; administration 
to the endeavours of commissioners, assignees, and solicitors involved in a 
commission; liquidation to the disposal of assets and winding up of bankrupt 
estates.  Bankruptcy commissions did not attempt to save bankrupts’ 
businesses, they were therefore effectively liquidations in the sense employed 
in twenty-first century English insolvency.  A more contemporary phrasing for 
the work of the commission would be ‘the getting in of the bankrupt’s estate’ for 
the purposes of distribution.  I have not used this phrasing simply because it 
would be unwieldy. 
This, in short, was how a bankruptcy commission was structured and how it 
proceeded.  But as will become evident through the chapters of this study 
matters often did not proceed in anything like such a straightforward manner.  
The conceptual and jurisdictional boundaries between a regime that had at its 
centre the deprivation of liberty, and the putatively modern and more pragmatic 
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system of bankruptcy, were porous and disputed.  Many events in this study 
were driven by the tensions between these two jurisdictions.  Conflicts between 
the two branches of law and their respective representatives broke out 
continuously.  Contemporary commentators blamed the statutes, which in the 
early nineteenth century after centuries of tinkering still warranted this charge 
from Edward Christian in 1812: ‘There is no branch of the Law of England that 
exhibits such extraordinary specimens of contrariety of opinions, and 
irreconcilable decisions as the Bankrupt Law.’188 
Finally, returning to George Clay, he had probably not sought his own 
bankruptcy as he had absconded altogether before being later apprehended.  
He failed to surrender before the commissioners in December 1739, but in 
fairness to Clay this was because he was already in gaol (or assumed to be in 
gaol somewhere).  The commissioners still wanted him before them and 
required the gaoler and keeper to ‘deliver to Mr James Robertson the body of 
the said Clay’ so that he ‘might be dealt with’ under the law of bankruptcy.  They 
also ordered that Clay’s ‘goods, chattels, books…wheresoever they be found’ 
be seized.189 There is evidence that Clay was produced as records show that a 
gaoler was paid two shillings to deliver Clay to Robertson, and Robertson, who 
was probably the commissioners messenger or a sheriff’s officer, was in turn 
paid two shillings to ‘take him and his effects’.190 It is pertinent that this first part 
of the account of the English bankrupt laws has ended mentioning messengers 
and sheriff’s officers as these officers were the facilitators and implementors of 
bankruptcy commissions and instrumental in shaping the overall experience of 
bankrupts. They are considered along with legal professionals in the second 
part that follows. 
 
Part Two 
2.2.1 People in bankruptcy proceedings 
Unlike bankrupts the categories of individuals described below, although not 
central in this study, are not peripheral either because they were the necessary 
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facilitators and implementors of the material aspects of the experience of 
bankruptcy.  They were the people that actually did things in a bankruptcy: they 
called and attended meetings, took decisions, drew up legal documents, issued 
instructions, took material possession of objects, detained and held the bodies 
of persons if necessary; whereas bankrupts were, at least notionally, passive 
and unable to act.  These agents had a variety of roles in the implementation of 
a bankruptcy commission, and they maintained important relationships and 
interactions with bankrupts.  They will surface again and again throughout this 
account of the social experience of bankrupts and therefore the reader will need 
a knowledge of their roles and significance. 
In addressing the legal professionals of the long eighteenth century this thesis 
will limit itself to describing the roles and functions of legal professionals while 
they implemented and oversaw the law and practice of bankruptcy.  There were 
principally two categories of agent: lawyers (commissioners, barristers, 
solicitors, attorneys); and officers of the law (sheriff’s officers, messengers, 
bailiffs). The most influential of these roles in bankruptcy were those of 




Originally there had been no strict rules as to who could be appointed a 
commissioner except that they should be “wise, honest and discreet”.191 
Commissioners mattered to bankrupts because, in theory at least, they oversaw 
the whole bankruptcy process to its conclusion, and were charged with the 
authority of the Lord Chancellor to see that the liquidation was conducted 
according to statute and established procedure.  Commissioners were also 
under obligation to report on how they managed and distributed the estate of a 
bankrupt.  They wielded considerable powers and could commit uncooperative 
bankrupts to gaol where they could be held until they cooperated.  In 1776 John 
Paul noted how bankrupts by ‘not knowing the authority of the commissioners, 
have frequently incurred the censure of the law, even to the loss of their 
 





personal liberty’.192 An example of this occurred in 1781 when, as a result of 
‘gross prevarications’, a Bristol bankrupt, Joseph Pedley, was committed to 
Bristol Newgate for ‘his not giving a satisfactory account’ to the commissioners.  
There he remained for two and a quarter years before being again committed 
for giving answers ‘much less satisfactory than before’.193 In 1797 one subject in 
this study, John Kempster, a Wiltshire corn dealer, was ordered by 
commissioners to be held in ‘Custody for not making satisfactory Answers to 
certain Questions touching his Estate and Effects’.  The commissioners kept 
Kempster in the county gaol for over two years.194 Lying to commissioners could 
land a bankrupt in a criminal court as was the case in 1830 with a bankrupt 
linen draper who had ‘sworn to a false return’ and was sentenced to seven 
years transportation at Hereford Assizes.195 
London commissioners, who were appointed from a list of sixty, sat at the 
notoriously overcrowded Guildhall.  In some other locations, for example King’s 
Lynn, commissioners also sat in a guildhall, but generally country 
commissioners sat in inns and taverns.  For example, for the commission 
issued against Somerset yarn washer Richard Hutchings the commissioners 
met on 2 April 1744 at ‘the Dwelling house of Ambrose Cecill at Crewkerne, 
Innholder, being a publick Inn and known by the sign of the George’.196  Five 
commissioners were appointed, typically it was two esquires and three 
gentlemen; only three commissioners were required to attend meetings and 
sign memoranda.  There they swore one another into their respective offices. 
The commissioners for the commission issued against Sherborne maltster John 
Slade swore one another in on 14 May 1830 at the offices of Thomas Ffooks, 
solicitor to the commission.197 
The reader might imagine that bankruptcy commissioners could be relied on to 
be reasonable and respectable actors in the whole bankruptcy process and that 
they would protect bankrupts from the harshness of creditors.  Such a notion 
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encounters some challenges which are related below.  However, in the cases in 
this study the commissioners appear to have applied themselves dutifully and 
endeavoured to interpret the law and conduct commissions professionally and 
reasonably, given the tensions that existed between creditors and bankrupts.  
Furthermore, being gentlemen, they even found opportunities to demonstrate 
their sensibility.  There are few detailed accounts of the words and interactions 
at bankruptcy commission meetings, apart from their formal memoranda.  High-
profile bankruptcies which were reported in the press sometimes contained 
accounts of what was said by different parties during commission meetings.  
One report that records a commissioner’s words is provided by a meeting in 
1772 which heard the examination of William James, one of the partners of 
notorious bankrupt Alexander Fordyce.  Had it not been for the scale and 
consequences of the failure of the banking house of Neale, James, Fordyce, 
and Down the meeting would not have been reported.  Mr James was too 
overcome to read his own statement to the meeting, so passed it to the 
presiding commissioner.  The commissioner read James’s address to the 
meeting, and being moved to tears, ‘evinced himself a man of feeling’.198  Thus 
the commissioner communicated to the assembled creditors what attitude he 
thought ought to be taken towards the bankrupt. 
The mood was somewhat different at Fordyce’s examination in October at 
which the commissioners protected the public villain from the ire of the 
creditors.  Questions put to Fordyce, to which, had he responded in the 
affirmative, would have exposed him to criminal prosecution, were checked by a 
commissioner who pointed out: 
our power by no means extends to it; we as commissioners are to inquire 
into the state and condition of his effects, to ask and inquire in what 
manner they are concealed or made away with, or in any and what parts, 
and to subject him to the consequences…but to enter into the whole 
scene of a man’s life that tends to circumstances of criminality, or to 
make him so, we as commissioners (as no judge in England will oblige 
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him) cannot submit to it…I protest it is a question I think we should not 
suffer to be asked…199 
Did commissioners weary of the antics of bankrupts and creditors?  William 
Cowper, who spent several years as a bankruptcy commissioner and received 
sixty pounds a year for it, suggested that overseeing commissions made 
demands on his time saying, ‘I am going to spend 2 or 3 days at the Park, if the 
Bankrupts will give me leave’.200 The discomforts of sitting in the restricted 
space of the Guildhall in which London commissioners endeavoured to conduct 
meetings is discussed in greater detail in chapter six. 
Commissioners did not escape censure and had been the subject of criticism 
since bankruptcy entered English law.  Commissioners, who in the earlier years 
of the bankrupt laws had also been creditors, drew criticism, for example, for 
using their position to embezzle.  The statutes had been silent on how 
commissioners were to be compensated, but they clearly expected to be 
reimbursed for their personal expenses.  They were readily accused of using 
long sittings for personal gain.  Of commissioners it was said that they 
‘swallowed up as much of the poor bankrupt or pretended bankrupt his estate, 
by often and unnecessary sitting about the same’.201 A common charge against 
commissioners, certainly from the late seventeenth century, was that the cost of 
their ‘eating and drinking at the expense of the Bankrupt's estate, that the 
tavern bills of the commissioners formed much more formidable items in bills of 
costs in Bankruptcy, than the fees of the commissioners’.202 Such practices 
were to some extent curtailed by legislation passed in 1705, although ways 
round it were found.  The introduction by Lord Chancellor Harcourt of the 
London lists of commissioners aimed to ‘prevent the appointment of improper 
persons’.203 
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Harcourt’s lists did not solve the matter of the commissioners’ tavern bills.  A 
petition of London merchants to the House of Commons in 1718 still 
complained that excessive charges meant ‘the estate and effects of bankrupts 
were swallowed up’.  An Act was passed in the same year that prohibited 
allowances for ‘the eating and drinking of the commissioners’, and placed limits 
on their emoluments.  The 1718 statute’s effect was only partial, and many 
commissioners continued to receive more than their entitlement and to order 
‘great sums of money to be charged for their eating and drinking’.  The act at 
least required commissioners to take an oath to act honestly and impartially.  
London commissioners were then charged with tabling so many meetings on 
the same day that they were obliged to adjourn them whilst taking fees for each 
notional meeting.204 
Country commissions were still less well regulated.  The petitioning creditor, or 
his solicitor, could put forward their own choice of commissioners, usually 
barristers residing in the area.205 Also, as late as 1828 country commissioners 
were still permitted to charge their tavern bills to bankrupts’ estates.206 Sources 
consulted for this study show just such tavern bills.  Bankruptcies could be 
expensive, and there were complaints that the dividend, the sum creditors 
finally recovered, could be cut by as much as half.207 This also reduced the final 
sums that bankrupts were allowed after the value of the dividends achieved was 
known. 
 
2.2.3 Solicitors and attorneys 
In the sources employed in this study lawyers are identified sometimes as 
solicitors and sometimes as attorneys.  By the commencement of the period of 
this study little difference remained between solicitors and attorneys following 
an Act in 1729 which ‘virtually abolished the distinction between solicitors and 
attorneys’.208 For brevity, unless the historical records specifically refer to an 
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attorney, I will employ only solicitor in general discussion as in England this title 
was steadily replacing attorney.209 
In the eighteenth century with ‘new societal and economic needs’ solicitors had 
to offer more complex services.210 They were also, according to Penelope J. 
Corfield ‘social power-brokers within eighteenth-century England’.211 
Administering bankruptcy commissions was only one field of an eighteenth-
century solicitor’s professional activity.212 Nevertheless, some solicitors were 
clearly deeply involved in administering bankruptcies, but they have been little 
mentioned in historical accounts of the bankruptcies.  This seems to some 
extent an oversight as much of what we can learn about bankruptcies lies in 
documents that have survived in law firms’ collections.  Solicitors were always 
the factota in the growing numbers of bankruptcy cases throughout the 
eighteenth century, but they were far from mere administrators and writers of 
conveyances.  They were certainly persons of reference in cases of bankruptcy; 
the solicitor was ‘the confidential lawyer…who always knew what to do’.213 
Usually, a single solicitor was at the centre of a bankruptcy commission and 
their role was variously identified as ‘attorney to the commission’ or ‘solicitor to 
the commission’.214 The petitioning creditor employed a solicitor to make the 
case for a commission of bankrupt and this solicitor usually became the 
commission solicitor.  It would not be unusual for the same solicitor, if the 
bankruptcy had been a ‘friendly’ one, to act for both petitioning creditor and 
bankrupt; this was especially likely to be the case if the solicitor had previously 
acted for the trader prior to his bankruptcy.  Hostile creditors had their own 
solicitors.  Once approved by the Lord Chancellor, the ensuing commission 
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would be in the hands of the commissioners and the solicitor.  Then, while the 
commissioners took executive decisions, it was the solicitor and his clerks that 
did the work.  Solicitors’ bankruptcy files contain correspondence between 
solicitors and bankrupts, sometimes between solicitors and bankrupts’ wives, 
creditors, and inevitably from solicitors for other parties. 
Like commissioners, solicitors did not escape criticism for their expenditure 
whilst acting for the commissioners.215 There was a popular view that lawyers 
sought to enrich themselves from commissions as much as fraudulent 
bankrupts did.  It was a view with a long history.  Back in 1588 in a sermon 
Lancelot Andrewes had already lumped them together warning against ‘false 
bretheren, namely of the wilfull bankrupt, & the deceitfull lawyer’.216 It has been 
noted that many bankrupts fell back on practising the law when times were 
hard.217 C. W. Brooks relates how many lawyers made themselves unpopular in 
the seventeenth century through sharp practice and excessive fees, and then in 
the eighteenth century how William Hutton, maintaining the same opinion, 
‘thought that local attorneys were broken-down drunkards who stirred up 
unnecessary suits in order to fleece their clients with exorbitant fees’.218 
According to A. H. Manchester ‘the attorney was generally held in low public 
esteem in eighteenth-century England’.219 In their defence Schmidt argues that 
‘Popular literature notwithstanding, country attorneys were not so often knaves 
using their skills to cheat unwitting clients as indispensable cogs in the rural 
economy where they served the interests of the landholding classes.’220 In fact 
in this study of bankrupts in which some of the greater traders were also 
substantial landholders, we will see this kind of service being rendered even 
after bankruptcy. 
Nevertheless, there were negative attitudes towards lawyers who handled 
bankruptcies, and it should not therefore be too surprising that eighteenth-
century English society could understand that even bankrupts could be victims 
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to knavish lawyers who stood to gain from a self-interested ‘execution’ by the 
legal profession.  This was highlighted in the very public swipe taken at certain 
members of the profession in Samuel Foote’s 1776 comic romance The 
Bankrupt.  The first thing to know about Foote’s play is that there is no bankrupt 
in it, only a potential one.  The source of villainy is not the trader, who is 
presented as well-meaning and entirely innocent, but predatory lawyers whose 
scheme is to contrive a bankruptcy and then milk the bankrupt estate after 
persuading a city merchant and banker to become a fraudulent bankrupt.  As 
one of the lawyers declares ‘there is not a nicer road to hit than the region of 
Bankrupts’.221 The scheming lawyers boast about the ruses they habitually 
employ to make money at the expense of ‘loobies’ (unsuspecting creditors), all 
of which must surely have been familiar and meaningful to an eighteenth-
century theatre audience that saw bankruptcy as a bandwagon all too easy for 
many contemporaries to jump aboard.222 
Views of the competence of solicitors and attorneys in bankruptcy matters were 
also mixed, especially when it came to a metropolitan appraisal of country 
practitioners.  In December 1754 a major London creditor of one of the 
bankrupts in this study, having sent a knowledgeable friend to make enquiries in 
Wiltshire, received a letter from his emissary that addressed technicalities in 
issuing a commission: ‘I am pretty sure the commission will bear date from the 
time of the arrest of which you will inform your self tho’ attorneys here will not 
think so, but you know some are very ignorant’ (in 1758 William Blackstone 
would complain ‘about a lack of knowledge among practitioners’223).  
Fortunately for the London creditor competent help was at hand as his friend 
informed him, ‘If you have occasion to employ an attorney I could recommend 
you to Mr Charles Young at Marlborough: he is a man of fortune and 
reputation.’224 Popular tropes aside, this study will show a good number of 
solicitors behaving with patience and professionalism towards bankrupts and 
creditors.  It was not unusual for solicitors to have been previously engaged by 
traders prior to their bankruptcies; sometimes these solicitors had become 
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‘family friends’.225  Nevertheless, given the acrimonious turn many bankruptcies 
took, the solicitor often struggled to remain on cordial terms with the parties, 
something that was necessary if they were to continue to act as effective 
intermediaries. 
 
2.2.4 Other officers 
No bankruptcy commission would have functioned without the participation and 
actions of ‘people on the ground’, who in the material world, implemented 
commission directives in space and time.  These were sheriffs’ officers, bailiffs, 
‘messengers’, clerks, auctioneers and others, and in turn their servants (often 
referred to simply as their ‘men’).  It is not the intention of this thesis to open a 
broad discussion of long eighteenth-century law enforcement officers, especially 
where the apprehension and punishment of criminals is concerned.  The 
interest here is limited to the categories of officers employed in civil actions to 
recover debts, and who acted in and around bankruptcy proceedings. 
The principal enforcement agent of English bankruptcy commissioners was their 
‘messenger’, an office which should not be confused with certain other offices 
bearing the name of messenger, or a messenger-at-arms in Scots law.226 
According to definitions in the OED entry for ‘messenger’: ‘The messenger was 
a sort of sheriff's officer employed to execute the orders and warrants of the 
court.  Originally…a messenger was attached to the court of each 
commissioner.’; and, ‘A sheriff's officer employed to execute the orders or 
warrants of a bankruptcy court.’  The only pre-1831 example, which dates from 
1732, does relate the messenger clearly to bankruptcy commissioners: ‘That 
every such Bankrupt…shall be…required…to deliver up…all his…Bookes of 
Accounts…not seized by the Messenger of the said Commission.’227 Overall, 
these slightly fuzzy definitions tell us correctly that a messenger was not 
dissimilar to a sheriff’s officer, but that he was engaged as the bankruptcy 
commissioners’ officer. 
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Although the commissioners’ messenger did indeed sometimes deliver special 
‘messages’, such as summonses, their messenger should not be understood as 
being a messenger in any everyday sense.  Messengers had several important 
functions under a bankruptcy commission.  Firstly, immediately after they had 
declared a trader to be a bankrupt the commissioners needed to secure and 
protect the bankrupt’s goods and household effects from other parties that 
might attempt to seize them, they therefore sent their messenger to be quickly 
in ‘material possession’ of the property.  In order to be securely ‘in possession’ 
of the property the messenger often installed ‘a man’ in a bankrupt’s house to 
watch the property.228  Only this way could a bankruptcy commission be safely 
‘in possession’ and prevent the agents of other creditors getting ‘in possession’.  
Commissioners provided messengers with warrants that authorised them to: 
enter into and open the house [of the bankrupt and] all other place and 
places…where any of his goods are…and there seize all the ready 
money, jewels, plate, household stuff, goods, merchandizes, books of 
account…and in case of resistance, or of not having the key or keys of 
any door…you shall break open [the door]…229 
Acting for the commissioners was not without risks, in 1705 a messenger with a 
commissioners’ warrant was ‘knock’d down’ at the gate to Southwark Mint.230 
Bankruptcy records tell us the names of messengers and little else.  It is 
probable that the kind of person appointed to fill the office of messenger to a 
bankruptcy commission was a very similar person to that appointed to fill the 
office of a sheriff’s officer.  A messenger’s office was not for an uninterrupted 
period like that of constable, but rather like sheriffs’ officers, who were 
‘appointed by the High Sheriff to act on each occasion of executing process 
wherein he is concerned’ and ‘when a warrant is granted to him he becomes the 
special officer of the High Sheriff for that occasion, and for that occasion 
only’.231  
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Messengers were only appointed when a bankruptcy commission was issued 
and had to be provided with a warrant from the commissioners before they 
could act.  Messengers were remunerated with fees for actions performed on 
behalf of commissioners.  Examples of messengers’ fees can be seen in the 
commission solicitors’ bills pertaining to some bankruptcies in this study.  For 
example, in a bill from 1806 for administering the bankruptcy of Ann Harding the 
messenger received five shillings for summoning the commissioners to meet; 
other messenger’s fees are subsumed into the solicitor’s charges.232 In the 
much larger Wakeford bankruptcy of 1826 the extensive messenger’s bill 
includes many charges of fifteen shillings for summonses, five pounds and five 
shillings for making an inventory, and two charges of nine pounds and sixteen 
shillings for ‘28 days possession’ at the houses of two of the Wakeford brothers.  
The ‘assistant Messenger’ took away four pounds and four shillings.233 
Given that offices like that of sheriff’s officer or commissioners’ messenger were 
of limited duration the individuals probably engaged in other employments or 
they had their own trades.  It is also possible that messengers, as with sheriff’s 
officers, were at other times no other than the historically better-known, but 
contemporaneously unpopular, bailiffs.  One pamphleteer in 1723 declared, ‘a 
Bailiff is Universally hated by Man, Woman, or Child’.234 A publication of 1802 
declared them ‘low implements of the law’ and ‘licensed harpies’.235 They were 
as officers ‘notoriously corrupt’.236 Messengers and bailiffs, as unpleasant 
beings, were lumped together by Bishop George Berkeley when he wrote: ‘A 
Man had better a thousand times be hunted by Bailiffs or Messengers than 
haunted by these Spectres’.237 It seems Berkeley could imagine something 
worse than bailiffs and messengers. 
So, it is probable that messengers were held in similar esteem to bailiffs and 
sheriffs’ officers given that messengers also seized, or more technically got into 
possession of, all debtors’ and bankrupts’ goods and personal and household 
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possessions.  They seized everything, including the chamber pots.238 Daniel 
Defoe famously had his civet cats seized in 1692.239 Messengers, or their men 
who were described to a Parliamentary Committee 1818 as being ‘of the lowest 
degree’, remained in bankrupts’ houses.240 In 1783, while proposing reforms, 
James Bland Burges maintained that the display of ‘insolence of office, for 
which these subaltern retainers to the law are so notorious, ought, as much as 
possible, to be prevented’.241 Once in the possession of the messengers all the 
trade goods and utensils on the trade premises, and all the furniture and 
bedding, silver plate, and kitchen utensils in the dwelling house were liable to be 
sold for the benefit of creditors. 
Their conduct whilst in possession of the property of others did not go 
unchallenged.  In April 1824 a messenger by the name of Burwood, had 
demanded of him in the Vice-Chancellor’s Court ‘that an account might be 
rendered…of certain differences of wines and liquors during the period he had 
possession two bankrupts’ estate’ as there was a ‘great deficiency of wines and 
liquors occurred during the period Burwood had possession of the bankrupts’ 
property’.242 On the other hand messengers could face danger and antagonism, 
for example in a case brought in Chancery in 1803 it was argued that a 
‘messenger under a Commission of bankruptcy was put out of possession of 
property on board a ship, by threatening to throw him overboard’ as well as 
being subjected to ‘contemptuous language’.243 
Throughout the events in this study there was a tension between two different 
legal avenues for the recovery of debts: seizure of property and/or 
imprisonment under common law; and bankruptcy under statute law.  In theory 
at least statute took precedence as, according to Blackstone, an Act of 
Parliament was ‘the exercise of the highest authority that this kingdom 
acknowledges upon earth’.244 Manchester makes the point that by the time 
Blackstone was making this observation ‘in the event of a conflict between 
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statute and common law, statute would prevail’, although judges still had to 
interpret statutes.245 This did not mean, however, that conflicts, were resolved 
by default. 
The agents of the law who acted out this conflict in a physical sense were 
sheriffs’ officers and the bankruptcy commissioners’ messengers.  The conflicts 
usually consisted of a race to get material possession of a debtor’s property and 
plant a ‘man’ in or on it.  One conflict that had unfortunate consequences 
occurred in Chatham in December 1821 where a sheriff’s officer was violently 
assaulted by a messenger’s men over possession of a bankrupt’s property.246 
So far, this researcher has identified only a few instances within bankruptcies 
where matters descended to rough or violent behaviour, although perhaps 
some outcomes of this nature should be expected.  Lawrence Stone, albeit 
referring to the seventeenth century, wrote of enmity in rural England and put 
forward a challenge to the myth of ‘a peace-loving, conflict-free, golden age of 
the village’ given that ‘early modern English society was at least five times more 
violence-prone than contemporary English society’, although Stone is clear that 
levels of violence descended greatly over the eighteenth century.247 
To some extent tensions between the jurisdictions and their agents can be 
better understood when it is known that officers who were mistaken in their 
authority and action, or whose right to possession was overturned, would lose 
their fees or even be subject to penalties.  In 1754 the London creditor’s friend, 
mentioned above, who had travelled to Wiltshire to investigate the 
circumstances of David Kennedy pointed out that another creditor who had 
incurred expenses (£14 3s) for arresting Kennedy before he became a 
bankrupt, risked not recovering his costs ‘for if a commission is taken out he will 
not be allowed one penny expenses’. 248 It was the risk that a zero-sum game 
might play out between one creditor or group of creditors, and a rival group of 
creditors who preferred a bankruptcy commission, that sometimes so heated 
personal relations during bankruptcy.  Because sheriffs’ officers and 
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messengers also risked losing their fees, the conflict sometimes played out to 
the extreme as in Chatham in 1821.  However, this study will also show that, in 
the context of bankruptcy, it was not only men of ‘the lowest degree’ who laid 
hands upon one another. 
 
2.2.5 Conclusion 
To one not conversant with the Bankrupt laws it must be a matter of 
curious speculation to consider, how very little effect has been produced 
by so immense an application of accumulated force.  Statute after statute 
has been made: but the grievances have continued…[a]fter such 
repeated attempts…after so long an experience of their little efficacy, 
what are we to conclude? 249 
So wrote James Bland Burges in 1783 and it should also be evident to the 
reader from reading this chapter that bankruptcy law in its statutory forms and in 
its practical implementation was deeply flawed.  The laws were products of their 
times in which prevailing moral attitudes had as much influence in shaping the 
law as did practical considerations.  Because reform and adaption of the laws 
moved slowly, the laws failed to keep up with the needs of a changing 
commercial world.  Therefore, by the period of this study the subjects were all 
acting under an inherited system that was not fit for purpose and was often an 
influential factor in the bad experiences that will be related in this study.  In the 
words of Burges ‘nothing is so fatal as an insufficient law’.250 The subjects, who 
not surprisingly did not have a good grasp of the law, did not readily construe 
their difficulties as being the product of unsatisfactory legislation, but rather they 
tended to explain matters in terms of morality and personal relationships, 
themes which are explored in greater detail in the next chapter.  This chapter 
then, should have equipped the reader with sufficient understanding of the 
English bankrupt laws, including how they were implemented and by whom, in 
order to make sense of events that unfold in subsequent chapters. 
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Bankrupts: Villains or Victims? 
3.0 Introduction 
Late in 1751 the creditors of David Kennedy, a Wiltshire linen draper, were 
exchanging letters in which they discussed the options available to them for 
recovering as much as possible of what they were owed by Kennedy.  They 
debated the merits of a composition or a bankruptcy commission, but an 
obstacle before them was the fact that a quick-acting creditor who ‘was very 
free in speaking of Kennedy and represents him as a very great villain’ was 
holding him in Salisbury gaol.251 If a creditor categorised his debtor as a ‘villain’ 
then it was easy to justify his action of imprisoning this debtor, after all what 
more appropriate place was there for a villain but a gaol?  Bankrupts, however, 
represented themselves differently.  In 1807 when a London bankrupt, William 
Everhard Von Doornik, finding himself unable to secure a discharge from the 
bankruptcy process under which he barely had the means to live, declared: ‘It is 
high time for me to be released or I will real[l]y and truly fall the victim to utter 
Despair’.252 
Being a bankrupt was of course a legal identity, but it was also a social identity 
the further refinement of which invited these two powerful and morally opposed 
representations.  The problem for eighteenth-century English society was which 
view to take.  It was aptly summed up in 1760 by one commentator in a letter to 
a member of parliament thus: 
as one Bankrupt may be a worthy object of our regard and pity, whilst 
another, as being a villain, may deserve a gibbet, the ideas attendant on 
the word are very various, and consequently the Bankrupt stands in 
different lights to different people…253 
It would impossible to proceed with this chapter without reference to Hoppit’s 
commentary on perceptions of, and attitudes to, bankrupts in the chapter he 
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titled ‘The Bankrupt: Friend or Foe?’.254 Hoppit discusses eighteenth-century 
society’s conflicted feelings about bankrupts: Were bankrupts industrious men 
who had benefitted the nation prior to succumbing to misfortune and who were 
therefore worthy of compassion (they were therefore friends in need), or were 
they a threat to the integrity of the nation’s wealth and morals (they were 
therefore foes)?255 The kind of public discussions examined by Hoppit, which 
were dominated by English society’s elites and scholars are revisited in this 
chapter in order to show the nature of the moral climate and linguistic influences 
that, to a greater or lesser extent, are likely to have operated upon the attitudes 
and language of the subjects in this study.  In addition to this, this chapter 
introduces examples of voices of bankrupts and their creditors as they 
articulated their self-perceptions of victimhood or their beliefs about the villainy 
of the other party. 
Eighteenth-century judgemental discourses on debtors, and especially 
bankrupts were embedded in a centuries-old culture of credit and reputation.256 
A consumption led economy had grown from the second quarter of the 
sixteenth century and the absence of sufficient specie required households to 
trust one another to pay or exchange in kind at a later date.257 For the economy 
and commerce to function credit had to be given and taken and credit was 
underpinned by trust, which Craig Muldrew describes ‘as the central institutional 
bond of society’.258 Reliable households or businesses enjoyed credit because 
they were trusted to meet their obligations when required.  This bond between 
them was socially important as it secured ‘general ease of life for all entangled’ 
in the chains of credit.259 
 
254 Hoppit, Risk and Failure, p. 18. 
255 Ibid., p. 19. 
256 For in-depth studies of the early modern and long eighteenth-century middling sort’s 
dependency on credit, see Muldrew, Economy of Obligation, and Finn, Character of Credit.  
For additional commentaries on credit see the following: for the notion of building and 
maintaining strong credit as a means to confront risk through the thinking of Adam Smith, see 
Emily C. Nacol, An Age of Risk: Politics and Economy in Early Modern Britain (Princeton, 
2016), pp. 101–4, 107, 118, 122; for a discussion of conflicting attitudes to the mysterious 
influence of credit, see Jonathan Sheehan and Dror Wahrman, Invisible Hands: Self-
Organization and the Eighteenth Century (Chicago, 2015), pp. 49–58; for the role of credit in 
political economy, see Carl Wennerlind, Casualties of Credit: The English Financial Revolution 
1620–1720 (Cambridge MA, 2011), passim. 
257 Muldrew, Economy of Obligation, p. 3. 
258 Ibid., p. 182. 





Therefore, everyone fundamentally had the same interest in maintaining credit 
and averting defaults, but as a result of economic fluctuations or business 
mismanagement there inevitably were failures to meet obligations, and these 
caused considerable friction at household and community level.  Muldrew 
observes: ‘Just as trust and contracts were seen as the basis of human society; 
breaking one’s word was not only unjust but was considered socially harmful as 
well.’  Communities wished to avert disharmony, but with such enormous webs 
of obligations there were frequently disputes and ‘differences occurred and 
emotions could flare quite quickly’.260 Obligations to pay for goods on agreed 
future dates mattered beyond their mere monetary importance.  ‘Credit 
contracts’, Margot Finn maintains, ‘figured in English memory and imagination 
(and functioned in English markets) as ongoing social relations rather than as 
purely contractual agreements’.261 So it was necessary for people to trust one 
another’s word or paper which was not without risk, especially when reputations 
were unknown.262 Trust, of course, could also be bestowed rashly.  Wakelam 
gives the example of Richard Hogarth (father of Hogarth the artist) who, having 
‘trusted unwisely’, was imprisoned for debt.263 Breaches of trust were disliked 
because an obligation had no value if it was not met; and if promises to pay 
were worthless there would be loss of confidence throughout the economy.  
Although a debtor might lay claim to misfortune their failure to pay could also be 
interpreted as contrived and therefore a deception.  Eighteenth-century 
legislators had already decided what they thought of deceivers, having passed 
a law to hang forgers whose ‘lies and deceptions’, according to Randall 
McGowen, they considered ‘violated sacred pledges’.264 
Creditors’ attitudes and choice of language were informed and shaped by moral 
discourses which had been honed over centuries such that Hoppit maintains 
members of eighteenth-century English society ‘inherited’ their attitudes to 
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bankrupts.265 The discourses contained rival explanations for the events and 
consequences that surrounded traders’ failure: on the one hand there was the 
villain explanation; on the other the victim explanation.  In the case of the former 
it was wickedness that explained a trader’s failure and then as a bankrupt his 
exploitation of the bankruptcy regime to cheat and defraud his creditors.  This 
was the more traditional explanation.  A more modern explanation, especially in 
the wake of the bursting of the South Sea Bubble in 1720, was that of the 
recklessness of speculative activity.  In the eighteenth century speculation was 
often regarded as a major cause of bankruptcy.  The Times reported in 1788: 'In 
a commercial country, like England, where speculation has no legal check, and 
paper credit far exceeds the real wealth of those in trade, failures must be very 
common.' 266 The counter-explanation for failure was misfortune, which was 
accompanied by complaints from both bankrupts and their sympathisers that 
their treatment was unjustly harsh. 
Eighteenth-century England possessed an accumulation of critical and 
cautionary discourses from both legislators and commentators of earlier 
generations.  In order to gain a sense of the accumulated weight of these 
attitudes I will look briefly at attitudes that became established in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries.  This is necessary because it cannot be assumed 
that the views of eighteenth-century metropolitan commentators, such as James 
Boswell and Horace Walpole (cited later in this chapter), were certain to have 
reached the eyes or ears of the subjects and their creditors, especially the non-
elite provincial ones.  Some of these individuals might equally have formed their 
attitudes as a result of the continuing circulation of the writings or influences of 
seventeenth-century figures such as Samuel Butler and John Bunyan (also 
cited below267).268 To know what exactly individuals from a trade milieu read and 
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how it influenced their attitudes is difficult, but one notable example was 
provincial shopkeeper Thomas Turner.  The East Sussex shopkeeper’s reading 
was extensive, and while including ‘old canon’ works by the likes of Butler and 
Bunyan, it also took in more contemporaneous publishing.  In May 1755 Turner 
read and reflected on the 1722 play The West Country Clothier which negatively 
represents luxury and bankruptcy.269 
 
3.1 Bankrupts as Villains 
A suspicion that sixteenth-century merchants were extravagant ‘was a common 
attitude of the time’ according to Jones.270 Jones observes that Sir Edward 
Coke although ‘perhaps making an overly literal interpretation of the preamble 
to the Henrician statute, declared that it had been necessary because English 
merchants had wallowed in extravagance, “costly building, costly diet, and 
costly apparel," which had caused them to waste their wealth and neglect their 
trade’.271 It was because of this discontent with merchants’ behaviour that the 
first bankrupt laws were enacted.  This discontent had been expressed very 
clearly in the preamble to the 1543 statute (cited in chapter two) which directly 
censured some merchants’ taste for ‘delicate living’.272 
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Negative moral attitudes toward bankrupts, rather than merchants, could not 
circulate until bankrupts existed as an identifiable category of individuals.  As 
seen above this category came into being in the sixteenth century ‘that period, 
when the name of Bankrupt was first introduced into our law’, wrote James 
Bland Burges in 1783.273  From the time England created bankrupts as a legal 
category of person in 1543 (strictly speaking they were not named as such until 
the statute of 1571, although the 1571 statute implies that a bankrupt as a 
person in law was contemplated in the Act of 1543), criticism of, and warnings 
about, bankrupts became common.274 Bankrupts had then become the trade-
related category of individuals onto whom fears and opprobrium could be 
projected.  Anxiety was expressed in Parliament; according to Jones in a 1571 
Parliament ‘some prophesied that all trades connected with buying and selling 
were in danger of rapid decay’ and the ‘abuses and deceits of “bankrupts” were 
described as intolerable’.275 From the sixteenth century onwards in England 
bankrupts were surfacing in a variety of print media as the subject of economic, 
legal and moral argument.  In Tudor and Stuart England bankrupts began their 
trajectory, which was to last well into the nineteenth century, as recurring tropes 
in works of fiction.  ‘Bankrupt’ also came to coexist as a public insult alongside 
others such as ‘villain’, ‘scoundrel’, ‘rascal’, ‘rogue’ all of which were commonly 
used ammunition in early modern England.  For frequency of use against men 
one set of data for the eighteenth century ranks ‘bankrupt’ in eighth place out of 
twenty-three, well behind ‘rascal/rogue’, ‘villain’, ‘cheat’, ‘thief’, ‘liar’ and others, 
but firmly above ‘murderer’ and ‘dog’.276 
There were instances in discourses in the public sphere in which bankrupts 
were equated with all manner of wickedness.  This was a time when any notion 
of an accidental bankrupt, let alone an unfortunate one, barely existed.  In 1588 
the populace was warned to be on guard against ‘those citie mothes those 
bankrupts, that eate vp & consume yo[ur] wealth’.277 Cadwallader says of Tudor 
and Stuart England that the ‘community of the 16th and 17th centuries could only 
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see the bankrupt as a semi-criminal’ or worse, he relates how in Thomas 
Dekker’s 1606 Seven Deadly Sins ‘Fraudulent Bankruptcy heads the cavalcade 
of sins as they enter the gates of the city bringing the plague with them’.278 This 
early modern equation of bankrupts with the wrong side of the spiritual divide 
was common, making ‘bankrupt’ an even more feared and resented label.  In 
1584 John Dee was indignant at the ‘slanderous words’ which had cast him as 
‘a Conjuror, and a bankrupt alkimist’.279 Bankrupts were viewed as not only 
wrong-doers, but also the natural inhabitants of vile locations.  Francis 
Maximilian Misson, in describing the liberty of the Savoy in late seventeenth-
century London, declared it and similar places to be ‘nothing but Dens of 
Thieves and Bankrupts. There are in these Places inaccessible Nests of such 
Vermin’.280 
In 1667, however, Samuel Butler, in a more secular take sketched the 
stratagem for which bankrupts would become notorious in the eighteenth 
century, which entailed fraudulently abusing credit and the goodwill of others 
thus gaining ‘more by giveing over his Trade then ever he did by dealing in it’, 
and ‘lay's his Traine (like a Powder-Traytor) and get's out of the way while he 
blow's up al those that Trusted him’.281 Although also accurately relating how a 
trader could grow rich with fraudulent business practices, John Bunyan in 1680 
concentrated on a bankrupt’s slide into iniquity and inevitable damnation in The 
Life and Death of Mr Badman.  Badman, having been schooled by the devil, 
had the ‘very knack of knavery’, and aimed to ‘get hatfuls of money by breaking’ 
(i.e. becoming a bankrupt).  Just as the serpent beguiled Eve, ‘so did Mr. 
Badman beguile his creditors’.282 It did not of course end well for Badman, and 
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Bunyan was able to assure his readers that this particular bankrupt was ‘gone 
to hell and is damned’.283 
This belief that bankrupts were essentially evil that had persisted since the 
sixteenth century, if not superseded, was from the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries onwards, supplemented by new and changing 
interpretations as a new commercial age dawned.  Moral anxiety and panics did 
not disappear, simply the principal reasons for fearing bankrupts shifted 
somewhat from sixteenth and seventeenth-century beliefs about how their 
wickedness posed a threat to moral and religious standards, to the threat they 
posed to trade, to national prosperity, to social order, and to justice.  In 1708 
Edmund Calamy declared: ‘Among the many Complaints of the Times we live 
in, hardly any one is more commonly in the Mouths of all, than against the 
breaking of Tradesmen’. Calamy argued that the former ‘fair way of Trading’ 
that had been ‘so reputable, and so successful’ was lost.  Trade was now 
conducted on the basis of ‘Tricks and Projects, and Crafty Undermining Arts’, 
the consequences were surely to be ‘Disorder and Infection’.284 
Calamy viewed the love of money as still the cause of traders’ failure, but also it 
was by ‘their Aspiring Projects’ that they failed.285 In 1729 Bolingbroke imputed 
‘a declining Condition’ in the country’s riches to, amongst other factors, ‘the 
daily Bankruptcies that we find in all our News Papers’.286 Bolingbroke was right 
in so far as the frequency of bankruptcies would increase over the course of the 
eighteenth century as the population, the economy, and credit and trade grew.  
At the same time bankruptcy grew in the popular imagination as the worst 
manifestation of evils that emerged from a climate of deteriorating values and 
easy credit.  There had long been ambivalent attitudes to such easy credit.287 
However, in 1769 William Draper for example, rather than credit, was still 
blaming notions of bad men straight from the pages of Bunyan.  He declared: ‘I 
hope that my countrymen will be no longer imposed upon by artful and 
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designing men, or by wretches, who, bankrupts in business, in fame, and in 
fortune, mean nothing more than to involve this country in the same common 
ruin with themselves.’288 Major John Cartwright launched a torrent of invective 
against, amongst others, ‘insignificant coxcombs’, ‘toad-eaters’, ‘wretches’, 
‘profligates’, ‘gamblers’, ‘public plunderers’, and of course ‘bankrupts’.289 
Those moved to publish on the subject did so for a variety of moral or 
intellectual reasons or were prompted by events, although it may also have 
been injury to personal finances which galvanised some to vent their feelings as 
Pope and others had done in the wake of the bursting of the South Sea Bubble.  
John Gay was of the view that Pope had lost half his fortune.290 Fifty years later 
after not dissimilar events a disgruntled James Boswell wrote: 
War, famine, and pestilence, used formerly to fill up the number of the 
general calamities of mankind; but, in the present age, one has been 
added, viz. Bankruptcy…291 
Although Scottish bankruptcy law was different from England’s, Boswell was 
writing in the wake of the 1772 financial crisis which had brought down banking 
houses in both England and Scotland.  His words suggest that he regarded 
bankruptcy as a new and modern man-made apocalypse perpetrated by 
bankrupts like Alexander Fordyce.  The harm to society that could be wrought 
by bankrupts, especially ones that contrived to use bankruptcy to their 
advantage, was a concern that, if contemporary literature and sermons are 
believed, worried everyone.  Boswell, of course, had his own reasons for being 
exercised over financial matters.292 
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The national scandal that followed the financial crisis of 1772 probably indelibly 
fixed the image of the ‘bad-man’ bankrupt in the eighteenth-century public’s 
imagination.  It also spurred the pulpit to action with William Scott reprising 
Bishop Fleetwood’s 1708 sermon which had censured an earlier crop of 
bankrupts.  Generally, the dangers warned against were the same: assuming 
excessive risk, consuming too much, and worst of all, taking too much credit.  
The inevitable consequence was bankruptcy. 
Scott had been particularly incensed by the actions of the bankrupt Alexander 
Fordyce and also of Sir George Colebrooke, who he clearly held responsible for 
‘the almost total ruin and distress of (perhaps) Thousands of honest and well 
meaning People!’.293 Sir George Colebrooke, a director of the East India 
Company, sustained major losses from 1771, but did not become a bankrupt 
until 1777.294  Scott opened his sermon with a ‘dedication’ to Fordyce and 
Colebrooke: 
Gentlemen…Don’t mistake me – I don’t mean by this, to point either of 
You out in particular, as tho’ YE were the only ones:  Would to God that 
there were not already too many in this Great City and the Three 
Kingdoms, under the like predicament with Yourselves, and to whom 
therefore, it is equally applicable!  But as the unhappy Proceedings of the 
One, and the unexpected (consequently disagreeable) Stop of the Other, 
have made You become the popular Topics of Conversation both at 
home and abroad…295 
Boswell in 1772 was anxious that something might be learnt and that a society, 
seemingly out of kilter because of ambition and luxury, might be righted.  He 
hoped: 
that the late bankruptcies, however distressing to individuals, deserving 
and undeserving, may be of general utility, if they have the effect which 
we may suppose they will have on every rational and well-disposed 
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person, by restoring just notions of subordination, frugality, and every 
other principle by which the good order of society is maintained…296 
Bankruptcies continued of course such that in 1783 Horace Walpole, weary of 
constant bad news, demanded to know if there had not been ‘changes 
enough?’, ‘divorces enough?’, ‘lies enough?’, and of course, ‘bankruptcies and 
robberies enough?’.297 
So, what were bankrupts doing such that they so inflamed public opinion 
against themselves?  Obviously, damaging bank failures with the stopping of 
payments, frequently followed by the bankruptcies of the partners, were 
attributed to luxury and excessive risk taking.  Yet these high-flying financiers 
were a largely metropolitan minority.  William Scott in his sermon had been 
concerned about the other ‘ones’, the nation’s lower-flying sort of tradesmen 
whose bankruptcies Scott considered ‘too many’ in number.  He added an 
address to the citizens of London: ‘It is for your Sakes especially that I address 
Myself on this particular Subject.’ That subject being, in his words, ‘the Affair of 
Bankruptcy’.298 
What was worrying so many was the notorious practice by some in trade of 
breaking deliberately.  This entailed contriving a bankruptcy, not for reasons of 
failing trade, but in order to illicitly enrich themselves.  This was of course fraud, 
but it was not difficult to do and anyone in trade had the opportunity to do it.  In 
fact, so commonplace was the underhand practice believed to be, that it earned 
its own place among the objects of eighteenth-century satire.  Fielding had 
already successfully lampooned intended breaking on the stage with ‘Mr Stocks’ 
in his farce The Lottery in the 1730s.299 No less than five editions of the play 
were published up until at least the 1770s which permitted the generations that 
followed Fielding’s original audiences to learn about villains like Mr Stocks.  
Very simply, false breaking involved accumulating trade stock obtained on 
credit, selling it to cronies for cash at knock-down prices or otherwise 
disappearing it, then getting an accomplice creditor to get a bankruptcy 
commission issued under which, most unfortunately, there would be very few 
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shillings in the pound to pay legitimate creditors who had supplied goods and 
given credit in good faith. 
This kind of blatant and ubiquitous contrivance was satirized in verse in 
Midnight Conversations which imagined eavesdropping on a private 
conversation between a husband, an ‘intended BANKRUPT’, and wife as they 
schemed to fraudulently break.  An apparently successful, but cynical, young 
tradesman wishing to eschew the lot of a ‘plodding, patient Man of Trade’ 
declares to his wife: 
My credit to the last I’ve strain’d. 
And various mighty orders feign’d; 
My warehouses with goods are fill’d, 
My Agents, in their business skill’d, 
Will quickly of these goods dispose, 
And take the cash 
He then proposes to secrete the money ‘Where no Commissioners can trace’ 
before ‘boldly’ breaking, and nonchalantly declaring, ‘‘tis the fashion now to 
break’, before assuring his wife: 
It’s done with safety ev’ry day; 
To break at present is mere play. 
I tell you its become a trade; 300 
Burges outlined more formally the easy pickings available to the dishonest 
bankrupt: 
By a well-concerted Bankruptcy, every possibility of hazard may be 
avoided, and a greater fortune may be acquired by one single stroke, 
than could, in the common course of business, have been accumulated 
after a life of honest industry.  No sooner was this secret known, than 
fraudulent Bankruptcies grew up into a regular system.301 
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Under the prevailing statutes flagrant abuses of the bankruptcy regime were not 
hard to get away with, and once a certificate was obtained with the help of co-
conspirator assignees, a trader could return to trade and repeat the whole 
process.  Clearly, the actions of some bankrupts had been sufficiently dishonest 
and damaging to establish bankrupts in the minds of many as a category of 
villains who were a menace to the nation.  Offenders were satirized, but they 
could also be punished.  Returning to John Cary, who in 1695 had 
acknowledged that real misfortunes could afflict people in trade, he took a 
different view of fraudsters calling: 
for those who design under the shelter of a Protection or Privilege to 
spend all they have, and thereby cheat their Creditors, no Law can be 
too severe…302 
Half a century later Adam Smith was also convinced that such severity was 
required: 
The lesser frauds are generally obliged to be recompensed by the 
deceiver and are besides punished with a fine. There are however two 
species of fraud which are more severely punished; the 1st is with regard 
to bankruptcy. By the statute of bankruptcy in England, the debtor, on 
giving up all his substance to his creditors, is freed from all farther 
distress; but if he embezzles above 20£…he is punished with death.  
This law was made in the time of George 2d, and many have been since 
executed upon it; and with great justice. For though the resentment of the 
injured would not perhaps require so great a punishment yet there are 
severall circumstances which make it necessary.303 
The perpetration of frauds by bankrupts was not without danger, as fraud was a 
capital offence.  However, Smith overestimated the numbers hanged and it was 
the frequent escaping of severe sanctions, or any sanctions at all, that stoked 
public indignation.304 Boswell certainly thought bankrupts were getting off lightly: 
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How inconsistent is it, that in a country where we hang a man who steals 
or robs to the extent of a trifle, we should be so tender to fraudulent 
bankrupts, though they have actually deprived their neighbours of sums 
enormous, and occasioned universal and deep distress.305 
He felt strongly that they should not be allowed to get away with flaunting their 
ill-gotten gains.  He continued: 
If they will strut, let it be in prison: If they will be merry, let it be within 
those walls where culprits dwell…306 
Because an unsatisfactory law allowed many bankrupts to commit fraud, 
seemingly with impunity and to evade the sanctions desired by Cary, Smith and 
Boswell, bankrupts were widely regarded as agents of destruction in society.  It 
is therefore not surprising that in eighteenth and early nineteenth-century novels 
bankruptcy, or the actions of bankrupts, were a cause of anxiety and sudden, 
unexpected and calamitous changes to people’s fortunes.  Examples can be 
found in works by Daniel Defoe, Tobias Smollet, Oliver Goldsmith, Henry 
Mackenzie, Fanny Burney, Charlotte Turner Smith, and Maria Edgeworth, and 
others.307 In 1817 in Ormond Edgeworth created a vision of the destructive 
power that bankruptcy could exercise over a society when an Irish bank failed, 
and the banker became a bankrupt.  The bankruptcy was all the talk: ‘It was a 
public calamity, a source of private distress, that reached lower and farther than 
any bankruptcy had ever done…in every house it was the subject of 
lamentation, of invective.’308 Edgeworth was writing towards the end of the 
period of this study and showed that beliefs about bankruptcy and bankrupts as 
capable of causing great damage persisted. 
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Although most bankruptcies were not the object of the attentions of the press 
and pamphleteers as was the case with Fordyce and Colebrooke, the kind of 
opinions in print cited here would easily have reached eyes or ears beyond 
London and it is probable that at least some of the commentary on bankrupts 
issuing from the Metropolis reached some parties involved in the cases in this 
study.  As will be apparent in this study many bankruptcies were relatively small 
affairs which occurred within more localised and less extended trading 
networks, whether in London or in smaller provincial locations.  Bankrupts in 
such places were often closely associated, either as family or by proximity, with 
many of their creditors.  In these situations, judgments on parties’ behaviour 
and moral conduct were harsh and bankrupts’ motives were imputed to ‘villainy’, 
and the figure of the ‘villain’ was readily evoked. 
Most of the views presented thus far have been those of soldiers, statesmen, 
scholars and gentlemen.  However, not participating in the national dialogue 
discussed above were views from the ground, that is the voices of ordinary 
bankrupts and those associated with them or affected by them.  It is with these 
less audible voices that this study is primarily concerned, and examples follow.  
In early nineteenth-century Swansea a creditor judged the behaviour of William 
James, a bankrupt, declaring that ‘he acted Exceedingly wrong’.309 
Relationships between bankrupts and their creditors were often expressed in 
terms of moral deficit, with one party because of their wickedness greatly 
injuring the other.  Daniel Scott, the brother of bankrupt Isaac Scott who was 
acting in Isaac’s defence, was by the assignees ‘given out to be the greatest 
Villain ever heard of’.310 One of David Kennedy’s creditors, cited above, 
represented Kennedy ‘as a very great villain’.311 On the other hand, failed 
merchant Thomas Pyott blamed ‘the Villainy of others’ for his ‘utter Ruin’.312 
These instances of defamatory language were not uttered in public spaces.  
They were recorded in depositions, letters or journals, although sometimes they 
were expressed in pamphlets which were sold or distributed, as was the case 
with the Scott family’s diatribe against their assignees.  We do not know how 
many read it sympathetically but one copy of the pamphlet, priced at two 
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shillings, was intended for, or came into the possession of the musician 
Redmond Simpson, who ‘was for many years the first performer on the hautboy 
in this kingdom’.313 Further reference to Simpson is made below. 
In exchanges between parties the level of personal grievance was sometimes 
so pronounced that there were calls for punishment and threats were made.  In 
1808 another of William James’s creditors charged James with being ‘a most 
unprincipled and dishonest Scoundrel’ and hoped that the assignees would ‘at 
his Examination…be Extremely Severe with him’.314 In 1767 Isaac Scott was 
told by the assignees in his case that if he persisted in his obstinacy that he 
‘must not complain of the Treatment he will certainly experience’.315 Isaac’s 
behaviour would subsequently be declared ‘a Perrot affair’ which invoked the 
capital sanction applied to the bankrupt John Perrott who had been hanged only 
a few years earlier.316 
 
3.2 Bankrupts as Victims 
Although bankrupts were frequently the objects of disapprobation, they were 
sometimes objects of compassion.  Bankrupts who had not acted dishonestly 
had their defenders and their sympathisers.  Some regarded the bankrupt laws 
as too harsh and furthermore, ineffective.  From the 1690s into the first quarter 
of the eighteenth century, bankrupts had an outspoken and emotive voice in the 
form of Daniel Defoe, who had himself been a bankrupt.317 Defoe spoke for the 
honest trader of course, although even Defoe thought the gallows appropriate 
for dishonest bankrupts.318 The principal thrust of his argument was that the 
essentially Elizabethan statute was ineffective with costs consuming estates 
and therefore incentivising bankrupts to abscond and/or conceal assets.  
Neither creditor nor debtor benefitted under a commission while ‘a revengeful 
creditor’ could continue to pursue a bankrupt even if he had nothing.  This 
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meant honest bankrupts could be treated very harshly.319 Defoe wanted 
tradesmen to know that under a reformed law they could stop trading and still 
‘be well Treated, that on a fair Surrender, they shall be us’d like Honest Men, 
and pitty’d as Men of Misfortune’.320 In 1697 he complained that the bankrupt 
laws stripped the debtor ‘of all in a moment, but renders him for ever incapable 
of helping himself, or relieving his Family by future Industry’.321 
Others thought that those that assumed risks in furthering trade and the 
country’s prosperity, ought to be treated with understanding.  This was the view, 
cited above, which John Cary espoused in 1695.322 In 1739 David Hume was 
able to contemplate bankrupts as unfortunate, at least up to a point: 
A bankrupt, at first, while the idea of his misfortunes is fresh and recent, 
and while the comparison of his present unhappy situation with his 
former prosperity operates strongly upon us, meets with compassion and 
friendship. After these ideas are weakened or obliterated by time, he is in 
danger of compassion and contempt.323 
Boswell also conceded: ‘let us not forget that there are a few unfortunate 
[bankrupts]… For these I can make all the allowance that the tenderest 
humanity would wish’, but he also insisted on rigorous scrutiny whilst roundly 
condemning ‘villains’ who obscured the facts: 
let us be sure that the excuse is true, before we dispense with the 
punishment… I myself am agreeably satisfied with the innocence of 
some: Woe be to those villains who have thrown a cloud of suspicion 
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Hearing directly from bankrupts about their predicament was harder, but voices 
were sometimes heard publicly complaining about their treatment.  In 1759 one 
‘Honestus Moneyless’, who had been a bankrupt and who had, he claimed, 
‘drank deeply of the water of affliction’, drew the London Chronicle’s readers’ 
attention to a gathering in a London tavern of certificateless bankrupts whose 
intention it was to apply to parliament ‘to mitigate the laws in…regard to 
bankrupts’.  Honestus articulated what already was, and would continue well 
into the nineteenth century to be, the fundamental complaint of bankrupts that 
the laws were ‘most shameful’y put in execution’, the result Moneyless 
maintained of ‘a common expression of foreigners’ that ‘no country in the world 
has “better laws than the English, but none worse executed”’.  The 
consequence of this was the ‘present deplorable state of those unhappy 
wretches and their families’ for which he blamed the implementation of the law 
for setting assignees and bankrupts against one another (as we will see with the 
Scotts in subsequent chapters) with the result that bankrupts and their families 
were kept in ‘the utmost degree of want and desperation’.  This, he argued, did 
no one any good.  Bankrupts who could not obtain their certificates from 
implacable assignees were being driven abroad taking the ‘arts and misteries’ 
of their callings with them to ‘very great prejudice of this kingdom’.325 This last 
argument may not have washed much with creditors who were all too aware of 
the power they could wield by refusing to grant a certificate.  Boswell, at least, 
was not to be pacified by any pleadings from bankrupts, declaring he would not 
be ‘soothed by the whining of their artful emissaries’.326 There was, however, 
some softening in the legislation. According to Jones: ‘A statute of 1774, 
describing many bankrupts and debtors as well-meaning but unfortunate, 
asserted that such "have always been deemed the proper objects of public 
compassion"’.327 
In 1783 the advocate of bankruptcy law reform, James Bland Burges, put it 
rather more bluntly saying, ‘[t]he honest Insolvent is permitted to be a victim’ 
whilst still censuring the dishonest bankrupt who ‘triumphs in his uncorrected 
villainy, and insults those laws he glories in having evaded’.328 Burges 
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understood that the prevailing bankrupt laws had unintended consequences, 
which rather than ensure good conduct, actually encouraged immorality.  He 
argued that the bankrupt laws ‘instead of deterring the iniquitous, or of intailing 
a certain punishment upon their offences, have been converted into a means of 
protection, and are become an engine for villainy and deceit’.329 Yet he 
remained sensitive to the need to distinguish between the villainous and the 
unfortunate maintaining that ‘a distinction ought constantly to be made between 
those who become Bankrupts by unavoidable accidents and misfortunes, and 
those who bring insolvency upon themselves by their own improvidence, 
profusion, or dishonesty’.330  
Burges also took unscrupulous and opportunistic creditors to task whom he 
considered capable of abusively interpreting the bankrupt laws in order to 
exploit their trade debtors: 
The unsuspecting victim of an abominable conspiracy may in an instant, 
in the full tide of fame and of prosperity, be turned out of his house; his 
effects, his books, and his most valuable writings may be seized.  His 
name may be branded with the epithet of Bankrupt throughout Europe, 
and his reputation may receive a mortal wound.331 
‘Nomius Antinomos’ had been of a similar view in 1760 when he declared of a 
bankrupt: 
He has no time to offer or propose a composition: the commission is 
already out; his creditors are hasty, and ruin is the word.  Thus the gentle 
and honest man is ranked under the denomination, and forced into the 
class of villains, to give up himself and fortune, at the mercy of those who 
are perhaps interested in his undoing…what is still a greater pain of 
mind, he must submit his fame to be sacrificed to common ignominy, lies, 
and scandal…332 
Should Burges’s unfortunate bankrupt have had a commission issued against 
him before the courts long vacation then he ‘remains without relief, without a 
vindication of his character; his effects are in the hands of his enemies, he 
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continues subject to all the severe penalties of the Bankrupt Laws’.333 Burges 
appealed for there be a change in the law and to attitudes for the sake of honest 
bankrupts who were ‘liable to condemnation, without being heard in their 
defence; they are liable to confiscation, without a power of resisting; they are 
declared deserving of death for a merely civil offence’.334 In a challenge to the 
draconian measure applied to insolvents and bankrupts Burges asked: ‘Is 
Insolvency more criminal than Felony? Is it more horrible than Murder?’335 
Few calls for reform and a better understanding and treatment of bankrupts 
were more eloquent than Burges’s, but it might still seem that in general calls 
for compassion and less harsh treatment for bankrupts were probably getting 
drowned out by more powerful invectives in the printed public sphere from the 
many elite commentators on the subject.  However, there is evidence that 
bankrupts had been getting a steady trickle of more understanding treatment in 
a wide variety of print.  From the late seventeenth century there was a counter-
narrative more sympathetic to bankrupts in plays and novels.  In these texts, 
bankrupts and their families, instead of being villainous and fraudulent, were 
portrayed as victims of misfortune and manipulation. 
In Francis Kirkman’s The Unlucky Citizen (1673) the young protagonist finds 
himself listening to a ‘melancholy’ travelling companion who tells how ‘NO 
SOONER’ had he got to London, his creditors descended on him ‘and at length 
a Statute of Bankrupt came upon me, that LIKE a Deluge swept away all’.336 In 
the 1722 play The Obliging Husband a scheming wife uses the frightful spectre 
of a bankruptcy to panic her husband into making over his estate: ‘I’ll tell him 
that Parson Gripeall threatens to take out a Statute of Bankrupt, and then his 
Estate will be taken away from him, and rent to Pieces’ (the image of estates, 
and indeed individuals, ‘rent to Pieces’ is one that will reoccur throughout this 
study).337 A preoccupation of Defoe’s was the manner in which many women 
married to traders, lived in ignorance of their husbands’ financial affairs only to 
be taken unawares by disaster.  He expressed this through the mouth of 
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Roxana who laments how often she saw women living in comfort and style one 
day, and the next ‘surprised with a disaster, turned out of all by a commission of 
bankrupt, stripped to the clothes on her back’.338 In 1741 in Eliza Haywood’s 
Anti-Pamela, a trader, unable to face his family with the injury he had done 
them, and rather than become a bankrupt, attempts to shoot himself through the 
head.339 Predictably, he fails in this endeavour just as he had failed in his trade. 
That bankruptcy could represent an oppressive threat to the fortunes and spirits 
of traders and their vulnerable families is represented in Smollet’s The 
Adventures of Sir Launcelot Greaves (1762) in which the ‘affliction’ of Suky, a 
widow in debt, is aggravated by the ‘prospect of bankruptcy’.340 In Fanny 
Burney’s Camilla (1796) a family is rumoured to be ‘in danger of bankruptcy’.341 
When an aristocrat’s agent is dismissed in disgrace in Maria Edgeworth’s The 
Absentee (1812), it not only represents a pecuniary loss to the man as he fears 
‘losing his other agencies’, but above all he feels the ‘dread of immediate 
bankruptcy’.342 The struggling shopkeeper Gabriella in Burney’s The Wanderer 
(1816) is ‘unpractised in every species of business’ and unable to ‘calculate its 
chances’, thus added to her difficulties is ‘a perpetual horrour of bankruptcy’.343  
Here we can see writers equating the experience of bankruptcy with the 
language of disaster, violence, and fear: ‘a deluge swept all away’; an estate 
might be ‘rent to pieces’; a woman ‘stripped to the clothes on her back’; a man 
shot in the head; people felt ‘dread’ and ‘horrour’.  These fictional individuals 
were not represented as competent tradespeople, neither were they 
represented as frauds and villains.  They were represented as potential victims 
of misfortune worthy of the same compassion extended to creditor ‘sufferers’ 
afflicted by the consequences of bankruptcies.  Just as the negative tropes and 
language could, as stated earlier, reach eyes and ears in all parts of the 
country, so could these more sympathetic representations. 
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Artistes and creators of literary works had reasons and agendas for 
representing bankruptcy as they did (the financial problems of many are well 
known), and there is some evidence for there being real sympathies for 
bankrupts.  In 1768 Redmond Simpson might have readily paid two shillings for 
the Scott family’s pamphlet as we know he had some years earlier played at a 
benefit for the musician Ferdinand Tenducci who was being held in the King’s 
Bench for debt.344 In 1778 Samuel Johnson wrote to Elizabeth Montagu 
soliciting five guineas to help ‘Poor Davies, the bankrupt Bookseller’ to 
repurchase his ‘household stuff’, which had obviously been sold at auction by 
his creditors.  ‘Poor Davies’ was Thomas Davies (c. 1713–1785) who had 
introduced Boswell to Johnson.345 
Sympathisers came from other quarters in society. Diarist and letter writer 
Penelope Maitland recorded her compassion in her diary in the 1790s: ‘Heard 
poor Mr Charles Ross was a bankrupt…the Lord sanctify his afflictions, support 
and deliver him and family’.  A few days later she again prays for an ending to 
the ‘family’s great distress’.346 Several years later she recorded her sympathy 
for another bankrupt ‘in a most afflicted state’.347 It would be wrong to suggest 
that negative attitudes toward bankrupts had changed greatly by the 1820s, but 
it is worth noting that in 1829 at a meeting of creditors in the bankruptcy of Fry 
and Chapman, the solicitor for the commission declared that an investigation 
would find that the bankrupts had been ‘more sinned against than sinning’.348 
 
3.3 Conclusion 
The overall impression given by the commentaries and exchanges in this 
chapter is that in eighteenth-century England bankrupts were disliked.  
Accusations of villainy were regularly levelled at bankrupts both in the public 
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domain and in private exchanges.  Strong rhetoric was driven by feelings of 
being wronged or of having privations extended, and also the fear of sustaining 
even greater losses.  Dislike of bankrupts derived from several factors, not least 
inherited attitudes and suspicion.  Clearly, fraudulent bankrupts were reviled, 
but bankrupts were also simply censured because they were deemed to have 
breached trust and failed to pay what they had undertaken to pay.  The 
evidence also suggests that bankrupts were disliked because they were 
believed to not only damage national prosperity and stability, but because in so 
doing they caused loss and trouble to many individuals.  It should not therefore 
be surprising that bankrupts were deemed a menace to society.  However, not 
all those who gave vent to their views represented them as villains, as attitudes 
shifted over the eighteenth century others were willing to regard them as victims 
of misfortune.  As R. J. Morris puts it: ‘Bankruptcy began as little better than a 
crime, attracted varied amounts of moral censure, but ended the period as 
something like an accident of trade.’349 
A problem for long eighteenth-century society was that, whilst bankruptcy could 
easily be understood as villainy in the abstract in metropolitan discourse, at 
neighbourhood and provincial level bankrupts were known individuals living in 
close relationship to others.  They were family, friends, neighbours, customers 
and suppliers, or members of the same church congregation.  Positive social 
relations depended on the meeting of obligations and if obligations were not met 
relations between creditor and debtor deteriorated, although charges of villainy 
could flow both ways with bankrupts sometimes regarding their creditors as 
villains for withdrawing trust and cutting off vital credit.  How then were they 
regarded by the people who knew them?  It will become plainer in this study 
that the moral standing of bankrupts and their quality as citizens was contested 
repeatedly by those with whom they were entangled.  Much of what conditioned 
the experience of bankruptcy resulted from understandings, assumptions and 
misunderstandings about the relationships and obligations that existed between 
the various ‘actors’ involved.  It was when these relationships came under strain 
that the actors began assigning the roles villain or victim.  This chapter has 
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been very much about subjective judgements, the next chapter takes a more 






























Economic and Financial Context 
4.0 Introduction 
Perhaps, it may be said, that many large fortunes were made during the 
war; granting that this was the case, it was on account of certain 
fortunate speculations, or because the money had left the hands of those 
who are most serviceable during peace, and had passed into the hands 
of those who are most serviceable during war; and thus, as no foreign 
connection could be formed immediately, bankruptcies, failures, and 
stoppages of payment amongst many considerable commercial houses, 
to a very great amount, were the consequences of these speculations.  
Every one now became suspicious of the credit of his neighbour.  Money 
from all quarters was called in for payment.350 
The last two lines above, written by one ‘H.B.’ of Bath on the numbers and 
causes of bankruptcies in 1816, show considerable insight relative to the 
anxious noises of other commentators which were presented in the previous 
chapter regarding what they believed to be the factors that were driving the 
growth in numbers of bankruptcies in the long eighteenth century.  This chapter 
eschews the noise in favour of numbers and the more probable causes of 
bankruptcies, such as the mutual loss of confidence identified by ‘H.B’.  The 
chapter is divided into three sections: section one tells us about how many 
bankruptcies were really occurring in the long eighteenth century and how the 
numbers grew; section two looks at the economic and political factors that 
influenced the likelihood of bankruptcies occurring; section three looks at the 
probable direct causes of individual traders’ bankruptcies. 
 
4.1 Bankruptcies in numbers 
This study of bankrupts commences in 1732, a year that bisects that period of 
economic growth in England from 1700 to 1760 which most historians of recent 
decades have regarded as being one of slow but unevenly upward growth 
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before the, now somewhat contested, ‘take-off’ in the 1760s.351 The period is 
one in which there was major political and economic change, and it ends in 
1831 just as booms in railways, banks, mines and insurance were spreading 
through the country.352 More mundanely, it was also the year in which an Act 
was passed to establish a Court of Bankruptcy, which was a major step towards 
making many of the bankruptcy practices described in this thesis obsolete.353 
Such a reform was, in part, necessary due to the sheer number of bankruptcies 
in the first decades of the nineteenth century.  If bankruptcy numbers are 
compared to the size of England’s population, which roughly doubled over the 
period of this study (1732–1831),354 then the annual numbers of bankruptcies in 
the 1820s had risen seven to eight-fold over the same period. 
W. J. Jones has observed that before the eighteenth century ‘debtors were 
many but bankrupts few’.355 Certainly, in the fifty years before this study 
commences few bankruptcy commissions were issued in England despite the 
existence of bankrupt laws since the mid-sixteenth century.  According to Hoppit 
in the last two decades of the seventeenth century only a score or two of people 
were made bankrupt each year.  Only in the last few years was there 
appreciable growth, with numbers reaching nearly a hundred in 1699, which 
was more than double the number of bankrupts in 1695.356 However, during the 
long eighteenth century bankrupts’ numbers grew and they came to increasingly 
matter, in part because there were simply more and more of them amongst the 
general population, but also for other reasons which will be explored in this 
chapter and subsequent ones.  How do we know about these numbers? 
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Early efforts to gather bankruptcy data were made in the late eighteenth century 
by George Chalmers who produced a ‘curious, and instructive, table’ in 1794.357 
Reliable figures, however, were not produced until the twentieth century when a 
few historians visited the raw data with a view to improving the unsatisfactory 
‘official’ statistics that made appearances throughout the nineteenth century.  By 
the 1980s Hoppit, Marriner and Duffy had provided reliable figures on 
eighteenth-century English bankruptcy.358 Hoppit has calculated that in the 
eighteenth century some 33,000 businesses in England and Wales were 
subject to bankruptcy proceedings.359 
As might be expected the numbers became more concentrated as the century 
advanced, but caution is necessary before drawing conclusions about trends. 
There are issues with methodologies employed to create statistics for 
bankruptcies.  For example, it can appear that more business owners were 
becoming bankrupts, perhaps because of war or economic downturn, but the 
reality may be more mundane.  Sometimes we can see more bankrupts being 
recorded, not because the risk environment in the eighteenth century had 
intensified, but simply because new Acts of Parliament permitted more 
categories of trader to be included under the bankrupt laws.360 Then there is the 
issue of different data series, and which one to follow.  Marriner provides 
numbers from several sources and there are substantial differences, hence the 
issues alluded to earlier.361 The number of dockets struck was never the same 
as the commissions that were eventually issued, and even then commissions 
might be superseded (annulled), before being issued afresh by a different 
petitioning creditor.  The striking of a docket was really just, according to Hoppit, 
an entry ‘made in the Docket Books in response to a creditor's petition to have 
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his debtor declared a bankrupt’.362 A trader was not definitively a bankrupt until 
commissioners declared him to be one. 
Hoppit recognised that the only way to arrive at an approximation of accuracy in 
counting bankruptcies was to accept that only those cases that were dragged 
through every stage, and advertised as such in the London Gazette, could be 
confidently considered complete bankruptcies.  In other words, simply counting 
dockets or entries in The Gentleman’s Magazine would lack accuracy.  Hoppit 
does not claim to have tracked every single bankrupt through the London 
Gazette, so his bankruptcy statistics must be regarded as a guide rather than a 
wholly accurate representation of an objective state of affairs in the eighteenth 
century.363 Of course, although the bankruptcies in this study occurred over a 
period of one hundred years, the period does not coincide with that of Hoppit’s 
century (1700–1800).  Therefore, to show the trend of bankruptcy numbers for 
the period of this study I am using Margrit Schulte Beerbühl’s graphic synthesis 
of data (assembled from Hoppit and others) because it plots the general trend 
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Figure 2.1.  General Trend in Bankruptcy in England, 1710–1826 (yearly averages per 
decade), Source: Margrit Schulte Beerbühl, The Forgotten Majority: German Merchants 
in London, Naturalisation, and Global Trade 1660-1815.365 
For the first half of the eighteenth century there were on average 172 to 278 
bankruptcies every year, ‘comparatively few’ according to Schulte Beerbühl 
given what was to come.  From the middle of the century the numbers began to 
rise.  Then something started to happen from the 1770s and bankruptcy 
numbers experienced their own take-off.  In Hoppit’s words, bankruptcy was ‘an 
eighteenth-century growth industry’.366 Bankruptcies were averaging 478 a year 
between 1771 and 1780, but by the 1790s that average had risen to 762.  In 
1793 the number of cases rose above a thousand for the first time.  After the 
turn of the nineteenth century numbers rose still more steeply, and by the 
middle of the first decade with the Napoleonic blockade, the number of 
bankruptcies had again exceeded a thousand.  From 1811 to 1820 cases 
averaged 1,622 a year, and then until 1826 there were, on average, 1,353 
cases a year.367 1826 was extreme with over two and a half thousand cases, 
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and then until 1831 numbers fluctuated in a range of just over twelve hundred a 
year to around two thousand.368 
These are total numbers for England and Wales.  A different picture arises from 
a closer study of the regions, although as the following figures rely on Hoppit’s 
data, the discussion only applies until 1800.  Not surprisingly, London produced 
by far the largest number of bankrupts in the country, almost half of the total 
from 1688 to 1800.  This figure is even greater if contiguous counties, such as 
Middlesex, Berkshire, Surrey, Sussex, are added.  The rest of English counties 
only creep above one percent of the national total if a major trading hub 
happens to have been located there, for example: Exeter in Devon; Norwich in 
Norfolk; and York in Yorkshire.  The proximity of Bristol probably explains higher 
figures for Somerset and Gloucestershire.  There are a few examples of marked 
regional changes in trade and industry over the eighteenth century: in Devon 
numbers of bankruptcies almost halved towards the end of the eighteenth 
century, whilst in Lancashire they more than doubled.369 The relative decline of 
trade in Exeter relative to the growth in Liverpool and growing industrial towns 
like Manchester were responsible for this.  Such regional trends support the 
argument that where business activity increased, business failures also 
increased. There is a danger of concluding simply that troubled times and 
bankruptcies went hand in hand and assuming a probable causal relationship.  
This is a relationship that Hoppit challenges by positing that eighteenth-century 
prosperity, not downturns, gave rise to higher rates of bankruptcy.370 
Although contrasting regional differences is not an objective of this thesis, it is 
important to know that London, as the financial centre of the country with the 
greatest share of international trade, was also the location of the largest 
bankruptcies.  It also seems self-evident that more bankruptcies would occur in 
London and large cities because of the larger populations and number of 
businesses.  However, this is too simplistic: bankruptcies were also more likely 
to occur in an urban environment such as London because of high levels of 
consumption.  Ever changing fashionable habits gave rise to great fluctuations 
in the demand for goods and services.  This could be very good for business, 
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but it also could be very bad as the risk of poor decision making increased.  
There was exposure to the vicissitudes of overseas trade which greatly elevated 
levels of risk, particularly for merchant houses based in London.371 There was 
also the factor of the decline of once thriving trades, for example the Levant 
trade declined into insignificance by the 1760s, prompting Jonas Hanway to 
lament, ‘our Turkey Merchants, who some years since figured at the top of the 
commercial world, now bow their diminished heads’.372 
Apart from the clear general trend of growth in bankruptcy numbers across the 
period of this study, this statistical information in isolation tells us very little 
unless we are clearer about the factors that generated the numbers.  
Contemporaries who paid attention to increases in the numbers of bankruptcies 
generally tended to attribute the trends to a variety of personal failings on the 
part of the bankrupts before they considered the influence of political and 
economic climates.  Sudden spikes in numbers tended to cause moral panics 
and heightened perceptions of bankrupts as fraudsters and menaces to society 
despite events and trends in the wider political and economic climate.  The next 
section discusses how big political and economic factors influenced bankruptcy 
numbers. 
 
4.2 Economic and Political Influences 
What were the major factors that, whilst not being directly responsible for 
individual bankruptcies, created conditions that made creditors more aggressive 
and therefore survival for some traders impossible?  Examples of probable 
factors are given by Grassby, who suggests factors such as climate, natural 
disasters, plague, famine, war or financial crises, but also changes in politics, 
technology, and fashion.373 For Hoppit the factors that put the greatest pressure 
on the economic and business environment, and consequently on individual 
traders, were principally war and finance.  The latter is not easily separable from 
the former as wars were often directly the cause of financial crises.374 War 
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caused substantial losses, for example some 3,250 ships were lost during the 
War of Spanish Succession.375 Unfortunately for some, wars ending did not 
necessarily help economic climates.  Langford maintains that recession 
followed the Seven Years War, foreign and colonial trade slumped, and profits 
fell as a result of reduction in public expenditure on the war effort.376 The 
general discussion below of the causes of bankruptcies is intended to be useful 
to the reader because one problem with the case studies in the subsequent 
chapters is the frequent absence of clear evidence to explain the reasons for 
individual failures. 
 
4.2.1 Economic crises 
To speak about causes is problematic.  It would be more meaningful to talk 
about economic contexts and climates that created conditions under which 
traders were likely to increasingly struggle and therefore be increasingly likely to 
fail.  Direct causes of bankruptcy, as this study will suggest, were idiosyncratic 
to the individual trader and their relationships and bonds with others.  However, 
there are examples of traders readily attributing their demise to crises. Thus, 
Benjamin Travers, a failed London sugar merchant, reflected in 1811 on the 
economic and financial climate and the likelihood that others would follow him 
into bankruptcy: 
What sad distress has overtaken the commercial world since I quitted the 
great city!  Should the bank limit their discounts in order to return as soon 
as possible to payments in specie – the consequences must prove fatal 
to many – now in high repute – The present crisis – I think very 
alarming.377 
In March 1793, Havilland Le Mesurier, another bankrupt merchant, in writing to 
Henry Addington the Speaker of the House of Commons declared the collapse 
of other businesses in London to be the cause of his own bankruptcy.  He 
wrote: ‘I will only say that the failures yesterday in the City have dragged me 
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into their vortex’.378 These sophisticated businessmen in late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth-century London were substantial players so it may not surprise 
to find them reflecting on wider economic factors being the cause of 
bankruptcies, especially their own.  Margaret Hunt notes that it has been argued 
‘that as early as the seventeenth century some economic theorists were fully 
capable of abstracting the working of the market out from the human and social 
context’.  Yet, Hunt maintains, ‘there is little evidence, however, that the 
average man or woman engaged in trade during this period possessed such an 
ability’.379 One trader who did not look to the greater economic context to 
explain his failure was Reading bankrupt Matthias Deane, who in 1795, only 
ventured that his demise was due to ‘a Variety of unforeseen Losses, and 
untoward Circumstances’, which if nothing else, gave him cause for ‘a 
Reflection on the Uncertainty of human Pursuits’.380 Not all provincial bankrupts 
were so philosophical, and the chapters that follow will show bankrupts 
attributing their demise to the actions of individual creditors. 
 
4.2.2 Wars 
There is a clear correlation between wars and increases in the number of 
bankruptcies:  merchant houses with major overseas operations, and 
associated high risks, were vulnerable; markets for exports might not be 
reached, and domestic customers might not be supplied with imported goods; 
ships could be seized by privateers, and insurance costs could rise.  The 
disruptive effect on overseas trade caused problems with credit and the 
payment of debts.  This would quickly lead to liquidity problems, crises of 
confidence and the failure of banks, merchant houses, and whole networks of 
smaller businesses.  During the Continental Blockade (1806-1814), with its 
embargo on trade with Great Britain, bankruptcies rocketed.  A government 
seeking to raise finance could be particularly detrimental to some sectors.  
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During the American War, the building boom of the mid-1770s was stopped due 
to increases in duties on glass and wallpaper.381 In wartime right across the 
economy businesses would find themselves competing with government to 
secure labour, goods and finance.382 In Hoppit’s view, however, those that 
adapted and survived while competitors melted away, stood to be rewarded.383 
So, although war was likely to have been a major factor in causing many 
failures, it was not necessarily bad for all businesses.  As Hoppit points out, 
wars also created business opportunities.384 Supplying armies and navies was 
profitable business.  He notes that early in the five major wars of the eighteenth 
century bankruptcies rose, but he also notes that they fell back towards the end 
of hostilities.385 Then the arrival of peace brought new problems as it did not 
benefit industries that had supplied the war effort such as the iron and steel 
sectors, which lost government contracts.386  Ending trade embargoes allowed 
influxes of cheaper imports which undermined domestic businesses. 
Wars did not simply cause material damage and loss, they also created 
uncertainty, instability, and a lack of confidence in the business environment.  
This, in conjunction with the lack of reliable information and the alarming nature 
of news arriving, could easily have a bearing on the types of decisions made.387 
Typically where money and confidence are interlinked, objectivity can be 
replaced by anxiety and the herd instinct.  It is much harder, however, to say 
that a war was the overwhelming direct cause of an individual bankruptcy.  
When the external trade and business environment heated up, it will often have 
been a matter of how well a specific business was structured and run when it 
came to survival or failure.  If wars did not directly cause financial crises, then 
other more peaceable activities of men could.  Hoppit essentially characterises 
financial crises as ‘moments when confidence in some financial mechanism 
evaporates and is followed by an intense demand for liquidity’.388 With 
generalised squeezes on credit across the population previously patient and 
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benign creditors could suddenly turn the heat on their debtors because they 
feared for their own financial integrity.  This study will show that it was almost 
always, at least with the cases selected, creditors’ actions to recover debts that 
directly caused individual bankruptcies. 
As has already been discussed many financial crises, which inevitably had a 
bearing on bankruptcies, were the result of war and disruption of overseas 
trade.  To say which crises were purely financial and when they happened is not 
straightforward, the question is discussed in much greater detail than here in 
Ashton and Hoppit.389 Ashton suggested thirteen financial crises for the 
eighteenth century: 1701, 1710, 1715, 1720, 1726, 1745, 1761, 1763, 1772, 
1778, 1793, and 1797; 1797 also saw the suspension of cash payments by the 
Bank of England, which were not fully resumed until 1821.390 For the first three 
decades of the nineteenth century Duffy sees the periodic surges in bankruptcy 
numbers as deriving essentially from fluctuations in overseas trade.391 Mina 
Ishizu notes the high occurrence of bankruptcies in the years 1810–11, 1815–
16 and 1825–26.  Bank failures in the first year followed by contractions in 
liquidity rippled out across the country causing failures in other sectors in the 
following year.392 Also, in the years following the end of the Napoleonic Wars 
there were problems with provincial banks, many being ‘cut down’ by what 
Pressnell called the ‘scythe of post-war deflation and depression’.  He records 
sixty country banks failing in 1825, as opposed to only three in London.393 Some 
partners in country banks are subjects in this study. 
For much of the eighteenth century the influence of financial crises on the 
number of bankruptcies had not been great, until matters changed radically in 
the 1770s.  When in 1772 the bankruptcy of Alexander Fordyce’s banking 
partnership in London and the failure of the Ayr Bank in Scotland occurred, a 
devastating ripple expanded across the financial system.  Then with the onset 
of the American Wars it meant colonists were not paying their debts; they owed 
British banks and businesses about five million pounds.394 A decade later in 
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1788 abusive credit practices led to the failure of a major calico printer and 
banker (Livesey, Hargreaves, Anstie, Smith & Hall) which in turn brought down 
other banks and businesses.395 These were major shocks that created credit 
climates in which bankruptcies were more likely.  However, in these climates 
only some traders failed.  The reader will therefore ask what exactly it was that 
tipped some traders into the abyss. 
 
4.3 The direct causes of individual failures 
Eighteenth-century people had their own explanations for the failure of others.  
According to Margaret Hunt the ‘trading classes’ had moved on from 
providential interpretations, and began to think in terms of material factors: 
lack of industry and especially inattention to one’s accounts, keeping bad 
company, lending to or otherwise supporting people who were 
untrustworthy or "in declining circumstances," drunkenness, illicit sexual 
activity, and domestic extravagance.  What was unusual was not the 
vices themselves, which were quite traditional, but the fact that they now 
seemed in and of themselves to provide a sufficient explanation for the 
phenomenon of failure.396 
These were popular and mostly simplistic explanations that clung to notions of 
personal weaknesses and moral shortcomings.  They were also not dissimilar to 
the explanations given from on high by the elite commentators who featured in 
chapter three.  Enough contemporaries probably understood that such 
behaviours did not directly cause failure.  They were anxious, however, about 
these behaviours because they threatened stability and, in Hunt’s words, to 
yield to vices ‘could tip the mechanism over and plunge everyone in one's orbit 
into bankruptcy’.397 There were still more explanations.  Grassby suggests that 
failures in business were sometimes the result of thefts or frauds.  Frauds, of 
course, were sometimes perpetrated by traders with the intention of enriching 
themselves through fraudulent bankruptcies.  Trading households could be 
destabilized by premature and untimely death from illness or third-party 
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bankruptcies.398 Lack of experience in business increased risk for traders, just 
as the possession of experience reduced risk.399 Grassby further maintains: 
the unskilled merchant was a danger both to himself and to 
others…Merchants in every area of trade complained about “raw young 
men” who were reckless, who overpaid and sold too cheaply.  The high 
degree of skill required by trade was frequently underestimated by 
gentlemen who mistakenly put their least intelligent children into 
business…in competitive trades, ignorance and poor judgement led to 
failure.400 
If businesses made it to maturity (Josiah Child estimated that ten years were 
necessary401) they were more likely to survive, but new entrants, according to 
Grassby, ‘were trapped in a vicious circle’.  Too many of them, with expensive 
borrowings, competed for scarce opportunities whilst compelled to take risks 
that were too great, and young merchants who failed ‘were thrust into the 
squalid, frightening world of the bankrupt, the criminal and the social outcast’.402 
It should be noted, however, that not all traders who failed entered the ‘squalid, 
frightening world of the bankrupt’.  As should emerge in this study, all bankrupts 
were not equal.  Some sank much deeper into frightening worlds, others barely 
at all. 
Failure was out there waiting for all but the most experienced and guarded.  For 
the unwary merchant in the second half of the eighteenth century, Schulte 
Beerbühl observes: ‘Wars, piracy, unreliable business partners, and 
misconceptions of distant, complex markets could quickly turn expected profits 
into losses.’403 Poor business decisions, loss of good reputation and 
creditworthiness, as well as unforeseen calamities including the failure of other 
businesses could all combine with events in the immediate business 
environment or changes in the wider economy to make failure an inevitability for 
some.  Valid all these factors are as plausible and probable causes, it is still 
very difficult to know the direct cause, or causes, of a specific case.  For 
example, Schulte Beerbühl relates that the cause of the failure in 1761 of 
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Uhthoff & Battier, a large London merchant house of German origin, was 
attributed by one to ‘great irregularity’ in the counting house, as well as 
‘excessive speculation’.  However, this was merely a contemporary’s opinion, 
as Schulte Beerbühl observes we cannot know if this was the case.404 If the 
lives of bankrupts are to be explored, questions about why they failed will 
always be raised, so can the sources help us at all? 
The answer in short, is not readily.  On the direct causes of bankruptcies Hoppit 
observes: ‘From the London Gazette it is possible to learn chronology, 
geography and occupation of eighteenth-century bankrupts but difficult to find 
the precise causes of failure. Indeed, among other sources direct evidence on 
the causes of bankruptcy is virtually non-existent.’405 Hoppit is right on both 
counts because for most bankruptcies that appeared in Gazette notices it is 
impossible to find complementary records.  Then, even when records of 
bankruptcies have been preserved the surviving documents are often few in 
number and of limited utility.  A beautifully calligraphed petition for the issue of a 
bankruptcy commission on parchment with the Lord Chancellor’s seal attached 
gives a few names which Gazette notices do not provide (e.g. name of 
petitioning creditor and commissioners), but from such a document we learn 
nothing about the factors that hastened a bankrupt’s demise. 
Where proceedings of individual bankruptcy commissions have survived this is 
a start.  Commissioners had the power to examine bankrupts extensively, but 
largely they confined themselves to ensuring commission procedures were 
observed and that the whereabouts of assets were revealed.  Hoppit maintains 
that bankrupts were ‘never required to explain how they had fallen into the 
abyss of failure’.406 This impression is easily arrived at after the perusal of many 
commission files.  However, ‘never’ is not quite the case as sometimes some 
explanations can be found, and this study brings a few explanations to light for 
a number of bankruptcies amongst the case studies.  Furthermore, in the better 
sets of bankruptcy records, usually from law firms’ collections where 
correspondence has survived, creditors can also be found providing their own 
‘explanations’ by levelling accusations at bankrupts about their behaviour and 
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practices.  If creditors could point to bankrupts’ villainy it was easier to justify 
their debt recovery actions which might entail seizure of debtors’ property or 
imprisonment of their bodies, than to show forbearance born of an 
understanding of misfortune caused by the wider economic climate.  Even if a 
creditor did feel inclined to ponder his debtor’s misfortune, this could be 
dangerous as delay might permit another harder-hearted creditor to land an 
execution or snatch the body of the debtor leaving less, or nothing, for the 
creditor with a modicum of compassion. 
So, ‘villainy’ was a convenient explanation and as a concept it was much easier 
to come to terms with than the far more elusive issue of solvency, which returns 
us to H.B.’s explanation in 1816 that: ‘Every one now became suspicious of the 
credit of his neighbour.  Money from all quarters was called in for payment.’407 
Basically, what H.B. was describing was a culture of ‘every man for himself’.  
When the external political and economic climate heated up and credit 
tightened, a trader’s survival depended on their ability to get paid by their 
debtors before they were forced themselves to settle with their own creditors.  
Typically, traders with weaker credit and poorer reputations, and who were 
often also smaller fish relative to their creditors, were the first to be leaned on to 
settle accounts.  If putative insolvent debtors were already late in meeting their 
obligations their creditors had the legal option to impose the kind of debt 
recovery actions described above.  The commencement of these actions would 
either precipitate matters such that a debtor sought the protection of a 
bankruptcy commission with the assistance of ‘friends’; or worse, if a creditor 
considered their interests would be better served by a commission he could get 
one issued without the acquiescence or even knowledge of the trader, in other 
words he could prosecute a hostile bankruptcy.  The latter action was 
particularly unwelcome to traders who maintained they were not insolvent and 
therefore should not be made bankrupts. 
Solvency was of course a contested state.  A trader’s solvency could only really 
be known either by a thorough examination of his books (assuming he kept 
them) and discovery of his assets, or an informed judgement by one who knew 
both trader and the trade intimately, or a combination of both.  Given that 
 
407 H. B., Thoughts upon the Causes of the Present Distress of the Country and upon their 





bookkeeping standards, as well as the business practices of some, were often 
poor, it should not be assumed that a trader would have known with any 
certainty whether he was solvent or not.  What others believed about his 
solvency could easily depend on what was in their interests.  For example, in 
the spring of 1808 when William James, a Swansea shopkeeper, was facing 
impending bankruptcy, protestations of solvency were made in his favour in 
correspondence.  One correspondent commented on ‘the affairs of William 
James’ maintaining that ‘he has more Effects than will pay all his debts’.  
Another respondent on James’s affairs was prepared to give the claim serious 
consideration, pondering ‘if he be as you represent him, solvent’.408 James was 
not saved from a commission becoming a bankrupt by the end of the 
summer.409 In 1813 another reluctant bankrupt’s complaint was that he had, in 
fact, always been solvent and that the issuing of a commission against him was 
at best ill-advised, and at worst malicious.  These were the complaints of 
Edmund Townsend who maintained that he had been engaged in ‘a very old 
and lucrative concern’ before some ‘adverse creditors’, who were reacting to the 
news that he had sustained losses, initiated a hostile bankruptcy despite his 
estate, he insisted, being ‘quite solvent’.410 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
What this chapter has shown is that it is not difficult to understand how, in the 
big picture, political events and economic changes created conditions that were 
likely to ‘favour’ the occurrence of bankruptcies.  The numbers show clearly that 
the greater the economic activity and the more ‘political’ events (particularly 
wars) there were, then the more bankruptcies there were.  Yet the closer we 
draw to the specifics of individual cases of bankruptcy then the harder it gets to 
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know what factor or event most determined a trader’s demise, although it will 
usually have been a combination of factors. 
To a considerable extent this is a problem of sources.  This study will show few 
bankrupts reflecting on the wider economy and business environment and what 
the implications were for them.  This is not to suppose that they did not reflect, 
but that simply their reflections are rarely evident in the sources.  Equally, 
reflections on how their own shortcomings in business might have contributed to 
their failure are also hard to find.  This raises the question of exactly to what, or 
to whom, did bankrupts attribute their failure.  The suggested answer is that 
although when they explained their failure, they frequently cited misfortunes and 
unexpected disappointments, what they felt really pulled the rug from under 
them were the actions of their creditors. 
In the following chapters the reader will notice bankrupts attributing their 
bankruptcies to the actions of creditors who had taken formal measures to 
recover their money.  The fact that creditors were rarely strangers, and indeed 
were sometimes ‘friends’ or family generally increased bankrupts’ resentment 
toward individuals who they held personally responsible for their demise.  This 
meant that for bankrupts their experience of failure was far more about personal 
relationships than it ever was about the economy or business practices.  The 


















Despite being in his late thirties in 1830 and being the proprietor of an 
established malting and carrying business in Sherborne, Dorset, John Slade 
was unmarried.  The account of his bankruptcy that year mentions no family 
except his sister, Mrs Whittle, who is mentioned only in reference to his final 
years in Sherborne.  At the time of his bankruptcy his ‘family’ were the servant 
couple who formed a household with him. 
John Slade dwelt next to his yard with his servants, William and Ann Luffman.  
When the Luffmans were called to be examined by the bankruptcy 
commissioners they provided the testimony required to prove an act of 
bankruptcy and for the commission to gain legal jurisdiction over Slade’s assets.  
However, it is also possible to get a sense from Ann’s statement that she held 
some affection for her master, whose sister was distraining his goods and 
personal effects, and that she had had some knowledge of his declining 
circumstances.  She seemed inclined to help him in so far as her position 
enabled her to.  She knew that in 1828, two years before the bankruptcy, Slade 
had been considering selling up and going to Van Diemen’s Land (present-day 
Tasmania).  She knew of his involvement ‘in a stud’.  He had clearly spoken to 
Ann about the problem his sister was causing him with an execution.  Ann 
believed one of his creditors’ (the butcher) bills was inflated.  She defended his 
trade practices assuring that ‘by his good management he would shew a poor 
man how to live’.411 
Ann related how an anxious Slade ‘called me to his bed room and desired I 
would not leave it ‘till he was asleep’.  With an execution in place and the 
sheriff’s officer’s man in the house Slade determined to flee in the night.  He 
turned to Ann for assistance in packing declaring, ‘My cruel Sister has 
distressed me’.  Ann related that Slade was too beside himself to do any 
packing as he ‘sat down on the bed side and cried and said you must do all, I 
can do nothing myself’.  Ann packed a trunk for him and then at Slade’s request 
 






got her husband William to load and ready the cart before driving Slade away.  
Ann related something of their farewell: she ‘parted from him that night in the 
Hall of his House; he wished me well and shook hands with me’.412 
At the time of his bankruptcy John Slade lacked the two basic pillars of support 
for a trader: family and friends.  Worse still his own family acted against him and 
caused his final demise.  In Grassby’s view, risky trades ‘were best financed 
within the family, because siblings and kin were less likely to imprison for 
debt’.413 Yet Slade’s sister’s execution exposed her brother to that most feared 
outcome for traders, that of prison and poverty.  Slade could not meet another 
levy upon his property and that meant the next creditor might easily have 
imprisoned him, hence he fled.  That night with no family or kin to aid him, Slade 
found friends in his servants.  For bankrupts to be deserted by family and 
friends was untypical, but neither was it exceptional. 
Family members with the financial wherewithal to assist and to sustain, and not 
pull the financial rug from under them, really mattered to bankrupts.  Once in 
financial difficulty troubled kin needed to borrow money which often required a 
relative to stand surety, or they simply needed to be directly rescued 
financially.414 These kinds of instrumental roles for family members in 
bankruptcies were representative of the inter-relatedness of family with the 
bankruptcy process and experience.  A case like Slade’s is unusual on a 
number of accounts: firstly, the explicit role of a close family member in his 
undoing which seemingly militates against any notion that family could always 
be relied upon to bail out, and not to torpedo, a relative facing financial failure.  
It is also unusual because of Slade’s apparent lack of recourse to any other 
family members or friends to keep him afloat.  But for the assistance of his 
servant Ann and finding a creditor to take out a petition of bankruptcy against 
him, he appears to have faced his bankruptcy alone without the usual 
interventions and assistance from family and friends that was the case for other 
subjects in this chapter.  Family and friends of course did not merely assist, they 
were often affected detrimentally by the bankruptcies. 
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Family also mattered to bankrupts as the privations they suffered were also 
imposed on those who were dependent upon them.  Hunt has observed that 
England had ‘a legal system in which the distinction between business liability 
and personal and family liability was extremely vague’.415 Thus family was 
quickly mired in seemingly interminable processes of debt recovery actions and 
litigation, which respected no boundaries.  More fortunate relatives, however, 
who were not dependants of bankrupts could provide financial and other 
assistance, therefore relationships with them mattered greatly to bankrupts.  
Hunt notes the eighteenth-century middling sort’s desire ‘to fashion the family 
into an emotional and financial refuge from the vicissitudes of business’.416 Yet 
family neither offered a simple solution to finance, or a straightforward safety 
net when things went wrong.  In Grassby’s words families ‘were not rational 
structures conforming to rules, but chaotic and infinitely diverse aggregations of 
individuals in motion’.417 Slade’s sister probably had her reasons for resorting to 
legal measures to recover money from her brother; relatives already established 
in business always feared contagion from their less prudent and business-like 
kin.  Relatives found themselves having to make loans or pay off debts.  Equally 
unscrupulous rescuers sometimes took advantage of their position as trusted 
kin to further their own ends.418 These factors surface in the discussion below of 
roles and relationships of those close to bankrupts. 
This study of bankruptcy and its consequences will consider all the people most 
closely involved with the subjects.  Failed traders did not experience bankruptcy 
in isolation they experienced it along with their families and the members of 
their households.  The role of family and friends in getting individuals into a 
trade, and once there assisting them, has received plenty of attention in early 
modern and long eighteenth-century historiography.419 Arguably somewhat less 
attention has been given to the roles of family and friends when things went 
financially wrong. This chapter on family and friends attempts to address this 
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gap and to assess to what extent bankrupts’ families and friends cushioned 
them or compounded their troubles, and to assess what effect these behaviours 
had on relationships.  The chapter approaches family and friends in three parts: 
in the first part the significance of family roles and relationships are addressed; 
the second addresses the importance to bankrupts of finding ‘friends’ to assist 
them; and the third part goes into greater detail about the most important 




Mr Fortescue is quite dissatisfied with me[,] it may be to the future 
serious injury of my family…420 
The Mr Fortescue, who was believed to threaten such harm to John Brickdale’s 
family, was not one more impatient trade creditor, but rather he was related by 
marriage to the bankrupt.  This seems to fly in the face of notions that the family 
was essentially a safety unit or network for distressed traders.  Grassby’s view 
on family and its response to members in financial trouble, that conflicts ‘were 
inevitable but usually resolved…[k]in and friends provided crucial advice and 
assistance at moments of crisis and stress’, will still find support in this study.421 
However, there will be instances where kin (and friends) provided little 
assistance and ramped up the stress. 
Family members were involved in all aspects of bankruptcies, but particularly 
early on they were vital participants in the theatre that was the committing of 
acts of bankruptcy.  In 1772 Ann Adams was owed money by shopkeeper David 
Brigstock, and so in July she sent her niece Polly Adams to Brigstock’s home to 
ask for payment.  Brigstock, who was in his shop nearby, responded with a 
member of his family sending his wife to tell Polly he was not at home.422 On 
another occasion Brigstock’s brother, Jeremiah, who had been living with 
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Brigstock and working in the shop for some ten years, received the creditor 
Philip William on 20 July 1773.  William told Jeremiah that he wanted to speak 
to Brigstock, and when Jeremiah located his brother in a field near the house, 
Brigstock told Jeremiah to deny him to William, which Jeremiah did for his 
brother and master.423 
Brigstock managed to have his family members acting out their roles in the 
manner that he understood they had to in order to commit an act of bankruptcy 
correctly.  This proved to be far from the case with Hampshire brewer, Thomas 
Lodge. Before he became a bankrupt, he was depending on his relatives to 
repeatedly meet creditors’ demands on him, whilst at the same time seeming to 
fall out with his family.  Hunt makes the point that the middling sort did not have 
landowners’ option to mortgage estates, so creditors depended more on the 
strength of kin relationships to guarantee payments.  In the event of business or 
financial disaster there was a moral onus on kin to come to the rescue and 
spare relatives the seizure of their goods or imprisonment.424 There were, 
however, sometimes limits to kin’s patience and they also perceived threats to 
their own interests, which necessarily conflicted with that moral onus.  This is 
demonstrated in the case of Thomas Lodge who had got on the wrong side of a 
number of creditors, as well as Sir Henry Paulet St John (Sir Harry) for whom 
he had been acting as steward. 
On 9 January 1775 Lodge was arrested at the suit of five creditors for debts of 
£906.  His release was obtained by his brother-in-law Wyeth giving security to 
the creditors.  Wyeth received some security as Lodge first conveyed three 
houses and some ground to him.425 Family assisted again when Lodge returned 
from London on 22 January 1775 and found his father-in-law, Mr Stephens, 
waiting for him.  According to Richard Allee, a servant, ‘he found Mr Stephens 
at his house and expressed the greatest concern but said he [Stephens] did not 
mind it’ and that Lodge ‘should stand his ground and that he could pay every 
one and should not go out of the way for fear of being arrested’.426 It is not clear 
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from Allee’s statement whether Lodge or Stephens ‘could pay every one’, 
although Stephens seems more likely as he had the opportunity to honour the 
assurance the next day.  On 23 January when Lodge was arrested again, this 
time for £340, Stephens stood bail for him and Lodge was once again 
released.427 
Family assistance in Lodge’s manoeuvres to avoid arrest continued on 
Wednesday 25 January when he went to his father’s house and hid until the 
following Sunday.  During this sojourn there occurred the more unusual 
intervention of a sibling when Lodge’s sister Jane, asked Lodge’s servant, 
Richard Allee, to deny that Lodge was at the house.428 If the wrong family 
members participated in an attempted act of bankruptcy this could be a cause 
of subsequent problems at law. 
Repeatedly performing these rescues until the demands became too great, may 
have been what prompted Stephens, along with Lodge’s ‘colleague’ Henry Lunn 
and Lodge’s own father, ‘finding they could not get rid of the Execution [taken 
out against Lodge’s goods] formed a plan of making Lodge a Bankrupt for 
defeating Sir Harry of his Remedy and Lunn struck a Doquet for a Commission 
of Bankruptcy’.  Later Stephens and Lunn would nimbly get themselves chosen 
as assignees at a poorly attended second meeting of creditors.429 Lunn’s 
friendship with Lodge would come under pressure later, but Stephens’ 
appointment as assignee aimed to secure both family interest, and control.  
How much Stephens acted with the knowledge and consent of Lodge, and how 
much he was acting in his own interests rather than out of familial loyalty, is less 
clear, but it is possible that Stephens and Lodge’s father used the family 
members they could influence, their daughters, to attempt to construct acts of 
bankruptcy around Lodge.  The next month Stephens continued to act 
decisively in his son-in-law’s affairs after the sale of Lodge’s effects had been 
advertised on 20 February.  Stephens, ‘apprehending that Matters might be 
accommodated’ intervened directly by paying Lodge’s most powerful creditor 
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(Sir Harry) a visit and got his consent for a postponement of the sale until 
assignees had been chosen for Lodge’s estate.430 
The possibility, at least in some cases, that family assistance only persisted for 
as long as the assisting party was securing the principal benefit is suggested by 
the souring of Thomas Lodge’s relationship with his wife and her family.  Lodge 
had been adamant that he was not a bankrupt and that a commission was 
unnecessary and, furthermore, that there was no debt above £100.  Such was 
his position that he initiated his own lawsuit against the assignees, one of whom 
was his father-in-law.431 Furthermore, Lodge’s unexplained absences from 
home may not have endeared him to his wife and her family, but his behaviour 
over the bankruptcy may have been the cause of an even greater cooling with 
her father. There was a move by creditors against Lodge’s own father, but 
whether Stephens was amongst those creditors is unclear.432 Unsurprisingly, 
problems with debts, sometimes leading to bankruptcy, caused friction in 
families within and across generations.  Sometimes family and friends were 
creditors, or they had given sureties.  As a result of their kinsmen’s or friends’ 
predicament they often stood liable to bear substantial losses themselves, 
which gave them a sense of license to interfere. 
Another parent who intervened in a bankruptcy was Isaac Orchard, the father of 
bankrupt widow and haberdasher Ann Harding.  Ann had tried to continue the 
family business while her husband was hiding and then after his death.  
Orchard was financially linked to Ann’s husband Thomas, as they had entered 
into a joint bond on 15 October 1804 binding them to John Griffit for the sum of 
£500 plus interest (the bond was for £1,000).433 Orchard, an ‘accomptant’ was 
also a creditor in Ann’s bankruptcy for the amount of £90 1s 10d, which was not 
one of the larger debts.  The trustees of Thomas Harding’s estate held a debt of 
£930 12s 10d.  The firm of Sleigh and Alsop were owed £193 7s 10d.434 
After her husband’s death Ann was pursued by his creditors.  In September 
1806 Messrs. Sleigh, Alsop & Co had obtained an execution which they 
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intended to levy on Ann’s goods.  Requests on behalf of Orchard to ‘remove the 
execution off the goods’ were refused.  An officer was placed in Ann’s house by 
the Under Sheriff, and in effect he was in possession of Ann’s goods.  It was 
this circumstance that decided Ann’s father to strike a docket against Ann, the 
intention being ‘to prevent a sale of her effects under the execution’.  Orchard 
himself would not strike the docket (or could not if his debt was below £100), but 
rather Samuel Ash, a Bristol merchant, agreed to be the petitioning creditor.  
Orchard’s initiative persuaded the other party’s solicitor to ‘assent to take off the 
officer if an affidavit of act of Bankruptcy having been committed previous to the 
levy should be produced to him’.  Ann’s father then obliged by drawing up the 
affidavit of an act of bankruptcy.435 
Ann Harding’s brother Isaac Orchard (‘the younger’), had been assisting her in 
the haberdashery trade, and he was the principal witness of the denial of a 
creditor for the proof of an act of bankruptcy.436 During the bankruptcy 
proceedings Ann was being put under some pressure by Samuel Ash to 
account for every last effect, and when he informed Ann that ‘a pair of saddle 
bags were missing from the house’ he asked her to write to her brother to see if 
he had taken them.  The detailed reply Ann received from her brother about the 
whereabouts of items in the house: ‘on the shelf above the kitchen stairs’ and ‘in 
the third storey front room over the best bedroom’, suggest that he enjoyed 
autonomous access to the house during the taking of the inventory and 
possession of the Hardings’ domestic goods, and to have had access to the 
house, whilst Ann did not.437 
Ann’s situation was distinct from most women caught up in bankruptcies 
because, unlike the wives and daughters who are also discussed in this 
chapter, Ann was the bankrupt.  Although the male bankrupts in this study were 
very evidently stripped of much of their agency, they still found ways to make 
themselves instrumental by using their unique knowledge of their trading 
networks to assist the assignees to get in debts, as was the case with David 
Kennedy, who is discussed in detail in chapter seven.  Ann, however, seems to 
 
435 Ibid: Solicitor’s Bill, September 1806. 
436 Ibid: commission memoranda. 






have been left little agency as the sources largely only record the decisions or 
actions of her father, brother, and a solicitor. 
Providing financial assistance to relatives involved risk to the helper.  Unhappily, 
as examples from this study of bankrupts show, relatives who came to the 
rescue often found themselves having to worry about preserving their own 
households from falling to creditors, which inevitably had negative 
consequences for relationships.  The ripple effect of a bankruptcy on other 
family members was particularly marked in the case of the Brickdale family, 
bankers in Taunton, Somerset.  In 1819 both John Brickdale and his father, 
Matthew, had bankruptcy commissions issued against them.  On top of this 
John Brickdale’s son, John Fortescue Brickdale, was imprisoned for debt.  
Furthermore, John Inglett Fortescue, Brickdale’s brother-in-law who had 
provided sureties on behalf of the floundering banker, found himself subject to 
actions by Brickdale’s creditors, which soured relations.  On 20 February 1820 
Brickdale lamented to Robert Beadon, the commission solicitor and family 
friend, that he felt: 
Harrassed and almost worn out…by the daily letters I receive (in no very 
pleasant language) from Mr Fortescue, and the lamentable situation in 
which my son is placed.  I…must trust to your kindness in turning your 
thoughts [to] how we may effect some arrangement to calm the irritated 
feelings of Mr F. and to liberate my son from the thraldom which now 
separates him from his wife & family.438 
Here family was not pulling together, and early support seemed to have given 
way to persecution.  Brickdale clearly resented his brother-in-law, whilst he 
helplessly saw members of his family subjected to all manner of privations. 
Family also made matters harder in the case of John Slade, the bankrupt 
Sherborne maltster introduced at the beginning of this chapter.  Slade’s sister 
had obtained a writ of fieri facias which empowered the sheriff’s officer to place 
an execution (the taking possession of moveable property) in Slade’s house.  
By seizing and selling her brother’s effects before anyone else did, she stood a 
good chance of getting cash for the whole value of the debt.  The records do not 
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reveal Slade’s sister’s side of the story and Slade portrayed her as merely an 
external persecutor.  Ann Luffman, Slade’s domestic servant, in her 
examination recalled Slade lamenting that ‘he could not think how his Sister 
could be so cruel’.439 But likewise bankrupts and their financial disasters made 
things harder for family. 
Bankrupt banker Alexander Fordyce’s brothers’ ‘honourably acquired’ fortunes 
were ‘irrecoverably sunk in the vortex, and lost for ever!’.  For his brother James 
this entailed a ‘contracted household’.  Where previously they had been 
accustomed to ‘luscious sweets of plenty’, now his wife, she herself claimed, 
‘regulated every thing with such nicety, frugality, and decorum’ that they 
apparently managed to disguise the fact that their circumstances were reduced.  
Fordyce’s other brother, William, also had to settle for ‘humbler felicity’.440 
However, the suffering was always relative.  Elite traders turned bankrupts, who 
had relatives amongst the wealthy and gentry, rarely experienced the privations 
faced by more modest tradesmen like Slade for whom family assistance, or the 
absence of it, equally mattered. 
However, membership of the gentry was no guarantee of ready assistance from 
family.  In the 1760s former Hull gentleman trader Thomas Pyott, forever on the 
verge of bankruptcy, lamented in his journal that those who threatened to 
imprison him ‘will not believe me when I tell them I have not a Relation that can 
deliver me’.441 Pyott’s struggle with his own feelings about his impecunious 
circumstances made his attempts at negotiating assistance with his relatives 
difficult.  He was willing to accept ‘Generosity’ if it were offered, but he was 
fearful of the reaction he might get if he dared to ‘ask for money’.442 Pyott did 
eventually get some assistance from a branch of his family, but it did not come 
quickly or easily.  The implications of his dilemma with his relations is discussed 
further in chapter eight. 
When bankrupts were unable to obtain assistance from their relatives, the 
bankrupts were left contemplating the consequences for the welfare of their 
families who they were unable to support.  In 1813 Edmund Townsend, a 
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bankrupt who seemed unable to enlist help from family or friends, went onto the 
printed page and there fretted that he was ‘sixty years of age, unequal to great 
and continued exertion’, and he was even more anxious for his family.  His 
daughter was ‘as yet incapable of supporting herself’, and his wife was ‘solely 
dependent upon him’, although he would go on to maintain that in any case he 
was unable to support them.443 By 1817 matters had not improved for 
Townsend and family.  Having attained the age of sixty-four his cries about the 
injustice done him by the bankruptcy commission continued, his thirteen year-
old daughter was ‘without even commonly decent apparel’, nor did he have the 
means to provide an education for her.444 Invoking the sufferings of family 
members was a recurring way in which bankrupts petitioned public figures for 
help in their misfortunes and tried to enlist the help of individuals beyond their 
circles of family and friends.  It was a way to portray themselves as victims and 
not villains.  It was a way to emphasize the injustices they believed they were 
subject to as a result of malicious commissions.  It was also a supplication for 
lenient and indulgent treatment, and for financial help and employment. 
 
Part Two 
5.2 Finding Friends 
‘A meeting will make friends, and you will be protected.  A contempt of 
this overture will be your utter ruin’.445 
The above warning to a debtor was part of a notice placed in the Sunday Times 
in 1831.  It was accompanied with the further threat ‘to Advertise you, and take 
out a Commission of Bankruptcy’.  Clearly making ‘friends’ was the better option 
for the addressee.  Bankrupts needed to find people to be ‘friends’, especially if 
the assistance provided by family was insufficient or non-existent.446 Following 
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the dynamics of bankrupts’ relationships with family in their households and 
other close relatives, their relationships with certain friends, who were 
sometimes also relatives, were the most significant in shaping their experience, 
for better or worse.  Friends were important to the bankrupts in this study, both 
before, during, and after their bankruptcies.  Some of the bankrupts in this study 
were helped into business by individuals they described as friends.447 Then in 
times of trouble they also placed their hopes in friends; and sometimes in 
anyone who they desperately hoped might be a friend to them in their distress.  
In 1752 Edward Kennedy found himself having to implore another to be his 
friend: ‘I have never a friend in the world besides yourself and I beg that you will 
stand my friend in regard to it [getting his certificate] against the next 
meeting’.448 
Identifying and being able to trust new friends was fraught with dangers.  Early 
in his ill-fated entry into business Thomas Pyott had put his trust in one man, 
but as it turned out ‘[t]his man, with all the flattering professions of Friendship, 
after He had boasted of laying the ground plot of my Ruin, and… was the very 
first to tell the difficulties I was under upon change, and every Book-sellers 
Shop in Hull, surmising the consequence must be a Bankruptcy.’449 Pyott had 
made a poor choice, when what he needed were friends who would be ‘allies, 
backers, associates: persons on whose support one could rely in times of 
need’.450 With his credit shot to pieces Pyott was left lamenting that he knew no 
one who ‘had Humanity or Generosity to assist’ him.451 
Edmund Townsend, bankrupt in 1805, was initially favoured by an act of 
friendship when he entered his first business by succeeding a relation.  
However, when he entered his ill-fated wine and spirit dealing venture in Covent 
Garden he did so by acting as manager for ‘a gentleman of fortune, who found 
capital’.  He recorded that his ‘friend retired from the concern a few years 
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after…and left the capital in my hands’.452  Townsend is notable for, apart from 
his wife and daughter, not mentioning further family at all.  After his bankruptcy 
and the onset of privations Townsend set great store by the benign attention of 
‘friends’.  During the inclement weather of the winter of 1813, he had borne two 
months of ‘sufferings’ whilst his family in London were ‘equally distressed’.  
Their privations were alleviated by the intervention of a ‘benevolent Patron’ who 
enabled them to procure ‘clothes and other necessaries’.  Townsend 
subsequently dined several times with his ‘polite and condescending’ helper.  
He did not name the man, but as ‘he took pains to enter fully into my case’, he 
may have been a lawyer.  However, Townsend was to find that ‘friends’ equally 
had their dangers.  Townsend annotated some entries on the cash account he 
kept for his sojourn in Bath, in which a condemnation of one Mr T. is scribbled in 
the margin: ‘a – refers to transactions with a professed friend who obtained 
money from me and others for my use and retained it for his own purposes’.453 
How could stricken traders find friends at all, let alone identify genuine friends?  
Thomas Pyott needed friends because he had no money.  This only distressed 
him further because he saw lack of money as an obstacle to finding friends.  He 
expressed his awful predicament declaring, ‘I am now destitute of money, 
consequently of Friends’.454 
Having to rely on people who were not relations to be ‘friends’ meant risks were 
higher.  A calamitous quest for a ‘friend’ was undertaken by David Brigstock.  
He was arrested for debt in Carmarthen on 26 July 1773 and held there in 
custody.  On 28 July Brigstock was contacted by John Philipps, who had heard 
of his confinement.  Philipps [sic] offered to be Brigstock’s ‘friend and extricate 
him’ from the debt for which he was held, which Philipps did, and Brigstock was 
released.  However, Philipps’ friendship was disingenuous, and highly 
conditional.  While Brigstock was still detained, Philipps sent two men to secure 
Brigstock’s shop and appraise his stock.  They were received and assisted by 
Mrs Brigstock.  They then nailed up the shop door and carried off the keys and 
books. 
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This was the state of affairs at Whitland Forge when the freshly-liberated 
Brigstock arrived home.  A few days later Philipps called Brigstock to his home 
in [Way…], and there he asked Brigstock to give him security for his debt 
promising ‘to be his friend in future if he would comply’.  Brigstock did comply 
and executed a bill of sale of his goods and stock to Philipps.  Furthermore, 
Philipps offered to let Brigstock remain in possession of his goods so that he 
could sell them to pay his other creditors.  No sooner had he executed the bill, 
than Philipps demanded payment of his debt.  When Brigstock could not pay, 
his ‘friend’ had Brigstock’s stock sold whilst all the time keeping him locked out 
of his shop.455 
Having been failed by one ‘friend’, Brigstock quickly sought another to get a 
commission of bankrupt issued against him.  With Philipps seemingly betraying 
David Brigstock’s trust and pushing him further to the wall, Brigstock wrote to 
Richard George, a deal merchant in Bristol, on 7 October 1773:  
I am very sorry to give you this trouble for I never thought it would come 
so, but as I throwed myself to hands I should not, I have been consilling 
with lawers which is Mr Watkins of Laugharne and Mr James of 
Hollway… 
These lawyers had advised Brigstock that he needed to persuade one of his 
creditors to take out a commission of bankruptcy against him, and thus he 
turned to Richard George saying that he could do nothing ‘without you be 
pleased to be a friend to one’.456 Brigstock was relieved when he finally 
received a response from George on 16 November 1773.  Brigstock replied to 
him the following day addressing himself to his ‘Esteemed Friend’, and 
explaining how, while he had been waiting anxiously for a reply to his request, 
he had been ‘thinking I had not a friend to take my part’.457 
Unfortunately, we do not have George’s side of the correspondence, but 
Brigstock wrote to him again on 28 November.  He said his brother Jeremiah, 
who worked in the shop, and who had lived with Brigstock for some ten years, 
would be able to testify to an act of bankruptcy.  Brigstock closed his letter 
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declaring himself George’s ‘most distressed’ servant.458 Brigstock would again 
have a long uncomfortable wait for news from George, and on 8 January 
Brigstock wrote again: 
Sir, Being so long without having answer from you forced me to write 
these lines hoping, Sir, you will not fail with the first opportunity… 
Brigstock needed to know if George would petition to make him a bankrupt.  
Brigstock continued: 
the way of bankrupt is the best if you would be as kind as to help us 
through…but ‘tis of no use to talk about it if you be not willing to assist 
us…459 
Brigstock was trying to find a friend who would concert a bankruptcy with him, 
which despite being illegal was common practice.  A better friend might have 
told Brigstock that to discuss it in writing was ill-advised.  Brigstock’s 
importuning letters to a ‘friend’ would come back to bite him, as they were 
exhibited at the Quarter Sessions.  He found the contrary to what he had 
sought.  As Grassby observes ‘friend’ only has meaning ‘in relation to its 
opposite, that is enemies and complete strangers’.460 The kind of friendships 
that Brigstock had hurried into with Philipps and George were no more than 
what Hobbes called ‘market friendship’.461 The trust he placed in their friendship 
had been misplaced.462 Both Philipps and George were mere market friends to 
Brigstock, and as creditors who were not willing to be patient and forbearing 
they were not friends at all.  Creditors who were willing to wait, as well as being 
prepared to compound on debts, were friends. 
In this study the bankrupt with undoubtedly the most complex and fraught 
relations with family, friends and creditors was Taunton banker John Brickdale.  
If Brickdale had had friends aplenty before his bankruptcy, he was at pains to 
find friends to assist him afterwards.  One person who had been standing by 
him consistently was Taunton solicitor Robert Beadon.  A friend in the law was 
very useful to bankrupts, and Beadon is a good example.  Although it should be 
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noted that, as many of the case records used in this study were generated or 
accumulated by solicitors, and some like Beadon were already friends of the 
subjects before they became bankrupts, these lawyers predictably stand out as 
bankrupts’ friends. Even if not already a friend, records often show solicitors 
putting themselves across in a friendly, helpful and well-intentioned way 
towards bankrupts.  Although the bias of the sources, mentioned above, should 
be remembered. 
In the particularly complex nature of the Brickdale bankruptcy the pre-existing 
relationship with Taunton solicitor Robert Beadon was a vital asset to the family 
in their attempts to find their way out of a maelstrom of litigious actions.  The 
significance of the relationship between Beadon and the Brickdales became 
evident when George Nuttall, the Brickdale family’s bailiff, was casting about for 
an attorney to assist him in taking out a petition of bankruptcy against the 
Brickdales.  His first choice was Robert Beadon, but he was advised to the 
contrary.  Beadon, he was told, was a friend of Matthew Brickdale’s.  Nuttall had 
to visit three other attorneys before he found one at home.463 
As the Brickdales’ affairs lurched ever closer to bankruptcy John Brickdale 
increasingly reached for family friend Robert Beadon.  He wrote to Beadon on 
31 October 1819: ‘[I] am very unwilling to lay so grievous a tax upon you though 
I know that you would not consider yourself or your personal convenience to do 
no service’.464 Brickdale, rightly or wrongly, never wanted to accept that 
bankruptcy offered the only way out of his difficulties, and he relied on Beadon 
as a friend to influence other ‘friends’.  In November he asked Beadon to gather 
together the bank creditors in order to ‘convince them that an arrangement 
would be preferable to a Bankruptcy’.  This he believed could be achieved ‘if our 
friends would be really in earnest about it’.465 For Brickdale Beadon was a very 
useful friend because he could connect Brickdale to other ‘friends’ who might 
assist him. 
Brickdale often seemed to believe that those he considered ‘friends’, especially 
Beadon, would be able to steer developments to suit him.  Once he had been 
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declared a bankrupt, Brickdale was clearly anxious to be free of the status of a 
bankrupt and his obligations under the commission.  Quite unrealistically he 
wanted his certificate of discharge signed by the creditors before he had his 
final examination.  Again, Brickdale believed that ‘friends’, guided or cajoled by 
Beadon, would be readily persuaded.  Beadon, however, was less confident 
that there existed a collective amenable disposition amongst the friends and 
advised Brickdale on 6 December that he did not think he would ‘get any one of 
your creditors, except it be a very particular friend, to sign your certificate’ 
before having finished his examination.466 
Still determined that the ‘friends’ would be willing to oblige him, the next day 
Brickdale wrote to Beadon proposing to consult Beadon about 
getting our friends to come and prove their debts at the first meeting, as 
well as to lay the plan for my last examination – should not the Certificate 
be prepared that as our friends prove they may sign…467 
Even when Brickdale was keeping a low-profile he was in continuous contact 
with Beadon over debts and the sale of assets.  He had also begun to recognise 
that he needed assistance to find employment.  He told Beadon: 
I wish I was in a situation to avail myself of the kindness of some friends 
who might think me proper to fill the situation of assessor in some place 
of contested election.  It would be very convenient for I am living upon 
charity and unable to do anything (which I would most willingly 
undertake) to gain a present livelihood.468 
The category of ‘friends’ Brickdale alluded to now were not quite the same as 
those to whom he owed money and who he had hoped might offer him 
agreeable terms.  With the bankruptcy a fact, Brickdale looked to those who 
would find him a job.  People who helped others obtain employment were 
gratefully considered ‘friends’.469 In the meantime while Brickdale hoped for a 
more permanent situation he had to live and feed his family, which led him to 
resort to yet another kind of friend, one willing to advance cash.  When the loss 
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of entitlement to a life insurance pay-out threatened, for the want of ready 
money Brickdale asked Beadon, ‘Could I get a friend to advance the Premium 
[?]’.470 Ten days later when writing to Beadon again he confessed that he had 
only ‘a very few pounds left of a small sum which a friend lent me and am 
paying here for the board – lodging, washing of Mrs B. a daughter and 
myself’.471 Prior to the bankruptcy the friendship between Beadon and Brickdale 
may have been an instrumental relationship, one described by Thomas as 
existing between individuals of unequal power and status, but where there was 
‘mutual self-interest’.472 After his bankruptcy the former banker and estate 
owner’s power and status was diminished, but it is evident that Brickdale 
expected Beadon to continue to be a friend to him in an instrumental way by 
finding people to be Brickdale’s friends.  Eventually, ‘Some friends’ did help him, 
as by the beginning of 1821 he was employed at the Custom House in Bristol.  
 
Part Three 
5.3 Bankrupts’ Wives  
certainly you would not have your Wife and all your Family to be a 
Servant…473 
Thus, Thomas Pyott reproached himself for even contemplating a way out of his 
difficulties by requiring his wife to adapt to a diminished social status.  Reality 
was that wives were almost as much impacted by bankruptcy as the bankrupts 
themselves, and it would be impossible to narrate the experience of bankrupts 
without dedicating space to their wives, with whom their social and economic 
lives were intimately bound.  If they had both been involved in running a 
business, then in Hannah Barker’s words, ‘the bond between husband and wife’ 
was crucial.474 In the event of a bankruptcy there was probably no more tested 
relationship than that existing between bankrupt and wife. 
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Wives’ entrepreneurial business activity and competent domestic management 
have been increasingly identified by historians.475 And thus far this study has 
found no evidence of wives’ poor domestic or trade management.  Neither has 
this study encountered evidence of wives’ extravagance, which contemporary 
commentators blamed for contributing to bankruptcies.  What the evidence in 
this study does suggest is that it was bankrupt men’s risk-taking or poor credit 
management that was responsible for their financial difficulties.  On this point 
Amanda Vickery has observed that even if imprudent household consumption of 
luxuries had been a contributing factor to difficulties, husbands were as much 
spenders, if not more, than their wives.476 We might reasonably expect the 
wives of the more modest subjects in this study, rather than squandering 
proceeds, to have been contributing to running the family business. 
Wives were part of what Erickson calls ‘an economic partnership’.477 Some of 
the wives that feature in this study were involved in, and clearly understood, 
their husbands’ trades.  This was not unusual as businessmen were likely to 
marry within the business community, often finding spouses amongst 
neighbours and friends.478 Grassby observes: ‘most wives of businessmen were 
not marginalized, divorced from production, nor converted into idle breeders’ 
and husbands and wives ‘fundamentally worked as a team with flexible 
strategies’.479 In fact it was only prudent for wives to work with and know their 
husbands’ trades.480 Catherine Hall maintains that a ‘major field of women’s 
economic activity in the eighteenth century was as wives, daughters, mothers 
and sisters active in family enterprises’.  Hall lists many areas of competence in 
which retailer’s wives were routinely involved which included: ‘minding the shop 
when necessary and looking after business affairs when their husbands were 
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away’.481 Sweet and Lane maintain that ‘women were a significant presence in 
the eighteenth-century urban economy’.482 Involvement in business was not 
limited to shopkeepers and similar retail trades, according to Anne Murphy: 
‘women from all strata of society operated autonomously in business and 
displayed competence both in running their own enterprises and contributing to 
those operated by others’.483 Murphy further maintains that because ‘the wives 
of merchants often worked jointly with their husbands’ this ‘ensured that they 
would have been comfortable supervising business, negotiating credit and 
making and receiving payments’.484 Furthermore, she adds, ‘wives of merchants 
and other tradesmen commonly found themselves in charge at home while their 
husbands were away’.485 
With many wives accustomed to assisting their husbands in the running of their 
businesses, and some proving themselves the equals of their husbands,486 we 
should expect to find some being proactive during their bankrupt husbands’ 
incapacitation.  There was, however, anxiety in eighteenth-century England 
about the preparedness of members of trading families for the management of 
disaster, such as a husband becoming a bankrupt.  In the case of wealthier 
traders, Hall notes that: ‘Up to the Restoration it had been seen as quite natural 
that wives of merchants and large farmers should play an active part in 
business affairs but from 1660 onward this seems to become increasingly 
unusual.’487 Defoe was particularly concerned that his eighteenth-century male 
contemporaries in trade would neglect to ensure that their wives were 
sufficiently versed in their trades.  He firmly believed that a wife should be ‘let 
into the knowledge of their business…that she may be put into a posture to 
save him from ruin, if it be possible, or to carry on some business without him, if 
he is forc’d to fail, and fly; as many have been’.488 He worried that some wives 
would incline to ‘being above taking notice of their husbands affairs’.  He 
thought this poor judgement as life married to a tradesman entailed ‘a state of 
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life full of accidents and hazards, and that innumerable families in as good 
circumstances as theirs fall every day into disasters and misfortunes’.489 
Nevertheless, Defoe did not lack confidence in bankrupts’ wives’ capabilities: 
How many widows of tradesmen, nay, and wives of broken and ruin’d 
tradesmen do we daily see recover themselves and their shatter’d 
families, when the man has been either snatch’d away by death, or 
demolish’d by misfortunes, and has been forced to fly to the East or 
West-Indies, and forsake his family in search of bread? 490 
Certainly, becoming a bankrupt prevented a husband from continuing to run his 
business.  They were often absent from their family and home for periods and 
their executive powers were curtailed.  This meant, in some cases, their wives 
became instrumental in certain matters.  It should be noted that wives did not 
take over the running of their bankrupt husbands’ enterprises as everything 
necessary to the continuation of their business was seized following the 
declaration of bankruptcy. 
Almost without exception what is known about the subjects’ wives and what 
they were doing before the bankruptcies, and to what extent they were involved 
in the family business, is limited.  More generally, according to Vickery, 
evidence of wives’ roles from account-books, for example, is sparse as the 
books of families who ‘went to the wall’ ended up on the bonfire.491 However, 
the records of bankruptcies do reveal something of wives’ roles and experience 
within middling-sort households during distressed financial circumstances.  
Bankrupts’ wives were often in the front line when creditors came to call, and 
this is reflected in the most basic depositions in commission records.  In 
September 1739 when a creditor called twice at absconded King’s Lynn 
merchant George Clay’s house, it fell to his wife to inform the creditor that her 
husband was not at home.492 In March 1743 in Somerset a sheriff’s officer 
arrived at the home of yarn washer Richard Hutchings to arrest him for a debt of 
£20, but it was Hutchings wife, Philadelphia, who met the officer, her husband 
having already fled.493 How well he had prepared her, if at all, seems doubtful 
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as according to Hutchings’ wife, he only told her of his circumstances the day 
before he left.494 While David Brigstock was under arrest in Carmarthen his 
wife, Ann, faced the men who had come to nail up the door to her shop.495 
In other cases, in the final days before bankruptcy wives sometimes ran the 
family business while their husbands were hiding to avoid arrest (or had already 
been arrested), or they took charge of other crucial matters.  Other wives, 
having been widowed, endeavoured to continue a family business, before 
sometimes facing bankruptcy themselves, as was the case with Ann Harding.  
Then, after their husbands’ bankruptcies wives sometimes took action regarding 
the bankrupt estate or with their bankrupt husbands’ personal affairs.496   
Ann Harding, the wife of Bristol haberdasher Thomas Harding, had to cover for 
him while he was hiding from his creditors.  Harding was ‘so much in debt and 
his affairs so deranged’ that he was considered unlikely to ‘shew himself in 
public for some months’, yet ‘the Shop is continued by his Wife’.  Thomas 
Harding was not a bankrupt at this stage, but it was looming, and attorneys 
Bowen & Lucas were openly discussing the option of issuing a commission.497 It 
was not long before Harding died intestate leaving Ann with several young 
children.  She not only had to contend with being administratrix of her late 
husband’s estate, but she also had to deal with being made a bankrupt herself.  
Much trouble arose from the difficulty in separating Harding’s assets and 
liabilities from those subsequently acquired by Ann when she carried on the 
family trade, after her husband’s death, but prior to being declared a 
bankrupt.498 
Even if some wives were little involved in running the family business, they were 
frequently drawn into and implicated in the set actions and behaviours that 
surrounded attempts at committing acts of bankruptcy.  Acts had to be 
committed in conformity with the prevailing conventions, legal opinions, and 
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judgements on what constituted a bona fide act of bankruptcy (discussed in 
chapter two).  It is difficult to learn from the records if any agreements existed 
between spouses to act in a concerted way.  I have to conclude, given that 
endeavouring to get a bankruptcy commission issued was often the best way 
for a family to protect itself, that there will have been considerable agreement 
between spouses in trying to get a commission.  However, as this study should 
make abundantly clear, the consequences of decisions taken, and the course of 
events often did not proceed according to anyone’s plans or expectations, and 
there remain questions about the extent to which act of bankruptcy ‘etiquette’ 
was understood, or misunderstood, by the different parties involved in a 
household. 
One example of where a course of action might have been agreed by husband 
and wife occurs in the case of Thomas Lodge.  On 10 January 1775 Mrs Lodge 
instructed a female servant, Ann Carter, to tell anyone asking for her husband 
that he was not at home, emphasising that Ann was to do this even if she knew 
her master to be at home.  This she did when John Brown, the sheriff’s officer, 
came to the house and asked to see Lodge.499 However, this action by Mrs 
Lodge was seemingly performed at high risk in that it could have invalidated an 
act of bankruptcy: legal opinion was that only a direct instruction from the 
bankrupt to a servant would be valid to demonstrate intent to evade a creditor.  
Lodge had already been arrested the day before, and Mrs Lodge was probably 
anxious to prevent a repetition.  Lodge himself clearly did not want to be taken 
into custody, yet neither, as his actions made plain, did he wish to be made a 
bankrupt.  It is unclear as to whether anything had been planned between 
husband and wife.  It is possible that Mrs Lodge was acting, not from anything 
agreed between her and her husband, but on instructions from her father, Mr 
Stephens, who would subsequently position himself as one of the assignees in 
Lodge’s commission.  When other creditors came to call Mrs Lodge continued 
to insist that her husband was not at home while Lodge was visible to creditors 
through an outside window.500 The latter circumstance was not unusual in 
proving an act of bankruptcy, but the wife giving instructions was.  Instructions 
had to come from the trader.  However, if Lodge himself had never wished to be 
 







made a bankrupt, his wife in concert with her father could still have been 
contriving to paint Lodge as wilfully committing an act. 
In a case like Brigstock’s there is no evidence to suggest that there was 
disaccord between husband and wife, but in the case of Thomas Lodge, it is 
harder to be certain as Lodge seemed to want to keep matters from his wife, or 
so the following events suggest.  On Monday 16 January Brown again had a 
warrant against Lodge for a debt of £107.  That day Lodge was in his father’s 
garden in Dogmersfield Park and Brown spotted him over a low wall.  Brown 
asked to speak to Lodge, Lodge complied, and Brown told him about the 
warrant and Lodge asked to be allowed to meet Brown in Odiham.  There 
Lodge paid him what was owed, but when the business was concluded Lodge 
asked Brown not to tell his wife about the matter.501 
Unsurprisingly, the records do not reveal much about Lodge’s domestic life, 
save that he was frequently absent from home ‘without it being known to his 
wife or family, where he was, and when he meant to return’.502 Apart from 
possibly undermining relations with his wife, the fact also rather undermined the 
alleged act of bankruptcy.  Sudden uncharacteristic and ostensibly unplanned 
departures from home were required for a reliable act.  Someone who 
disappeared in the middle of the night as a matter of course was providing 
valuable evidence for anyone with an interest in alleging that no such act had 
ever been committed. 
Lodge displayed his unpredictable behaviour one evening, possibly 22 January 
1775 when he had just returned from London.  His sister Jane recalled the 
evening’s events: 
she dined and drank tea and supped with her late father, Mr Lodge, the 
wife of the Bankrupt, and other company at Mr Round’s at 
Dogmersfield…her brother came to them about 8 o’clock in the evening 
and staid there some time drank several glasses of wine, and then left 
telling Mrs Lodge that he should be back again to supper and would go 
 
501 HRO, 15M50/1216/35, Paulet St John’s Case: from Broome for the opinion of James 
Mansfield, June 1776, p. 2. 





home with her but did not return and that… Mrs Lodge went home about 
10 o’clock.503 
Lodge was increasingly absent by the spring of 1775, therefore what happened 
in his home was inevitably determined by Mrs Lodge.  On 1 April she sent for 
John Ring and Edward Lane, who had taken the original inventory of Lodge’s 
effects after they were seized for Sir Henry.  She declared to Ring and Lane 
that ‘she could not be happy unless she shewed them sundry effects which they 
[the Lodge family] had concealed’, and she revealed ‘a considerable quantity of 
plate, Linen, China & other Effects’.504 Ring and Lane took some of these items 
and sold them.  In the records it is remarked that this action could not be 
explained, as more than enough money to meet the demands had already been 
raised by the previous sale of effects, and with the fieri facias returned, no more 
effects were liable to seizure and sale.  Mrs Lodge’s conscience, in the absence 
of Lodge, may have got the better of her, or she may have simply wanted ready 
money.  It is impossible to know her true intentions here as they are obscured 
by partiality and incomplete records, but we do learn something about the kind 
of decisions taken by a bankrupt’s wife in his absence. 
Once a bankruptcy was declared a trader’s business ended with immediate 
effect and he was ‘professionally’ incapacitated as the former trader’s entire 
assets and stock were seized, thus rendering a continuation of his trade by any 
family member a legal and practical impossibility.  Furthermore, bankrupts were 
sometimes forced to be absent from their homes, and thus it would be wrong to 
assume that wives of bankrupts were even less protagonists than their 
husbands or were without role or agency amidst the muddle and chaos.  One 
such spouse was John Brickdale’s wife Anne, who took a significant role while 
her husband was hiding. 
An apparently more cooperative relationship between husband and wife is 
evident in the case of the Somerset banker John Brickdale.  At the time of 
Brickdale’s bankruptcy he was unable to move about as he feared arrest.  His 
wife became the conduit for communications to and from him; she was also his 
agent in his attempts at maintaining a semblance of control over unfolding 
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events.  On 12 November 1819 he informed his friend and solicitor, Robert 
Beadon that he did not want Mr Fortescue, his brother-in-law, to know his 
whereabouts: ‘I do not wish him to be told where I am, but that he can 
communicate with me through Mrs Brickdale’.505 Whilst endeavouring to remain 
incognito Brickdale despatched regularly to his wife communications for others.  
On 25 November in a letter to Beadon he told the attorney, ‘Mrs Brickdale will 
send you this with two letters’.  Brickdale then urged Beadon to meet his wife 
the next Sunday to discuss where they might all be able to meet on the 
Monday’.506 Mrs Brickdale also scribbled a hurried note to Beadon on the 
morning of the twenty-fifth saying she had ‘heard from her Husband’ and asking 
Beadon to visit her at the rectory in Monkton.507 The next day Beadon wrote to 
Brickdale informing him that he had met Mrs Brickdale, who had passed various 
letters to him; further meetings with Mrs Brickdale were mentioned.508 In 
Brickdale’s reply of the next day he refers to the need for further meetings with 
his wife.509 
The following day Mrs Brickdale sent an urgent message to Beadon informing 
him that she had relayed to Brickdale a summons and urged Beadon to inform 
her husband regarding his protection from arrest when attending the 
summons.510 Mrs Brickdale continued to get warnings to her husband about the 
danger he was in.  Clearly, although circumstances were keeping them apart, 
she expressed to Brickdale, ‘I should be delighted to see you if you could do it 
with safety – you shall hear from me at Avishayes’.511 Once the threat of arrest 
receded Mrs Brickdale’s role seems to have receded, and we do not find further 
evidence of her acting on her husband’s behalf. 
The wives of the most elite bankrupts were much less likely to have had direct 
involvement in the day-to-day of their husbands’ businesses, although they 
might have had their own interests and projects as Elizabeth Fry did.  If their 
husbands did not discuss trading concerns with them then the sudden 
manifestation of a state of bankruptcy could come as a shock.  Such was the 
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case for banker Alexander Fordyce’s wife and family.  The arriviste Fordyce had 
courted and married Lady Margaret, an Earl’s daughter, with promises of 
‘wealth, and style, and grandeur’. Following their marriage his wife did enjoy ‘the 
luxuries and gorgeous appointments of an establishment, magnificent as a 
palace, near the metropolis’, such was the description of Fordyce’s ‘splendid 
residence’ in Roehampton.512 However, when he returned home on the day his 
bank failed Fordyce’s strange behaviour and words at dinner clearly frightened 
his wife.  ‘What, what!’, Margaret cried in alarm as she grasped his arm in 
response to Fordyce’s ‘I am…am….’.  Fordyce ‘famously’ answered that he was 
‘A man!’.  One thing is clear, that what Fordyce could not, or would not, utter 
before his wife, brother, and sister-in-law, was that he was a bankrupt.513 The 
words ‘bankrupt and beggar’ were supplied on the following page of his sister-
in-law’s memoir.  The next day Fordyce fled to the continent.  No less shocked 
at the development were Fordyce’s brother James and wife who had been ‘in 
the serene enjoyment of domestic pleasures, when their quiet received an 
interruption as terrible as it was unexpected’.  This ‘shook their comforts and 
independence to the base’.514 
The examples above have only presented fragments of bankrupts’ wives’ 
experience.  However, one subject in this study provides a narrative account of 
bankruptcy from a wife’s point of view.  Elizabeth Fry cannot be said to be 
representative of the lives and circumstances of most bankrupts’ wives in 
England in the long eighteenth century.  Her privileged connections protected 
her from any real privations and permitted her to pick up her reform work again.  
However, her internal experience of coping with economic and social changes 
caused by forces beyond her control will not have been so very different from 
that of other bankrupts’ wives.  Fortunately for the purposes of this study 
Elizabeth kept a journal. 
Since the mid-nineteenth century Elizabeth Fry’s journal has served as a source 
for biographers who, despite their broader motivation, have not ignored the 
failure of her husband Joseph’s bank and what she thought about the 
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bankruptcy and him, and the effect of events on her.  However, because their 
objective has been to narrate the whole religious and reforming life of Elizabeth 
Fry, accounts of the bankruptcy have been to varying degrees, highly selective, 
summarised or paraphrased.  Therefore, an analysis of Elizabeth Fry as an 
example of a bankrupt’s wife has not been undertaken.515 
Elizabeth Fry was born a Gurney in the wealthy Norwich family of Quaker 
bankers.  She married the Quaker merchant Joseph Fry, who subsequently 
moved into banking.  Elizabeth had her own philanthropic projects and she does 
not appear to have had major involvement in the running of her husband’s 
business, unlike the wives of humbler bankrupts such as Ann Brigstock or Ann 
Harding.  She was, however, far from uninterested or unaware of how her 
husband’s business was fairing.  She was worried when things were going 
badly for Joseph Fry’s bank in 1825 when the bank was being propped up with 
Gurney money.  There was acrimony between Elizabeth and her brother-in-law 
William Fry, one of the partners in her husband’s bank.  She regarded her 
husband, Joseph, as ‘expensive’.  She was angry in February 1825 when 
Joseph returned from France with many costly purchases, and she feared the 
consequences of her husband’s profligacy.516 When the financial crisis of 1825 
broke only support from her siblings, the Gurney bankers, saved Fry’s bank.517 
According to Hatton, Joseph Fry was a ‘reluctant businessman’ and Elizabeth 
sometimes helped with the accounts.  Between Fry and Elizabeth’s brother, 
Joseph John Gurney, ‘there was animosity that sometimes resulted in 
argument’, and the Gurneys dealt only with Elizabeth and not with her 
husband.518 During the 1825 crisis Elizabeth recorded: ‘My brothers Joseph 
John and Sam came to tell me of it and to consult me whether they shd run the 
risk of some thousands to do it for that day only.  This was taking a great weight 
on myself.’519 
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Concern about the family’s finances were never far away. In June 1828 
Elizabeth wrote: 
I have had once more money anxieties feeling we were spending beyond 
our income and that we were once more in business difficulties – but 
thanks to that most gracious Lord… our income has this half year just 
covered our heavy expenses – and our business demands appear to be 
provided for…520 
Although Elizabeth was clearly well aware of the role played by her siblings in 
keeping her husband afloat, she was at times conflicted over the extent to which 
she was willing to believe that providence intervened in their fortunes or human 
frailty and economic forces.  By November of 1828 whilst on the one hand she 
wrote of ‘the kind providential care of the everlasting shepherd and Bishop of 
souls’, she also recorded ‘…but I find that outwardly and about me there are 
storms not at present so much in my very own borders as close to them’.521 
We know only a little about the discussions that she had about business with 
her husband and her Gurney brothers.  Privately in her journals she recorded 
her thoughts and judgements about their business fortunes and performance.  
On 15 November 1828 she wrote: 
The storm has now entered my own borders and my beloved brother’s.  I 
believe in degree quieted at least to his own feelings – Once more we 
are brought into perplexity and trial through imprudence in business and 
it is believed that without some assistance we cannot get through this 
winter.  Those who have formerly done it appear quite unwilling to do it 
now therefore humanly speaking there appears little or no hope for us – 
in addition to this the expenses of the year have been so very heavy that 
it will be very difficult to make ends meet.  My own monies not coming in 
as usual.522  
On 20 November Elizabeth fleetingly put her faith in a family-brokered solution: 
‘There has certainly been some glimmering of light [arise] on our dark picture as 
to outward things but an awful uncertainty yet rests upon our prospects today it 
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is proposed that Overend’s523 [house … determine] our lot…’.524 Clearly, 
Elizabeth was being kept abreast of developments with her husband’s bank.  
The pressure was quickly back on, and on 23 November she wrote: 
We have passed through many ups and downs one deeply distressing 
day and night, yesterday a little better.  Still we are comforted and upheld 
at times remarkably so – When I see my own family generally in full 
prosperity and see myself and my family laid low before them as 
dependents almost for daily bread and really in temporal things under 
their control.  I feel almost ready to complain but this I believe I do not 
really do…525 
With it likely that Joseph Fry and Elizabeth now knew that there was no 
alternative way out of their difficulties except bankruptcy, a ‘deeply distressing 
day and night’ was to be expected.  Elizabeth recognised her husband’s failings 
in business, but at the same time was conflicted in her feelings towards her 
siblings whose individual inclinations to assist Fry’s bank were not consistent: 
Fowell[526] and Joseph have been kinder than I know how to express to 
me and Sam I am sure means the same but from his fearful mind and 
extreme caution in business he has not in this time of deep trial shown 
himself so strong and firm a helper as they have nor did he in 1825 partly 
I believe because his judgement is against helping us through and he is 
weary of the folly and great imprudence of our houses.  However, no 
brother can be dearer to me…527 
Elizabeth showed understanding of the business and financial goings on and 
was more than able to contrast the practices of the Frys and the Gurneys.  
Elizabeth would not say it explicitly, but she clearly understood that it was her 
brother Samuel Gurney’s position that finished Fry’s bank, yet she only went as 
far as to say that ‘in business matters’ they did not see ‘eye to eye’.  However, 
she still called him her ‘beloved brother Sam’, and noted that she had received 
her ‘pocket money’, which was income paid to her as a Gurney.  She continued: 
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I believe I shall be favoured to make ends meet of my [expenditure] (This 
was entirely done and I had the satisfaction of having now kept the 
accounts and care of our expenditure since the beginning of 1826 and 
left the account at the bank better than I found it by nearly £50)528 
Elizabeth appeared, obviously with the assistance of her independent Gurney 
money, to be holding the household economy together in a way that her 
husband clearly was not.  Joseph Fry’s bankruptcy was announced in the 
London Gazette on 25 November 1828.529 The same day Elizabeth wrote: 
The awful and dreaded stroke is struck this morning and our banking 
house stops payment – it has brought me at times into little short of 
anguish of spirit not I think so much for what we must suffer ourselves as 
for what others may suffer through us.  The whole thing appears fraught 
with distress…530 
Elizabeth knew that bankruptcy entailed the loss of all material possessions, 
including her own house and the things within it that made it a home.  Again, 
that November day she mused: ‘How [striking] to look round upon many things 
and not know that I can call one thing my own (except my children) houses, 
lands, furniture’.  All Elizabeth Fry’s journal entries on the bankruptcy are 
intermingled with her religious reflections.  Despite her sadness at the 
consequences of the bankruptcy she was resigned and saw what was taken 
from her as providential rather than a further instance of human agency within 
the context of the unsatisfactory bankrupt laws.  ‘If it be the Lord, let him do as 
seemeth him good!’, she wrote.531  
Fortunately, and here Elizabeth’s circumstances inevitably differed from the lot 
of the families of modest traders, Gurney money assisted her.  She wrote: ‘I am 
thankful to say I have still money for all private debts and for the present to live 
comfortably’.  She later recorded the gifts of money that relatives made to her 
family: ‘my dearest sister Hoare has given us in the most free and generous 
manner 286 pounds, brother Buxton 100 - [P…?] 25 – Anna Gurney and Sarah 
Buxton 50.  Therefore we are now well provided for thanks to our heavenly 
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father and may a blessing rest upon these most [s/r]easonable and kind 
helpers’  In fact she further mused that with assistance from her Gurney 
brothers ‘some allowance from the business may keep us for the rest of our 
lives comfortably’.532 
Whilst she was relieved that her immediate family’s privations could be 
ameliorated by wider family, she maintained a concern for those to whom the 
Frys owed money.  She maintained that she had always been able to pay all 
her debts and, perhaps in defence of her own part in her family’s enterprise, 
also declared: ‘and as far as I have had to do with our business concerns I have 
most earnestly promoted not only doing [justly] but [brought honour] in all their 
transactions which I believe has been a good deal the case with them.’533 
Throughout December and into the new year Elizabeth said little about the 
bankruptcy in her journal (some of the handful of references appear in other 
chapters of this study), but a few developments compelled her to record her 
feelings, particularly the events of 23 December 1828 when the Quaker meeting 
addressed her husband’s bankruptcy.  She wrote: ‘Today the case of my 
beloved husband will be brought before our monthly meeting.’  She hoped the 
meeting would treat her husband kindly before continuing: 
I am sorry to say that some of our friends (as we supposed some of 
them) have already been cruelly slandering my husband and brother and 
Overend’s house, at least so we hear it is a sad, very sad thing that any 
of so high a professing people should thus show a wrong spirit and walk 
unworthy of their high and holy calling…534 
Although she later added in parenthesis on the page that she believed ‘that this 
was not the case’, Elizabeth Fry who cut pages out of her journal and heavily 
crossed out sections, still left this remonstrance intact.535 
Close family continued to be the principal source of assistance and by March 
1829 Elizabeth and family were living with one of her elder sons, who had his 
own household and his family at Mildred’s Court in the City, until they could find 
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something more permanent.536  Mildred’s Court had been Joseph and 
Elizabeth’s home before they moved to spacious Plashet, their country 
residence.  This property was clearly, unlike Plashet, beyond the reach of the 
bankruptcy commission; title may have lain with her son John Fry. 
Although Elizabeth was not comfortable in this reduced space, she recorded 
how much she valued the assistance she and her family were receiving from 
‘Relations and friends who have cared for me and mine and provided for us so 
that we are not likely ever to want the necessary comforts of life – and many 
many sympathising spiritual friends’.537 She reflected on the efforts her brothers 
were making ‘to arrange our outward affairs business’ [sic], whilst she 
recognised that it was ‘exceedingly difficult for them to please all parties’.538  
Although Elizabeth did want fair treatment for those affected by the bankruptcy, 
she was constantly worried about the economic situation of her family.  Late in 
March 1829 she had felt more optimistic, recording that there had been ‘some 
favourable appearance as to the business as if there would still be a provision 
for us and our families’.539 Problems often lowered her mood, but repeatedly 
she acknowledged the assistance her family was receiving: ‘I do most highly 
value the kindness of my relations and friends in our deep distress, some have 
done more than I could expect’.540 
The financial assistance, the relaunch of the Fry family business in tea only, and 
the provision of a modest home at Upton next door to her brother Samuel 
Gurney’s estate were all testimony to the role that family could play, if they had 
the means of course, in protecting middling-sort business failures from poverty, 
and in re-establishing them in trade.  However, according to Rose, the Gurneys 
did not trust Joseph Fry again.  Having saved the tea business they effectively 
constrained his scope for spending or ruining another business by making him 
an employee rather than a partner and paying him a monthly salary which was 
considerably less than they would pay Elizabeth.541 
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Parents and siblings were often closely involved in the business and domestic 
lives and circumstances of the bankrupts in this study.  Overall, the sources 
come down on the side of the family assisting their bankrupt members, and 
sometimes actively colluding with them.  In most cases they were loyal, patient, 
and willing to put their hand in their pocket.  The most likely sources of financial 
assistance amongst relatives were senior family members, typically fathers, 
fathers-in-law and male siblings and brothers-in-law.  Younger siblings or adult 
children and adult nephews and nieces were less likely to provide pecuniary 
assistance, although they would often be valuable providers of other modes of 
support.  Male siblings sometimes filled a kind of representational gap left by 
their bankrupt brothers and sisters or acted in an executive role for the 
otherwise arrested, embarrassed, or disempowered siblings and their wives.  
When wives make appearances in bankruptcy records it can appear that their 
autonomy was limited, and matters were left to male relatives or male 
professionals.  Yet at the same time bankrupts’ wives at all social levels showed 
considerable understanding of their circumstances and some of them did get 
involved.  They did not exercise the levels of agency possessed by male 
relatives or influential friends, but they could sometimes be seen, as Anne 
Brickdale was, to take the initiatives required to protect their bankrupt 
husbands. 
The frequent practice of arresting people for debt in eighteenth and nineteenth-
century England required the swift action of family and friends to quickly provide 
bail and secure their release from arrest.  Evidence from all the cases in this 
study suggests most bankrupts did not find themselves cast adrift completely as 
frequently family did pull together to assist their afflicted kin.  Although the help 
they received took many forms, and clearly some relatives and friends were in 
positions from which they could provide far greater support than others.  
Creditors anticipated this, and they were often, not without reason, suspicious 
that there was family involvement in underhand business and financial 
manoeuvring. 
Nevertheless, families were not always being simply dutiful or compassionate in 





the bankrupts’ affairs and finances, and therefore had much to lose.  Therefore, 
interference or gaining control of assets was often simply an exercise of self-
interest, and the rules governing bankruptcy commissions were well suited to 
facilitating such control with family creditors merely needing to get themselves 
chosen as assignees.  However, there were exceptions as family patience and 
tolerance was not without limits.  There were cases where family acted only out 
of ruthless self-interest, with apparently no regard for the bankrupt, such as in 
the actions of John Slade’s sister, the ‘cruel’ Mrs Whittle.  No assumptions 
should be made about bankrupts’ relationships: relatives were not always 
friendly, but creditors were not always cruel. 
Exactly how bankruptcy was experienced was conditioned by the nature and 
quality of family relationships and interactions.  Family members and friends 
held, to a greater or lesser extent, an involvement and interest in bankrupts’ 
domestic, commercial, and social existence prior to the onset of bankruptcy.  
This involvement rarely ended with the bankruptcies, but rather it continued and 
was frequently subject to major change as parties sought to protect their 
interests or cope with the consequences of bankruptcy and relationships 
became strained.  A major problem with sources on bankruptcy is that they 
rarely tell us anything of the fortunes of most bankrupts, apart from the ones 
with the highest profiles, after the grant of certificates.  We rarely learn whether 
relatives set their unfortunate kin up in business again, or filtered money and 
assets back to the ex-bankrupt and his family while ensuring they never got into 
trouble again. 
In bankruptcies, family tended to be more on the spot and therefore more likely 
to act swiftly to assist, or to start meddling.  Family were usually the first to ‘be’ 
friends.  However, family was sometimes absent, or at least not enough.  But 
neither did bankrupts always have to hand the kind of friends who could help 
them.  Thus, bankrupts needed to find ‘friends’ by petitioning those they 
believed able to assist them. 
Friends, unless they were also creditors, were less likely to be sufferers.  What 
they were was a vital source of assistance and bankrupts expended much ink 
and anxious energy in finding those who were willing to be friends to them.  
Friends who were professionals, such as the solicitors, had to balance any 





objectives.  The complicated and sometimes fraught relations between 
bankrupts and solicitors can be tracked across several of the cases in this 
study.  If bankrupts could manage to maintain good relations with the 
commission solicitor, and sometimes with their own if they had one, it counted 
for a lot in ameliorating the discomforts of the bankruptcy process and 
expediting a tolerable conclusion. 
The subjects of this study often expressed their need for a ‘friend’, or if they had 
friends pinned their hopes on the loyalty and trustworthiness of such 
relationships.  Bankrupts frequently displayed the confidence that their ‘friends’ 
would readily come to their assistance.  Other times they imagined a benevolent 
helper would come forward and reveal themselves to be a ‘friend’. Such 
conviction was displayed again and again by Pyott, by Townsend, and by John 
Brickdale as the account of his interactions with family and friends revealed.   
However, not all ‘friends’ turned out to be of the nature the bankrupts believed, 
or vainly hoped.  Friends were sometimes shadowy figures about whom the 
bankrupts were not always forthcoming as to identities.  Some of these friends 
seemed to have been far more ephemeral and self-interested than family.  
Bankrupts’ difficulty was in identifying and securing the help of genuine friends 
and not falling prey to false ‘friends’ who covertly pursued advantage from 
bankrupts’ predicament.  These ‘friends’ merely saw an opportunity to take 
advantage of someone in distress, and as in the case of David Brigstock, made 
matters much worse for the bankrupt. 
This chapter has examined the effect upon bankrupts’ experience of the 
strengths and weaknesses of their personal alliances.  The next chapter looks 














Bankrupts in Space 
6.0 Introduction 
‘No! No! I can submit to every thing but being in the power of others to put me 
into a Cage for Life’, protested Thomas Pyott in the spring of 1767 as he 
contemplated the very real prospect of incarceration.  Pyott, ‘bred up to the 
profession of a Merchant’ and trading wine and spirits to the New World, had 
only recently declared himself a man ‘born and supported in a spirit of liberty’.  
However, that spring the threat of imprisonment depressed his mood.  In his 
journal he harangued himself with the ‘continual fear of Creditors, whom you 
cannot satisfy’.  His creditors, he warned himself, were ‘Harpies who might 
confine me in a jale’.  Pyott, deserted, he believed, by his relatives, began to 
see leaving the country as the only way to preserve his freedom.  With his 
imagination fired by the Odyssey he wrote out the line: ‘A man opprest, 
dependant, yet a man’. Thus, he declared, ‘I thought it less dangerous to throw 
myself into the Sea of Life, than hazard starving or a jale’.  For Pyott ‘jale’ had to 
be avoided for he lamented to himself, ‘I am certain no one will release me’.  His 
only recourse was to be ‘in the World’, and ‘to be at large, exercising my own 
liberty’.542 
Pyott’s nightmare of being deprived of his liberty and put in a ‘Cage for Life’ by 
terrifying ‘Harpies’ is characteristic of the melodramatic writing about his 
insolvency that fills his memoir and collection of letters, but this fear of 
incarceration was real for him and other failing traders who were on the verge of 
bankruptcy.  There is a certain irony in that Pyott, the young gentleman 
merchant, never left the country nor was he imprisoned.  In fact, in the end, he 
even managed not to resort to becoming a bankrupt despite being already 
resigned to it.  What his complaints do demonstrate is the great anxiety felt by, 
particularly genteel traders, about the deprivations of gaol and the loss of their 
liberty to move freely.  There is perhaps in Pyott and others a suggestion that 
gaol was a place inappropriate to their social station, but as Pyott understood 
only too well, creditors were not swayed by such sensibilities.  To avoid long-
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term imprisonment for debts they could never pay, terrified gentlemen could 
become bankrupts and thus hope to escape confinement in awful places.  
However, it was far from simple as this chapter will relate. 
This chapter describes bankrupts’ experience as it unfolded in a variety of 
places and spaces, and it further considers why and when these places and 
spaces became important for bankrupts and their families.  The chapter 
highlights the fact that bankrupts’ experience was not simply a legal and 
financial one, but rather it was an experience that played out in space, and as 
will be discussed in the following chapter, in time.  The first way in which space 
within the experience of bankrupts will be explored is by looking at how the 
spaces that bankrupts had habitually inhabited and moved through freely 
contracted as they found themselves on the verge of bankruptcy, and following 
that phase, during the time in which they were legally defined and treated as 
bankrupts. 
There has been a tendency for historiography to understand bankruptcy as a 
means of preserving liberty (i.e. avoiding imprisonment) when in fact bankrupts 
experienced a variety of confining experiences which in some cases was actual 
confinement, such that their experiences sometimes overlapped with those of 
‘ordinary’ insolvent debtors.  It was far from the case that only poorer insolvent 
traders went to prison and wealthier ones simply got away with it by becoming 
bankrupts (of course some did get away with it, either totally or at least relatively 
speaking).  Whilst most bankrupts might not have experienced physical 
confinement, the constraints on their liberty often left them inhabiting a spatially 
contracted world.  Most bankrupts generally careered along a spectrum on 
which at one end lay threatened, or actual, confinement and at the other was 
complete discharge (i.e. freedom). 
Not surprisingly, ‘liberty’ was something that mattered a great deal to harassed 
and failing traders as they found themselves on the verge of bankruptcy or 
having become bankrupts.  ‘Liberty’ was a demand not infrequently invoked by 
eighteenth-century bankrupts as they contemplated, in the words of Bristol 
bankrupt Joshua James in 1785, ‘perpetual imprisonment’.543 Bankruptcy rarely 
entailed ‘perpetual imprisonment’, but getting the wrong side of the law and its 
 





proceedings had consequences that led to confinement for bankrupts.  In 1759 
one commentator writing in the London Chronicle who styled himself Honestus 
Moneyless, complained that a bankrupt faced ‘the perpetual loss of his liberty’ if 
he refused to answer the commissioners questions.544 In 1760 in a letter to a 
Member of Parliament another champion of unfortunate bankrupts complained 
about the cruel treatment of bankrupts by creditors ‘to whom they have 
given…all they had in the world; they cry out for life and liberty’.545 Returning to 
1759, Honestus Moneyless was back the next week with a fresh angle on 
liberty, that it was something an ‘unhappy bankrupt’ deserved.  When such a 
bankrupt had ‘done all in his power’ to comply with the requirements of his 
commission, then he ‘really merits his liberty’, but still a few ‘unchristian, 
morose, and revengeful’ creditors could ‘deny him his liberty’.546 Moneyless 
invoked liberty, and more to the point denial of liberty, repeatedly.  Invoking 
liberty in the sense it was understood in the ancient world, he equated the state 
of a bankrupt denied a certificate with that of enslavement.547 In his call for 
liberty Moneyless made special mention of the bankrupt merchant or 
manufacturer ‘who may have employed many thousands of persons, and many 
thousands of pounds annually, to the great advantage of his country’.  These 
major traders, as bankruptcy and other records show, will also have had 
interests in the Atlantic slave trade and the enslaved populations of plantations.  
We do not know whether Honestus, who confessed to suffering ‘storms, 
tempests, and shipwreck’ in his own affairs, ever had in mind the freedom of 
these people when he wrote that he hoped to ‘see the glorious dawn of liberty 
appear’.548 
The second exploration of space in this chapter will take the reader into, quite 
literally, the physical places which bankrupts experienced.   Bankruptcy sources 
tell us things about the spaces (domestic and commercial – public and private) 
that traders (before and after they became bankrupts) inhabited and used.  It is 
hoped that the sources may provide some insights into eighteenth-century 
people’s use of, and experience of, space; and how bankruptcy influenced 
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perceptions and uses of these spaces. The chapter is organised in two parts.  
The first part ‘Changing Spaces’ is divided into the following sections: 6.1.1 
addresses the most powerful influence on how bankrupts experienced space: 
the ever-present possibility, and sometimes reality, of imprisonment; 6.1.2 
addresses the ways in which bankrupts sought to evade their creditors and 
conveniently commit acts of bankruptcy at the same time; 6.1.3 addresses how 
bankrupts’ ability and confidence in moving freely was affected; 6.1.4 examines 
these issues in greater detail in the case of the bankrupt Hampshire brewer 
Thomas Lodge.  The second part ‘Going Places’ is divided into the following 
sections: 6.2.1 is a discussion of bankrupts experience of movement between 
commercial and domestic spaces; 6.2.2 looks at the public and private spaces 
in which bankrupts were examined, particularly in the experience of bankrupt 




6.1.1 Bankrupts and imprisonment 
In recent historiography on long eighteenth-century insolvency bankrupts are 
little mentioned, and when they are, they are considered to have been secure 
from that severe treatment that was inflicted on many insolvent debtors, i.e. 
arrest, imprisonment and the loss of their liberty.  V. Markham Lester maintains 
that ‘a bankrupt could not be imprisoned’.549 This view is enlarged by Margot 
Finn who observes: ‘Bankruptcy proceedings, restricted by law to merchants 
and traders who owed substantial sums, allowed substantial commercial men 
both to avoid imprisonment and to extinguish their debts in full’.’550 Of 
merchants struck by disaster who were unable to settle their accounts Jerry 
White states ‘they could take advantage of the bankruptcy laws and sell up in 
gentlemanly sessions with Commissioners in Bankruptcy, without any 
humiliations of arrest or imprisonment that less wealthy people suffered’.551 In 
recent writing on eighteenth-century imprisonment for debt Tawny Paul and 
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Alexander Wakelam are more accurate in that they suggest that imprisonment 
was a measure that impinged little on bankrupts, rather than not at all.552 
Imprisonment of bankrupts is worthy of consideration as some bankrupts were 
arrested and imprisoned and more significantly, although not quite the same 
thing, most feared incarceration to distraction.  That said, this study does not 
seek to suggest that the embarrassed circumstances of bankrupt merchants 
and bankers, or even lesser traders, were on a par with the privations of minor 
shopkeepers and humble artisans gaoled for months in lamentable conditions 
for trivial sums, but this study does seek to show that being made a bankrupt 
only ever offered partial immunity from arrest and imprisonment.  For many 
bankrupts it all actually started with arrest. 
When Bristol colour manufacturer Uriah Haddock was on the verge of 
bankruptcy and was fearing arrest by one Jones, he was heard by a servant to 
declare ‘that not only Jones would arrest him but another and another and that 
he should take himself off’.553 It was fear of this certain imprisonment that drove 
many traders to seek the protection that bankruptcy could afford them.  One of 
the assumptions this study is examining is that bankruptcy offered protection 
from arrest and imprisonment; and while this would seem to have been 
substantially the case, it was not always.  Fundamentally in eighteenth-century 
England all personal financial obligations were entered into in the knowledge 
that, were there ever to be default, imprisonment could be used to coerce 
settlement of debts.  It was according to Paul Haagen ‘a dominant reality of life 
in England and Wales’.554 A few in eighteenth-century society were spared the 
awful prospect.  They were of course the ‘nobility of England’ and Members of 
Parliament, as well as certain special categories of person such as foreign 
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As was explained in chapter two, commencing an action to imprison a debtor 
was the cheapest and quickest method of recovering debts.  The results 
creditors got, whereby most debtors coughed up, suggested to creditors 
generally that the mere threat of imprisonment worked, and that the next steps 
to imprisoning a debtor were unnecessary.  There was the further benefit for a 
fast-moving creditor of recovering the entirety of what they were owed without 
regard to the interests of other creditors.  This was dangerous for debtors 
because if little remained in their estate for the other creditors, they could be 
rearrested again and again by other creditors for whatever remained to them 
before finally being incarcerated in unsavoury conditions with their creditors 
betting that compassionate family and friends would meet the outstanding 
obligations.  Therefore, the existence of aggressive creditors, along with the 
relative ease of obtaining a warrant to arrest a debtor, meant that for most 
failing tradesmen, imprisonment was a real prospect. 
For tradespeople in long eighteenth-century England, exceptional 
circumstances apart, prudence, skill in business and finance, or simply lack of 
misfortune would usually keep insolvency at a distance.  When trouble did loom, 
benevolent family and friends often came to the rescue.  If more comfortable 
safety nets failed there were measures and regimes that also kept 
imprisonment at bay, such as reaching compositions with creditors or, if all else 
had failed, bankruptcy.556 Under bankruptcy, which was intended to benefit all 
creditors equally in proportion to their debts, a bankrupt was required to give up 
all their assets upon being declared a bankrupt.  The regime, therefore, afforded 
protection to bankrupts as, at least in theory, there was no need to coerce 
money out of them with imprisonment because on becoming bankrupts they 
‘discovered’ and then conveyed to assignees all their property.  Yet bankrupts 
were still to be found in English prisons although by the eighteenth century they 
only constituted a small proportion of the gaol population.  Tawny Paul has 
calculated for several date ranges between 1736 and 1772 that about one 
percent of the debtor population of the Fleet and King’s Bench prisons were 
procured discharge by coming under the bankruptcy regime.557 It is not clear 
how many of these prisoners in these two gaols entered as bankrupts or 
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became bankrupts while in gaol under the two-month lying in gaol rule.  The 
average number of days incarcerated, sixty-one days, fits the rule.    
One percent is a small proportion of the prison population, but if the definition of 
a bankrupt is understood as a little more fluid than the strict legal one (by which 
a trader was only a bankrupt from the moment the commissioners declared him 
or her to be one), and the definition is allowed to include traders on the verge of 
bankruptcy (i.e. traders whose circumstances were so ruinous that, and 
assuming they qualified under the statutes, were de facto bankrupts), and 
uncooperative bankrupts gaoled by commissioners for not making full 
discoveries and who were deemed likely to abscond, and also recaptured 
absconding bankrupts, then prison was a place that may have hosted more 
bankrupts than simply those coming under the two-month rule.  I do not include 
fraudulent bankrupts in this speculation as they would have been imprisoned as 
felons.  Although interesting in themselves, fraudulent bankrupts are not the 
object of this thesis.558 This chapter is enquiring into how bankrupts came to be 
in prison under civil process.  The following sections suggest answers. 
In late October 1751 Wiltshire linen draper David Kennedy was being held by a 
creditor in Salisbury Gaol where he received correspondence from John 
Stabler, one of his principal London creditors.559 John Stabler Esq. was ‘an 
eminent wholesale linen-draper in Watling Street’.560 Stabler, who at this point 
thought a composition might be best in Kennedy’s case, said he ‘was sorry to 
hear’ that Kennedy was in prison and sought to give Kennedy hope saying, ‘I 
doubt not but your affairs might soon be brought to a conclusion and you set at 
liberty.’561 However, by early 1752 Stabler and other creditors were of the view 
that it would serve their interest to keep Kennedy in gaol.  Stabler wrote: ‘I have 
consulted the London creditors about it and we all are of the opinion it will be 
best to…detain Kennedy in prison till the second payment is discharged.’562 We 
do not know how Kennedy felt about his wait for ‘liberty’ being extended, but the 
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conditions for debtors in provincial gaols were often poor, such that some 
imprisoned debtors got themselves transferred from the counties to London 
debtors’ prisons, such as the Fleet.563 The Fleet and the King’s Bench were the 
more ‘desirable’ London debtors’ prisons, but generally debtors’ prisons, or 
debtors’ sections of county gaols, were feared for their squalid and unhealthy 
conditions.  Stabler and the other creditors eventually took out a commission 
against Kennedy and made him a bankrupt which probably superseded the 
original action against him, making his release as a bankrupt possible.  This 
was quite possibly how they secured his cooperation with the commission as 
will become clearer later in this chapter. 
There was a second reason why bankrupts could be found in prisons.  Within 
the civil process of bankruptcy there were requirements that, if not complied 
with, could land a bankrupt behind bars by order of the commissioners.  Such 
was the case in 1797 of Wiltshire corn dealer John Kempster.  A bankrupt was 
expected to cooperate fully with the proceedings of a commission.  However, 
the commissioners in Kempster’s bankruptcy declared that his answers were 
not satisfactory, and his ‘refusing to give any further or other answer’ meant the 
commissioners required and authorised the sheriff’s officer to: 
immediately upon receipt hereof to arrest and take into your custody the 
body of the said John Kempster and him safely to convey to the 
Common Goal at Fisherton Anger in and for the County of Wilts and him 
there to deliver to the Keeper of the said prison who is hereby 
required…to receive the said John Kempster into his custody and him 
safely to keep and detain without bail or mainprize until such time as he 
shall submit himself to us the said Commissioners…and full answer 
make to our or their satisfaction to the question so put to him by us…564 
Kempster’s place of confinement was the county gaol in Fisherton Anger, just 
outside Salisbury, where the prison had been since the early sixteenth century.  
Fortunately for Kempster, debtors and felons were accommodated separately in 
the prison.  However, the place that Kempster would have experienced cannot 
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have been very comfortable, as even after ‘enlargement and the reconstructions 
of the late 18th century the gaol remained inadequate, its site constricted and its 
buildings old’.565 
Nevertheless, Kempster remained in the county gaol for more than two years as 
in October 1799 the commissioners despatched another warrant to the keeper 
to have Kempster brought up to Highworth to be examined.  To the keeper the 
commissioners proclaimed their authority declaring that Kempster ‘is not in your 
Custody upon Execution but only under our said Warrant’.  The examination 
was being held at Kempster’s request.  He had written to the commissioners in 
August 1799 assuring them that he wished ‘to answer the Questions that shall 
be there put to him to our Satisfaction’.  The meeting was set for 29 November 
1799, and the commissioners therefore required the keeper ‘to bring the Body 
of the said John Kempster the younger before the Commissioners’.566 It is not 
clear why Kempster preferred two years in gaol to answering the 
commissioners’ questions, or in what conditions he resided during that time.  
What is clear is that there were many hazards in the bankruptcy process for the 
furtive or uncooperative bankrupt, and that bankruptcy commissioners had the 
power to confine bankrupts, and in some cases did.  Imprisonment was of 
course also a means to prevent flight, and subsequent non-appearance before 
the commissioners, if the possibility was suspected.  The long-term 
imprisonment of bankrupts was perhaps not the most usual restriction on liberty 
that bankrupts had to contend with, whereas short confinements as bankruptcy 
loomed were more frequent and at this pre-bankruptcy stage traders were being 
treated no differently from insolvent debtors as the next section will explain. 
 
6.1.2 Confinement, evasion, absence and exile 
The long confinements of Kennedy and Kemptster were not typical for 
bankrupts; more typically bankrupts were likely to experience degrees of 
confinement as they approached bankruptcy when they were increasingly 
becoming the object of actions by individual creditors.  Often matters went only 
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as far as holding a debtor in a temporary place of confinement for a relatively 
short time.  This happened to Carmarthenshire shopkeeper David Brigstock, 
who in July 1773 whilst still pre-bankruptcy, was arrested in Carmarthen ‘at the 
suit of’ Nathaniel [W___], a Bristol grocer, for the sum of £85.  There he ‘was in 
Custody of a Bailiff’ for a few days, probably in the bailiff’s house, until at the 
petition of Brigstock’s wife, another major creditor agreed to ‘assist in getting 
him out of Custody’.567 Brigstock experienced confinement, but not in a gaol; 
this sort of confinement was not untypical for subjects in this study.  His brief 
confinement loosened the purse strings of a ‘friend’ who, it subsequently turned 
out, was acting with more than a little self-interest. 
To brush with confinement, it was not necessary to be held in a gaol or lock-up 
at all, even temporarily, for a bankrupt to experience some loss of liberty.  They 
could experience constraint on their freedom by merely being kept in the 
company of an officer, sometimes in their own home (I am yet to encounter 
instances of physical restraint being employed).  In 1752 David Kennedy wrote 
to one of the assignees of his estate and mentioned ‘my imprisonment at my 
own house’.568 In 1819, while on the verge of bankruptcy, banker John 
Brickdale was held in custody in his own home.  At one point he fled the house 
and hid himself in a shed in the kitchen garden (sheds could afford certain 
protections from arrest).  Although after being pursued and retaken, he denied 
that he had the intention of escaping.569 The fact that Brickdale had escaped 
and then was discovered and retaken, albeit all in the privacy of his own home, 
suggests receiving a treatment commensurate with being a prisoner. 
Because of the legal requirement to commit an act of bankruptcy traders 
engaged in a variety of behaviours to evade their creditors which could be 
subsequently construed as valid acts.  As related above in 1773 David 
Brigstock had been caught badly unprepared for the moves of his creditors, and 
his efforts to get himself made a bankrupt merely got him into greater trouble.  
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As he desperately insisted that he could easily be made a bankrupt, he 
recounted a meeting he had on his way to his shop and home: 
I committed the Act of Bankrupt on one of our neighbour’s wedding Day 
as I may have proof and the man may take his oath if need for, for he did 
see me and did talk to me and though I was coming to my own house 
after him, but I turned aside because I had not the money to pay him…570  
Brigstock could not return directly to his own house but had to deviate from the 
route he was taking in order not to be engaged by a creditor about a debt.  On 
this occasion in order to evade a creditor Brigstock was compelled to be absent 
from his home, when the more usual scenario for bankrupts was to be confined 
at home in order to evade creditors.  This, Brigstock would also experience and 
is related below. 
Stricken traders frequently secreted themselves in rooms in their dwelling 
houses as they frantically tried to avoid arrest and imprisonment, or simply to 
correctly commit an act of bankruptcy.  There is always an ambiguity around 
these self-confinements, in that it can often only be deduced from the details of 
each individual case whether the motivation was primarily to avoid arrest, or 
whether it was an entirely contrived behaviour intended only to be witnessed as 
the committing of an act of bankruptcy or, as was probably often the case, both.  
These periods of self-confinement lasted hours, a whole evening, or were 
sometimes overnight.  Traders did this in order to meet, at least as they 
understood them, the requirements under the bankrupt laws for committing an 
act of bankruptcy.  Shopkeeper David Brigstock confined himself in a variety of 
manners as he tried to both evade his creditors and to commit a credible act.  In 
1773 when a creditor called on Brigstock, Brigstock was found by his own 
servant hiding in a nearby field in order to avoid the creditor.  The creditor was 
determined to locate Brigstock, declaring that, ‘he could not be far off and that 
he would go and see for him’.  Then, somewhat nimbly, Brigstock ‘came in from 
the field and went upstairs into a Room’, but seemingly close on his heels the 
creditor returned to the house and ‘continued for a considerable time there’ in 
expectation of seeing Brigstock, but he did not come downstairs for the whole 
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evening, eating his supper in his bedchamber, then going straight to bed to 
avoid the creditor.571 
As acts of bankruptcy were subject to disputation by unfriendly creditors, traders 
were often zealous in their interpretation and observance.  One such was 
Sherborne maltster John Slade.  Around Easter 1830 Slade called his domestic 
servant, Ann Luffman, ‘to his bed room and desired [she] would not leave it ‘till 
he was asleep’.  Once Slade was asleep, she left the room ‘fastening him in’ 
and putting the key under the door.  This she had done for him on several 
occasions.572 This repeated locking in of Slade was probably because of his 
anxiety to comply, in a way that would not be challenged, with the requisites of 
the law for committing acts of bankruptcy.  At the same time his behaviour 
revealed his insecurity about the legal safety of what he was putting into 
practice. 
Self-confinement was very much a phenomenon of the act of bankruptcy, but 
the need could remain even after a trader had been declared a bankrupt.  Such 
was the case for Isaac Scott who in August 1767 sought protection from arrest 
in ‘The Place…Where Freedom makes her last Retreat’.573 This was the Verge 
of the Court where debtors, including bankrupts, could enjoy protection from 
arrest.  Historically the extent of the Verge had covered twelve miles around the 
seat of the monarch’s court, but by the mid-eighteenth century it had reduced to 
‘that ground about Whitehall and St. James's which belongs to the crown’, 
under whose jurisdiction it was.  John Trusler described it as a ‘privileged 
place’.  It was not a liberty, nor was it a place within the rules of a gaol, but it 
was a place ‘privileged from arrests’ which made it popular with debtors.574 
Trusler further maintained that a ‘sheriff’s-officer arresting a man in the Verge, 
will be punished by an application to the Board of Green Cloth’, the officiating 
Court body.  However, such impunity could be curtailed, as the ‘Board of Green 
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Cloth’ if petitioned by a creditor, could expel or have its own officer arrest a 
debtor who would not enter into terms.  The Verge, in marked contrast to former 
liberties to the east and south of the Thames such as the liberty of the Mint, only 
offered a debtor a conditional ‘privilege’ at a price, rather than a place of 
indefinite sanctuary.  The Verge also had a literary existence: it featured as a 
place of refuge for Captain Booth and family in Fielding’s Amelia,575 and for 
Smollet’s Roderick Random.576 The Verge, located in the ‘West-end of the 
Town’ close to St James’s, probably more readily served the ‘pretty’ gentlemen 
described by Addison in the Spectator in his allusion to the Verge, than it ever 
served tradesmen.577 Although we do not know if Isaac Scott was such a 
gentleman as well as a dry salter, we know that as a bankrupt he chose to 
protect himself there. 
Early in the summer of 1767 Scott’s assignees had secured his attendance at a 
meeting with assurances that the creditors would sign his certificate, but at this 
supposedly last examination, contrary to Scott’s expectation the creditors did 
not sign his certificate.  Scott ‘apprehending some ill natured Intent’ and ‘with 
the Advice of his Friends’ took ‘a Lodging in the Verge of the Court’ where he 
would be privileged from arrest.  When subsequently asked to meet the 
assignees in the City he declined and sent his brother George to explain his 
refusal.578 Scott remained in the Verge all summer waiting to have his certificate 
signed.  On 14 August he complained to one of his estate’s assignees that ‘he 
must be sensible, living in these Places are as dear as they are disagreeable’.  
On receiving an unsatisfactory answer, he wrote again the same day 
complaining of ‘the most disagreeable uncertain Situation I am in, confined 
within the Rules of the Court’.579 Scott’s ‘Lodging’ afforded him little liberty. 
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The flipside of confinement for bankrupts at home was absence from home.  
Just as at times they were compelled to be inside their home, even locked 
inside it, they were also compelled to be outside it.  David Brigstock’s ‘turning 
aside’ to avoid the attention of a creditor was little compared to the major 
evasive action that some bankrupts took to avoid arrest, which often involved 
removing themselves entirely from their own locality and placing themselves at 
a great distance.  When on 14 March 1743 sheriff’s officer Robert Fry went to 
Richard Hutching’s home in Somerset to arrest him under a warrant ‘at the suite 
of John Bovett Gent. for a debt of £20’, Fry found only Hutching’s wife and son 
at home.  When he asked them where Hutchings was, they replied that he was 
not at home then asked Fry if he had a warrant against Hutchings.  Fry replied 
that he had, ‘whereupon they said that he was afraid of being arrested by his 
creditors and was therefore gone to his son’s beyond London to raise money to 
pay his debts with a resolution never to return home again if he could not raise 
money sufficient for that purpose’.580 Travelling in the opposite direction in 1814 
was bankrupt Covent Garden wine and cider merchant Edmund Townsend who 
had left his family in London and removed to Bath for fear of arrest, later 
observing: 
if I had not left London at the time I did leave it, I should have been 
thrown into prison, (of which I had before had nearly two years 
experience), and probably, in the very severe winter…581 
For failing traders, not becoming a bankrupt and therefore having to resort to 
flight from creditors intent on imprisoning them, was a factor that threatened to 
remove them indefinitely from the places in which they wanted to remain.  In 
November 1773 as David Brigstock worried that his pleas to a creditor to make 
him a bankrupt would not succeed, he lamented that he was ‘loth to go and 
leave my Country’.582 Some bankrupts were capable of imagining themselves 
not just as unhappy fugitives, but even as tragic exiles not only within their own 
country, but also beyond.  In 1763 Thomas Pyott saw leaving the country as 
one way out of his troubles: ‘I offered to banish myself from my Wife, my 
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connections, and all other dear ties of the Human affections; to go to 
Martinique, destitute of Friends, of Interest, connection or knowledge of a single 
Person upon the Island’.583 He of course did not go as Martinique was returned 
to the French.  Although the actions or imaginings of these ‘exiles’ represented 
the loss of freedom to reside in the places of their own choosing in order to 
avoid what they saw as the greater evil of incarceration, many other bankrupts 
did not go so far as to ‘banish’ themselves.  However, they did absent 
themselves from their homes for periods long enough to be construed as 
committing acts of bankruptcy.  Such was the case in 1817 when the son of 
Romsey brewer John Latham swore that his father had secreted himself in the 
house and stayed away from his business because he feared arrest by his 
creditors.  Prior to this Latham had left his home in Romsey and stayed away 
for eight to ten days, and when he did return home it had been after dark 
(presumably because he believed he could not be arrested at night).584 
Clearly the freedom of traders on the verge of bankruptcy to remain in their own 
homes was restricted, with permanent absence a real possibility.  They were 
also compelled to range over a larger area while absent from familiar places.  
Information on these periods of absence, about where they hid and what they 
did, is not abundant.  However, we have a few insights into these periods of 
absence when bankrupts moved between different hiding places and traversed 
the country’s roads on horseback or by chaise and they are discussed below.  
This researcher must observe that he is yet to come across an account of a 
bankrupt walking any great distance, which says something about their relative 
financial means even when their businesses were failing or had failed.  A 
person on foot would of course have been very vulnerable to arrest by officers 
waiting on the road.  The above sections have discussed varieties of physical 
confinement experienced by bankrupts and how they were sometimes 
compelled to absent themselves; they experienced being closed in or driven 
out.  However, constraints on bankrupts’ liberty to move freely was not 
experienced simply when in gaol, being held by officers, trying to evade arrest, 
or when they confined themselves at home or in privileged places.  Therefore, 
the next section discusses how constraint was also experienced by bankrupts 
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as a general loss of freedom to move around even after they had officially been 
declared bankrupts and we might expect them to be free from arrest. 
 
6.1.3 Freedom of movement 
As bankruptcy commissioners did not imprison cooperative bankrupts, were 
they then in principle at liberty? It is pertinent to examine just how much they 
were and if there were constraints on their freedom of movement which derived 
from their simply being bankrupts.  This section discusses how bankrupts’ 
attempted to exercise freedom of movement and how much they were still 
constrained by fear of arrest.  In keeping with the rest of the study the definition 
of a bankrupt is widened in order to include the pre-bankruptcy period. 
The fear that the threat of arrest and imprisonment instilled in traders generally 
inclined them towards bankruptcy, under which they expected, or at least 
hoped, to ‘enjoy’ some protection.  Certainly once de facto ‘bankrupts’ had been 
officially declared bankrupts in law by the commissioners they were entitled to 
statutory protections from arrest under their commission.  In principle bankrupts 
were protected in the following way: A bankrupt could not be arrested during the 
forty-two days following his receipt of the order to surrender to his commission, 
nor when travelling to and from commission meetings.  If he were to be arrested 
for debt, on production of his summons to attend the commission, the arresting 
officer would be obliged to release him.  Furthermore, if a bankrupt was still 
fearful of being arrested on his way to the meeting he could obtain ‘a warrant of 
protection for his person’ from the commissioners, which would ‘secure his 
person from arrest and imprisonment’.585 In February 1774 David Brigstock, 
being informed that he was required to surrender himself to the commissioners 
on 14 March and to ‘fail not at your Peril’, received into his hands ‘at his 
dwelling house at Whitland forge’ a ‘Warrant of Protection’.586 Holding such a 
warrant meant Brigstock could at least exit the inside of his house and move 
outside, if only to attend his own commission. 
 
 
585 Anon., Solicitor’s Guide (London, 1768), pp. 17–18. 
586 BRO, JQS/P/44, Proceedings against David Brigstock: summons and warrant of protection, 





However, in law, if ever there was a silver bullet against slippery bankrupts then 
it was the feared writ of extent (extendi facias).  It was an action against which it 
was extremely difficult to protect a bankrupt.  The writ was an ‘execution upon 
debts of record due to the crown’.587 An ‘extent’ was a particularly powerful writ 
and could take body, chattels and lands.  In the face of this writ, bankrupts 
could not easily rely on the usual privileges from arrest.588 Of bankrupts facing 
an extent, one early nineteenth-century manual writer declared, ‘he is not 
privileged from arrest by virtue of an extent, even whilst under examination; for 
the crown is not bound by the bankrupt laws’.589 The crown as a creditor could 
outrank all other creditors.  In this study both John Brickdale and John Slade, 
bankrupts in 1819 and 1830 respectively, were in part brought down by writs of 
extent.  Brickdale, even before he managed to become a bankrupt, was taken 
into custody by a sheriff’s officer, ‘by virtue of writ of Extent’.590 Slade, in his 
absence, had his stock in trade sold ‘under a writ of Extent’ to pay the tax he 
owed.591 To what extent privileges from arrest were respected by powerful and 
aggressive creditors, is a matter which requires more research. 
Particularly constraining was a double-edged sword that sometimes hung over 
bankrupts: not only did they fear the consequences of missing a meeting of their 
commission having been told that they failed to attend at their peril, but they 
also feared being arrested on the way to and from meetings because there 
were creditors prepared to use legal powers and jurisdictions to challenge the 
commissioners and the bankrupts’ assignees.  Commission meetings at which 
bankrupts were required by law to attend were advertised in the London 
Gazette and other newspapers, therefore anyone wanting to arrest a bankrupt 
had the perfect opportunity when the bankrupt was making his way to the 
advertised place. 
The constant fear of arrest that these circumstances caused, and bankrupts’ 
frustration at not being able to move freely, were the cause of great resentment.  
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Isaac Scott, as mentioned above, had no illusions about his safety.  In 1767, 
despite having been declared a bankrupt, Scott remained fearful of arrest when 
he was ordered by the assignees to his commission to attend a meeting at a 
coffee house in Chancery Lane, but ‘it was apprehended by Mr Scott, that it was 
a Scheme concerted to arrest him’.  The assignees informed Scott that he ‘need 
be in no Fear of an Arrest’.  However, he was not confident he would enjoy 
protection from arrest and replied that ‘he did not think…that he could possibly 
attend with Safety to himself’.592 In October 1772 during a sitting of the 
commissioners at the Guildhall in the commission against banker Alexander 
Fordyce, Fordyce’s examination was interrupted by an announcement from a 
commissioner declaring that he had ‘reason to apprehend that an attempt will 
be made to arrest Mr. Fordyce on his going from this place’.593 He spent some 
time expounding on the law’s protection to a bankrupt while attending a meeting 
of the commission, but clearly some creditors, unhappy with the terms they 
might receive from a commission, still sought to recover debts via the route of 
arrest and imprisonment. 
Bankrupts had good reasons to want to move freely.  They wanted to get the 
process of bankruptcy over as soon as possible and to be released from the 
purgatorial state of being a bankrupt so that they could try and set themselves 
up again in their trade or seek a living by some other means.  Unfortunately, 
bankrupts had little capacity to challenge or in some way deflect the actions of 
those still determined to arrest them.  In the first instance as bankrupts, they 
had no assets and no credit, so they could not easily defend themselves by 
either paying off creditors or paying lawyers to obstruct them, unless they were 
assisted by family and friends to do so.  All this was problematic as bankrupts 
not only had to attend commission meetings, but they still needed to conduct 
their affairs and above all meet their own solicitors.  Bristol distiller Joshua 
James wrote to his solicitor in February 1785 wanting to know when he would 
be ‘safe from any Arrest in coming to Town’.594 In 1820 John Brickdale was 
wary of arrest and was reluctant to attend a meeting with his own solicitor, and 
he complained that he was ‘unable to expose myself whilst matters remain as 
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they are’.595 These kind of complaints were typical of those that figured in 
bankrupts’ correspondence with their solicitors. 
So often the certificate was the problem.  Release from the state of being a 
bankrupt was not possible until they obtained their certificate.  Some bankrupts 
helped to collect debts owed to their estate, which could require free movement 
about the country.  One such bankrupt who was very anxious to obtain his 
certificate was David Kennedy, who the reader may recall was kept in gaol, and 
then released, by his creditors.  As a bankrupt he then, for the benefit of his 
creditors, traversed the country to collect debts owed to his estate.  In order to 
do this, he needed to be free from arrest.  He wearily recounted his movements 
to Robert Cooper: 
I [went?] beyond [R]eading after John [Therestin?] of [Oackbourne] and 
Frome thence to the Earl of Berkley seat at Cranford Bridge after 
[Macklevers?] but could meet with no success and from thence to 
London…PS I have been round amongst the people owing the remainder 
on the books and done as much to push them in as possible but with little 
success hitherto.596 
Kennedy enjoyed freedom of movement while he was a bankrupt because he 
was harnessed to his creditors’ agenda.  When it had suited them earlier, they 
had kept him in prison for their own convenience.  Creditors were able to block 
bankrupts’ movement if they chose.  In August 1763 Thomas Pyott saw a 
solution to his problems through employment in the colonies.  However, he 
feared one of his principal creditors, Joseph Pease, would not permit him to 
leave England, unless he could obtain a ‘letter of License’ from the creditor.  
Having the letter would mean, Pyott maintained, that Pease would not be able 
to prevent him going to India.597 Pease wouldn’t let him have a letter, and Pyott 
never got to India.  Another factor that restricted bankrupts’ movement was 
financial as, in theory, although not always in practice, a bankrupt had no 
money or assets.  In 1820 John Brickdale complained that he could not attend a 
meeting because ‘[I] have not the pecuniary means of transporting myself 
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about’.598 One trader who encapsulated many of these aspects of confinement, 
absence and freedom of movement in the 1770s was Hampshire brewer 
Thomas Lodge. 
 
6.1.4 The Case of Thomas Lodge 
A trader who was arrested repeatedly as he lurched inexorably towards 
bankruptcy was Hampshire brewer Thomas Lodge.  Debtors like Lodge were at 
particular risk of arrest while traversing a street or highway.  They had to move 
evasively, or covertly by night, or limit themselves to those days on which the 
law did not permit arrests, principally Sundays.  Initially, on arresting a debtor, 
there was no need to take him directly to a place of holding as terms could be 
agreed on the spot, although as a highway was not the best of places for 
drawing up agreements it was necessary to repair to a place equipped for the 
drawing up of appropriate documents, such as an inn or an attorney’s office.  An 
example of this took place in January 1775 when Thomas Lodge was arrested 
for £960 under the suits of five creditors.  At Lodge’s request he was taken to an 
inn where his brother-in-law gave a ‘note’ for £1,000 to indemnify Brown a 
sheriff’s officer, and thus secure Lodge’s freedom for a couple of hours so he 
could go home to get some title deeds to properties so that a conveyance to his 
brother-in-law could be prepared to raise money to pay the debts.  Once the 
paperwork was done, Lodge was released.599 Lodge was never confined in a 
place intended for custody, but his person was in the custody of the sheriff’s 
officer.  Because there were stiff penalties against an officer for letting an 
arrested debtor escape, Brown was given the substantial indemnity while Lodge 
had his liberty conditionally returned to him.  Clearly the matter had been the 
subject of negotiation, and it shows that there was a certain elasticity to the 
space available to debtors, provided that someone assumed the risk of 
sustaining a penalty in the event that the debtor absconded. 
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On another day in January 1774 Thomas Lodge narrowly avoided being 
arrested.  Sheriff’s officer Brown, who had a warrant against Thomas Lodge for 
a debt, was skirting the boundaries of Lodge’s father’s property when he 
spotted Lodge over a low wall in his father’s garden.  If Brown could have 
reached over the wall and simply touched Lodge, it would have been an arrest 
in law.  However, Brown asked to speak to Lodge and Lodge complied, whilst 
quite possibly remaining at a safe distance on his side of the wall.  On this 
occasion an arrangement to pay was made across the boundary and Lodge 
remained secure in his father’s garden.600 
Lodge was arrested on other occasions and events took similar turns.  Lodge’s 
freedom of movement was punctuated by repeated arrests, and he only 
maintained his liberty by conveying assets each time.  On occasions, as above, 
his capacity to move about in conducting his own affairs was conditional upon 
fulfilling an obligation.  If at any time he had failed to make terms with his 
creditors he would have remained in custody, probably in a local lock-up or in 
the house of an officer, and then been taken to the corresponding county gaol 
to be held on mesne process. 
Few traders on the verge of bankruptcy could have secreted themselves to 
avoid arrest the number of times that Thomas Lodge did.  He responded to the 
approaches and actions of his creditors with multiple concealments in, and 
disappearances from, different domestic spaces.  On Tuesday 10 January 1775 
Lodge’s wife told her servant, Ann Carter, to tell anyone asking for Lodge that 
he was not at home, even though the servant might know him to be at home 
and in fact ‘locked up in his parlour for fear of being again arrested’, Lodge 
having been arrested the Monday before.  Later, when Ann tried to enter the 
parlour with the breakfast things, she found Lodge locked inside.601 
Lodge, unlike many failing traders, did not want to be a bankrupt although 
creditors who included family members were keen to make him one.602 
However, neither did he seem to want to engage with his creditors or be 
arrested.  He therefore repeatedly locked himself in rooms.  On Wednesday 25 
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January Lodge had locked himself in the ‘best parlour’ of the house for fear of 
being arrested when his servant, Richard Allee, tried to open the parlour door.  
Finding it locked, he asked who was in the room, and as he spoke the door 
opened and Lodge let him in.  He told Allee to shut the door again and Allee 
‘locked the door because he found it locked’.603 Lodge continued to seek secure 
spaces in domestic environments.  Later, on the same Wednesday 25 January 
Lodge went to his father’s house and concealed himself there until the following 
Sunday.  Then on the following Saturday morning Allee saw Lodge ‘in a room 
up one pair of stairs’ at his father’s house, and ‘to the best of his recollection’ 
the door was locked.604 
Lodge continued to fear Brown’s intentions and feared that merely locking 
himself in a room at home might not be sufficient protection.  According to 
another servant, John Thomas Chandler, Brown had already taken Lodge’s 
‘effects’ into his possession before 25 January, and now Lodge believed that 
Brown wanted to take Lodge’s person.  He feared that Brown had a warrant to 
enter any room in his house and arrest him, and that was why he remained at 
his father’s house upstairs.  Chandler said he also saw Lodge once in ‘a room 
below stairs’.605 Lodge seemingly was the master of concealment when it came 
to the visits of his creditors.  When on one occasion a creditor asked a servant 
to see if Lodge was at home, the servant went to the parlour, but ‘found the 
Candles burning and his Master not there’, which inverted the whole ritual of 
self-confinement by leaving an empty space.606 
Lodge did not in fact resort exclusively to concealing himself in domestic 
spaces.  He also absented himself.  When in early 1777 the whereabouts of 
Thomas Lodge was requested it was revealed that he was frequently ‘about the 
County for days together’.607 In March that year when a direct attempt was 
made to contact Lodge the only answer that could be obtained from a neighbour 
was that he was ‘somewhere near Dogmersfield’, the village where he lived.608 
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Lodge’s problems were protracted, and the nature and chronology of events 
seem problematic.  In the end he did experience longer-term confinement.  
Although Lodge appears to have received his bankrupt’s certificate of discharge 
in 1788,609 this was not before it seems he was held in ‘the Sheriff’s Ward of 
Goal at WINCHESTER’ from where he sought relief under an Insolvent Debtors’ 
Act in August 1781.610 Could Lodge have been gaoled by creditors while still an 
undischarged bankrupt?  The apparent contradiction needs clarification: there 
may have been an earlier discharge of which this researcher has found no 
record, which was followed by imprisonment (after bankruptcy Lodge would in 
theory have had no property or assets with which to meet demands), and then 
another bankruptcy commission from which he was discharged in the late 
1780s. 
Lodge’s experience, and that of other bankrupts, suggest that it was the 
unpleasantness and indignity of arrest, as well as its coercive force, that 
primarily threatened bankrupts such that they felt confined and their liberty 
curtailed.  Imprisonment was a real possibility and did happen to some traders 
despite being made bankrupts in law, but generally as bankrupts in law, along 
with family support, it was an outcome they managed to avoid.  The first part of 
this chapter has concentrated largely on how bankrupts endeavoured to evade 
arrest and imprisonment by either confining themselves in spaces like locked 
rooms or the corners of fields, or alternatively absenting themselves altogether 
from the domestic and commercial spaces they usually inhabited.  Part two of 
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6.2.1 Crossing boundaries: domestic spaces, commercial spaces 
The second exploration of space in this chapter will take the reader, quite 
literally, into the physical places in which being a bankrupt was experienced.   
Bankruptcy sources tell us things about the spaces (domestic and commercial – 
public and private) that traders (before and after they became bankrupts) 
inhabited and used. Hannah Barker has recently commented on the insufficient 
attention currently given by historians to how spaces were actually used.611 It is 
hoped that the sources in this study may provide some insights into eighteenth-
century people’s use of, and experience of, domestic and commercial space; 
and how bankruptcy transformed perceptions and experiences of these spaces. 
Because of the importance of proving that an act of bankruptcy had been 
committed by a trader, thousands of sworn statements were taken before 
bankruptcy commissioners.  Few of these records survive, but where these 
proofs do survive, they tell us things about the places inhabited and used by 
bankrupts and their families.  Records of acts of bankruptcy relate to the ‘on the 
verge of’ bankruptcy stage of insolvency when creditors and officers of the law 
visited the homes and commercial premises that tradespeople inhabited.  The 
records of acts of bankruptcy were usually detailed witness statements about 
what had happened in a variety of domestic and commercial places and were 
intended not only to prove an act of bankruptcy, but also to prevent, or at least 
make difficult, any subsequent challenges to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy 
commissioners and a bankrupt’s status as a bankrupt in law.  In taking these 
details from witnesses, information about events in, and movements in and out 
of, different domestic and commercial spaces were also recorded.  Regardless 
of the frequent contrivance and the panicky individual interpretations of the 
perceived requirements of the statutes that were so integral to the ‘narratives’ of 
the committing of acts of bankruptcy, without these records we would not have 
these additional insights into the spaces in and around traders’ homes, and 
details of interactions and relationships that took place within them.  Often as a 
result of disputes these records from early in the bankruptcy process were 
 





complemented by later documents, usually letters or further depositions.  
Although this later evidence was used to dispute earlier events, it provides 
additional insight into the domestic and commercial spaces of bankrupts’ 
environment. 
Records of acts of bankruptcy can tell us things about the buildings lived in by 
bankrupts.  Most bankrupts, at least until they became bankrupts, lived with 
their families in their ‘dwelling house’.  These houses had some, or all, of the 
domestic spaces typically associated with homes of middling-sort traders in the 
long eighteenth century.  However, some spaces featured more in the records 
than others.  Frequently cited were spaces which were principally used by 
servants or frequently shared with servants and visitors (halls, kitchens, ground-
floor parlours, stairs); and more private spaces, often on upper floors and 
primarily used by masters and mistresses (bedrooms, chambers, studies).  
Salons, dining rooms and closets are little mentioned, possibly because few 
bankrupts were elite enough to have them; it may also be the case that the 
events that mattered tended to occur in other household spaces.  Thresholds 
were also important.  A lot of the choreography of bankruptcy played out in and 
around the home and especially at or near the entrances to houses.  Events 
inside houses were also sometimes observed through windows from outside the 
houses.  The exterior spaces of dwelling houses (drives, gardens, paddocks, 
fields, and outbuildings) also featured in legal documents which were generated 
to prove acts of bankruptcy.612 
Traders’ dwelling houses and their commercial premises were frequently the 
places where events unfolded on their trajectory to becoming bankrupts.  Karen 
Harvey has remarked of ‘eighteenth-century British visual and written culture’ 
that the house and the domestic interior became ‘increasingly a richly detailed 
setting for human dramas’.613 Arguably as the problems resulting from 
insolvency and bankruptcy unravelled, these non-fictional houses and interiors 
of bankrupts became settings for generating written narratives of real dramas.  
Creditors who were anxious to get accounts settled visited both commercial 
premises and dwelling houses and sometimes both.  In several of the cases in 
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this study the dwelling house and commercial premises were structurally part of 
the same building, or at least on the same site, or located little distance from 
each other.614 When creditors called, they were pursuing a commercial matter 
and in doing this they often crossed boundaries and entered domestic spaces 
where their actions became part of the unfolding narrative of bankrupts’ 
experience. 
If a creditor called to speak with a trader about an account, he was sometimes 
informed by a servant that the master was not at home (this was especially the 
case if an act of bankruptcy was being contrived).  There is often no evidence to 
suggest that this brief exchange took place anywhere else other than on the 
threshold of the dwelling house after which the creditor departed.  However, 
many of the records examined in this study suggest, and often clearly indicate, 
that creditors and officers of the law were admitted into the interior spaces of 
bankrupts’ homes by servants.  What is harder to know is where they remained 
and what they did once admitted, and whether they spoke directly with the 
mistress in the absence of the master, or whether communications were relayed 
to them by servants.  Details are vague in some cases, much more specific in 
others.  After creditors had called to speak to King’s Lynn merchant George 
Clay in 1739 a witness deponed that they ‘could not see him’ which only means 
that the caller was not able or permitted to speak to him, rather than that they 
were admitted and had some sight of the interior of the house in which Clay was 
not to be seen.615 On another occasion Clay’s wife told a creditor that Clay had 
‘left nobody at home to transact his business’.616 The latter might suggest a 
message relayed to the front door, rather than the creditor being admitted to 
converse with Clay’s wife, although in the deposition no servant is mentioned 
conveying the message, in which case Clay’s wife might have spoken to the 
creditor on the threshold.  The limited detail in this case does not allow us to 
know with certainty whether the creditors crossed the threshold or remained on 
the doorstep from where they could only peer into the space beyond. 
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In a similar case on 14 March 1743 Robert Fry, a sheriff’s officer, went to the 
home of Richard Hutchings, a Somerset yarn washer, to arrest Hutchings under 
a warrant.  Fry found Hutchings’ wife and son and asked them where Hutchings 
was, and they replied that he had gone ‘beyond London’. It is possible that Fry 
spoke on the threshold to Mrs Hutchings and son, but it is also possible that as 
Fry was probably known to the Hutchings, and given the matters discussed 
(Hutchings fearing arrest, his being gone to his other son’s ‘beyond London’ to 
raise money to pay his debts, and his being resolved ‘never to return home 
again if he could not raise money sufficient for that purpose’) that this exchange 
with two people was conducted in the interior of the Hutchings’ dwelling 
house.617 In the above two cases one reason for suspecting that creditors may 
have entered the bankrupts’ homes is the absence of any reference to servants 
as carriers of communications between the callers on the thresholds and the 
inner spaces of the dwelling houses.  Creditors’ visits typically triggered a 
sequence of movements (by callers, servants, masters and mistresses) in and 
out of, and up and down the domestic spaces within bankrupts’ dwelling 
houses.  Servants (domestic and trade) also frequently gave evidence, not only 
for the proofs of acts of bankruptcy, but also about subsequent events.  When 
they had a role in these events, they tended to give more precise information 
about the movements of individuals between commercial and domestic spaces. 
If bankrupts’ commercial premises (interior and exterior) featured in accounts, it 
was generally when domestic and commercial premises were part of the same 
building (or complex of buildings) or were located near each other.  A 
bankruptcy that played out across commercial and domestic space was that of 
Sherborne maltster John Slade, who lived alongside a complex of commercial 
buildings.  Early in 1830 one Gillingham, a creditor owed money by Slade for 
hay, came to Slade’s yard and spoke to his servant and maltster William 
Luffman, whose wife Ann was Slade’s domestic servant.  Luffman recalled the 
movements that then ensued between the yard and Slade’s house: 
 
I went and told my wife of it and desired her to tell Mr Slade that 
Gillingham wanted to have his Account settled, She went to him in the 
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Parlour, and then brought a message to me to say, that Master had not 
his Bill and that he Gillingham was to call again in a fortnight…618 
Gillingham was not convinced by this answer having already left the bill with 
Slade’s clerk, and so, Luffman continued: ‘he went to the Office for it and having 
it then delivered to him, he, the same day, brought it to my wife, who in person 
carried it to Master’.619 Gillingham only communicated with Slade through the 
servants that day and it does not appear he called at the house.  Luffman did 
not know whether Gillingham got any further response from Slade, but some 
days later Gillingham had clearly decided that he was getting no result from the 
servants in the yard and, according to Luffman, he ‘called at the House, but it 
was after Slade had departed’.620 Another bankrupt who lived close to his 
commercial premises was Romsey brewer John Latham who on 13 November 
1817 received some letters ‘at around 9 o’clock in the morning’.  It is not clear 
whether Latham was at home or in his brewery when he received them, but he 
was quickly able to speak to ‘his son, who was in the Counting House’ and tell 
his son that he had to leave home for fear of arrest, and he left that same 
day.621 Both Slade and Latham as provincial maltsters and brewers of no great 
scale, lived close to their commercial premises.  In the case of large 
bankruptcies in this study, typically major merchants and bankers (Fordyce, 
Muilman and Nantes, Brickdale, Wakeford, Fry), who lived with their families in 
suburban villas or at their country seats, separation of domestic and commercial 
space was much more pronounced.  This only meant, as will be seen below, 
that matters developed in places separated in time, and hence such rapid 
exchanges between commercial and domestic spaces did not occur. 
An instance of creditors clearly entering a dwelling house to negotiate terms, 
and the movements that took place within that domestic space, is provided in 
the case of the failing soap manufacturer and soon-to-be bankrupt William 
Everhard Baron Von Doornik.  The events and movements took place one day 
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in November 1806 on the ground floor of soap manufacturer James Taylor’s 
house in Whitechapel.  Von Doornik was visiting his friend Taylor who was also 
in the company of Taylor’s business partner Thomas Lorkin.  The three men 
were in the house which had a front and back parlour.  Von Doornik was in the 
back parlour, but it is not clear where the other men were.  A maid servant 
asked Lorkin if he would go and see Von Doornik, which Lorkin did.  Von 
Doornik told Lorkin that a creditor and ‘another Person’ (probably a lawyer) 
wanted to see Von Doornik.  Lorkin offered to go and speak to the two men on 
Von Doornik’s behalf and ‘went immediately into the front parlour of the said 
House being the room adjoining that in which…[Von Doornik]…then was’.  
Lorkin maintained a discussion with the two men about Von Doornik’s 
arrangements ‘for the benefit of his Creditors’ which the men were unhappy 
about.  Lorkin resisted the men’s request to see Von Doornik, then, there being 
no agreement, and the two men ‘being about to leave the room’ Lorkin declared 
that Von Doornik ‘was there [in the adjoining room] and that they might see him 
if they liked’.  The men declined and left.  What is likely to have been happening 
here is that the creditors were trying to foist an act of bankruptcy on Von 
Doornik, and Lorkin realising this suddenly attempted to give them access to 
Von Doornik.622 
So far in this account creditors or their agents have seemed relatively patient 
and little intrusive as they stood on the thresholds of bankrupts’ homes and 
commercial premises.  However, this was not always the case, and it certainly 
was not representative of all bankrupts’ experience.  In bankruptcy the 
ownership and control of spaces quickly became inverted as property was 
conveyed away from bankrupts, and where once the bankrupts had been 
masters and directed their businesses, now in those same spaces others 
entered and took control.  In 1797 bankrupt London merchant Henry Nantes 
found himself answering awkward questions about the failure of his merchant 
house and the suicide of his partner in a place that had formerly been his own 
‘Accompting House in Warnford Court’, located off Throgmorton Street.623 
Under English bankruptcy law accompting houses and other pre-existing 
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commercial spaces (shops, stores, warehouses, offices, works yards and 
buildings, breweries etc.) could be seamlessly conveyed to new owners, or 
simply rendered empty spaces by fire sales of stock and utensils. 
Bankrupts sometimes experienced the summary seizure of their commercial 
premises.  In the summer of 1773 trouble descended on David Brigstock’s shop 
when two men, who represented a creditor, entered and demanded from Ann, 
Brigstock’s wife, the books and the keys to the shop.  They then locked and 
nailed up the door to the shop, thus excluding Brigstock and his family from the 
space in which they and their servants habitually interacted socially and 
commercially with neighbours and customers.624 Given that Brigstock’s 
commercial premises formed part of his dwelling house the creditors had 
effectively erected a secure boundary in a house which previously may have 
barely demarcated commercial space from domestic.  This seizure of the 
commercial part of the house removed the interface between the family’s public 
social space and their more private domestic space. 
The Brigstocks were provincial shopkeepers with probably limited status in the 
locality, and therefore aggressive creditors who understood the debt laws easily 
shut them out of their shop front and part of their home; if cross words were 
exchanged, they were not recorded.  However, there were many other kinds of 
shops or commercial spaces, and in some places matters became wholly more 
fraught.  In one respectable place of business, a bank which also served as a 
space for polite social interaction, the sudden pressures of financial failure and 
imminent bankruptcy transformed the establishment’s spaces into an arena of 
conflict and physical confrontation.  Thus in 1826 behind the public space at the 
front of the Wakeford brothers’ Andover Old Bank, there was a library where 
more private business matters were conducted.  What unfolded in this inner 
chamber of the bank on the morning of 4 March, was more than acrimonious.  
The catalyst for some un-genteel behaviour was the impending bankruptcy of 
Wakefords’ and the attempt by William Heath, a creditor of Wakefords’ and 
proprietor of another Andover bank, to gain an unfair advantage ahead of the 
bankruptcy by demanding immediate settlement of his account.  Clerks, 
lawyers, members of the respective banking families repeatedly entered and 
 






exited the library at the rear of the banking house while attempts were made to 
reach an agreement over payment to Heath.  But when only the Wakefords’ 
solicitor and Heath were alone in the room, Heath snatched a pile of money 
from the table and made for the library door, only briefly being obstructed at the 
threshold by the lawyer, after which he ‘bolted as hard as he could’ from the 
library and the bank.625 That morning the library, in a place supposedly of public 
reputation and probity, became a space in which men, bankers no less, and 
leading members of the local business community, grappled with each other like 
common thieves over a pile of notes and bills.  On that day bankruptcy changed 
their behaviour and how they used the space they were in. 
Other cases suggest that creditors, or their agents, did not hold back from 
entering directly into bankrupts’ domestic space and the processes of 
bankruptcy often entailed not merely a crossing of thresholds with commercial 
objectives, but a rolling back of domestic boundaries altogether.  An instance of 
this occurs in the Ann and Isaac Scott bankruptcy in which there were very poor 
relations between the bankrupts and the commission, and particularly with the 
assignees.  On a Saturday evening in 1767 a commission attorney entered 
Anne Scott’s home and ‘pushed by the Maid up Stairs, into the Room’ where 
Mrs Scott and her daughters were, and delivered a summons to appear before 
the commissioners the next Monday morning.626 When creditors, officers acting 
under civil law, or other agents of creditors or commissions succeeded in 
crossing thresholds and gaining access to domestic or trade premises, it was 
usually because they were admitted by a servant.627 If servants did not permit 
access it was because they had received instructions to deny access, but 
disadvantage in age, status, and sometimes gender, will have often meant that 
it was hard to carry out their instructions, especially when faced with pushy men 
in pursuit of money.  Ann Scott’s maid could not detain the attorney on the 
threshold, so he was able to enter Mrs Scott’s private space uninvited and 
accomplish his intended business.  Entry to the dwelling house might 
 
625 HRO, 52M84/60, Wakeford Bankruptcy 1826, Examination of witnesses: Robert Henry 
Aberdein, 22 July 1826, pp. 363–66. 
626 Scott, Case of Anne and Isaac Scott, p. 124. 
627 See Christopher Heyl, ‘We are Not at Home: Protecting Domestic Privacy in Post-Fire 
Middle-Class London’, London Journal, 27 (2002), 12–33, for an interesting discussion about 





sometimes have been prevented, but creditors and other agents easily moved 
in gardens and grounds. 
One subject of this study who felt the crossing of the boundaries around her 
domestic and private space was Elizabeth the wife of bankrupt banker Joseph 
Fry.  In November 1828, as her husband’s bank failed, Elizabeth recorded in 
her journal: ‘The storm has now entered my own borders’.628 Elizabeth meant 
that the mundane and tainted world of trade and financial embarrassment had 
invaded her private world.  At the same time her words presaged the assault on 
her domestic space by the agents of her husband’s creditors, who were soon to 
cross into her house and gardens in order to take possession of them.  The 
officers arrived early the next month.629 
At least for a while Elizabeth was able to remain in her home and observe (and 
write her journal) while the appraising took place.  No such courtesies were 
extended to David Kennedy.  In February 1752, a team of appraisers 
descended on Kennedy’s property and made an inventory.  Then to ensure that 
the contents of the house stayed put and were secure from any rival actions, 
they ‘barricaded the respective doors and entries belonging to the said house, 
turned every body out, and lock’d it all up’.630 
Actions within bankruptcy crossed boundaries between the commercial and the 
domestic because the law permitted creditors and their agents to exercise 
excessive and disproportionate power over bankrupts.  Furthermore, the actions 
of creditors and their agents collapsed domestic and private spaces into the 
commercial arena, in the sense that all that was private and personal, both 
space and things with their private and personal meanings, became mere 
assets to be traded by creditors, lawyers, and auctioneers. 
 
6.2.2 Meetings in places: the public and the private 
The previous section in this chapter examined events and actions that unfolded 
largely in and around the domestic or commercial places owned by bankrupts.  
Many of these events transpired while traders were on the verge of bankruptcy 
 
628 LRSFB, Diaries of Elizabeth Fry, MS Vol. S267/2, Plashet, 15 November 1828. 
629 Ibid., 3 December 1828. 
630 WRO, 492/280, Bankruptcy of David Kennedy: Burgesse to a creditor (probably Cooper, 





and prior to their being declared bankrupts in law.  However, once a trader’s 
bankruptcy commission had been officially announced in the London Gazette 
and promulgated by national and regional newspapers to notify creditors up and 
down the country, the trader turned bankrupt was required to attend statutory 
meetings.  The meetings were important because they gave creditors an 
opportunity to prove what they were owed, and thus register their right to 
participate in the pro-rata distribution of bankrupts’ liquidated estates.  The 
meetings of creditors with the bankrupt and the commissioners which were 
advertised in the Gazette were public meetings in so far as they were open to 
all creditors and were held in public places.  These official public meetings were 
intended to ensure transparency in, and scrutiny of, the proceedings by all 
creditors with a claim on a bankrupt’s estate.  The meetings included formal 
examinations of bankrupts before the commissioners.  Propriety and order were 
expected, and the proceedings were recorded.  They also allowed bankrupts 
the chance to explain themselves in a safe place, but they could also expect to 
be challenged by creditors. 
The first meeting of commissioners to carry out the preliminaries (e.g. swearing 
themselves in, examining witnesses for the proof of bankruptcy) ‘is usually at a 
tavern, coffeehouse, or other convenient place’.631 The offices of solicitors to 
commissions were also used.  For the public meetings with creditors London 
commissions met at the Guildhall in the City; in the country the meetings were 
held in suitable inns and taverns.  There were exceptions to this, for example, 
the commissioners in George Clay’s 1739 bankruptcy met at the Guildhall in 
King’s Lynn.  In major towns and cities, a single inn or tavern might serve 
commissions handling a much wider geographical area than the immediate 
municipality and environs.  A place that served the latter function was ‘the 
Dwelling House of John Weeks Vintner commonly Called or known by the name 
of the Bush Tavern’ in Corn Street, Bristol.  There the commissioners in the 
case of bankrupt Carmarthenshire shopkeeper David Brigstock sat. Brigstock 
was one of a number of Welsh bankrupts whose commissions met in Bristol.632 
It was not, however, the case that small bankruptcies in rural locations were 
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always taken to major towns or cities.  Yarn washer Richard Hutchings, a 
bankrupt in rural Somerset in 1744, who lived in a small village had only to 
make an appearance in the small town nearby at ‘the Dwelling house of 
Ambrose Cecill at Crewkerne…a publick Inn and known by the sign of the 
George’.633 
Inns and taverns, as typical places for hire, were conveniently able to provide 
refreshment and victuals for the commissioners and others with roles in the 
commission (in country commissions commissioners were still allowed to 
charge their dining and refreshment to the bankrupt estate).  In cities coffee 
houses were also places where business related to bankruptcies was 
transacted.  In January 1775, a month before his bankruptcy, Hampshire brewer 
Thomas Lodge travelled to London with a servant.  According to his servant 
Lodge stayed at Joe’s Coffee House in Mitre Court, whilst the servant was 
lodged at the Bell and Sunn Inn in Fleet Street.  Joe’s was well located for 
Lodge to consult gentlemen of the law and he spent several days there.  The 
servant ‘waited on’ Lodge at Joe’s a number of times, joining him in the ‘publick 
room’ where they supped, and the ‘Coffee Room’ where they breakfasted.634 
Coffee houses located close to London’s legal district naturally served 
commission solicitors.  In June 1782 Bristol solicitor Daniel Burges lodged at the 
Baptist’s Head Coffee House in Chancery Lane.  The Baptist’s Head in 
Chancery Lane was a coffee house ‘Frequented by gentlemen of the law’, it 
was also said of it that ‘Commissioners of Bankrupts sit here’.635 From there 
Burges conducted business on behalf of bankrupt Bristol distiller Joshua 
James.636 Inns, taverns and coffee houses also offered a variety of spaces for 
meetings and fulfilled other functions in the bankruptcy process, typically as 
venues for the sale of bankrupts’ assets by public auction.  For example, on 6 
July 1789 bankrupt distiller Joshua James’s home was advertised for auction, 
with the venue for the sale being the Exchange Coffee House in Bristol.637 
When in 1828 struggling Sherborne brewer John Slade’s home and premises 
were first put up for sale by auction, the venue was the Antelope Inn, 
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Sherborne.638 The Antelope Inn would also be the place for the meetings of his 
bankruptcy commission two years later. 
In as far as this researcher understands public meetings of the commissioners 
were not open to the merely curious public, but a claim to have a debt to prove 
would gain admission.  Most bankruptcies would have attracted interest only at 
a local level, or within trade networks and communities.  However, in cases of 
bankruptcies of notoriety, usually ones where the scale of the failure and debts 
were considerable and where many creditors were affected, public interest was 
alerted in the press and crowds gathered outside the meeting places rendering 
them very public.  This was particularly the case with the commission meetings 
of well-known bankers Alexander Fordyce (1772) and Joseph Fry (1828), which 
drew both crowds and journalists. 
In the case of the bankruptcies of partners in note-issuing banks, anyone left 
holding an unusable banknote was a creditor and needed to prove their debt at 
commission meetings (or through a power of attorney).  There could be 
hundreds, if not thousands, of holders of notes, therefore large gatherings of the 
public were inevitable at meetings.  The bankruptcy records of Wakefords’ Old 
Andover Bank fill volumes with entries recording the claims of holders of small 
denomination notes.639 Meetings of creditors also brought together a 
moderately diverse cross-section of the population (creditors could include: 
aristocrats, gentlemen and gentlewomen, widows and single women, 
professionals, tradespeople, and servants and labourers who were owed 
wages), bankrupts were therefore thrust into very public arenas in which they 
were examined before a sometimes ill-disposed audience. 
Whether a guildhall or a tavern, these physically constructed places provided 
the spaces in which bankrupts experienced the proceedings of the commissions 
issued against them.  A bankruptcy commission, wherever it met, created its 
own unique space by doing something with, or about, a bankrupt.  Phil Hubbard 
makes the observation that what matters about ‘space and place is not what 
they are, but what they do’.  What a tavern did, amongst other things, was hold 
proceedings against bankrupts.640 Equally, what was supposed to be done in 
 
638 DRO, D/FFO/27/102, Bankruptcy of John Slade: auction details, 1 May 1828. 
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certain places, sometimes could not be done.  On 16 October 1739 George 
Clay did not surrender to the commissioners who had gathered at the Guildhall 
in King’s Lynn at two o’clock to examine him, and thus the gentlemen 
commissioners could only record ‘nobody appeared’.641 No bankrupt meant no 
examination, and therefore no public arena.  Almost a century later in similar 
circumstances the commissioners in John Slade’s bankruptcy noted that Slade 
had failed to surrender to the third meeting at the Antelope Inn in Sherborne: 
although we attended at the place above mentioned in expectation of such 
Surrender till past three o’clock in the afternoon of the same day, and 
although due notice in writing, requiring him to surrender on the day and 
at the place above mentioned, had been left for him at his usual places of 
abode…642  
We do not know with any certainty why some bankrupts chose not to surrender 
to their commissions.  However, formal meetings in the presence of the 
commissioners were surely preferable to meetings without commissioners and 
held only with assignees.  Assignees were also creditors, so meetings had all 
the potential to be acrimonious.  By the late eighteenth century, the reputation 
of these meetings was sufficiently embedded with the reading public, if not also 
in popular culture, for contemporary satirical artists, principally Thomas 
Rowlandson, to represent such events.  Below appear two of Rowlandson’s 
images of bankrupts in meetings.  The former, Examination of a Bankrupt, 
shows the event presided over by commissioners and being conducted with 
relative decorum in a seemingly spacious London Guildhall.643 The adequate 
space and relative order in the hall does not tally with all accounts.   
With the greatest number of bankruptcies in England occurring in London the 
number of bankrupts taken through London Guildhall was immense, and few 
seemed contented with the accommodation the Guildhall offered.  Sir James 
Bland Burges grumbled in 1783 that using the hall was ‘productive of great 
 
641 NRO, BL/CS/1/1/1, Bankruptcy of George Clay: sworn depositions, p. 15. 
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643 Thomas Rowlandson and Augustus Charles Pugin, Examination of a Bankrupt before his 
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may be that as London bankruptcy commissions had to find space where they could in the 
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inconvenience.  The apartments…are in general small’.  Add to this an over 
concentration of separate commissions, each one trying to hear several cases 
in these rooms such that the result was an ‘immense crowd’ as well as noise 
and heat.  Burges asked: 
the confusion which such a crowd must create, it will rather appear 
surprising that the Commissioners should be able to breath[e], than that 
they should hurry over an unpleasant business…In such a chaos of 
papers and of a clamour, how can a due attention be preserved?644 
Isaac Scott had noted in 1767 ‘the Hurry of Business that Day at the 
Guildhall’.645 Things did not improve in the nineteenth century.  One 
commissioner grumbled in 1816 that the overcrowding: ‘produces such 
confusion, that the crowds round the tables resemble more the rabble round the 
stalls at Smithfield, than an assemblage of persons interested in the decent and 
orderly administration of justice’.646 One speaker in Parliament said that the 
Guildhall on a busy day ‘could be compared to nothing but a cock-fight’.647 And 
as for country commissions, Burges thought they were on ‘a still worse 
footing’.648 
 
644 Burges, Law of Insolvency, p. 339. 
645 Scott, Case of Anne and Isaac Scott, p. 39. 
646 Edward Christian, Practical Instructions for Suing Out and Prosecuting a Commission of 
Bankrupt (London, 1816), in Hoppit, Risk and Failure, p. 38. 
647 Parl. Deb., Vol. 38 (1818), col. 981, quoted in Weiss, Hell of the English, p. 42. 







Figure 3.1.  Examination of a Bankrupt before his Creditors in the Court of King’s Bench, 
Guildhall (1808), by Thomas Rowlandson (1756 – 1827). © London Metropolitan Archives 
During the liquidation of a bankrupt’s estate there were official meetings 
advertised in the London Gazette which were presided over by the 
commissioners.  Although more likely to attract wider public attention, formal 
meeting places had certain advantages for both bankrupts and creditors.  Apart 
from the general procedural order imposed by the commissioners, bankrupts 
enjoyed certain protections when attending; and creditors would hope 
transparency and equitable treatment in the liquidation of bankrupts’ estates 
was maintained by the commissioners’ supervision of the assignees.  These 
meetings with the commissioners can be regarded as ‘public’ meetings (or 
sittings), but there were other meetings which were considered ‘private’ 
meetings.  These were meetings at which the commissioners carried out 
essential proceedings, such as the initial meetings to examine witnesses in 
order to declare a trader a bankrupt.  There were other private meetings in the 






presence of only one commissioner at which, according to Sheila Marriner, 
‘proceedings were frequently not recorded’.649 
More ambiguous in status were ‘private’ meetings with assignees, but without 
commissioners.  The assignees as administrators of bankrupt estates were 
entitled to meet without the commissioners, and these meetings could be held 
with or without the bankrupt, and with or without some, or all, of the creditors.  In 
London, due to the demands on the Guildhall’s overcrowded space, alternative 
places were used.  These places were typically inns, taverns and coffee-
houses.650 Many of these places were in or near localities that were significant 
in the administration of the law or the treatment of debtors. 
Relative to places like the Guildhall there was a certain ambiguity to meetings in 
taverns and coffee houses without the presence of commissioners and there 
existed some doubt as to whether bankrupts would be protected when attending 
these meetings.651 In September 1767 the assignees in Isaac Scott’s 
bankruptcy tried to get Scott to attend a number of places including the Paul’s 
Head and Rolls Coffee-House in Chancery Lane.652 These places were less 
formal and less public than the Guildhall where commissioners would be 
present.  Private meetings in taverns and coffee houses without commissioners 
may have permitted assignees to conduct business in a manner that served 
their own interests. 
As related in part one above, Scott did not believe he could attend these private 
meetings with safety.  He insisted that he would only attend a place that was 
within the Rules of the Court.  When offered a meeting at Nando’s Coffee-
House, which was a haunt of the legal profession in Fleet Street, it appears he 
accepted, although unlike the Cardigan-head tavern, it was outside the Rules of 
the Court.  He may on this occasion have accepted the assignees assurances 
that they would ‘immediately bail’ him were he to be arrested.653 
 
649 Marriner, ‘English Bankruptcy Records’, p. 362 fn.4. 
650 Ibid., p. 352. 
651 The doubt is expressed by Cooke, Bankrupt Laws, II, p. 21.  Cooke’s original text on which 
later editions were based was first published in 1785.  An annotation at the foot of pp. 21–22 
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652 In 1810 commissioners were meeting at Rolls Coffee House, see Cooke, Bankrupt Laws, II, 
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Not only was Scott and his family uneasy about these private meetings with the 
assignees, creditors were too.  Private meetings of assignees and creditors as 
opposed to public meetings in the presence of commissioners were sometimes 
opportunities for assignees, who it must be remembered were also creditors, to 
put their own interests above those of other creditors, and of course above the 
bankrupt’s.  In January 1768 some of Scott’s creditors ‘began to be inquisitive’ 
about the assignees’ handling of assets.  The assignees advertised ‘a publick 
Meeting’, but ‘publick’ did not necessarily mean with the commissioners, so 
various principal creditors demanded the meeting be held ‘before the 
Commissioners, when Parties might be interrogated on Oath’ and because ‘a 
Meeting before the Commissioners’ would ‘tend more to the Benefit of the 
Estate than a private Meeting’.654 
For one impression of what these private meetings and the places they were 
held in might have been like it is useful to look at Rowlandson’s A Meeting of 
Creditors, which shows a scene in marked contrast to the Guildhall meeting.  
Despite some clearly intended symbolism in Rowlandson’s drawing, the picture 
shows a private meeting in what might conceivably be a private room in a 
tavern or coffee house at which an insolvent debtor or bankrupt, is being 
questioned before a group of creditors; the creditors remonstrating at the front 
may be assignees.  In the small crowded and cluttered room, the mood appears 
both acrimonious and slumberous, while intrigues are hatched in the 
background.655 Rowlandson will have been aware that back or upstairs rooms in 
London taverns or coffee houses were hired for these events.  Places of 
hospitality and sociability offered a variety of separate spaces that were useful 
to clients with complex agendas, and it was probably a venue like the one 
portrayed by Rowlandson that hosted some of the many meetings complained 
about by Anne and Isaac Scott in their pamphlet.   
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Figure 3.2.  A Meeting of Creditors (c.1785 – 90) by Thomas Rowlandson (1756 – 1827). © 
Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge 
The way the variety of spaces that a tavern offered were exploited at one of 
these private meetings was described by the Scott brothers.  One evening in 
November 1767 Isaac, Daniel and George had agreed to meet the assignees at 
the ‘Cardigan Tavern’, a place where, the assignees declared to Isaac, ‘we 
imagine you may attend with Safety’.  How safe the place itself was, might have 
been questioned, as the ‘Cardigan Tavern’ had been the scene of dramatic 
events.  In 1760 the ‘Cardigan head tavern, Charing-Cross’ featured as a 
meeting and dining place for those involved in the violent treatment of Anne Bell 
which led to her death.656 A year later it was the scene of a duel in which one 
Captain Jasper was fatally shot.657 However, this tavern should not be 
considered a place ill-suited to expediting bankruptcy business, partly because 
it was a place to which a bankrupt could go in safety.  The ‘Cardigan Head 
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tavern at Charing Cross…being in the verge of the court’ features in the 1768 
edition of The Solicitor’s Guide, AND Tradesman’s Instructor, CONCERNING 
BANKRUPTS.658 From the events that night in November 1767 at the Cardigan 
we gain some sense of the nature of the spaces within a London tavern and 
how they were used during a meeting of creditors. 
The Scott brothers waited at the tavern, then the assignees called Daniel ‘down 
into another Room to them’ separating him from Isaac and George.  When they 
had finished with Daniel ‘one of the Assignees, went up Stairs to pay a Visit to 
Mr George Scott’, and he sometime later again ‘joined his Company below’.659 
On another occasion when George Scott entered the chamber in which a 
meeting of assignees and creditors was being held (Isaac did not attend for fear 
of arrest), he found his presence unwelcome and he was ‘desired by some 
Creditors to go and wait in another Room till he was called for’ which Scott did 
not consider the ‘genteelest Treatment’ and he ‘therefore left the House, 
although he had as much right there as any other Creditor’.660 
There was another occasion when Isaac Scott was summoned to appear before 
commissioners at the Guildhall, which was the established place of appearance 
before commissioners in London, but he would not attend for fear of arrest.  It 
would be thought that Scott could safely attend a public sitting of the 
commissioners at the Guildhall, but the reader will recall the intelligence of an 
intended arrest of Alexander Fordyce received at his examination at the 
Guildhall in 1772 (related in part one above).  This time it was the 
commissioners who agreed to change places and to meet at the Cardigan 
which was within the Rules of the Verge of the Court where Scott was residing.  
Had it not been for this privileged place, Scott might not have attended the 
meetings of his commission at all.  At this meeting Scott managed to have ‘the 
Assignees and their Clerk sent into another Room’ before he would make a 
discovery before the commissioners.  They returned to the main chamber later 
in order to examine Scott.661 
 
658 Anon., Solicitor’s Guide, p. 26.  Ian Kelly says the tavern had ‘a dubious reputation’ and that 
some considered it a molly-house, but he provides no sources to support these observations, 
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This chapter has highlighted the extent to which bankrupts felt acutely 
aggrieved at being deprived of their liberty, a right to which they felt entitled.  
For them, a loss of liberty was no fiction.  Failing traders genuinely feared arrest 
and imprisonment, and it was this threat that often spurred them on to seek at 
least partial protection under the bankruptcy regime.  However, merely 
becoming a bankrupt did not afford complete deliverance from the threat of 
imprisonment.  Bankrupts who failed to satisfy commissioners could be 
imprisoned.  On the verge of bankruptcy, they were locked up or held in some 
form of custody, or they confined themselves in their own homes.  Even a place 
like the Verge of the Court, which offered partial protection, did so only in return 
for substantial sacrifices both pecuniary and in personal liberty.  As an 
alternative to confinement a bankrupt might absent or even exile themselves 
from their habitual places.  Where protections for bankrupts were offered, they 
were limited to specific journeys, which meant that otherwise bankrupts were 
largely confined to wherever they had been taken in as former homes were 
invaded by officers and auctioneers. 
Bankruptcy collapsed all boundaries.  Bankrupts needed to move about to 
conduct their affairs and to go to meetings which they were legally bound to 
attend.  However, the ambiguity in the status of many of these places and the 
uncertainty around bankrupts’ protections meant they continued to feel at risk of 
arrest and possible imprisonment.  The resulting sense of being trapped in a 
confined space, in which their liberties were suspended, was an experience that 
bankrupts wished to have over as soon as possible.  This, however, was often 
not to be the case.  Bankrupts thoughts and feelings about the time they spent 
in what Isaac Scott called a ‘most disagreeable uncertain Situation’ are the 












Bankrupts in Time 
7.0 Introduction 
In May 1814, the twice-bankrupted Edmund Townsend petitioned some one 
hundred noblemen and members of parliament with a complaint about how long 
the proceedings of the second commission, which had been issued against him 
in 1805, were taking.  He protested: 
There was a meeting of the commissioners on Saturday the 21st instant, 
to make (according to advertisement) a final dividend, which was, as I 
understand, further deferred till November next.  This will make about the 
forty third meeting of the commissioners, besides twelve to fifteen 
meetings of the assignees and solicitors, at an expense of £300 or 
upwards to the estate, exclusive of other expenses to the amount of 
several hundred pounds more, during the long period of nearly NINE 
YEARS AND A HALF. 663 
At the bottom of a printed copy of his petition was scribbled: 
Since the above were circulated the Meetings of the Commissioners 
amount to about fifty and the time has extended to more than Ten 
years.664 
Then in July 1814, as his commission ground on, Townsend directed his next 
complaint to the trade community, lamenting: ‘The long course of time it has 
taken, and the great expense I have been at in prosecuting this matter, have 
brought me into most awful situations and great inconvenience’.665 Then in 
1824, despite the passage of another ten years, the London Gazette was still 
advertising meetings of his 1805 commission.666 Over the decades an unhappy 
Townsend had continued to petition parliament for reform of laws which, he 
maintained, had subjected him to such a protracted process.  A petition in 1818 
presented by Sir Samuel Romilly ‘praying a consideration of the Bankrupt Laws’ 
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only got as far as being ordered ‘to lie on the table’.667 Again he petitioned in 
1825 ‘complaining of the Bankrupt Laws’.668 The following year his only 
daughter, 22-year-old Elizabeth, who had lived her entire life under the shadow 
of her father’s bankruptcy and who had long been ill, died ‘in a consumption and 
great distress’.669 Townsend and his family experienced the consequences of 
protracted bankruptcy proceedings and his being prevented from 
recommencing his trade.  We know about Townsend because he attempted 
through his petitions to take his plight directly to those with power and influence.  
But what about other bankrupts?  How did they experience the passage of time 
during their bankruptcies? 
Standing back for a moment from the many events that have unfolded so far in 
this study of the experience of eighteenth-century bankrupts, it is not difficult to 
notice the friction that existed on the one hand between the process side of 
bankruptcy which was driven by the bankrupt laws and by the de facto 
institution constituted by the commissioners (who were empowered with the 
Lord Chancellor’s authority) along with the vested interests of assignees, 
creditors, legal professionals, and on the other hand the bankrupts.  They, like 
Townsend, experienced delays and saw matters protracted during their long 
wait to get their certificates and to be finally freed from the state of being 
bankrupts.  The certificate, for Defoe, was ‘a kind of performing of the 
obsequies of the dead, and praying him out of purgatory’.670  The sustained 
friction over the years between the two sides involved in bankruptcy can be 
understood, in part, as being the result of the structural tensions that existed 
between two different conceptualisations of time. 
Looking at the legal process of bankruptcy, and then at the actions and events 
within the experience of bankrupts, it is possible to perceive a distinction 
between two different dynamics of time.  These two dynamics, or natures, have 
been categorized as chronological time, and as lived time.671 The difference can 
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also be represented by the distinction made in classical Greek between chrónos 
and kairós.672 Under these two categorizations of time a variety of descriptions 
and paraphrases have been suggested by which chrónos can be understood as 
all or any of the following: clock or calendar time, physical, quantitative, routine 
and rational time, as enlightenment time, as time recorded in a diurnal.  It can 
also be the ‘linear time of the Judeo-Christian tradition’.673 In contrast, the 
nature of kairós is quite different: it is the time of lived experience and of 
sentiment. 
Scholars have interpreted the distinction in a wider variety of ways, which 
further support the application of the differing natures of time to the experience 
of bankrupts.  Again, largely reflecting the chrónos-kairós distinction Hassard 
produces two main images or metaphors for time: ‘linear-time and circular-time’, 
the former representing ‘an industrial, objective and chronological form (clock-
time), while the latter represents a more anthropological, experiential and 
epochal one (social-time).’674 Hassard also understands social time ‘in the 
sense of Durkheim’s concept of “qualitative time” as opposed to “quantitative 
time” of “measured duration”’.675 
Once these two categories of time are applied within the context of bankruptcy it 
becomes easier to see how tensions surfaced.  Hassard, for the two categories 
of time, points to the opposition that George Gurvitch made between ‘“micro-
social-times” of “groups and communities” v. “macro-social-times” of systems 
and institutions’.676 It is not too hard to see bankrupts and their families as 
groups or communities in opposition to the power of ‘systems and institutions’.  
Add to this Cipriani’s observation that: ‘The real drama, however, occurs during 
the clash between chrónos and kairós, that is, between social exigencies and 
individual needs.’  He continues: ‘The latter are certainly disregarded and 
devoured by the pace imposed by chrónos.’677 The ‘real drama’ in bankrupts’ 
experience occurred, as this chapter will show, when their individual needs, 
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above all for their certificates, were subordinated, or even frustrated, by more 
powerful social actors.  Part one of this chapter explores the time of the process 
of bankruptcy and of its professionals and institutions, in other words, legal time.  
This part is organised into the following sections: 7.1.1 Length of bankruptcies; 
7.1.2 Times, numbers, and duration of bankruptcy commission meetings; 7.1.3 
Timing (the significance of when events occurred).  Part two considers social 
time through bankrupts’ perceptions of time and their experience of waiting and 
delay.  The sections are as follows: 7.2.1 Lost time (time as a commodity that 
could be lost or misspent); 7.2.2 Impatience for news; 7.2.3 Delay (the effect of 





7.1.1 Length of bankruptcies 
Having already learned about the protracted bankruptcy of Edmund Townsend, 
the reader of this study might ask just how long eighteenth-century English 
bankruptcies usually lasted, and also if other English bankrupts were affected to 
similar degrees by the kind of long waits that Townsend experienced.  The kind 
of answer which might be given to this question depends on whether we look at 
the bankrupt or the bankruptcy.  When discussing the length of bankruptcies, it 
is important to make a clear distinction between two distinct periods in law: a) 
the time a trader spent as an undischarged bankrupt, i.e. the period from the 
day of being declared a bankrupt until the day of being granted a certificate of 
conformity;678 and b), the time a bankruptcy commission remained open, i.e. the 
period from the issuing of a commission to the closing of the commission.  The 
first period, provided that a certificate was granted, was shorter and was what 
mattered most to bankrupts.  The intention of the statutes was to prevent frauds 
by bankrupts, not to prevent honest and conforming bankrupts from returning to 
useful economic activity.  Technically, according to the statutes and bankruptcy 
manuals, a trader need only have remained a bankrupt in law for forty-two days.  
So, because bankrupts were primarily preoccupied with getting discharged as 
 





soon as possible and returning to trade or some other living, the second period 
mattered less.  However, that it did not matter at all to discharged bankrupts 
was not the case for various reasons. 
There was potentially a residual financial interest (allowance) for bankrupts after 
the proceeds from their estate had been realised.  Marriner maintains a 
bankrupt’s allowance from the estate would be paid after the granting of the 
certificate (and therefore not after the final dividend), e.g. 5 per cent allowed if 
effects produced 8s in the pound or more up to max. of £200.679 But for the 
commission to be in such a position after only forty-two days would have been 
almost impossible.  It could take years to know how much a bankrupt estate 
would produce because of how long it took to get in the debts owed it.  If an 
allowance were paid after the grant of certificate, then it may only have been 
levied upon what the fire sales of bankrupts’ property and possessions raised 
(i.e. their homes and household furniture, commercial stock and premises). 
In narrating bankruptcies there is a third period, in its entirety beyond the scope 
of this study, which is the whole period from when a trader began to experience 
business and financial difficulties, through to the point in their life when they 
ceased to be touched by the consequences of their bankruptcy (if such a point 
was ever reached, it wasn’t for Defoe).  Not enough is known about how 
bankrupts were involved with, and felt about, the long slow liquidations of their 
bankrupt estates after they had received their certificates.  In this chapter much 
of the content relates to the time in which bankrupts waited for their certificates 
and how they often waited much longer than forty-two days. 
Long after a bankrupt was discharged, or even if they were not discharged, the 
liquidation of the bankrupt’s estate was continued by the assignees, the solicitor 
to the commission and the commissioners.  Whilst many bankrupt traders’ 
affairs and estates were simple, some estates were large and complex which 
slowed the process down.  A notice in The Sunday Times in February 1829 
under the title ‘Extensive Failure’ notified readers of a postponement of a 
meeting of creditors due to ‘the magnitude and intricacy of the Bankruptcy’.680 
Larger bankrupt estates were often owed lots of illiquid and difficult to collect 
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debts; debtors to bankrupt estates could be spread across the country, and 
sometimes the globe.  All debts due to the estate that could be got in, had to be 
got in, and the commission could not be closed until a final dividend was paid.  
Marriner observes that there were often several ‘final’ dividends, which 
highlights the difficulty of getting to finality in bankruptcy.681 
Add to this an uncooperative bankrupt (or even a fraudulent or fugitive one), 
throw in devious assignees (as Townsend alleged his to be) acting in their own 
interests and not those of the majority of creditors, and estate liquidations could 
drag on for years while expensive and interminable actions were pursued in 
Chancery.  In 1803 Frances James, the daughter of Bristol distiller Joshua 
James, who had become a bankrupt in 1785, petitioned in Chancery against the 
assignees of her father’s estate.  James, the bankrupt, died in 1795.  Between 
1791 and 1796 all the assignees died, except one.  Yet disagreement over the 
liquidation of the bankrupt estate was continued in the courts by the next 
generation.682 Bankrupts themselves did not always facilitate progress. 
Slowing proceedings down in 1828, for example, was a bankrupt sheltering in 
Calais who made an application in Chancery for another three months before 
he surrendered to the commissioners.  It was alleged that the bankrupt, who 
had already obtained one extension and who was apparently ‘seized with 
paralysis’, had got from London to Calais in two days, and furthermore that the 
bankrupt was in possession of one thousand pounds.  The Lord Chancellor 
gave him two weeks and ordered him to come over in that time.683 Not without 
reason did a trade manual warn creditors to think before they took out a 
commission of bankrupt ‘as multiplied experience has fully proved, that no other 
advantages arise from such proceedings in general, but small dividends at 
remote periods of time’.684 
Some liquidations of bankrupt estates far exceeded the lives of all concerned 
with only successors and descendants completing the process or receiving any 
residual benefits.  Basil Montagu, an advocate for the reform of the bankrupt 
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laws, recounted in Parliament in 1831 the case of a commission that had 
dragged on so long that: 
the Assignees, creditors, and all parties had disappeared: – some were 
dead, the rest could not be found; not a single party interested could be 
discovered, and there was not one single farthing to be divided, the 
whole proceeds of the estate having evaporated in litigation…685 
A similar observation might be made of cases in this study.  We have heard 
already from Edmund Townsend whose bankruptcy straddled three decades.  
Another long bankruptcy was that of Thomas Lodge who became a bankrupt in 
1775, but the liquidation of his estate continued until at least 1800, by which 
time he was dead.686 Already in 1793 the original assignees were dead, 
necessitating a meeting of creditors to elect successors.687 Of even greater 
length was the liquidation of the bankrupt estate of the partnership that had 
existed between Richard Muilman and Henry Nantes (bankrupts in 1797) which 
rumbled on into the latter half of the nineteenth century.  In 1860 a London 
Gazette notice asked creditors (if living, or if dead their representatives) who 
had been named on a schedule in 1800, to come forward and prove their debts, 
a mere six decades having elapsed.688 Some representatives of successors of 
creditors were still collecting dividends from this estate as late as 1879.689  
The reader might wonder what expectations bankrupts had with regard to how 
long they would have to live as bankrupts before they were granted a discharge.  
The law and practice of bankruptcy as set out and prescribed in contemporary 
advice literature described a clearly, on the face of it, linear time-bound, as well 
as timely, process which would promptly deal with bankrupts and set about the 
liquidation of their estates.  The Bankrupt’s Directory in stating commissioners’ 
duties declared that ‘as soon as they have sate…and declar’d the Bankrupt, to 
give Notice in the Gazette’; at the same time summonses were to be served on 
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bankrupts and thus the process for bankrupts began.690 Once the London 
Gazette notice had appeared, a bankrupt was allowed forty-two days to 
surrender before the commissioners.  However, this should not be understood 
as an allowance of forty-two days in which a bankrupt could appear at his, or 
her, convenience.  Within those forty-two days the bankrupt was called to three 
meetings on specified days, and the final meeting had to be on the forty-second 
day.691 At this third and final meeting bankrupts hoped that four-fifths of their 
creditors would assent to allowing them their certificates and thus they could be 
discharged from the state of being a bankrupt.  The estate, however, continued 
to be liquidated by the assignees until the final dividend could be paid and the 
commission closed.  They were bound to make a first dividend within twelve 
months of the bankruptcy, and a second within eighteen months.692 
For the bankrupt, the time frame was clearly advertised in a commission’s first 
London Gazette notice.  Expectations about the time frame of the bankruptcy 
process might also have been shaped by the authors of advice manuals, who 
intended their guides for the use of debtors and bankrupts as well as lawyers 
and creditors.  The brisk and practical phrasing of the advice literature made a 
prompt, orderly, and linear process seem plausible, or even likely.  However, if 
bankrupts had been regular readers of the Gazette (and other newspapers with 
‘bankrupts’ columns) they would have noticed, perhaps as creditors themselves 
in the bankruptcies of others, how the notices for many bankruptcies 
proliferated and how commissions continued in existence for years.  Knowledge 
and experience in trade communities and networks will have made bankrupts 
aware that the notional time frame for a commission was a best-case scenario 
and that far more protracted commissions were common.  Evidence discussed 
so far in this study suggests that bankrupts generally relied on the advice of 
solicitors and ‘friends’, who would probably have had experience of other 
bankruptcies, and even seen a few to their conclusions. 
 
 
690 Anon., The Bankrupt’s Directory: OR, Suitable Rules and Directions, BOTH FOR Bankrupt 
and Creditor (London, 1708), p. 10. 
691 Anon., Solicitor’s Guide, pp. 2, 8.  The forty-two days applied after 5 Geo. 2. C. 30, that is 
from 1732 (the commencement of the period of this study). 





If hearsay or the experience of others had not sufficiently cautioned bankrupts, 
then there was at least one manual that sounded an immediate note of warning 
to any bankrupt hopeful of swift discharge, when it declared that ‘he may 
patiently submit, and in the end be relieved of his oppressions’.693 Furthermore, 
it is hard to believe, given the growing number of bankruptcies in the latter half 
of the eighteenth century and given the ready circulation of knowledge or beliefs 
about bankrupts and bankruptcy, as well as the growing body of literature 
complaining about the bankrupt laws, that many bankrupts could have 
harboured illusions about getting speedily discharged.  The bankrupt laws set 
out a notional time frame, but the statutes, and the powers and jurisdictions of 
other courts, allowed for every sort of delay and protraction, often much to the 
distress of bankrupts as this chapter will show.  What made time matter so 
much in bankruptcy was not so much the legal obligation to strictly observe the 
framework of meetings and deadlines, but rather it was the unintended 
consequences that came about because of the clash between a rigidly 
prescriptive legal framework with its linear trajectory, and the infinite possibilities 
thrown up by individual human agency.  The next section considers the 
meetings that punctuated the duration of a bankruptcy commission. 
 
7.1.2 Times, numbers, and duration of bankruptcy commission meetings 
By statute a commission had to hold a minimum of three meetings in the 
presence of the commissioners, but frequently more were held if they were 
deemed necessary (as in the case of Townsend presented above).  One reason 
for exceeding the statutory three meetings was that commissioners or 
assignees required more information from bankrupts, and they could call 
bankrupts to as many meetings as they saw fit to justify.  From early in the 
eighteenth century it was understood that commissioners could have bankrupts 
‘submit themselves to be examin’d, from Time to Time’.694 In 1772 when 
Alexander Fordyce was to be examined, the commissioners clearly stated that 
Fordyce could be examined by the assignees ‘as often as they pleased’.695 One 
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advice manual stated categorically: ‘It is the duty of the bankrupt to attend the 
commissioners at all times till his affairs are finished, to be examined’ and ‘after 
his surrender, he is required to attend the assignees upon every reasonable 
notice in writing’.696 ‘All times’ often turned out to be many times.  When 
Andover bankers the Wakeford brothers, had a ‘Commission of Bankrupt’ 
issued against them on 11 March 1826 the London Gazette announced that 
they were to surrender to the commissioners on three dates: the 10, 11 April 
and 2 May, at the Star and Garter Inn, Andover.697 The meeting of 2 May, at 
which the bankrupts were to have finished their examinations was, however, not 
to be the last: it was adjourned and set for 21 July 1826.698 Then on 21 July the 
commissioners met at 10 o’clock, sat for four hours, wrote a memorandum of 
adjournment, met again at 3 o’clock the same day, then adjourned again until 
10 o’clock the next day.699 Many further meetings followed, which were in turn 
adjourned.  The reader may recall in the previous chapter the repeated 
demands assignees made upon Isaac Scott to attend meetings with them.  Yet 
when the Scotts wanted a meeting they had to wait.  They clearly felt they had 
waited long enough for a meeting at which Isaac’s brother was to attend, when 
they wrote ‘at last the Day came, when Mr. Daniel Scott was to appear before 
the Commissioners’.700 
Meetings of bankruptcy commissions attended by commissioners were held 
both in mornings and afternoons.  Some commissioners were not averse to 
getting to grips with a case promptly: on 1 October 1739 the commissioners in 
the bankruptcy of George Clay having declared Clay a bankrupt, summoned 
witnesses to ‘personally be and appear before’ the commissioners at 8 o’clock 
in the morning that same day at the Guildhall in King’s Lynn and ‘submit 
themselves to be examined’ by the commissioners.  Attendance was non-
negotiable ‘as they will answer the contrary at their peril’.701 Another day those 
same commissioners gathered at the Guildhall at two o’clock in the afternoon in 
the expectation of Clay’s surrender; time passed until they recorded that 
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‘nobody appeared’, Clay clearly having chosen peril in preference to the 
appointment.702 
Whilst meetings were usually held in mornings and afternoons, there were also 
evening meetings.  These were more ambiguous in nature and more likely to be 
held privately between assignees and bankrupts (and away from the official 
commission venue, as discussed in the previous chapter).  Some instances of 
protracted meetings drew criticism.  One evening encounter with the Scott 
brothers dragged on as it ‘was late before the Meeting broke up’.703 The 
dissatisfaction of the Scott family with the actions of the assignees was levelled 
at repeated nocturnal meetings ‘every Thursday Evening at the Tavern, to eat a 
Bit of Supper’.704 Of one meeting the Scotts complained ‘three Hours time had 
been expended in a fruitless Examination, till the Commissioners appeared 
quite tired’.705 
Other sources suggest that commissioners, particularly at London’s Guildhall, 
attempted to work through heavy schedules of one commission after another.706 
These meetings could not have lasted three or four hours and smaller bankrupt 
estates with few creditors probably facilitated quicker meetings, but some 
allowance was clearly made for major bankruptcies at which large numbers of 
creditors were expected to attend.  Being large and complex affairs, long 
examinations would have to be conducted.  As mentioned above, the 
commission in the Wakeford bankruptcy sat one morning for four hours.  The 
Wakefords were bankers so the time was necessary to take the details of the 
many holders of banknotes.  Meetings were sometimes long because 
examinations were long.  This was the case with not only the Wakefords, but 
also another bankrupt banker, Alexander Fordyce.  At one of Fordyce’s 
examinations in September 1772 at the Guildhall, Fordyce had been standing 
while answering many questions.  When the commissioners allowed him to take 
a seat, a creditor jeered ‘bring him a cushion to sit upon’.  This jibe at Fordyce 
suggests that in the view of some, examinations should have been just as long 
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and demanding as it took to get the required information out of bankrupts.707 It 
is worth observing that a single bankruptcy commission meeting could far 
exceed in length the trial of a felony at the Old Bailey, which were notoriously 
speedy, rarely lasting more than thirty minutes.708 
 
7.1.3 Timing 
Not only times, but also timing (good or bad), mattered in bankruptcy.  Getting 
the day right or wrong, in for example committing an act of bankruptcy, could 
make all the difference.  On this legal minefield the nineteenth-century ‘legal 
writer’ Humphry Woolrych, basing himself on many precedents and statutes 
from the eighteenth century or earlier, observed it had often been ‘a matter for 
argument, whether a day should be counted exclusively or inclusively, and 
sometimes there is an entire interval;– the day from which a calculation is to 
proceed, and the day upon which an act is to be done, being, in both instances, 
shut out of the enumeration’.709 Not surprisingly, it was usually bad timing that 
had the greatest impact on bankrupts’ experience.  The path to bankruptcy was 
littered with missed dates for payment of bonds, notes of hand, or other 
obligations.  It was often the non-performance of these obligations by the 
agreed time that decided creditors to seek redress with actions for debt.  In 
1739 King’s Lynn merchant George Clay was late paying bonds and notes of 
hand for sums running into hundreds of pounds to several local merchants and 
tradesmen, and therefore some of these creditors obtained a commission of 
bankrupt against him.710 
Dates when things were done, and the sequences in which they were done, 
mattered.  Mistakes or bad timing could mean failure to prove an act of 
bankruptcy – failure to do so might benefit a few creditors at the expense of 
those that stood to benefit from a more equitable bankruptcy commission.  
Worse still for bankrupts, an act not proved could mean the real possibility of 
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imprisonment looming again, therefore there was much fretting around dates.  A 
bankrupt anxious to keep a date was David Brigstock who wrote in 1773: ‘I 
committed the Act of Bankrupt on one of our neighbour’s wedding Day as I may 
have proof and the man may take his oath if need for… I have sent two men to 
the church to know the Day of the month and the day was on July 20th’.711 In 
1751 David Kennedy’s creditors were concerned about proving Kennedy was a 
bankrupt from a date that would best favour their interests.  John Stabler, one of 
Kennedy’s principal London creditors, wrote to Robert Cooper, one of the 
principal Wiltshire creditors: 
we must desire the favour of you to take out the commission, if possible 
before the delivering up of the goods value 150 pounds – his boy told Mr 
Currey he [denied] his master this 19th October.  And his man says he 
denied him the Tuesday followed, but when they was desired to make 
oaths of it they refused it, but perhaps you may get them to make 
affidavits of it which is before the time the goods was delivered up…712 
The preoccupation with getting the optimum date for a commission continued 
and was expressed by Arthur Edwards who was acting for Stabler in Wiltshire: 
now you are to know Kennedy has not committed any act of bankruptcy 
that can be proved, the 2 months imprisonment makes him one; then the 
question is; if the commission will bear date at the time of his being 
arrested or at the expiration of the imprisonment; now I think the former, 
and did insist on it before an attorney in the town,…I am pretty sure the 
commission will bear date from the time of the arrest…713 
As alluded to above there were periods (e.g. time spent in gaol) as well as 
dates which mattered.  On the same day Edwards wrote to Cooper about the 
dates: 
Kennedy as yet has committed no act of bankruptcy; tho’ 2 months 
imprisonment makes him; and then the question is whether the date of 
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the commission will be at the time of the arrest or at the end of the 2 
months imprisonment.  I apprehend the former.714 
Kennedy’s creditors proposed to use the period exceeding two months that he 
had lain in gaol to make him a bankrupt in law and gain advantage over those 
who had originally imprisoned him.  The two-month qualifying period was also 
used in the case of a Bristol bankrupt, Joseph Pedley, who in 1781 had ‘lain in 
Jail upwards of two months at the suit of several of his Creditors’ and was 
therefore deemed to have committed an act of bankruptcy.715  
As part of the forty-two days, bankrupts were allowed time to prepare 
themselves before making their appearances before commissions, but whilst 
most bankrupts were careful to present themselves within the time stipulated, 
one who did not was George Clay.  Clay, having been duly declared a bankrupt, 
‘did not appear within the forty two days’ allowed him to surrender.716 Nearly a 
century later John Slade likewise disappointed the commissioners by failing to 
appear in the time allowed him.  He may also have left the country altogether.  
In an opinion on his case it was stated: ‘John Slade has, I understand, become 
a Bankrupt and has left the Kingdom’.717 The first part of this chapter has been 
concerned with legal, linear and institutional time (and periods of time) over 
which bankrupts had next to no control.  The second part explores ‘social time’ 
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7.2.1 Lost time 
Bankrupts wanted to get to that time when their certificates were granted so the 
number of meetings commissions held, how long they lasted, and how many 
times they were adjourned or rescheduled all really mattered.  Townsend’s 
complaints and those of others typified how bankrupts believed their time was 
appropriated and mis-spent by others while the legal process of bankruptcy 
ground on over months and years.  It is to the ‘ownership’ of time, and the 
experience of the loss of it, that this chapter now turns. 
Of time Daniel Defoe wrote: 
The life of man is or should be a measure of allotted time; as his time is 
measured out to him, so the measure is limited, must end, and the end of 
it is appointed.  The purposes, for which time is given, and life bestow’d, 
are very momentous; no time is given useless and for nothing; time is no 
more to be unemploy’d, than it is to be ill employ’d.718 
Defoe’s words were a warning to tradesmen and intended to encourage 
practices that would avert failure.  The advice that time was not ‘to be 
unemploy’d’ will have been reflected upon with discomfort by bankrupt traders 
during the, not infrequently long, wait for discharge.  In fact, with their loss of 
control over their own time, Defoe’s words highlighted the harsh reality that 
bankrupts’ relationship to time was even worse than if they were simply ‘ill-
employing’ it in leisure.  Bankrupts still held nominal possession of a kind of 
time, but it was a time that was ‘useless and for nothing’. 
In England from the sixteenth century to the nineteenth century there was a 
prevalent view, particularly amongst non-conformists, that time was ‘God’s 
time’.  It was a precious commodity not to be wasted in leisure and idleness, but 
rather employed diligently in work; and individuals were accountable to God for 
how they spent time.719 In the seventeenth century, according to Matthew 
Kadane, the religious writer Richard Baxter whose ‘readership in early modern 
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England was surpassed only by that for the Bible and John Bunyan’, made  
‘piety synonymous with methodical work, even when work was practically 
unnecessary’.720 Work was far from unnecessary for bankrupts, but due to their 
status as bankrupts, it was practically impossible.  Kadane observes that it was 
English Puritans ‘who Weber thought firmly brought work and life into a 
collective project and sanctified economic striving’.721 The bankrupts in this 
study were not only people used to industry, but also some of them were, or 
their families had been originally, of a Puritan or non-conformist persuasion.  
Evidence of religious affiliation is clear for Joseph and Elizabeth Fry, who were 
well-known Quakers.  In other cases, affiliation is less clear, but from some of 
the language employed in correspondence non-conformity can be suspected.722 
Even if not influenced by a religious imperative, bankrupts still felt the loss of 
their time.  Benjamin Franklin’s injunction to ‘Remember that Time is Money’ 
suggests why they felt that the loss of time could also be felt in the pocket.723 
Franklin’s maxim was intended to influence young tradesmen in the mid-
eighteenth century not to waste time, when making good use of it could be to 
their financial advantage.  Bankrupts would have experienced an aspect of 
Franklin’s wisdom that even Franklin might not have contemplated: that once 
made bankrupts, they would not have had the luxury of being able to waste time 
as they would not have possessed time in any useful sense. To say bankrupts 
did not ‘possess’ time requires clarification.  Paradoxically bankrupts, stripped of 
their businesses and not allowed to work, had time in abundance.  Yet it was 
time that they could not do anything useful with.  Control over how long they 
remained bankrupts belonged to their creditors and for as long as their creditors 
pleased.  Creditors held them in circular time during which bankrupts could not 
advance their affairs themselves or turn their time into money.  Just as 
bankrupts lost control over their space, they also lost control over their time. 
 
 
720 Matthew Kadane, The Watchful Clothier: the Life of an Eighteenth‐Century Protestant 
Capitalist (New Haven, 2013), p. 86. 
721 Ibid. 
722 For a discussion of Methodists, see Cunningham, Time, Work and Leisure, pp. 18–19. 
723 Benjamin Franklin, ‘Advice to a Young Tradesman’, 21 July 1748, in George Fisher [added to 
and printed by Benjamin Franklin], The American INSTRUCTOR, or Young Man’s Best 





Many of the bankrupts in this study would have served apprenticeships or been 
schooled in good trade practices; among the instructive manuals available to 
them for much of the eighteenth century were the many London editions of 
George Fisher’s The Instructor: Or, Young Man’s Best Companion.  One of the 
text’s cautionary verses on valuing time intoned, ‘Most precious Time esteem, 
which no one can redeem’.724 This inculcation in trade culture not to lose time 
as if it were money or another valuable resource, undoubtedly exacerbated how 
pernicious they felt it was to be prevented from carrying on their trades and to 
be kept inactive while ‘precious’ time seeped away.  Inactivity can have done 
bankrupts little good.  Idleness and ennui were considered by Thomas Jefferson 
to be ‘the most dangerous poison of life’.725 Hannah Spahn observes of 
Jefferson, Franklin and many contemporaries that they thought of time as both 
scarce and precious, and as ‘it could be lost, wasted, or saved, time appeared 
connected to some idea of individual ownership’.726 So even if bankrupts were 
more inclined to consider time their property, rather than God’s, to employ as 
they pleased, the reality of bankruptcy was that their time was one more asset 
appropriated by their creditors.  Already appropriated were their business 
assets, homes, household possessions, and their freedom to trade.  Although, 
as should be clear below, it was not so much the loss of time per se that 
exercised bankrupts, it was, with Franklin’s meaning, the loss of money that hurt 
them above all.  Defoe put it still more bluntly: ‘This loss can never be restor’d: 
this expence of time was a fatal expence of money’.727 One factor more than 
any other was the cause of this fatal expense for bankrupts.  That factor was 
getting their certificates of conformity, without which they could never be 
discharged from the state of being a bankrupt. 
 
7.2.2 Impatience for news 
Bankrupts wanted the unwelcome period of time, which as bankrupts they were 
prevented from employing usefully, to be brought to an end as soon as possible 
by being granted their certificates.  The reader might wonder if any bankrupts, 
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given that they could not employ this time industriously, might have attempted 
to enjoy their enforced ‘leisure’.  By the eighteenth century there existed 
attitudes among the upper and middling ranks that positively embraced the 
enjoyment of leisure time.728 It is difficult to know what bankrupts did with the 
time on their hands, although cases in this study shed some light.  The 
enjoyment of leisure is conspicuously absent, but what is apparent is that the 
more complicated and contested the affairs of a bankrupt estate, the more time 
bankrupts passed in writing and answering letters or complaining and fretting 
about not getting answers.  Generally, the records left behind by bankrupts, and 
sometimes their creditors, reveal a sense of urgency, of time being lost, and 
fretting while wanting their affairs to progress and be concluded swiftly. 
Bankrupts were impatient for news and answers, and the waiting that this 
necessitated was integral to bankrupts’ experience of circular time.  It was of 
some comfort that the eighteenth century saw improved land transportation 
routes in England, which meant letters could be carried and delivered with 
greater speed and frequency.729 By the late eighteenth century the city of 
Bristol’s principal post office, for example, had seven out-offices which opened 
from 7 a.m. to 9 p.m., and post was delivered three times a day.730 Regular and 
faster postal services thus enhanced the pace at which bankrupts and others 
involved could be receiving, answering and forwarding correspondence on the 
same day.  On 21 January 1752 David Kennedy’s London creditor John Stabler 
immediately forwarded a communication to another creditor, writing: ‘The 
enclosed is a letter this day received from Marlborough’.731 Inevitably, an 
improved postal service also meant that parties, if they did not receive news in 
sufficient time to ease their anxiety, could more frequently pester one another 
with their demands and complaints. 
Such communications were often received and replied to with great expectation 
and haste, at the same time promptness and speed were urged.  In 1774 David 
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Brigstock wrote to a creditor ‘with speed & care’.732 Notes were dashed off on 
scraps of paper and delivered up to departing mail coaches.  In the 1780s 
Bristol bankrupt Joshua James scribbled to Daniel Burges, the solicitor of his 
commission, ‘I’ve just this moment received yours…for God’s sake prevail on 
him to take what you have offered and get time for the payment of it’.  James 
hurried to end his note as ‘the Coach [is] going off’.733 On James’s more frantic 
days when he was receiving communications from various correspondents, 
friendly or otherwise, he wrote to Burges up to several times a day, sometimes 
enclosing relevant documents.  He closed his notes with the exact hour of his 
writing, such as the note about his memorial which he sent from Stokes Croft at 
‘5 o’clock’,734 or when he scribbled ‘I have this moment received the enclosed 
from Mr [Lowle?]… Stokes Croft 7 o’clock monday Evening’.735 Naturally, 
creditors also wanted swift responses.  For example, when in September 1808 
William Hall wrote to Samuel Ash, assignee in the bankruptcy of William James 
of Swansea, to complain about the state of James’s stock, he wrote on the 
outside of the missive under Ash’s address ‘to be open’d Immly’.736 
A new eighteenth-century ‘punctuality-focused civility’ may have encouraged 
feelings of impatience.737 Bankrupts, just as much as their creditors, did not like 
waiting.  Bankrupts frequently expressed their desire for their interests to be 
attended to swiftly, but they were often frustrated in this.  In 1807 Von Doornik, 
being impatient for his certificate, insisted, ‘It is high time for me to be released 
[from being an undischarged bankrupt]’.738 However, for bankrupts there was 
something far worse than simply waiting: there was the experience of delay.  
Delays were of course beyond their control. 
 
7.2.3 Delay 
An attorney in Smollett’s Peregrine Pickle declares that it is ‘an old observation, 
that delay breeds danger’, which were words that bankrupts would have 
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understood well.739 Bankrupts feared and detested delay.  As stated above, 
bankrupts’ priority was to extricate themselves from the state of being a 
bankrupt and they therefore felt a strong sense of both urgency and frustration, 
which is evidenced in their communications.  Delay was often an unintended, 
but inevitable, by-product of a flawed linear legal process.  Its effect was 
independent from the linear process that uncomfortably and unhappily joined 
process to bankrupts.  It was a factor that worked upon bankrupts in their 
homes and places of refuge while they waited for news or developments.  If as 
they waited, they cared to employ their ‘leisure’ time in the reading of a few 
novels, they would have found their own feelings about the harm delay did to 
their interests and health clearly echoed. 
The feelings bankrupts expressed were not dissimilar to those expressed by 
characters in popular contemporary fiction who readily complained of the 
pernicious consequences of delay on their fortunes.  For these characters 
delays were ‘dangerous’740, they made people ‘uneasy’,741 they made people 
fret,742 and caused some the ‘greatest Uneasiness’.743 Delays ‘vexed’,744 
‘mortified’,745 ‘shocked’,746 and ‘enraged’ them.747 Delays were ‘painful,’748 some 
could not ‘bear’ them,749 whilst others were reduced to ‘a State of 
Desperation’.750 For some ‘a delay was worse than death’.751 It is almost 
impossible to know what individual bankrupts read let alone if they read novels, 
and whether novels influenced their modes of expression.  The authors 
employed contemporary modes of expression, and therefore we might 
reasonably expect those involved in bankruptcy to have expressed their 
abhorrence of delay in a manner similar to their contemporaries.  For example, 
in early 1820 bankrupt banker John Brickdale who was ever in hope of 
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progressing the administration of his complex affairs did not receive good news 
from the commission solicitor who informed him: 
It is with much sorrow I inform you that we heard from our Agent on 
Saturday “that the Vice Chancellor will not sit again upon Bankrupt 
Petitions before 20th. March”.  A most ruinous delay to you & vexatious to 
us…752 
Brickdale was perhaps unfortunate in that his bankruptcy occurred during the 
office of Lord Chancellor Eldon whose chancellorship was ‘marred’, according 
to David Lemmings, by ‘delays in suits and backlog of business’.753 Eldon was 
Chancellor for most of the years between 1800 and 1830, which coincides with 
a good number of cases in this study.  On this question of delay Horwitz 
observes that in the first decades of the nineteenth century the Court of 
Chancery saw a revival in its business ‘after a half-century or more of 
stagnation’, and ‘its creaking machinery was now under heavy strain’.  Horwitz 
also attributes this to the ‘distinctive character’ of Lord Eldon, but also maintains 
that this state of affairs was contributed to by Eldon seeming ‘to have 
preoccupied himself with time-consuming but more profitable bankruptcy 
proceedings’.754 It should be remembered that bankruptcy commissions were 
under the Lord Chancellor, not the Court of Chancery, but if bankruptcy 
proceedings were time consuming then the Lord Chancellor had less time for 
Chancery business, which meant less time for the matters at law that 
bankruptcy commissions sometimes put into Chancery.  Chancery had gained a 
reputation for its delays long before Eldon.  In the mid-eighteenth century, 
Christine Churches notes how litigants could slow down the progress of the law 
if it suited them.  One litigant complained in 1739 that another had vowed to 
keep him ‘in Chancery all his lifetime’.  In 1748 Sir James Lowther complained 
that people were ‘tired with delays’ such that they were inclined to ‘make up 
their matters’ with the result that there was ‘very little business’ in Westminster 
 
752 SRO, DD/DP/6/14, Correspondence, 1810–1820: Robert Beadon to John Brickdale, 22 
February 1820. 
753 David Lemmings, Professors of the Law: Barristers and English Legal Culture in the 
Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 2000), pp. 184–85.  For other comments on delays in Chancery, 
see Lemmings, pp. 32, 100. 





Hall.755 Delays were perhaps a contributor to the ‘stagnation’, referred to by 
Horwitz, before the return to ‘heavy strain’. 
Delay did not agree with another bankrupt.  David Brigstock was made to fret 
when responses to his letters were slow.  He was anxious to be made a 
bankrupt as soon as possible to avoid imprisonment and he had been writing to 
Richard George who he desperately hoped would take out a petition against 
him.  He was relieved when he finally received a response from George on 16 
November 1773.  Brigstock replied to his ‘friend’ the following day, explaining 
that while he had been ‘so long waiting’ for a reply to his request, he had been 
‘void of all hopes’.756 Brigstock would have a further long uncomfortable wait for 
news from George, and on 8 January 1774 he expressed in his letter to George 
that he had been ‘so long without having answer’ and that he hoped George 
‘will not fail with the first opportunity…to let me have an answer, whether I am to 
be made a Bankrupt or no’.757 So just as it was ‘vexatious’ to wait to be released 
from the status of being a bankrupt, it could be vexing to wait to be made a 
bankrupt!  In general, delays in proceedings and developments heightened the 
experience of loss of control and therefore exacerbated bankrupts’ feelings of 
powerlessness and anxiety. 
A thought though should be spared for creditors, especially smaller ones.  Time 
was also an issue for them.  Bankrupts and their families were not alone in 
being impatient for news or feeling the frustration of delay.  Creditors liked to be 
kept abreast of developments with bankruptcies.  An announcement in the 
Sunday Times in 1823 sought to reassure those of its readers ‘to whom the List 
of Bankrupts is important’ and who had complained about the absence of the 
list in ‘Saturday’s Edition of the SUNDAY TIMES’, that it was ‘NOT POSSIBLE 
to obtain the Gazette sufficiently early, but on payment of ‘One Halfpenny, 
which is the charge for putting a Paper into the Post after Six o’Clock’, the 
readers could easily be supplied with the list.758 Readers would have been 
anxious to know, not only who had become a bankrupt because of the need to 
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prove debts but also where bankrupt estates were already being liquidated, if 
there were to be further meetings or orders made to pay dividends. 
As this thesis is written to a considerable extent from the point of view of 
bankrupts it is too easy to give the impression that creditors were cruel, 
grasping and opportunistic.  This is not the intention of this study and there is 
also evidence that creditors showed patience and forbearance, although 
patience did wear thin sometimes.  For example, finally growing impatient, a 
group of creditors wrote in 1808 to the assignees of bankrupt Swansea 
shopkeeper William James complaining, ‘we have long expected as promised a 
statement of this man’s affairs, accompanied with proposals, and have waited 
patiently but have never received it.  This virtue being now exhausted…’759 The 
patience of some creditors was a good deal shorter.  A creditor of John 
Brickdale’s wrote tersely to the commission solicitor in April 1821 complaining, 
presumably of Brickdale, ‘the Man is making me Mad’.760 
 
7.2.4 The certificate 
In 1808 an indignant William Hill, angry about what he considered the dishonest 
behaviour of bankrupt Swansea shopkeeper William James, wrote to Bristol 
creditor Samuel Ash saying, ‘I hope his Certificate will never have your 
Signature to it’.761 Although written in statute, the application of the right to a 
discharge for bankrupts depended on the consent of their creditors.  In regard to 
bankrupts waiting for their certificates, Sheila Marriner states: ‘Sometimes 
creditors signed quickly; frequently there was delay of some years before the 
necessary proportion agreed; many bankrupts were never granted 
certificates.’762 She further maintains that even if the required proportion of 
creditors’ signatures were obtained the Lord Chancellor could be petitioned not 
to grant a bankrupt a certificate by alleging an irregularity.  Marriner gives Basil 
Montagu’s 1818 figures for bankrupts being allowed certificates: ‘between 1786 
and 1795 62 per cent of bankrupts were allowed certificates’, and between 1796 
 
759 BRO, 44352/2/1/14/2, Papers re William James: Heineman Ash & Co to Messrs. Davies & 
Berrington, May 1808. 
760 SRO, DD/DP/6/11, Miscellaneous correspondence re Brickdale's bankruptcy, 1820–1822: W. 
N. Leigh to Robert Beadon, 24 April 1821. 
761 BRO, 44352/2/1/14/2, Papers re William James: William Hall to Samuel Ash, 29 September 
1808. 





and 1805 ‘the percentage was 57’.763 From a bankrupt’s point of view the 
scenario this paints cannot have been a very reassuring one: first there were 
frequent delays of ‘some years’, then by the end of the century the odds were 
still little better than fifty-fifty on getting a certificate at all. 
If a very approximate parallel is drawn between the time a bankrupt spent 
waiting for a certificate and the time an insolvent debtor spent in gaol, then 
given the figures above, undischarged bankrupts probably experienced the 
longer wait.  Jerry White states for 1811 at the Marshalsea 87 percent of 
debtors were out within three months, and in 1816 it was 70 per cent.  He also 
records that in 1776 Dr William Smith had reported that most prisoners ‘seldom 
remain long’.764 Based on numbers for London’s Fleet and King’s Bench prisons 
and Lancaster Castle between 1720 and 1770, Tawny Paul challenges the 
popular trope of the debtor languishing in prison and maintains that there was ‘a 
constantly evolving prison community and a substantial population of short-term 
inmates’ with only about one third of prisoners being imprisoned for over a 
year.765 We know that bankrupts did not want to be incarcerated, but how did 
they feel when they began to fear that they might never be discharged as 
bankrupts?  This section examines this prospect in greater detail. 
Without creditor consent there was no discharge and therefore no end to the 
time spent as a bankrupt.  If a creditor was unhappy with a bankrupt’s conduct, 
he could not be obliged to sign the bankrupt’s certificate and, as exemplified by 
William Hill, might lobby others to ‘never’ sign it and thus compel a bankrupt to 
be forever a bankrupt.  Bankrupts’ anxiety to obtain their certificates was no 
doubt fuelled by knowledge that they so easily might not. Unfortunately, in 
eighteenth-century England creditors were known for dragging their feet over 
signing certificates.  One advice manual remonstrated with creditors in general: 
why keep a poor man in suspence? when, if ‘tis their intent to sign at all, 
they may as well sign it at first as at last…how common and 
unreasonable it is in one man to cry, I won’t sign it, till such a one has 
signed; I will sign it, when the rest have…766 
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Honestus Moneyless in addressing the notorious matter of certificates, related 
the case of Thomas Beaven a bankrupt clothier of Melksham in Wiltshire, who 
had been of ‘great reputation’.767 Beaven, having done ‘all that the law required 
of him … from time to time begged and desired, that his certificate might be 
granted, but could not obtain it, though no reason could be given, nor just cause 
shewn to the contrary, with relation to him.’ Beaven ‘[t]ired out at length’ of 
being an undischarged bankrupt, left England for Spain.768 Bankrupts were 
desperate to exit the status of bankrupt and therefore hated the long waits for 
developments on the way to getting their certificates. 
Given the extent of his complaints about the granting of certificates, it is hard to 
imagine that Moneyless cannot have had difficulties in obtaining his own 
certificate.  He maintained that while a bankrupt still had the prospect of his 
certificate being signed, he might get a little credit from friends against the 
expected allowance. ‘But alas!’, lamented Honestus, ‘after one, two, or more 
years, he is not able to obtain it’.769 Some looked to Parliament for assistance 
for bankrupts.  ‘Nomius Antinomos’ was ‘upon the general prayer…of the 
humane necessity there is of granting them their certificates’.  What would the 
consequences be, he asked, if bankrupts ‘not having obtained their certificates, 
be disappointed in the present hopes and expectations they have so long 
placed in the goodness of parliament!’.  They would ‘flee into foreign kingdoms’ 
and be a loss to their country.770 
It is difficult to generalise about how quickly certificates were granted.  It was 
not always the case that a large and complex bankruptcy would not see the 
grant of a certificate for years.  The Brickdale bankruptcy in November 1819 
was large, complex and fraught with litigation, but John Brickdale was to receive 
his certificate a mere six months later in May 1820.771 It had been a close-run 
thing as there had been a petition to the Lord Chancellor not to allow the 
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certificate on the grounds of collusion in the bankruptcy.772 Troubles for 
Brickdale did not end there however, and the liquidation of the bankrupt estate 
ground on until at least 1853.773 Two bankrupt bankers, the Wakeford brothers 
Joseph and William, waited some five years before being given their 
certificates.774 The endeavours and disappointments of one bankrupt in 
particular, the Wiltshire linen draper David Kennedy, to obtain his certificate are 
related below.   
 
7.2.5 Obtaining the certificate: the long experience of David Kennedy 
Kennedy had been made a bankrupt while in gaol and was then released.  
Kennedy was no longer confined, but he was not to be released from the 
‘purgatory’ of being a bankrupt as soon as he would have liked.  Kennedy had 
been set to work by his creditors to get in debts due to his former estate, and he 
would appear to have also sought signatures for his certificate. 
Initially in the records in Kennedy’s case we only hear the voices of his creditors 
as they discuss what to do with his debts and with him.  Suddenly in June 1752, 
possibly coinciding with his release from prison, Kennedy appears amongst the 
correspondents in a letter to Robert Cooper, one of his principal creditors.  
Kennedy was clearly already setting about assisting the assignees with the 
liquidation of his estate and, amongst other business, he communicated that he 
was paying visits ‘in order to collect some debts’.  However, at the very 
beginning of his letter Kennedy declares to Cooper that he ‘will be vastly obliged 
to you should you get my certificate signed’.775 It is to be wondered, given the 
above discussion, whether Kennedy held unrealistic expectations about how 
speedily his creditors would oblige him.  
The cause of Kennedy’s certificate would seem to have had some early 
success as by 3 July 1752 creditor Joseph Bun was signing his consent to 
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Kennedy obtaining the certificate.776 Meanwhile, Kennedy, writing to Cooper 
again on 12 July assured him, ‘I will use my endeavours in getting in the debts 
as much as possible’, although at the same time he complained to Cooper 
about how slow progress was with the liquidation of his bankrupt estate and 
how this prevented him from getting a living, he wrote, ‘you know it is very hard 
on me for to have those things delayed and cannot enter into any business’.777 
Kennedy wrote again on 17 September updating Cooper on his efforts and 
travels.  He got to London where he reached some of his creditors but ‘was 
looked very indifferent by some of them with regard in signing my certificate’.  
Consequently, he found himself imploring Cooper to ‘stand my friend in regard 
to it [the certificate] against the next meeting’.778 
When Kennedy wrote again to Cooper in January 1753, he updated Cooper on 
his progress getting signatures: ‘According to your request Mr Hawkes have 
signed the petition’.  However, Kennedy was getting ever more anxious to get 
his certificate and delays were caused by many factors, as Kennedy found.  He 
lamented that a ‘Mr Greenfield being extremely bad with the gout that he could 
not do it’, and that another creditor was ‘gone to London or else he would [have 
signed]’.  Yet another creditor very nearly wouldn’t sign being disgruntled at ‘the 
unreasonableness of the creditors delaying to prove their debts as there was 
such timely notice given according to law’.779 Accommodating these latecomer 
creditors may have caused further delay which was not wanted by many 
creditors either.  Kennedy was also passing the list of signatures to Cooper as 
he asked him ‘to forward it as fast as possible’ so that Kennedy, on getting his 
certificate or at least having the certainty of getting it, might ‘get into some way 
to get a subsistence for my family it being very hard with me at present having 
neither money nor credit’.780 Months past and Kennedy still did not get his 
certificate.  Then in July 1753 Kennedy wrote again to Cooper: ‘I have sent the 
enclosed which I have received from Mr [Corrile?] and beg you will forward the 
affair with all speed with regard to my interests and I beg that you would get Mr 
John Cooper [solicitor to the commission] to draw up my certificate and send it 
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by the bearer that I may go with it and what expense it may cost I [am] very 
willing to be accountable to you’.781 Kennedy seemed more than willing to do all 
the footwork if he could only get the certificate. 
On 15 September 1753 Kennedy wrote to Robert Cooper again: 
Sir 
I should be very glad to [know] when my certificate will be properly 
executed.  I should be very glad to be in some way of business you 
[know] Sir that I can do nothing till it is properly finished.  I would beg the 
favour of you to forward it as fast as possible and in so doing 
Sir you will oblige your most obedient humble servant to command David 
Kennedy 
PS Sir 
Please favour me with a line by the first opportunity of the [day]782 
Kennedy was still waiting in December of 1753 so wrote to attorney John 
Cooper: 
Sir 
I have not received the paper nor the certificate.  Please to send them by 
the bearer and I will take care to get them executed according to your 
directions and I beg that you would forthwith get it executed…and in so 
doing sir you will oblige your most obedient humble servant to command 
David Kennedy783 
It often seemed as if Kennedy was getting nowhere.  The time that he was in 
seems divorced from any linear progress in his bankruptcy.  He was stuck in 
circular time, in a disagreeable experience of waiting anxiously for his release 
and waiting for answers.  Delay, whatever the reason, caused the process to fall 
silent leaving bankrupts to simply wait and fret until they were recoupled to legal 
time.  Kennedy employed his time, with the assignees’ consent, in assisting with 
the liquidation of their estate by getting in debts.  He may have received ‘a 
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reasonable salary, as a clerk’ to the assignees, and even been ‘allowed half a 
crown per day’ as Honestus Moneyless thought the case ought to be.784 If 
bankrupts wanted to get their certificates it was certainly in their interests to help 
the assignees get the books and accounts into an acceptable state for 
presentation at bankrupts’ third and supposedly final appearance before the 
commissioners.  Kennedy traversed the country trying to get signatures on his 
certificate.  Where he needed the assistance of others to add to the list of 
signatures, he was assiduous in his correspondence and use of the eighteenth-
century postal system.  The impression his surviving correspondence gives is 
that he was kept busy by all this, although there are sometimes gaps of months 
between the letters.  The tone and content of his writing suggest that during his 
wait for the certificate he was much preoccupied by his circumstances.   
Wider sources, like the London Gazette, often do not reveal whether bankrupts 
definitively got their certificates, although TNA series B5 and B6 contain records 
of certificates issued, but these have not been checked for this study.785 The 
numbers given by Marriner suggest that many bankrupts did not get there 
certificates.  For the subjects in the case studies of this thesis the evidence is 
patchy.  Occasionally a commissioners’ memorandum displays a 
recommendation to grant a certificate or even a list of creditors lending their 
signatures survives in a commission file.  More generally, in the London Gazette 
notices can be seen in which commissioners certified that bankrupts had 
conformed under the bankrupt laws and that their certificates were to ‘be 
allowed and confirmed…unless Cause be shewn to the contrary’.  Such a notice 
appeared for Kennedy on 29 January 1754.786 It is not possible to know whether 
cause to the contrary was shown.  There is a final document in Kennedy’s file 
which has no date.  The appearance and substance are those of draft notes 
taken at a meeting and it ends stating: ‘Kennedy wants the House he lived in 
and Mr Hawkes is willing of it that he should have it but then Kennedy don’t care 
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to take it unless he can have his Certificate signed which he desires may be 
soon’.787 
Kennedy may have got it in the end, but it is worth adding that the 1732 statute 
which applied almost unreformed to all the cases in this study, was not 
understood as intending that a discharged bankrupt’s liberty should be 
absolutely free from obligation.  The assignees could still call a discharged 
bankrupt ‘to attend them to settle the accounts of his estate, or to attend any 
court of record to be examined…or for any other business the assignees judge 
necessary for getting in his estate’.  Were this to be the case, at least the 
bankrupt had to be allowed 2s 6d a day.788 Should, however, a former bankrupt 
be disinclined to respond to the assignees call, then ‘the commissioners may 
issue their warrant for apprehending him and commit him to the county goal, till 
he does conform’.789 Was it not a gaol where Kennedy commenced his journey 
as a bankrupt?  Was this not circular time, more Kairos than Chronos? 
 
7.3 Conclusion 
How long we understand a bankruptcy in the long eighteenth century to have 
lasted depends very much on whether we look at it from the point of view of 
people (principally bankrupts), or process.  The liquidation of bankrupt estates 
continued long after bankrupts had been discharged, but this was substantially 
the work of lawyers and administrators for which fees or other benefits were 
taken.  The workings of a bankruptcy commission took time, but largely 
progressed in linear fashion to an eventual conclusion when a ‘final’ final 
dividend was distributed to creditors. 
The shorter time that bankrupts waited for their certificates was not shorter for 
them in experiential terms.  While bankrupts remained undischarged, they were 
held in a kind of purgatory and could not practise their trade or support their 
families.  They wanted control of their time, just as they would like to have kept 
control of their property.  They understood that time lost could not be redeemed.  
A priority then for bankrupts was to dispose of their own time once more, 
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something they could only do after they finally obtained their certificates.  The 
waiting, delay and disappointment experienced by David Kennedy when set 
against the sometimes arbitrary or seemingly bloody-minded disposition of 
some creditors not to sign certificates, highlights how the loss of personal 
agency and independence trapped a bankrupt like Kennedy in circular time that 
seemingly delivered him time and again back to where he had started.   
The overlap and friction between the time of the linear legal process of 
bankruptcy (legal time) and the time of lived experience of bankrupts (social 
time) was constant.  Bankrupts were effectively trapped in both times.  They 
could not escape the process which repeatedly demanded that they ‘be and 
appear’ on the day and at the time established.  Their time was to be at the 
disposal of the institutions and individuals that held power over them and that 
required them to wait idly while their time slipped away until ‘in the end’ being 
relieved of their ‘oppressions’.790 Yet whenever the process seemed to pause or 
fall silent bankrupts found themselves stopped, ‘void of all hopes’,791 in temporal 
confinement.  It was often the relentless wasting away of their time while they 
waited in hope of getting their certificates that caused bankrupts so much 
anxiety.  The repercussions of the experience of bankruptcy on bankrupts’ 
health are discussed in the next chapter, along with the final question of what 
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Just a couple of weeks before being advertised as a bankrupt in the London 
Gazette, a clearly worried London merchant, Havilland Le Mesurier, wrote on 17 
March 1793 to the then Speaker of the House of Commons Henry Addington.792 
Sirs, 
 I have no apology to make for this intrusion – but misfortune. 
My brother Thomas in now on the circuit, and can only hear this day of 
my unhappy situation; if therefore this step I now take be improper, if I 
have no more claim to indulgence (for perhaps why should I?) than the 
many persons now rendered as unhappy as myself… 
 I was attempting the cause of writing it, but I feel unequal to the 
task: I will only say that the failures yesterday in the City have dragged 
me into their vortex and from being a Merchant of respectability when I 
last saw you, with a Capital of £15,000:  and a business of two to £3,000: 
a year, I was yesterday in a moment reduced to want a shilling, with a 
wife and five children to provide for. 
 The God in whom I trust has not however left me destitute!  He 
has given me a wife able to encounter mediocrity, and He has given me 
hands to act and some experience to direct me in the new scene His 
Providence has allotted me… 
 I have been taught by experience, Mr Speaker, that a Capital is 
indispensably necessary in Trade, and I am incapable of borrowing when 
I have no security to offer: you will not wonder therefore at my anxiety to 
get into some other line of life.  I merely seek a Living, and if …  … A 
place of £300: a year, with an opportunity of rendering myself useful 
would make myself happy: for less I fear I cannot live with a wife and five 
children, but with that salary we even could purchase comfort.793 
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Havilland Le Mesurier started out in life with many advantages.  Born in 
Guernsey in 1758, he was the son of the hereditary governor of Alderney.  In 
the 1770s he joined the family merchant house which profited from privateering 
in the American War of Independence.  Commercial problems when war broke 
out with France in 1793 were, apparently, the main cause of his house’s 
financial crisis and bankruptcy.794 Usefully, Le Mesurier’s letter to Addington 
suggests most of the headings under which the notion of loss is explored in this 
chapter.  Le Mesurier loses his ‘situation’ as ‘a Merchant of respectability’, 
which he exchanges for the very ‘unhappy situation’ of a bankrupt.  He loses his 
money and is ‘reduced to want a shilling’.  His ‘misfortune’ threatens to leave 
him ‘destitute’ and of course dependent.  He is therefore reduced to having to 
claim ‘indulgence’ from an influential patron for ‘a Living’, although so overcome 
by events he feels ‘unequal to the task’.  The letter contains much of the type of 
self-abasing rhetoric employed by bankrupts in their petitions to more powerful 
friends and patrons.  He, as a matter of course like many other bankrupts, 
attributes his ‘unhappy situation’ to ‘misfortune’ rather than any personal failings 
or poor business practices; and he trusts to ‘Providence’ to allot him a ‘new 
scene’.  Providence manifests itself through Addington, who gets him the £300 
a year he is seeking.  Fortunately, he is also able to bear some downward 
social mobility, in part because God has given him ‘a wife able to encounter 
mediocrity’.  Le Mesurier also gives importance to ‘rendering myself useful’ 
which is indicative, not just that he wanted to believe that his experience in 
trade meant that he had something to offer, but also his wish was rooted in 
contemporary beliefs about the importance of industry and not being inactive or 
worse still, idle. 
Le Mesurier’s private letter to Addington, like other correspondence examined in 
this study, reveals something of the shock and anxiety that individuals 
experienced as they sought to cope with the consequences of bankruptcy.  Le 
Mesurier was a bankrupt who recovered quickly from his failure by finding, with 
the help of Addington, a commissariat commission in the army.  He soon 
became deputy commissary-general to the army.795 No later than 27 July 1793 
he wrote to Addington to express gratitude for the position, which as eighteenth-
 






century bankruptcies went was a pretty quick turnaround.796 Why Addington 
proved such an obliging patron to Le Mesurier is less clear.  Le Mesurier might 
have been a well-connected and useful client amongst mercantile interests, and 
a war was commencing of course.797 This study, however, finds only limited 
evidence of patronage working for bankrupts. 
Le Mesurier’s usefulness in his new situation during a major war went a long 
way to repairing the loss of wealth and reputation he had sustained as a result 
of the bankruptcy, and this enabled him to recover his independence.798  
Matthew McCormack has observed that ‘independence through work resonated 
with the Protestant work ethic and freed middling men from the ignominy of 
patrician patronage’.799 However, in Le Mesurier’s case it was patronage alone 
that permitted him to regain his independence.800  Without such influential 
friends other bankrupts would not find recovering from what they had lost so 
quick or easy. 
This final chapter looks at the consequences, both immediate and long term, of 
bankruptcy for failed traders.  The chapter discusses a variety of social factors 
that will have worked, to varying degrees, on bankrupts’ experience and their 
sense of themselves.  This chapter also inevitably brings the study to the point 
at which legal and business history intersects with multiple scholarships within 
social history (e.g. identity, medical, gender, masculinity), and although explicit 
references in the study’s sources that address these scholarships are few, there 
are probably sufficient to go some way towards answering queries that may be 
arising in the mind of the reader regarding this intersection. 
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Bankrupts rarely left evidence in which they explicitly declared that their 
experience of becoming bankrupts compromised their sense of status, 
independence or identity.  They were, however, much more explicit about their 
states of mind and physical health.  It is probable that compromised status, 
independence or identity contributed to the overall effect on the minds and 
bodies of bankrupts and also paved the way for some of the graver experiences 
that befell them.  It is also plausible that what bankrupts said about the effects 
on their minds and bodies were coded expressions of the injury they felt to their 
status, independence and identity. 
Because the sources for this study offer only limited evidence to support an 
exploration of the themes mentioned above, I take a step further back and bring 
these themes under the overarching heading of ‘Loss’ as all the subjects in this 
study lost aspects of their lives and their selves as a result of their bankruptcies.  
Also choosing this heading allows other factors to be brought into the analysis 
such as the downward social mobility that came with the loss of property, 
income and material things, and which not only affected the status and identity 
of the subjects but also worked upon their emotions.  The chapter is divided into 
the following sections: 8.0 Introduction (above); 8.1 Loss of status, reputation 
and civic roles; 8.2 Loss of wealth, property, and downward social mobility; 8.3 
Loss of independence and the experience of becoming dependent; 8.4 Loss of 
health; 8.5 Beyond bankruptcy: endings and new beginnings; 8.6 A sense of 
loss: Elizabeth Fry, a bankrupt’s wife; and 8.7 Conclusion. 
 
8.1 Loss of status, reputation and civic roles 
If a trader had had a bankruptcy commission issued against him or her, then 
one of the first important changes they experienced was that of not simply being 
declared a bankrupt, but also more existentially, becoming a bankrupt.  For 
example, in 1772 Alexander Fordyce at his examination spoke of when he 
‘became a bankrupt’.801 Failed traders became something different from what 
they had formerly been.  London Gazette bankruptcy notices first declared a 
named trader to be a bankrupt and thereafter referred to him or her as ‘the said 
 
801 ‘Examination of Mr Fordyce, as a Bankrupt’, Gentleman’s and London Magazine, for October 





bankrupt’.  In legal documents and notices in other periodicals simply ‘the 
bankrupt’ was the identifier frequently employed in place of the trader’s 
name.802 
It being known that a trader had become a bankrupt could elicit compassion 
from some, but equally the sudden and concentrated attention and scrutiny of a 
bankrupt’s conduct, failure, and public persona could be negative.  Writing to 
Lady Hesketh in 1788 William Cowper delivered his appraisal of a local trader 
who had recently become a bankrupt: 
Rogers the Great, the Waggoner I mean, is gone all to pieces. I do not 
mean that he is Burst (which, adverting to his size you might suppose to 
be my meaning) but that he is Broken.  In other words, a Bankrupt. The 
consequence is an universal uproar in this country, some poor people 
are ruined and some rich ones shaken, Maurice Smith among others is 
likely to be much a Loser. I have mention'd this catastrophe in terms that 
do not bespeak much pity for Rogers, and because, in truth, I do not feel 
much.  Negligence and Drink have undone him, and just before he fell 
and even while he was falling he contrived by imposing on others and 
inveigling them to indorse his Bills, to pull them down with him. But the 
Waggon still goes, though under whose auspices I am not at present 
able to say — probably those of the Creditors.803 
Cowper’s words and tone suggest a pre-existing disdain for trade and especially 
for traders who might have succumbed to hubris (and too much beef and ale) 
during their rise.  Describing a bankrupt trader as ‘gone all to pieces’ was not an 
uncommon contemporary way of describing the transformation of a previously 
coherent individual and business into something broken and fragmented.  Defoe 
had already written of failed tradesmen being ‘dash’d all in pieces’.804 In 1758 
Thomas Turner, when he contemplated arresting a long-standing debtor, 
regretted that the person would be ‘entirely torn to pieces’.805 This rending apart 
of the trader can be understood as implying more than simply that the 
constituent parts of his enterprise had ceased to interact and function 
 
802 Repeated examples of this appear in the case of Thomas Lodge, HRO, 50M69/12, 
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harmoniously, each piece in turn to be carried off by creditors; it implied the 
disintegration of the trader’s place in the world, their wealth, their home, their 
status and reputation, and possibly their entire sense of self which was replaced 
by a simple new identity, that of being a bankrupt. 
Rogers ‘the Waggoner’ was unlikely to have relished his new status as a 
bankrupt nor the imputation of his fall to ‘Negligence and Drink’ or the charge 
that he behaved fraudulently and maliciously in getting others ‘to indorse his 
Bills’.  However, Rogers’ ‘story’ would not have been under his control.  Rafael 
Efrat argues that it was the widespread abhorrence felt at the breach of trust 
and the concomitant threat to a credit-based society that so determined the 
contempt in which bankrupts were held.806 Given the evidence presented here 
and in the foregoing chapters it should be clear by now that in the long 
eighteenth century English people did not like bankrupts.  They liked becoming 
bankrupts themselves even less.  They certainly did not like to be named as 
bankrupts in the press.  For example, in 1827 a bankrupt by the name of 
Alexander Bruce, an army clothier, secured the publication of a notice in the 
Sunday Times which corrected ‘unintentional errors into which various papers 
have fallen’.  The notice stated: 
In the first place, Mr. Bruce says he is not an individual bankrupt, but a 
joint bankrupt under the firm of Bruce, Brown, and Scott. 
This was clearly not enough clarification for Bruce as the notice continued: 
Mr. Bruce adds, that he is no bankrupt either in effect or form, and the 
joint effects of the firm were always more than sufficient to pay the joint 
debts.  Mr. B. denies that he is liable to arrest or imprisonment…807 
Bruce’s name had been published dozens of times in bankruptcy commission 
notices in the London Gazette over the preceding ten years.  However, he still 
maintained that once certain affairs were settled, he would ‘be worth 40,000l. 
after paying all his debts’.808 So he should be neither thought of as a bankrupt 
nor as worthless. 
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As bankruptcy tended to stop dead the trajectory of traders’ lives, it inevitably 
disrupted their pre-established public lives, roles and responsibilities.  This was 
even more the case if bankrupts had been of the wealthier members of the 
middling sort and had been substantial traders in their towns or parishes.  
Historical records do not often tell us if bankrupts resigned or were obliged to 
abandon roles and responsibilities.  However, it is likely that this would have 
been the case given the damage to reputation, loss of trust and the poor 
relations that unpaid debts would have engendered.  Alexandra Shepard says 
of men in the early modern period, that their ‘reputations were most frequently 
attacked through questioning their economic integrity in terms of plain dealing, 
reliability, and personal worth’.809 Bankrupts could not then be trusted with 
public responsibilities, for example: in 1744 bankruptcy left Somerset yarn 
washer Richard Hutchings unable to pay land tax arrears which were due from 
him ‘as collector thereof for the tything of Woolmistone’.810 In 1775 Hampshire 
brewer Thomas Lodge was not only steward and agent for Sir Henry Paulet St 
John’s Dogmersfield Park Estate, he was also responsible for paying Sir 
Henry’s 1772 county of Southampton election expenses, except that he did not 
pay them.811 As a result of Lodge’s deceptions in the accounts and his imminent 
bankruptcy Sir Henry ‘removed Lodge from his Stewardship’.812 In London in 
the 1790s merchant Henry Nantes had been a subscriber to the Veterinary 
College, a member/subscriber to the Philanthropic Society, and a 
governor/subscriber of both the London Hospital and the Magdalen Hospital (all 
of which was a remarkable amount of philanthropy for one so heavily involved in 
the Atlantic slave trade and ownership of plantations!).813 Following his 
bankruptcy in 1797 his name disappeared from later lists,814 although he was 
still appearing on the Magdalen lists in 1798 and 1803 by which time he was 
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probably already on the Isle of Man, a place favoured by insolvent debtors.815 
From at least 1814 bankrupt brewer John Latham had been a justice at the 
County of Southampton Quarter Sessions.  As a magistrate in Romsey in 
September 1817, only two months before becoming a bankrupt, he sentenced a 
man for defrauding a turnpike keeper of 3d.816 Before their bankruptcy in 1819 
Messrs. Brickdale & Co. were bankers to the Taunton and Somerset 
Hospital.817 One of the more modest traders in this study, Sherborne maltster 
John Slade, having in 1830 absconded altogether rather than face his 
bankruptcy commission, would not have returned to his role as steward for 
Sherborne’s ‘Annual Diversions’.818  
The names of bankrupts and the stories and issues that surrounded their 
failures got about through the press, through correspondents like Cowper, and 
by word of mouth.  In no time town, district, and sometimes the whole country 
would learn who was a bankrupt and with whom they were in dispute.  As the 
bankrupts Anne and Isaac Scott declared in their 1768 self-exculpatory 
pamphlet: ‘The Affair was now publick’.819 To a greater or lesser extent all the 
bankrupts in this study had been active participants in their trade networks and 
communities and will have practised middling-sort sociability within the various 
associations and institutions to which they belonged and subscribed.  Their 
failure as traders will have diminished or ended the public standing of many and 
potentially scarred their reputations indefinitely.  Of Jane Austen’s brother 
Henry, a bankrupt banker, E. J. Clery maintains that Jane ‘knew the bankruptcy 
had left an indelible mark on Henry’.820 Although as we have seen in the case of 
Le Mesurier there were sometimes successful and restorative afterlives. 
 
8.2 Loss of wealth, property, and downward social mobility 
Prior to their failures, traders, especially those set up by established trading or 
gentry families, lived in dwelling houses which they furnished with the requisite 
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domestic niceties which enabled them to project status and credit in their 
localities.  Thomas Pyott, who had been apprenticed in the timber trade, 
married Anne in 1760.  His ‘fortune’ was ‘a third share in the north Brewhouse in 
Hull’, and he also accumulated capital from other sources.  He tells us that in 
setting up home in Hull he took a house in the high street.  He furnished it and 
procured ‘Plate, China…a Post Chaise and Horses, all of which cost £1,000, 
and then contemplated to what use to put his capital.821 As the reader will recall 
Pyott failed in the wine trade and would lose his house and contents, although 
as will be seen below he endeavoured to keep his plate from his creditors by 
placing it with a friend to whom he wrote; ‘If it is not inconvenient to you, [I] 
desire you would keep my Plate sometime longer, as I have yet remaining many 
expectancies, and if I should die my wife would choose to have it’.822 The plate 
was a store of value for his wife in reduced circumstances, and it was also a 
material way to resist a loss of status. 
Earlier in the eighteenth century, Daniel Defoe had warned traders to be 
prepared to sacrifice status and domestic comforts in order to ensure their 
survival.  Defoe imagined the conversation between a tradesman and his wife: 
Wife: I hope you are not more asham’d to retrench, than you would be to 
have your name in the gazette. 
Husb. It is sad work to come down hill thus. 
Wife. ‘Twould be worse to fall down at one blow from the top: better slide 
gently and voluntarily down the smooth part, than to be push’d down the 
precipice, and be dash’d all in pieces.823 
Unfortunately, many traders, Pyott included, were ‘push’d down the precipice’.  
Immediately a trader became a bankrupt, they were not only subject to the kind 
of negative representation expressed by Cowper above, they also experienced 
being ‘dash’d all in pieces’ through the loss of all their property.   Under the 
authority of the bankruptcy commissioners all they owned was conveyed to the 
assignees who would effectively take apart a bankrupt’s estate piece by piece. 
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Bankrupts not only immediately lost their commercial premises, trade stock and 
utensils, they lost their home and everything in it.  For example, in February 
1752 an agent for the assignees of bankrupt Wiltshire linen draper David 
Kennedy got possession of all of Kennedy’s property.  The agent informed that 
‘[s]oon after we came from Salisbury our trusty and well beloved Charles went 
and took to everything he could lay his hands on at Kennedy’s’.824 The loss of 
personal objects and possessions was distressing and painful to bankrupts and 
their families, although bankrupts did not always have goods removed 
immediately from their homes with the speed that smaller debtors suffered.825  
At a deeper level the psychological impact was more than merely personal and 
emotional; it had wider social implications for them.  If they lost their 
‘necessaries’, in the sense intended by Adam Smith whereby such things were 
‘whatever the custom of the country renders it indecent for creditable people, 
even of the lowest order, to be without’, then being seen to have lost their 
property with the resulting poverty could only imply ‘extreme bad conduct’.826 
Having lost possession of their reputation and property, bankrupts often saw 
their property being sold in fire sales intended to raise cash quickly.  In 1782 a 
catalogue offered for sale ‘A Great Variety of Ancient and Modern Books’ which 
had been ‘the Stock in Trade of Henry Payne, Bookseller, a Bankrupt; Which 
Will Be Sold Very Cheap…By Order of the Assignees’.  The books were to ‘be 
sold for Ready Money only’ and discounts were offered ‘for the encouragement 
of Purchasers’.827 In 1829 The Sunday Times ran an advertisement that claimed 
that the stock of bankrupt drapers Kirkman and Co. not only consisted ‘of the 
best and most costly manufacture’ but that it would also be sold in a ‘Grand and 
unreserved SALE’ in which the public would enjoy ‘advantages unequalled 
since the panic of 1825’.  The auctioneers proposed to sell some goods at ‘one-
fifth of the late proprietors’ prices’.828 Sales of debtors’ and bankrupts’ property 
also readily attracted curiosity, and judgement.  James Woodforde recorded in 
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his diary on 8 October 1793 that: ‘Before dinner we all walked into Bruton to a 
Sale – Mr. Bonds, who is an Attorney but lately absconded being very much in 
debt, by living away highly.’829 Largely the evidence suggests that bankrupts 
were resigned to the loss of their property, although in 1775 bankrupt 
Hampshire brewer Thomas Lodge was not willing to accept the loss of his 
property at auction.  When the event commenced on 8 May the sale was 
subject to many interruptions by Lodge who ‘appeared and forbid any ones 
purchasing upon the Opening (and in the very Face of the Assignees) which 
Occasioned an Extraordinary Expence and delay’.830 Possibly the fact that 
some bankrupts notoriously secreted things of value with family or friends, like 
Pyott and his plate above, rendered the sales a little less painful.  Nevertheless, 
such behaviour was fraud, and it should not be assumed that all bankrupts 
secreted goods as a matter of course. 
Because all household things could be turned into cash, the loss of the most 
basic necessities like beds for sleeping or chamber pots was more than simply 
inconvenient, it was also humiliating.  The inventory of Thomas Lodge’s 
household goods included ‘3 blue & white Chamber pots’.831 The assignees in 
the case of Anne and Isaac Scott were ‘so enraged’ by their suspicion that the 
Scotts were hiding assets that they were rumoured to be intending to ‘not leave 
Mrs Scott a Bed to lay on’.832 When it came to potentially losing one’s bed from 
under one, as a bankrupt Mrs Scott may have enjoyed less protection than an 
insolvent debtor householder subject to a distraint, because a conventional 
distraint did not in theory permit the seizure and sale of beds.833 Following her 
bankruptcy Anne Scott was staying ‘in a Lodging, in a bad State of Health’ and 
was concerned about her estate which was in the hands of the assignees from 
whom she could not get a confirmation that her ‘Estate should not be touched 
by the Creditors’.  Whilst not entirely losing her property she had lost control of 
it.  It was agreed ‘that she might have the Furniture of her House’.  She was 
willing to give up the lodging and move ‘into a cheaper one in the Country, but 
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could not till she had leave to move her Goods’.  The chief assignee would not 
let her do this ‘unless she would find somebody that he approved of that should 
be answerable for the Goods whenever he should please to demand them’.834 
Anne valued her furniture and her goods, but she stood to lose them at the 
whim of the assignees.  And lose their personal property bankrupts did. 
In January 1818 following the bankruptcy of Romsey brewer John Latham, the 
assignees got started on the Latham family’s home and domestic possessions.  
To be sold by auction on 28 January was Latham’s ‘genteel and modern’ 
furniture.  As well as practical items, under the hammer were to go his family’s: 
‘lofty French window curtains, with rich silk hangings’ and the pianoforte; then 
thirty dozen bottles of ‘choice old Port’, and as many ‘superior old British 
Wines’.  All these signifiers of the family’s genteel status were to be lost to 
others who would have the benefit and enjoyment of them.  The family silver 
was condensed to ‘200 ounces of modern plate’.  Their tea china, books, 
paintings, pistols, and even Latham’s ‘brace of Pointers’ would become the 
property of others.835 
Traders struggling with debt and facing impending bankruptcy could quickly lose 
the material paraphernalia of domesticity by being forced to use it like cash to 
pay creditors’ demands and stave off bankruptcy a while longer.  This use of 
moveable goods as cash was more typical of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries.836 However, cash-strapped traders can be found resorting to it in the 
early nineteenth century.  In 1819 as the Brickdale family attempted to pacify an 
increasingly insistent creditor, who was their own estate bailiff George Nuttall, 
John Brickdale’s wife offered to give him ‘some articles of Plate in part 
satisfaction of his debt’.  So, Nuttall maintained, on 24 October 1819 she gave 
him some ‘Silver Forks, Spoons and other articles of Plate belonging to ... John 
Brickdale’.837 Nuttall converted the flatware from the Brickdales’ table into 
£73.10. 0, which was the most he could get after shopping around.  He also 
received ‘a plated Skewer and Fish Slice’ from Mrs Brickdale, which he sold to 
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Thomas Thorne for £7.838 These payments in plate were not sufficient to satisfy 
Nuttall as he still took out a petition of bankruptcy against John and Matthew 
Brickdale later that year. 
How attached Mrs Brickdale was to her plate the records do not tell us.  
Records do tell us, however, in the case of a Mrs Down.  She was the wife of 
Richard Down, one of the bankrupt partners in Alexander Fordyce’s bank failure 
of 1772.  She did not want to lose household items with personal associations.  
She listed: ‘A Tea Board, and old Piece of Family Plate, a Coffee Pott, a Cross, 
and Lamp, an Urn, Sauce Boats and Bread Basket, 2 Pr of Candlesticks and 3 
salvers’.  She petitioned the creditors for their return declaring, ‘all the above 
being Presents from relations and friends’.839 Sara Pennell raises the question 
of whether for eighteenth-century English people it was worth getting 
emotionally invested in material things because as a result of distraint (or 
bankruptcy), things could be gone tomorrow.840 Nevertheless, losing personal 
objects, especially if they were sentimentally valued, must have caused some 
sense of loss (see the account of Elizabeth Fry’s experience of loss below).  
Still more painful than losing valued possessions was losing absolutely 
everything.  Thomas Pyott wrote in 1767, ‘five long years of uncertainty, fears, 
hopes, doubts…I have been unfortunate, all my worldly goods are wasted 
away’.841 Bankrupt banker Henry Austen declared that as a result of his failure 
in 1816: ‘I lost everything’ and was ‘totally ruined’.842 Yet status, position, 
property and possessions were still not all that bankrupts lost.  In losing their 
trades and financial assets they became dependent on others, thus losing their 
independence, which is discussed below. 
 
8.3 Loss of independence and the experience of becoming dependent 
Chapters six and seven discussed bankrupts’ experience of loss of control over 
space and time.  However, the constraining effect of being a bankrupt went still 
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further and severely limited their ability to act for themselves or have any control 
over the social and economic aspects of their own lives.  Prior to their 
bankruptcies the subjects of this study were all independent traders in 
command of their own businesses, property, finances and personal and 
domestic possessions.  The loss of these aspects of their lives cannot have 
been comfortable given that independence was, in McCormack’s words ‘a 
fundamental aspect of Georgian male identities’.843 Henry French and Mark 
Rothery have shown how the achievement of financial autonomy and thus 
manly status and independence mattered to the gentry families that put sons 
into trade.844 The corollary of this was that ‘humiliating [financial] dependence’ 
should be avoided.845 This was necessary because, in John Smail’s words, ‘an 
essential part of being a man was not to be burdensome to relations’.846 
Bankruptcy entailed loss of independence and becoming, potentially at least, 
burdens on relatives. 
After their failure bankrupts could not practise their trade as their business 
premises, stock and utensils of trade were conveyed to their assignees.  Their 
homes or dwelling houses were also conveyed.  The loss went still further.  Any 
financial assets (cash, plate, and debts owed them), as well as other typical 
assets of the period such as land, buildings let to tenants, insurance policies, 
tradeable stock, government stock, stakes in lotteries, mortgages etc. were 
conveyed to the assignees.  And of course, bankrupts could get no credit, as Le 
Mesurier said above: ‘I am incapable of borrowing when I have no security to 
offer’.847 
Following the surrender of all their property bankrupts could make no significant 
decisions because they lacked anything to make decisions about and therefore 
had little control over their own lives.  Owning property was essential to a man’s 
independent status.848 According to McCormack: ‘In Georgian England, the 
household and the householder were the basic units of social 
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conceptualisation.’849 A bankrupt no longer held a house nor had he a 
household having had to dismiss the servants and to disperse family members.  
They lacked the financial means to implement even minor choices.  Probably 
the only serious decision making they could do (and for which we may have the 
best evidence) was about how best to cooperate with their commissions so that 
they could obtain their certificates.  Overall, it is tempting to reduce the question 
of bankrupts’ agency to the fact that they could not do or decide anything until 
they got their certificates, but this would be to ignore the complexities of their 
circumstances.  When bankrupts could not act for themselves, they sometimes 
acted (or at least felt they ought to be able to act) through proxies, usually 
family, friends, or lawyers (roles for family and friends in communications and 
negotiations were discussed in more detail in chapter five).  If bankrupts could 
not attend meetings themselves for fear of arrest, they sent a family member or 
friend, and sometimes their solicitor, to deliver a message or to negotiate on 
their behalf.  In the meantime, bankrupts and their families still needed to live, 
eat and sleep on beds.  So how did they manage?  Essentially, they depended 
on others which hardly conformed to the Georgian ideal of independence.850  
Bankrupts found themselves having to ask, if not effectively beg, for money in 
order to cover their basic necessities and those of their families.  Henry Austen 
maintained that after his bankruptcy in 1814 he was ‘reduced to beggary’.851  
It does, however, have to be asked to what extent many bankrupts were 
reduced to extreme poverty.  ‘Beggary’ need not be synonymous with ‘poverty’.  
Bankrupts unsurprisingly hated having to ‘beg’ from their more affluent relatives, 
but the self-abasement will have saved them from poverty.  Although this study 
has shown some of its bankrupts being reduced to hard times like Townsend 
and Brigstock (and Stych who appears below), the poverty of many probably 
never resembled anything like that of some of the labouring poor who struggled 
to afford one loaf of bread a week.852 Brigstock did lament that he did not have 
‘any way of living and have best to get bread to my family’.853 
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Money for bankrupts was most likely to be forthcoming from family and it 
sometimes simply came in the form of gifts of cash.  In 1828 Elizabeth Fry listed 
the amounts she and her husband received from their wealthy relatives: ‘sister 
Hoare’ gave £286 and ‘Anna Gurney and Sarah Buxton’ gave £50, such that 
she recorded ‘we are now well provided for’.854 Although Elizabeth accepted her 
misfortunes as an act of providence, she was open to accepting relief.  
Walsham (drawing on Paul Slack) notes that ‘acknowledgement of providence 
was never incompatible with energetic initiatives to prevent and ameliorate the 
effects of catastrophe’.855 
Given the dispositions of their respective families (Gurney and Fry), Elizabeth 
Fry and her husband Joseph may not even have had to ask for money before it 
was proffered.  However, Thomas Pyott back in 1766 dreaded the 
consequences of asking his relations, for whom he clearly harboured some 
resentment, for money.  He observed that they were: 
all lost in the pleasures and employments of their good Fortunes, and 
whilst they see me contented and in good Spirits to keep them company, 
they treat me as their equal, and are all anxious to have me with them; 
but if I was to ask for money, from that moment they would use me as a 
Dependant, and as I could not brook that treatment, my company would 
soon become disagreeable, and I should lose all Hopes of preferment.856 
Pyott’s misgivings were well founded given, in McCormack’s words, 
independence from obligation ‘was regarded as a manly and honourable 
condition’.857 Pyott did enjoy the advantage of, as he put it, being connected to 
‘so many powerful Families’ who he hoped would find him employment, but in 
the meantime he suffered the double indignity of not only being the poor relative 
who had had to make his way in trade, but also of having failed at it.858 
If family and friends were not forthcoming with pecuniary assistance, then 
bankrupts depended entirely on what their assignees would allow them.  In the 
summer of 1767 Isaac Scott had to write to the assignees in his commission ‘for 
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Money’.  The request was repeated at a meeting on 9 September by his brother 
George who was acting for his bankrupt mother and brother.  He felt compelled 
to ask the assignees ‘if he thought his Mother and his Brother could live on Air’.  
He thought ‘they would be intitled to something from the Estate’. The next night 
‘at the Meeting of Assignees’ George presented a note from Anne and Isaac 
Scott in which they offered to give a receipt for ‘our Allowance from the 
Commission…which will be of much Use, and greatly oblige’.859 They were 
granted some of their allowance at the meeting on 10 September 1767 as the 
assignees ‘promised that they would send some Money’ and later that same 
night they provided ‘Mrs Scott with twenty Guineas for her, and ten for her 
Son’.860 
Another cash-strapped bankrupt who asked, in effect begged, for money was 
Carmarthenshire wool stapler John Stych who in 1811 wrote to his commission 
solicitor Daniel Burges from Llanilly to ask ‘for a remittance’: 
I wrote you last Sunday but have received no Answer which makes me 
very uneasy as the woman is going from [Luarry] Immediately and I have 
no money to send the Children up by her if you would be so kind as to 
get the Assignees to allow even as little to send them up by her I should 
be extremely obliged for if they are left there they will Certainly Starve.  
My Stock is entirely out and I have not even a Shilling left to pay postage 
of a Letter if you would be so kind as to send me a little Immediately I 
should be extremely obliged as I am Entirely pennyless.  I have had 
Several Applications for [Luarry] but no Offer…861 
It is not known whether Stych was sent ‘a little’.  Assignees, however, were not 
bound to allow bankrupts subsistence money, but they could choose to do so if 
they were inclined.  Therefore, a bankrupt in Stych’s position had to ask nicely 
and somewhat importunately.  At the same time Stych was careful to remind 
Burges that he was trying to assist the commission by (probably) facilitating 
viewings of [Luarry], which may have been a property or farm that he had 
owned prior to his bankruptcy and which had to be sold.  It was not unusual to 
 
859 Scott, Case of Anne and Isaac Scott, pp. 42–43. 
860 Ibid., pp. 42–44. 
861 BRO, 44352/2/1/15/7, Bankruptcy of John Stych, 1811–1812: Stych to Daniel Burges, 8 
September 1811, ‘for a remittance’. The letter was written from ‘Llanilly’ which is most likely to 





leave a bankrupt in charge of viewings of a property they had previously owned.  
Where there were good relations with assignees, they sometimes allowed 
bankrupts to continue living in their homes until the homes were eventually sold. 
Bankrupts’ relations with assignees were not always cordial and if living 
allowances were not forthcoming for some bankrupts then they were forced to 
petition whoever would listen to them.  In 1785 bankrupt Bristol distiller Joshua 
James wrote a desperate ‘Memorial’, possibly to an office holder in the Excise.  
He wanted it to be known that: ‘By a Chain of Events so calamitous, so afflicting 
and so unforeseen your memorialist and his family are reduced from a state of 
affluence and comfort to a state of ruin and Beggary’.  James explained that the 
only assets he had left were the distilling equipment (‘utensils’) with which to 
pay the Excise, after which he would be ‘left to the mercy of his provoked and 
injured Creditors’.  James ended basically opting to ‘throw himself upon the 
Clemency of a Minister’ to spare him from exposure to ‘the horrors of want’.862 
Because James’s memorial is written in a fair hand the document was probably 
written for him by a lawyer or his clerk.  In contrast to this type of petition, 
bankruptcy records generally show bankrupts writing their own letters in which 
they petitioned for assistance.  According to Faramerz Dabhoiwala over the 
eighteenth century, people increasingly wrote their own petitions rather than the 
early modern reliance on scriveners.863 If bankrupts were unsure of how to 
couch their petitions there were manuals to help them.  For the humbler 
‘decayed’ and ‘reduced’ tradesmen, George Brown’s New and Complete 
English Letter-Writer had some handy models of petitions.864 Then there was 
Thomas Cooke’s Universal Letter-Writer, which in addition to providing similar 
models to Brown’s, also provided a model letter for a bankrupt merchant’s 
widow seeking the ‘smallest matter’ towards her ‘immediate subsistence or 
future support’ from ‘a distant Relation’.865 The hardship typically claimed in 
these model petitions is reflected in the language of James’s memorial, as it 
was in the appeals or remonstrances of many bankrupts.  Dabhoiwala notes 
that the language of suffering was ‘a common petitionary trope’.866 This should 
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be borne in mind when endeavouring to ‘hear’ the voices of bankrupts.  In some 
cases, we only hear their petitioning voice. 
James is not the only bankrupt in this study who was compelled to appeal to 
strangers.  In 1813 Edmund Townsend, the bankrupt Covent Garden wine and 
cider merchant, was quite systematic when it came to petitions.  He employed 
his own printed forms which he addressed to, for example, ‘THE OPULENT 
AND BENEVOLENT’ and closed them declaring that ‘he therefore begs most 
humbly to throw himself upon the bounty and kindness’ of those who might be 
sympathetic towards his ‘afflicting case’.  He intended a third party ‘to receive 
contributions’ on his behalf, but it is not clear if anything was collected as 
Townsend abandoned London for Bath.867 Soon after his arrival in Bath he 
started to keep an account of his receipts and expenditure.  His account shows 
a variety of gifts and borrowings, as well as the sale or pawning of minor 
possessions.  He received from ‘Sir W. J. bart.’ a ‘gratuity’ of 10s 6d; another 
‘gratuity’ from a ‘Mr. M.’; he ‘Borrowed of Mr. J.’ 2s; ‘a friend’ gave him a present 
of 3s 6d and he received a ‘present from a Gent.’ of 1s; two further gentlemen 
gave him 5s each; and after ‘A number of Tradesmen, &c. at the Raven Tavern’ 
had a whip round he took home £1 2s; in the final entry he borrows 3s ‘of Mr. 
H.’.  In the statement with which he closes his account he states: ‘My Family in 
London were equally distressed, till *my very benevolent Patron afforded me 
still further and repeated means of procuring us clothes and other necessaries, 
of which we were in extreme want.’  From the account Townsend would seem 
to have ‘pledged’ most of his clothes.  The asterisk indicated a gift of £5 entered 
in the accounts from ‘T. H. esq.’.868 Townsend had clearly become dependent, 
not only on his basic survival strategies of selling books and pawning clothes, 
but more vitally on direct gifts of money.  Possibly ‘A number of Tradesmen, &c. 
at the Raven Tavern’ did better for Townsend than ‘THE OPULENT AND 
BENEVOLENT’.  In the absence of family, trade may have been more 
sympathetic to trade than gentry and aristocracy. 
Another survival strategy of bankrupts was to petition for employment.  If, as 
expressed by Le Mesurier at the beginning of this chapter, they did not believe 
they would again enjoy sufficient credit to be able to raise enough capital to 
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start afresh in trade, then employment was their only alternative to complete 
dependency.  Le Mesurier was successful in side-stepping from the ruins of his 
business into well-remunerated employment as an army commissary.  Other 
bankrupts took very different directions.  After his bankruptcy in 1816 Henry 
Austen settled for taking Holy Orders and became a curate at an annual stipend 
of fifty-two guineas.869 
Another bankrupt who saw his survival in employment was one Richard 
Yeoward, a bankrupt linen draper who had traded from Ironmonger Lane in the 
City.  He decided in 1796 to petition to succeed the late incumbent ‘Clerk to the 
Court of Requests’.  He affirmed his good reputation and imputed his losses to 
‘unforeseen events’.  He had lost his wife and he had eight children ‘unprovided 
for’.  He ended:  
Under these heavy Calamities, I trust I am justified in soliciting your 
Protection; and should I be honoured with your Support, the most steady 
Attention to the duties of the situation, should prove my lasting Gratitude 
for the Favor.870 
Bankrupts not only wanted to be able to provide for themselves and their 
families, either through recommencing a trade (although they did not always 
return to the same trade) or through employment, they also wanted to lose the 
stigma of being bankrupts.  It should be remembered that a bankrupt was 
something that a trader became.  If they were one kind of man (or woman) 
before bankruptcy, they were regarded as a different kind of man afterwards.  
However, this new identity was one they wished to shed.  According to Defoe in 
1727 a bankrupt wanted to be ‘a clear man’ such that he ‘may begin the world 
again’.871 
This same anxious desire was expressed in 1753 by Wiltshire linen draper 
David Kennedy when he wrote from Marlborough to the commission attorney 
John Cooper.  He urged Cooper to get him his certificate so that ‘I may be once 
more a clear man in the world’.872 From his choice of words it is to be wondered 
whether Kennedy had read Defoe’s Tradesman.  For Joshua Montefiore in 1804 
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if a bankrupt obtained his certificate he became ‘an unincumbered man’.  
However, Montefiore continued: 
on the contrary, if the commission be unfriendly, the bankrupt not only 
does not receive that liberal treatment to which his situation entitles him; 
but after all these difficulties, which the prejudice of mistaken interest 
casts in his way, he is ultimately refused his certificate, and stigmatized 
as a proscribed man…873 
These examples of contrasting designations for the kind of man a bankrupt was, 
may for the reader, raise a question about bankrupts’ masculine identity.  Did 
the male bankrupts feel that their manliness or masculinity was compromised 
and did others regard them or treat them as being compromised or diminished?  
Not very surprisingly the subjects in this study did not express themselves 
explicitly on this subject, or at least not in forms that survive.  To a considerable 
extent we can only surmise what they might have felt by trying to read between 
the lines, which risks imputing more to their words than the subjects intended.  
However, whether the subjects recognised it or not in Georgian England loss of 
independence was doing a lot of the work towards undermining masculinity 
anyway, as McCormack maintains the ‘independent man’ was identified with 
‘maleness itself’, and only independent men had full control over their 
identities.874 Part of wanting to be ‘once more a clear man in the world’ was 
about recovering that lost identity.  One thing is certain: bankrupt men waiting 
for certificates were not independent men.  According to McCormack being 
dependent connoted ‘a degrading lack of manliness, virtue and free will’ and 
dependence on ‘a patron, an employer…was enough to call an individual’s 
manliness and freedom into question’.875 Was this what Le Mesurier meant 
when he declared to his patron that he felt ‘unequal to the task’?876 
It is not easy, however, for the purposes of this study to find instances of 
bankrupts explicitly reflecting on their imperilled masculinity or to find instances 
of specific attitudes to, and treatment of, bankrupts for their dereliction of male 
duty to both family and wider society.  For the eighteenth-century anglophone 
world, one of the few scholars to directly address the question of imperilled 
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masculinity amongst male debtors, failed merchants and bankrupts is Toby 
Ditz.877 Ditz gives an account of a young merchant who in 1794 confided that 
his business reversals ‘had “wholly unmanned” him’.878 Ditz’s example of the 
young merchant raises the question of whether more examples of this kind of 
self-perception by failed traders can be found.879  For this study, evidence of 
this nature has proved difficult to find although Thomas Pyott gives us an 
example of the question from the debtor’s point of view.  In 1766, despite his 
dependent situation Pyott was ready to censure the male members of his family 
for, to his way of thinking, not being able to step up to the challenge of assisting 
him.  He lamented: ‘If I had a Relation that was capable of feeling any Manly 
sentiments of Generosity, I should receive an uncommon satisfaction in being 
obliged to him’.880 All the factors that have been identified and discussed in the 
preceding sections clearly had a wearing effect on bankrupts and inevitably 
gave rise to negative consequences for their minds and bodies.  These 
consequences are discussed in the next section. 
 
8.4 Loss of health 
In 1727 Daniel Defoe in The Complete English Tradesman related a dialogue 
that he maintained had come to his ears between a failing trader and his wife.  
The trader had been ‘melancholy, and oppress’d with the thoughts of his 
declining circumstances’.  His wife would hear him ‘fetch a deep sigh’ and ‘at 
another time say he wish’d he was dead’.881 This ought to have been enough to 
worry any wife and she therefore asked him what the matter was, but found she 
had a struggle to get anything out of him.  In exasperation at his evasions, she 
exclaimed: 
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Don’t put me off with such stuff as that; I tell you, ‘tis not for nothing that 
you have been so concern’d, and that so long too; I have seen it plain 
enough, why you have droop’d upon it for this fortnight past, and 
above…SURE ‘tis some terrible thing then, why must not I know it? 
[W]hat, are you going to break? 882 
To break, as the reader will already know, was to become a bankrupt.  This was 
what the wife feared was oppressing the mind of the trader.  Defoe’s dramatic 
sequence is not unlike an extract from one of his novels’ more troubled 
episodes, but as this chapter will endeavour to show his melancholy tradesman 
and wife prefigure the mental and psychological experience related by many 
insolvent debtors and bankrupts over the ensuing hundred years.  In this 
section we hear directly from bankrupts as they describe their states of mind 
and their physical symptoms.  We will also learn about some of the graver 
psychological and physical events that were probably directly or indirectly the 
consequence of their financial circumstances. 
In 1739 someone felt the need to publish these lines: 
How heavily Time moves away. 
Sometimes e’re Morn begins to peep, 
For Debt was never Friends with Sleep 883 
The words suggest that contemporaries understood only too well that loss of 
sleep was an inevitable consequence of anxiety over debt.  Unsurprisingly, the 
most common state of mind reported by bankrupts was an anxious one, which 
of course did nothing for their ability to sleep.  The pernicious effect of debt on 
spirits and health was recognised in England well before the eighteenth-century 
expansion of credit and debt, and the growth in insolvency and bankruptcy that 
followed.  The seventeenth-century astrologer and physician Richard Napier 
recorded that of 767 people who told him about their problems, 99 spoke of 
financial troubles.  Over half feared ruin, and it was debt that was the cause of 
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their anxiety.884 The subjects of this study recorded their anxious states during 
one or more of the three broad stages of bankruptcy. 
Firstly, there was the anxious period as money troubles built.  The anxiety will 
have been the greater if traders were engaged in speculative ventures and 
feared financial losses.  This was the view, in 1802, of physician and scientist 
Thomas Beddoes.  He believed the British mercantile class was prejudicing its 
health by ‘participating in speculative schemes and “scenes of trade at London 
or at Bristol”’.885 Alternatively, traders may already have been in fear of arrest 
and imprisonment by one or more of their creditors.  This was a time for traders 
when ‘apprehension instantly arises in his mind, and his imagination, by 
representing to him what may happen, shall cause apprehension to terminate in 
dread’.886 This period of dread might be endured for months or even years prior 
to a bankruptcy, and all the time the trader, according to Defoe, lived a 
‘miserable, anxious, perplexed life…before he Breaks’.887 For example, Thomas 
Pyott the failing Yorkshire wine merchant who got into major difficulties in 1762, 
and who was in constant fear of bankruptcy, having already had his personal 
property sold by his creditors, and after taking refuge with his father-in-law, 
fretted: ‘I found it possible I might be left without a Shilling and have two 
Annuities to pay; this consideration alone gave me sufficient pain and 
anxiety’.888 In addition to mere anxiety he often cited ‘pain’ as one of his 
symptoms.  A year later in a letter to his partner, Pyott apologised for not having 
written before saying, ‘the anxiety of my mind and the indifferent state of my 
Health prevented me’.889 The following month he was desperate for a way out 
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as he became weary of being pressed by his creditors, and he declared ‘I am 
determined to be a Bankrupt, rather than endure so much pain and anxiety’.890  
By 1766 Pyott had become debilitated by several years of anxiety.  When he 
was being threatened with imprisonment for debt, he immediately thought of the 
implications for his physical health.  He declared: ‘I am to expect the worst 
consequences of the Law…I am told I must expect the Fleet, if I do not pay the 
Debt.  I cannot conceive of what service my lean, lank, and bony Body will be to 
them’.891 After the pressure had laid him low he recalled: ‘and when I was 
thought to be upon my Death-Bed, worn out by Care and Anxiety they never 
heard one single complaint escape my Lips, and tho’ I was for fourteen days in 
a doubtful State’.892 Becoming a bankrupt might have spared him debtor’s 
prison, but one wonders whether given the experience of the bankrupts 
described here, whether he would have been any happier.  In the next few 
years his troubles persisted and reflecting on 1766 he recorded ‘feelings of self-
mortification, in continual dread of being confined by my creditors’.893 
Again, sleep and equanimity were great casualties of debt as exemplified by 
Bristol distiller Joshua James who, in late 1784 was on the verge of bankruptcy.  
He wrote to Bristol solicitor Daniel Burges in the hope that Burges’s agency 
might be ‘of great ease to my mind for I cannot rest day nor night am like a 
distracted man therefore I hope in your next you’ll give me some comfort’.894 In 
the 1790s Joseph Brasbridge, a keeper of a silverware shop on Fleet Street, 
began to have financial difficulties.  He recalled, ‘I found myself oppressed with 
fatigue and care’.895 In July 1817 John Brickdale, writing to his solicitor Beadon, 
expressed his desire for ‘a short respite from incessant fatigue of body and 
mind, which is rapidly wasting my frame’.896 Matters did not improve for 
Brickdale as two years later, and only weeks from becoming a bankrupt, he 
wrote early one morning in October 1819 to Beadon first apologising for 
troubling him straight after breakfast, and then revealed he had ‘a sad complaint 
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in my bowels from anxiety & fatigue - Let nothing of this transpire’.897 His 
request to Beadon to keep the lid on the fact of his state of health suggests that 
news escaping of a banker’s ill health could only further damage confidence 
and credit, which would in turn have further ramped up Brickdale’s anxiety and 
ailments.  Brickdale’s anxieties were well founded as the next month failure 
could no longer be staved off and he became a bankrupt. 
The arrival of bankruptcy ushered in a usually briefer, but more traumatic, 
period of shock and distress at the realisation of absolute failure and the loss 
that accompanied the calamity.  This was when bankruptcy was ‘attended with 
so many mortifications, and so many shocking things’.898 Defoe advised 
strongly that this sort of shock should be averted, but if it was inevitable, he 
cautioned traders to prepare their wives such that they ‘might not be 
overwhelmed with the suddenness and the terror of it’.899 Michael MacDonald 
observes that early modern ‘writers of all kinds warned that fear and grief, 
especially when they were sudden and intense, sometimes caused madness 
and even death.’900 
Defoe explicitly feared for traders’ wives, but his warning could have applied to 
all family members.  In the late 1760s the states of mind of members of the 
family of bankrupt Isaac Scott were greatly affected by the bankruptcy, if his 
creditors are to be believed.  When the assignees of Isaac Scott wrote to him on 
the continent in an attempt to persuade him to return to London, they took it 
upon themselves to inform him of the sufferings of members of his family.  One 
wrote, ‘Oh! Isaac, had you seen…the wretched, miserable, distressful Scene 
that I saw! Your worthy Mother overwhelmed with Grief…to see your poor Sister 
faint away, overpowered with Shame and Grief’.  Thus, they urged him to 
return, repeating ‘if you could behold the Distress of your poor aged Mother, 
and distracted Sister, you would not hesitate a Moment’.901 The ‘Scene’ painted 
might have been purely emotional blackmail perpetrated on Scott by the 
assignees to induce him to return so that they could arrest him, but it was 
reproduced in the Scotts’ own pamphlet.  The account of his family’s ‘Grief’ may 
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have worked on Scott as he did return to London.  If we are to believe the 
complaints expressed above by bankrupts and the accounts of scenes of 
distress and distraction should we accept that the arrival of bankruptcy was for 
contemporaries an overwhelming shock?  One bankrupt for whom events 
seemed overwhelming was Sherborne maltster and carrier John Slade. 
Slade had been struggling under financial pressures in the late 1820s and by 
Easter 1830 it was all over.  He fled Sherborne in the dead of night.  Only 
afterwards when his servants were examined for the purposes of declaring him 
a bankrupt was light shed on his state of mind.  His domestic servant described 
his increasingly anxious state in the days preceding his bankruptcy, and she 
told the bankruptcy commissioners that Slade had called her ‘to his bed room 
and desired I would not leave it ‘till he was asleep’.  She then revealed, as 
matters further deteriorated, how his mental state appeared to her on the night 
he fled: ‘he appeared to be distressed in his mind’ and ‘for some time before he 
seemed very low’ with his mind ‘rather lost’.  Before he left, she asked him 
where he was going, but he said he did not know.  To her it seemed that Slade, 
as he departed ‘appeared like a deranged man’.902 Slade was probably trying to 
commit an act of bankruptcy as he understood it, but such a specific witness 
statement about his state of mind is unusual in depositions of this kind.  This 
suggest that the antics that night were not mere theatre but indicative of real 
distress.  Slade never returned to face his commission and his fate remains 
unknown.  Surely, like thousands of other bankrupts Slade only had to attend 
the routine meetings of the bankruptcy commissioners when called, be 
examined, and then wait patiently to obtain his certificate.  Was it really so 
dreadful to become a bankrupt? 
In long eighteenth-century England bankruptcy held a position similar to death 
in the ranking of calamities.  For example, a bond from master to the 
Corporation of Gloucester was drawn up on apprenticing a boy with charity 
money in the event of death or bankruptcy.903 Defoe went further and in one of 
his imaginary exchanges a ‘Lady’ customer returns to a mercer’s shop, which is 
shut.  She asks how long the shop has been shut and is told about a month.  
 
902 DRO, D/FFO/27/103, John Slade, proceedings in bankruptcy: deposition of Ann Luffman, 14 
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She asks if the mercer is dead and receives the reply, ‘No, Madam, he is not 
dead…SOMETHING worse, Madam, he has had misfortunes.’  According to 
Defoe ‘her mercer was broke’.904 There were traders who did not want to be 
bankrupts and who, on learning that they were bankrupts or were soon to 
become bankrupts, took their own lives.  They chose death rather than 
bankruptcy.   
Before the period of this study the trope of the bankrupt-speculator suicide was 
already well established.  The suicide of goldsmith-banker and financier Sir 
Stephen Evans (or Evance as he was more widely known) in 1712 attracted 
attention.  Lady Mary Wortley Montagu remarked: ‘Deaths or marriages I know 
of none, but Sir Stephen Evans, that hanged himself’.905 Not long before he 
hanged himself, he had been declared a bankrupt.  He had engaged in 
speculations which failed and reputedly owed more than £100,000.906 Evance’s 
suicide was explained by Thomas Bruce, Earl of Ailesbury with the remark: ‘as 
ill got money never thrives, he broke… by grasping at too much’.907 
Defoe’s caution to contemporaries about the dangers of sudden financial 
shocks was not misplaced, although in this study we learn far more about the 
consequences for husbands than of the effects on family members.908 
Nevertheless, concern about family distress (like that of Isaac Scott’s sister and 
mother) and protecting them may have been a consideration in the choices that 
some bankrupts made.  For some the shock and the shame as they confronted 
the reality of bankruptcy was too overwhelming.  It can only be conjecture that 
there was a correlation between scale of bankruptcy (Evance had owed 
£100,000) and the probability of a bankrupt ‘laying violent hands upon himself!’ 
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905 Lady Mary Wortley Montagu to Mrs. Frances Hewet, c. 8 March 1712, in Robert Halsband 
(ed.), The Complete Letters of Lady Mary Wortley Montagu, 3 vols (Oxford, 1965), I, 1708–
1720, pp. 118–19. 
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as William Scott had said of Evance.909 Minor traders who owed much smaller 
sums also killed themselves, for example a keeper of a coffee house in 1715.910 
As the eighteenth century progressed and the numbers of bankruptcies grew, it 
was not unusual for London papers to draw a connection between bankruptcy 
and suicide.  During the credit crisis of 1772, according to Paul Kosmetatos 
‘lurid tales abounded in the press for a time of merchants cutting their throats, 
shooting or hanging themselves, and jumping out of the window “in agony of 
mind arising from the failure of the Bankers”’.911 The Star and Evening 
Advertiser declared in 1788 that ‘the progress of bankruptcy and that of suicide 
seem to keep pace with each other – and both are to be ascribed to the same 
causes, dissipation, extravagance’ and once again, ‘speculation’.912 In 
eighteenth-century England it was true, bankruptcy did ‘progress’.  Annual 
numbers of bankruptcies increased through much of the long eighteenth century 
and, according to the press, suicides were also increasing for the reasons 
alleged above.  Certainly, the trope of the bankrupt-suicide (like Sir Stephen 
Evance who failed after speculating for gain) occupied a place in the 
contemporary cultural landscape, particularly novels.913 
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However, this study is concerned with real, rather than literary, bankrupts.  In 
1797 one bankruptcy had tragic consequences for Anglo-Dutch merchant and 
Member of Parliament, Richard Muilman Trench Chiswell (formerly just Richard 
Muilman).  On 9 February that year French Laurence broke the news to 
Edmund Burke writing ‘for there is one tragical incident in my story. You may 
have heard that a great Dutch House in the city, that of Muilman, Nantes, & Co. 
has failed.  The occasion is now the talk of the Exchange.  They had in their 
hands 44,000l. received from Holland on account of Mrs. Hastings.’  Mrs 
Hastings’ money ‘was all gone’ and Laurence continued: ‘I am sorry to add, Mr. 
Muilman, finding an exposure of his affairs unavoidable, shot himself; his 
partner has disappeared, and the house has broken to pieces.’914 Again the 
metaphor of the shattered fragments in the context of bankruptcy as highlighted 
earlier.  In this case it was not just the house that was in pieces, it was Chiswell.  
Chiswell had killed himself on 3 February only four days before his name would 
have appeared in a London Gazette bankruptcy notice along with his partner.  
He was still named, but as ‘Chiswell…Merchant, deceased’.915 Chiswell’s 
partner Nantes did do one thing before he ‘disappeared’, he wrote to Marian 
Hastings: 
From the papers of pubblick report you must ‘ere now have heard of the 
dreadful shocking catastrophe of my friend and Partner Mr. Chiswell 
having made away with himself: a sudden derangement of his intellects 
only could have induced him to commit this rash action.916  
There were good reasons, which are discussed below, for maintaining that a 
suicide owed its cause to a ‘derangement’ of ‘intellects’.  However, it was also 
an explanation that circumvented inevitable questions about bankrupts’ 
business practices and speculations.  Following Chiswell’s death Nantes was 
clearly sensing that responsibility was being attributed to him and he defended 
himself to Marian: ‘God knows that I freely forgive the invectives launched out 
against me in the world, knowing myself to be innocent.’  In much of the rest of 
his letter to Marian Hastings Nantes insisted that, had he been allowed by Mrs 
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Chiswell’s legal advisers to employ the Muilman Chiswell’s ‘immense personal 
property’ as ‘collateral security’, then ‘the house would have been able to stand 
it’s ground’, and Marian Hastings would not have been a ‘sufferer’ and her 
money would not have been ‘not now existing’.917 This was again the bankrupt’s 
argument that they were in fact solvent, and that it was the actions of others in 
refusing credit and security that finally brought down their edifice. 
The suicide of high-profile bankrupts like Chiswell drew considerable attention 
in the press, and reporting was often quite graphic.  Was the failure of ‘the 
House’ the cause of Chiswell’s suicide? The press attempted to explain 
Chiswell’s conduct, for example, the Gentleman’s Magazine explained that his 
suicide ‘was occasioned by a chain of unsuccessful speculations on West-
Indian estates’.918 The implication being that failed speculations and bankruptcy 
explained suicides.  They also tried to explain events in terms of madness.  The 
Gentleman’s Magazine continued that after Chiswell had ‘discharged a brace of 
balls from a pistol through his head’, that close to his body a note was found 
‘penned in a very confused way, and as by one greatly agitated in mind’.919 By 
taking his life Chiswell did not have to answer to the commissioners or suffer 
further public scrutiny, and he may have believed that he could in some sense 
take his liabilities with him into eternity.  His family would have needed a 
coroner’s verdict of lunacy (non compos mentis) to avoid a finding of felo de se 
(rational suicide or ‘self-murder’ as contemporaries called it).920 However, 
Chiswell would not have protected his family from the creditors nor really 
evaded bankruptcy even in death, for as one legal writer had already observed 
earlier in the century, ‘that Statute which gives Continuance to the Commission 
when the Bankrupt dies, makes it all one, as if the Bankrupt died not; for though 
he be dead, yet as to this Purpose he is still taken to be living’.921 These deaths 
caught the public’s attention, but on the basis of the cases in this study, suicides 
as an immediate response to the shock of bankruptcy, were very much the 
exception rather than the norm. 
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This distressing period when traders first broke and the shock was absorbed, or 
not, was soon superseded by the stage which was experienced as a kind of 
‘purgatory’ because of its uncertain duration.  In this time fresh anxieties 
awaited traders.  These fears were generated by new pressures: impatient 
creditors who did not wish to be governed by commissions and who preferred 
actions in the courts; the knowledge that bankruptcy commission and lawyers’ 
fees were eating up their estates; and the anxiety about obtaining a certificate of 
conformity.  During this time bankrupts and their families had to survive without 
their homes and possessions, without financial assets or the means to carry on 
their trade and support their families.  While they waited for the often-elusive 
certificate there was no certainty as to when they would be freed from the 
constraints that caused them so much of their anxiety.  John Brickdale survived 
the shock of his inevitable bankruptcy in November 1819, yet the pressures 
continued.  In February of the next year while he waited for news of 
developments, he related to his solicitor, Robert Beadon, that he was 
‘[h]arrassed and almost worn out with suspense’.922 Anxiety was identified as 
the direct consequence of the bankruptcy process in another letter to Beadon, 
he wrote: ‘My anxiety is most acute about the certificate upon which my whole 
future destiny depends’.923 Such a statement reveals the pressure the need for 
the certificate exercised over bankrupts. 
Bankrupt soap manufacturer William Everhard Von Doornik was, at the 
beginning of 1807, enmeshed in a web of obligations to different individuals and 
in writing to a solicitor to ask for financial assistance he expressed his concern 
that if one of the individuals were ‘put to expenses’ it would ‘destroy my peace 
of mind’.924 It was not untypical for bankrupts to describe their states of health in 
their correspondence with the commission solicitors.  For example, on 18 March 
1807 Von Doornik, who was holed up off Leicester Square and in need of £10, 
opened his letter to the solicitor Mr Abbot confessing: ‘I have been obliged 
these two days to take medical assistance finding myself much indisposed’.  
Von Doornik was caught between a legal action that involved a ‘trial’ (possibly in 
Chancery) and the proceedings of his bankruptcy commission.  Such 
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circumstances may well have been enough to undermine his health.  He closed 
his letter to Abbot declaring: ‘I should wish for heaven’s sake to see my present 
situation altered I fear it will break my heart at last’.925  
The ambiguous broken heart (for was it in the end mind or body that suffered 
most deeply the consequences of debt and failure?) had long been invoked in 
narratives of debt. Fatal consequences of long-term anxiety about debt had 
been recorded a century earlier by William Stout in regard to the death of his 
master in 1698.  Stout wrote: 
his circumstances became so burdensome to him that he daily expected 
to be made a prisoner.  Which, with the shame of forfeiting his former 
reputation, it drew him into despair and broke his heart, so that he kept to 
his house some time and dyed for grief and shame…926 
Von Doornik did not die but lived to become a bankrupt yet again in 1810.  He 
was during the following years once more immersed in litigation which 
continued to take its toll on him and family.  In a deposition sworn at Serjeants’ 
Inn in Chancery Lane in May 1814 he declared his wife was ‘ill and in bed’, and 
that ‘both himself and Family are in the greatest Distress’.927 Edmund 
Townsend, also mired in protracted disputes and whose long wait for an end to 
his bankruptcy was discussed in the previous chapter, wanted to campaign to 
reform the bankrupt laws and for his own case to be reviewed, but was 
hampered in his efforts due to ‘Ill health and other adverse circumstances’.928 
Again in 1817 he complained about how the extended process he was trapped 
in, including ‘petitioning the Court of Chancery as a pauper’, ‘so injured his 
health’.929 
The post-bankruptcy period could be long, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
and it could be unhappy and unhealthy. Where the sources tell us, we can see 
the subjects in this study faring differently in the months, and sometimes years, 
that followed the initial shock of bankruptcy.  There is evidence that this stage of 
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the experience came to an end and was followed by new and changed lives.  
What were these lives like after bankruptcy? 
 
8.5 Beyond bankruptcy 
On many subjects in this study, once their commissions ended or fizzled out, 
historical records are hard to find.  Even where we do know something of 
bankrupts’ afterlives, far more is not known than is known.  In the 1790s Le 
Mesurier, as related above, successfully turned his misfortune around after 
being placed in advantageous employment by an obliging patron.  Other 
subjects, for example Joseph and Elizabeth Fry, who are discussed further 
below, led well-documented lives for years after Joseph’s bankruptcy in 1828.  
The path of many others is less clear. 
The arguably infamous Alexander Fordyce, for example, lived another 
seventeen years after the disastrous failure of his bank.  Despite his 
circumstances no longer being those of a prosperous banker, he was still 
married to the daughter of the 5th Earl of Balcarres.  According to Mrs Thrale, 
Fordyce and his wife ‘were luckily Scotch people, so had a Pension settled 
upon them on which they now live, and face the World with a Degree of 
Confidence’.930 Despite the damage to his reputation in the 1770s Fordyce still 
attempted for the second time, without success, to be elected Member of 
Parliament for Colchester.931 In the years before his death in 1789 he seemed 
to fade from view.  Elizabeth Sheridan, having spotted Fordyce’s wife driving 
about Tunbridge Wells, wrote to her sister in 1785 observing, ‘I have not been 
able to learn even where he is’.932 
By the 1770s Thomas Pyott was finally helped out of his difficulties by his 
relative Sir Robert Burdett who gave him a place to live on his estate.  The twice 
widower Burdett, did not contemplate a third marriage, and wished Pyott and 
family ‘would think of no other Home’.  Wrote Pyott: ‘My little Establishment 
consisting of my Wife, maid Servant, Self, and little black Dog of the true King 
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Charles breed, were now fixed at Sir Robert Burdett’s’.933 The idyll with Burdett 
did not last due to servants’ gossiping about Burdett keeping Pyott and wife ‘out 
of Charity’.934 He again fell back on his father-in-law’s support.  Pyott enthused 
one last time: 
Now my Friend, you will think that my hopes and fears; all those anxious 
hours of dependant fortune are terminated in a fixed abode with a Father, 
whose happy independence I may succeed to.  An excellent House, a 
pleasant situation, an agreeable country surrounding, a sociable 
neighbourhood, inhabited by men of Letters and of Manners; all 
contributing to the real and adorned pleasures of Life.935 
Reading between the quite wide lines this was still dependence, but evidently 
Pyott was able to reconcile the bitter pill with the fact that family connections 
had secured him a modestly genteel life, which was clearly important to him.  
Pyott of course narrowly evaded bankruptcy which had the downside that 
despite his retreat to ‘a pleasant situation’ in a ‘sociable neighbourhood’ he got 
a letter from a creditor now and then.936 There is no indication that he ever 
returned to trade or would have wanted to revisit what had been an unhappy 
experience judging by some of the final words in his memoir: ‘Here ends all my 
anxious Hours and constant oppression of mind whenever I reflected on my 
Transactions in Trade and the Balance that then subsisted against me’.  Pyott 
declared that his mother’s legacy was gone ‘and all other Property I was ever 
possessed of to this day; for then I am called to the Great account…’937 
Matthew and John Brickdale’s post-bankruptcy experience was long and 
complicated and the detail is beyond the scope of this study.  They were 
survivors, if in reduced circumstances.  Despite the bankruptcy in 1819 Matthew 
lived another twelve years reaching the age of 96.938 His son John, who shortly 
before his bankruptcy had procured himself the position of ‘Comptrollership of 
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the Customs’ at the port of Bristol and having obtained his certificate quickly, 
was able to live upon this employment.939 He died in Bristol in 1840 aged 81.940 
Another bankrupt from this study, Joseph Brasbridge, was able to resume trade 
and later to retire in 1819 and write his autobiography The Fruits of Experience, 
which usefully included an account of his experience of bankruptcy. 
Having failed in banking, two of Andover’s three Wakeford brothers (William and 
Robert) acquitted themselves modestly well becoming wine merchants in 
Southampton.  Joseph Wakeford, however, would seem to have continued less 
happily.  Having settled in Devon he did not re-enter business and money was 
tight leading to ‘difficulties and unpleasantness’.941 Joseph was the eldest 
brother and would have been approaching 40 at the time of the bankruptcy.  For 
discharged bankrupts to return to trade was not considered by some an easy 
prospect, especially where age was a factor.  On this matter ‘Nomius 
Antinomos’ wrote: 
the undesigning, truly unfortunate man, whose only fault is having too 
long struggled with adversity, and too much weakened himself in the 
contest, to which he was ashamed to yield, is often left destitute of 
friends (for them perhaps he has already used) and of credit: for without 
friends to speak for him, a man, perhaps, advanced in years, finds a self-
recommendation to the world very hard.942 
An offer of future assistance was made to Wiltshire linen draper David Kennedy, 
who was probably in his late thirties at least by the time of his bankruptcy.  In 
the early stages of bankruptcy, he received overtures about being subsequently 
helped back into trade.  One of his major creditors wrote to him while he was 
still being held in gaol and told him: 
I always took you for an honest man and I hope I shall always find you 
so[. T]his method that I propose is the likeliest way to make your 
composition the larger, which will be a means of your getting fresh credit 
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when you begin business again.  If I find you acted with honour and 
honesty I will assist you hereafter.943 
However, we do not know what became of Kennedy and whether he was 
helped to set up in business again in the manner intimated above.  Other 
bankrupts neither returned to trade nor satisfactorily relaunched themselves in 
new employments, although there were things that they tried their hands at.  
The eighteenth century in England saw many traders who had previously been 
bankrupts simply set up as attorneys, which was cause for some complaint in 
the legal profession.944 One bankrupt desperate for a living who attempted a 
similar path was the ever-resourceful Edmund Townsend who chose to put his 
own bad experience to good purpose when he advertised at the Antigallican 
Coffee House in Threadneedle Street.  His notice offered ‘his advice and 
services to Merchants, Manufacturers or Traders, whose affairs may be in any 
manner deranged’, as well as advice with accounts and drawing up 
agreements.  He was to be remunerated ‘upon terms adapted to the nature and 
extent of the concerns and the means of the parties’.945 We do not know if 
Townsend ever eked out a living from trading in his experience. 
Other London bankrupts seemed to quietly slip away from attention in the 
capital.  After attending examinations in the Spring of 1797, the subsequent life 
of the late Muilman Chiswell’s partner Henry Nantes remains opaque.  His wife 
Marianne died in 1800 in Battersea.946 However, it is unclear exactly when he 
removed to the Isle of Man, but there he remained for as long as a decade 
marrying twice as well as fathering an illegitimate child.947 Exactly when or how 
he came to leave the Isle of Man is not clear, but from the early 1810s and until 
at least 1822 Nantes was the tenant of Kenwith Lodge, which was according to 
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an advertisement a desirable residence near Bideford in North Devon.948 This 
researcher has failed to find evidence of Nantes ever obtaining his certificate, 
but one of his son’s school register enters him in the mid-1820s as ‘merchant’ of 
Bideford.  It is conceivable therefore that he may have obtained his certificate, 
which meant he could abandon the Isle of Man and trade again in mainland 
England free from the possibility of arrest for past debts.949 
Although in London the bankruptcy commission issued against Nantes and 
Muilman Chiswell in 1797 ground on, there is little evidence that it any longer 
impinged on a (possibly) discharged bankrupt’s new provincial life.  A letter 
received in January 1819 inquiring about a sum of £62,000 did not seem to 
cause Nantes any disquiet.  The letter was sent by Richard Dann who had been 
solicitor to the commission in 1797 inquiring about the sum owed to Mrs Marian 
Hastings.  Dann declared, ‘from the length of time which has elapsed since the 
Commission issued I have entirely forgotten the circumstances under which the 
debt had originated’.  Nantes answered, ‘I lose no time in replying’ and 
explained that Mrs Hastings’ money had been invested ‘in the 3 perC 
consolidated bank annuities’.  He also informed Dann: ‘My son Daniel will be in 
Town next week’, which raised the possibility of further liaison with Dann over 
the matter, but no specifics were stated.950 However, the short letter to Dann 
does not suggest a bankrupt still oppressed by his circumstances.  More than 
twenty years after the death of Muilman Chiswell, and despite his words to 
Marian Hastings in February of 1797, it is difficult to get a sense of whether 
Nantes really carried with him any sense of responsibility or regret for the death 
of Chiswell, or any other matters.  It is easier to know bankrupts’ experience 
during their bankruptcies, but much harder to know their reflections in the 
subsequent years.  These were some of the quieter afterlives of bankrupts.  For 
others the years that followed their bankruptcies brought further tragedies, as 
was the case for the Latham family. 
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Bankrupt brewer John Latham of Romsey in Hampshire had become a bankrupt 
in December 1817.  He obtained his certificate within a couple of months.951 
However, five years later he was dead by his own hand.  According to the 
Morning Post of 22 October 1822 he discharged ‘a pistol, loaded with ball, into 
his mouth…literally blowing his brains out’.  The act was explained as ‘a sudden 
fit of derangement’, and the county coroner and jury returned a verdict of 
‘Lunacy’.952 There is possibly another explanation and that is that the deceits 
Latham perpetrated upon his ‘renowned’ ornithologist father to obtain the 
money necessary to stay afloat weighed upon him in the years following his 
bankruptcy.  The once wealthy Dr Latham was effectively ruined by his son.953 
In the absence of Latham the younger’s own reflections on his state of mind 
post-bankruptcy, it is impossible to explain his choice.  It does show, however, 
that across the long eighteenth century suicides continued to be a response 
resorted to by a minority after major financial failures, which of course for them 
were also personal failures.  Latham’s death did not fit the more established 
‘defenestrating’ trope in which bankrupts immediately took their lives, like 
Chiswell, upon learning of their losses. 
At this point it has to be observed that the greater part of this chapter has been 
about the experience of Georgian men and the things and attributes they lost as 
a result of bankruptcy; and also, whether they were able to re-establish 
themselves in any form.  However, this account of the different forms of loss 
experienced by bankrupts is not restricted entirely to men.  Women, especially 
wives, were greatly affected in ways that went far beyond merely parting with 
the household silver.  Therefore, the final section seeks to remedy this deficit 
with an account of how a bankrupt’s wife, namely Elizabeth Fry, experienced 
loss. 
 
8.6 A sense of loss: Elizabeth Fry, a bankrupt’s wife 
At the centre of most bankrupts’ experience was the family home.  This was not 
simply because their ‘dwelling house’ was often structurally part of the same 
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building in which, or from which, their trade was conducted, but because the 
dwelling house, or the dwelling parts of the house, were the private spaces that 
were so often first assailed by creditors, and then often completely and 
permanently lost to the bankrupt and family. 
Most of the bankruptcy records and related source material examined for this 
study tell us little to nothing about how bankrupts and their families felt about 
losing the personal and domestic aspects of their home.  Fortunately for the 
purposes of this study, a sense of place and a sense of loss was expressed by 
Elizabeth Fry through her experience of her husband Joseph’s bankruptcy.  His 
bank had failed, and he was declared a bankrupt in November 1828.  The Fry 
family were obliged to give up spacious and comfortable Plashet House in East 
Ham, which was then a pastoral environment outside London.  Elizabeth Fry 
recorded her reflections as she experienced change over the months in which 
her family’s home, and home life, was dismantled.  In her journal Elizabeth 
barely mentioned the proceedings of the bankruptcy commission issued against 
her husband and focussed almost entirely on the direct consequences for her 
private, and to a lesser extent, public experience. 
She knew in November 1828 that her life was going to change and that much of 
the way of life and the comforts and many of the possessions that had 
surrounded her were about to be lost.  On 25 November she reflected: ‘How 
[striking] to look round upon many things and not know that I can call one thing 
my own (except my children) houses, lands, furniture [+/etc] [well] if it be the 
Lord, let him do as seemeth him good!’.954 On 27 November she wrote to her 
daughter Rachel saying, ‘parting with servants, the poor around us, schools, 
and our dear Place.  These things overwhelm me; indeed I think naturally I have 
a very acute sense of sorrow’.955 
She experienced the evaporation of all boundaries around her and her family’s 
home while the expropriation of their private and personal space and 
possessions took place.  Whilst still residing at Plashet in early December 1828 
Elizabeth wrote in her journal: 
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Here I am in my own room expecting an officer who is going round the 
house to take an inventory of all that we possess for our creditors.  
Another about the grounds and taking an account of all that we have 
there.  Another in another part of the house watching over the rest of our 
property – So it is but after all it is a trial that goes but to a certain extent, 
houses, lands, possessions.  If all be gone…956 
Her journal lapsed quickly back into prayer.  Although her resignation to 
providence helped her to accept events, she still experienced a sense of loss as 
a result of the change to her and her family’s material and financial 
circumstances, and events had an effect on Elizabeth’s mood.  She would write 
later of ‘her low spirits and depression’.957 
While still at Plashet on 16 December 1828 she recorded: ‘I continue in the low 
valley, and naturally feel too much, leaving this sweet home, but not being well 
makes my spirits more weak than usual.’ Although, her religious belief told her 
how she should understand and accept the loss of things to which she was 
attached, she still found the experience difficult.  She expressed her willingness 
‘to give up whatever is required of me, and in all things patiently submit to the 
will of God’, yet she confessed and was somewhat uncomfortable ‘to find how 
much I cleave to some earthly things – health, ease, places, possessions’.958 
However, what she had to give up at Plashet was far from merely material; it 
was also a way of life which included patron-client relationships.  Of this time 
her daughters later wrote: ‘With leaving Plashet came much that was sad – 
uprooting habits, long-formed tastes and local associations, parting with 
servants, and leaving many old pensioners and dependants.’959 
On finally leaving Plashet, Elizabeth and family were installed at her son John’s 
City home in Mildred’s Court, Poultry.  Of this relocation her daughters recalled 
that: ‘It was no easy thing to arrange for a very large family party, accustomed 
to country habits, and liberty of space, when confined to a city dwelling; and that 
under circumstances of such peculiar pain.’960 
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During this time Elizabeth wrote repeatedly about ‘place’.  For her, ‘place’ was a 
focus of loss, although sometimes it was the loss of convenience that she felt.  
She wrote: 
We are remaining in this place with John, Rachel and their children until 
there is some opening for having a settled home in some place.  It is 
certainly a striking event at this period of our lives to have to seek a 
home and to have experienced as we have our outward prospects to be 
broken up and to leave places that have given us so much pleasure.961 
Elizabeth did not start her 1829 journal until March, attributing the delay to ‘the 
numerous interruptions to which I am liable in this place’.  It was a place where 
she meant to remain only ‘until there is some opening for having a settled 
home’.962 When at last a permanent home was found to replace Plashet and the 
final move from Plashet was in progress Elizabeth recorded again the absolute 
sense of loss that the experience of bankruptcy had caused her: 
We are in the midst of moving from this most commodious long loved 
home, it to my mind partakes of the nature of a funeral and most strongly 
brings home to me the time when our places here will know us no more 
on this side the grave – I have such deep interesting associations 
attached to almost every thing about us that it certainly is a great change 
and a real trial…963 
She went on to affirm that she was resigned to bear the ‘great changes’ with 
patience declaring: ‘The Lord giveth and the Lord taketh away’.964 Clearly, 
Elizabeth Fry, partly because she was Elizabeth Fry, deferred to providence.  
However, again and again she acknowledged that she felt the material loss. 
Elizabeth and family were finally settled at The Cedars at Upton, a property 
belonging to her brother Samuel Gurney, and next door to his own grander Ham 
House.965 Elizabeth was determined to come to terms with their reduced 
circumstances and in June 1829 declared, ‘Place is a matter of small 
importance’ and ‘I may say although a large garden is not my portion I feel 
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pleasure in having even a small one’.966 She was on the one hand thankful, but 
on the other she still lamented ‘the extreme disorder our things have been got 
into by all our changes, the pain of leaving Plashet, the difficulty of making new 
arrangements has at times worried and tried me.  But I trust that it will please a 
kind Providence to bless my endeavours to have and keep my house in 
order’.967 Although Elizabeth recorded that they were comfortable at The 
Cedars, the process of adapting to the loss of Plashet was not without recurring 
regret and she wrote on 25 June 1829: ‘We are now still more settled into our 
new habitation which is comfortable and much better than we deserve.  The 
principal things that I miss are space in the garden in walking about and the 
retirement of that dear home’.  She conceded, however, that under the 
circumstances their present abode was ‘the right place’.968 There is a sense in 
Elizabeth Fry’s thought that ‘place’ for her in this context was also a social 
place, a new station in life, that under the circumstances was deserved by her 
family because they had erred. 
As can be seen from the examples above, Elizabeth returned in her thoughts 
again and again to the loss of Plashet.  Although it was only one of a number of 
losses that her husband’s bankruptcy caused, it clearly had an impact on 
Elizabeth that went far beyond the mere financial.  In October 1829 unexpected 
events called Elizabeth back to Plashet.  The dwelling houses of bankrupts 
were not usually left empty, even if they were destined to be sold by the 
assignees.  Either a bankrupt and family were allowed to stay for a period, or a 
trusted person was installed in the house.  A woman known to Elizabeth ‘who 
had charge of the house’ was suddenly taken ill and died.  Elizabeth travelled to 
Plashet and, arriving in the evening, encountered the doubly painful experience 
of loss by returning to behold what once had been hers, and was no longer.  Of 
her return to her former home, she later recorded: 
It was different.  I arrived there after dark, drove once more into the dear 
old place – no one to meet me but the poor man who lived in the house, 
no dog to bark, nor any life nor sound, as used to be.  Death seemed 
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over the place, such was the silence – until I found myself up stairs in the 
large, and once cheerful and full house…969 
Bankruptcy did not only give rise to loss of property and social status it could 
have an impact beyond a bankrupt’s local trade and social milieu, or that of his 
or her immediate family. The account of loss given by Elizabeth above related 
to her internal and private experience.  She of course also had had a very public 
life before the bankruptcy, and this was also subject to change.  Elizabeth Fry 
had been active in the prison reform movement, but her husband’s bankruptcy, 
whilst not completely halting her activities, meant she lost her leading role.  She 
had also been a prominent member of the Quaker community and inevitably 
many Quakers were creditors of her husband’s bank. 
At the beginning of September 1829 Elizabeth was hoping to attend Quaker 
meetings in Suffolk, but 
as some of the largest creditors of our bank lived at Ipswich and some of 
these friends who I highly esteemed and who I thought esteemed me 
and who I truly love some of them particularly I thought it safer to write to 
them to know whether the affecting events in our family would render my 
visit unacceptable to them fully expecting in reply that however they 
might express themselves hurt by those in the bank that they would in 
Christian love want to receive me as having been a sufferer as well as 
themselves, instead of which the answer was very discouraging 
expressing [a] desire not to [hinder] the right thing, but they all felt in 
reference to the late affecting circumstances there are some things 
difficult to reconcile no doubt alluding to myself.  This has certainly given 
me real pain and brought me very low… I could not but say to myself 
what a change!  A family that used to be so glad to see me, so warm in 
pressing me to their houses and not even the least hint of a wish for my 
company… Taking me in a low and fatigued state I have no doubt made 
me feel it more – My [sober?] mind upon it now is not to be too much 
cast down…’ 970 
 
969 Fry and Cresswell, Life of Elizabeth Fry, II, p. 57. 





Because of her husband’s bankruptcy Elizabeth had not only lost her respected 
position amongst the ‘Friends’, but she had also lost friends.  A glance at the 
passage above in Elizabeth’s hand in her manuscript journal suggests a person 
much affected by the things they are relating.  As she expressed her thoughts 
on this part of her experience, she covered several pages in the journal with 
little punctuation and barely discernible breaks.  The outer public experience 
had caused her a private and inner experience, one which she chose to set 
down directly onto the page.  She felt an injustice in her treatment and 
lamented: 
I may have appeared to do wrong to others in some things where I really 
have not done it but from the very peculiar nature of my circumstances 
have been blamed for things that I was perfectly innocent of and 
therefore cannot clear myself without implicating others therefore 
perhaps had better leave it.  I did not ask the [monthly meeting] for a 
minute because I did not think it right to do it while such friends thought 
[some] things in my conduct difficult to reconcile – for so I understand the 
dear friends letter.971 
Because of his bankruptcy Joseph Fry lost his ‘membership’ of the Society of 
Friends. This was because bankruptcy was reason for disownment in Quaker 
society and was considered a sin on a par with excessive drinking, dishonesty 
and adultery.  A disowned ‘Friend’, who would be in disgrace, was not permitted 
to be present at business meetings or to participate in the Society’s decision 
making, although they were still allowed to worship in meetings.  Reinstatement 
was only possible after public apology for their errors.972 Elizabeth wrote in 
March 1829: ‘Our time of trial continues – Now it [comes near] to the [peril?] I 
feel the prospect of my husband’s disownment very much.  It is strikingly a cut 
down to our family in so many ways’.  She found one ‘friend and his wife greatly 
raised in life and he insisting my husband as a delinquent!’. From the various 
comments in her journal Elizabeth was clearly very unhappy about the 
disdainful manner of some of the ‘Friends’. 973 According to Janet Whitney, 
Joseph Fry was ‘cast out unjustly’.  Not only he but Elizabeth bitterly felt the 
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blow to pride and even to self-respect’.974 In the 1830s Joseph Fry started to 
keep a journal, and in his entry for 14 May 1837 he declared: 
Our Monthly Meeting, which had disowned me (not I think on sound or at 
all just grounds) at the time of our failure in 1828, my honour or 
uprightness never having been even called in question or ground given, 
has, during the past year, re-instated me in membership.  I apprehended 
it my duty to apply for it…975 
The reconciliation of the Frys with the Society of Friends was not an easy 
process.   Because of the treatment of their parents, gradually all but one of the 
Fry children left the Society.976 Although Joseph Fry got his certificate fairly 
promptly and was able to return to business (but not banking) he was marked 
by the experience of bankruptcy.  In Whitney’s words: ‘Something that belonged 
to his essential self was killed, and never raised its head again.’977 Despite the 
bankruptcy in the 1830s Elizabeth Fry was able to continue her prison reform 
and philanthropic work.978 There is a certain irony in that Elizabeth Fry and her 
brother Joseph John Gurney had visited many debtors in prisons in England in 
1819, yet little did Elizabeth know that less than a decade later she and her 
husband would become sorts of debtor themselves.  Her concerns on those 
visits were for the imprisoned debtors’ conditions, rather than how they came to 
be there (i.e. law of imprisonment for debt).  Her concerns specifically 
addressed space and ‘comfort’ for the debtors, issues which emerged later in 
her own experience, in a very distant sense, of being a bankrupt’s wife.979 
The reader may question to what extent Elizabeth Fry can ever represent the 
experience of a typical bankrupt’s wife, or a bankrupt woman, or indeed a 
bankrupt man.  Born into the Gurney banking family, she had only ever known 
privilege and once the dust had settled from Joseph Fry’s bankruptcy, she only 
had to adjust to modestly reduced circumstances owing to generous family 
support.  Nevertheless, I argue that the sentiments she expressed about the 
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loss of things, places, and relationships were the kind of sentiments that could 
plausibly have been felt and expressed by any person subject to the same 
experience, even if from within more modest circumtances.  Most of the 
subjects in this study lost possessions and property and probably experienced 
loss in similar ways to Elizabeth Fry, they just did not record the experience in a 
journal that we can read. 
 
8.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has emphasised how different aspects of loss were integral to the 
experience of bankrupts in the long eighteenth century.  Money and property 
were only a part of what they lost.  Bankrupts and their families lost many more 
things that they valued: status, public roles, homes, comforts and valued 
possessions.  Some lost their health, temporarily or permanently.  Some, by 
their own hand, lost their lives. 
Three related factors impacted negatively on bankrupts’ health: the cumulative 
effect of constant anxiety about money; the shocks and distress resulting from 
sudden losses or suddenly becoming bankrupts; and finally, a combination of 
the former along with all the reputational and identity pressures.  Bankrupts’ 
health, in both mind and body, bore the repercussions of constant anxiety which 
was greatly exacerbated by the experience of loss of control over just about 
every aspect of their lives.  In describing their mental and physical symptoms 
bankrupts were trying to draw attention to what they believed to be the objective 
consequences upon them of what they considered to be the harsh and unjust 
interpretations and practices that the English bankrupt laws permitted and by 
which many bankrupts were trapped for sometimes protracted periods. 
Regarding the extreme outcomes after bankruptcy, bankrupts clearly did not kill 
themselves simply because they had become bankrupts.  Society did not 
expect it of them, but neither was society surprised when they did.  Although 
coroners’ verdicts were usually ‘lunacy’ (a diagnosis which today we would give 
a variety of different names), they took their own lives because of a fatal 
combination of factors, such as the various forms of loss discussed above, and 





It would be hard to make an argument for bankrupts’ lives being naturally 
shortened as a result of the cumulative effect of anxiety over their financial 
situation, or as Defoe put it being ‘harass’d and tormented for money’.980 The 
case studies suggest that the more common bodily consequences of worries 
about debt and bankruptcy endured while the difficulties lasted.  There is 
evidence for bankrupts recovering from their failures and living to ages that 
belie any notion that in the long eighteenth century debt and failure must 
necessarily have brought on an early demise.  What we know little of are 
bankrupts’ subsequent lives which were neither abruptly ended nor happily 


























Bankrupts, real or fictive, were ubiquitous in eighteenth-century English society, 
but they did not constitute a social group because as individuals they were too 
socially diverse and geographically dispersed.  However, what bankrupts did 
have in common with one another was their experience: that of being subject to 
bankruptcy proceedings, losing everything and having to make their lives anew.  
To become a bankrupt was a real prospect that hung over the lives of large 
numbers of the English middling sort who were engaged in trade.  Word of 
mouth, the press and publications, and increasingly popular novels, meant that 
contemporaries knew what it was like to be a bankrupt.  This knowledge 
exacerbated their fear of bankruptcy.  For some there was no need to ‘hear’ 
about it, as they experienced being bankrupts firsthand.  However, this common 
experience of people in the eighteenth century has been largely forgotten with 
only the more ‘technical’ discussions of bankruptcy being included in the 
historiography. 
Because of this historiographical gap I have, in so far as possible, endeavoured 
to tell the stories of bankrupts and not the story of bankruptcy, although this 
account of bankrupts has only been possible by building on solid pre-existing 
scholarship on debt and bankruptcy.  Therefore, this study has: firstly, identified 
information about bankrupts so that we may have greater acquaintance with 
them; and secondly, related and analysed their experience as bankrupts.  
Knowing more about bankrupts and exactly what their experience was like 
matters because by doing so we can gain more insight into why narratives of 
disaster played on the minds of so many members of the English middling sort 
and caused them so much anxiety.  Eighteenth-century people did not even 
need to become bankrupts to be distressed, the thought of it was enough.  
Furthermore, the experience of becoming a bankrupt was always to a greater or 
lesser degree public, with bankrupts being cast as either villains or victims.  Of 
course, most were neither one thing nor the other, but fell haphazardly between 






In order to really know who English bankrupts were and what they were like this 
study has brought together a diverse body of historical evidence which, whilst 
still being a collection of snapshots, opens a window on the forgotten 
experience of so many financially afflicted individuals in the long eighteenth 
century.  An important part of the process of carrying out this research has been 
the cross referencing of contemporary insolvency and bankruptcy literature with 
the lived experiences of real bankrupts; thus, it has been possible to show how 
the bankrupt laws were implemented ‘on the ground’, and how individuals 
reacted to and interacted with them, therefore contributing to our understanding 
of how this branch of civil law actually affected the lives of indebted people in 
the long eighteenth century.  The study has also shed light on the roles and 
interactions of obscure actors in insolvency actions, such as commission 
solicitors, messengers, and sheriff’s officers. 
Although this study is concerned with bankrupts rather than the more frequently 
studied occupants of debtors’ prisons, an unexpected conclusion of this study is 
that the boundaries between imprisonment for debt and bankruptcy were far 
more blurred and overlapping than is often assumed.  For many members of the 
English middling sort there was a fine line between becoming an insolvent 
debtor in prison and a bankrupt at relative liberty.  The case studies here have 
made it very clear that the mere possibility of imprisonment was frequently the 
catalyst for bankruptcy proceedings to be initiated.  Moreover, the many 
accounts in the preceding chapters of bankrupts’ negative experience should 
also have shown that becoming a bankrupt was not, relative to imprisonment, a 
soft option solely for the wealthier sort of trader, but that it was an unpleasant 
and feared prospect for a wide spectrum of English people in the long 
eighteenth century.  We have also seen bankrupts (Brigstock, Kennedy) in the 
absence of sound legal advice and the right sort of friends, having their 
expectations of what bankruptcy would mean for them frustrated.  It was often 
bankrupts’ attempts at interpreting what they had been told about the 
constraints and demands of the bankrupt laws that led them to bungle matters, 
typically acts of bankruptcy, and consequently to fall foul of the law. 
With the exception of the failed speculators (Fordyce, Nantes) precise reasons 
for bankruptcy such as poor bookkeeping or bad business practices rarely 





constant influence on all traders across the period of this study and there were 
some common factors in the causes of their failures.  We know that major 
factors in the long eighteenth century, principally wars, caused credit squeezes.  
These negatively impacted on the large speculators as much as the small 
traders, undermining their solvency.  Creditors, who had to satisfy demands 
from their own creditors, were also affected by contractions in credit and so they 
were more likely to call for the prompt payment of debts.  Nevertheless, this still 
does not explain individual failures. 
There is evidence in this study that traders were in fact sometimes not insolvent 
or failing.  They, or their friends, did not consider they were failing, but a single 
creditor rendered them insolvent by demanding settlement of a debt when they 
did not have sufficient liquidity (Clay, Brigstock, Brickdale, William James, 
Slade).  A creditor’s threat to imprison, or indeed actually attempting it, triggered 
a resort to bankruptcy.  It was often creditors’ behaviour that surfaced in the 
explanations and complaints of bankrupts.  Relations between bankrupts and 
these creditors were invariably poor.  The story of bankrupts’ failure in this study 
is above all about the breakdown of relationships over money rather than 
impersonal economic and financial factors.  Bankrupts’ fear of being imprisoned 
by a hostile creditor, or the fears of groupings of their more restrained creditors 
that a single creditor might gain advantage over the rest of them, were the 
factors that precipitated the issuing of bankruptcy commissions.  Friendly 
groups of creditors effectively protected bankrupts from hostile creditors, which 
demonstrated the importance of friends to survival in an often hostile credit 
environment. 
Family relationships also mattered a lot to bankrupts.  Family were crucial in 
cushioning bankrupts’ fall and protecting them from poverty.  Furthermore, as 
family members were often important creditors, they were sometimes able to 
position themselves as assignees in order to protect bankrupt estates from 
hostile non-family creditors and thus protect the wealth of the wider family 
network.  A friendly commission run by a bankrupt’s relatives (Harding, Latham, 
Lodge) was not only infinitely preferable to imprisonment by a hostile creditor, it 
was preferable to an unfriendly commission run by hostile assignees (Scott, 
Townsend).  Where bonds with family and friends were strong, and if enough 





comfortable and satisfactory recovery was more likely.  This study has also 
shown that when family and friends were opposed to a bankrupt, or just absent, 
matters went much harder (Brickdale, Slade, Townsend).  Evidence in this 
study suggests that despite the development of more ‘institutional’ and less 
personal types of financial entities and ‘services’ like the private banks of the 
later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when major financial problems 
were experienced it was still family and friends that provided financial support 
and places of refuge.  Indeed, the bankers themselves had to turn to family for 
assistance and protection from poverty (Fry), although bankers’ families were 
not always obliging or patient (Brickdale). 
Women bankrupts were relatively few in number compared to men.  
Nevertheless, in this study two bankrupts are women (the widows Anne Scott 
and Ann Harding).  Scott and Harding took active roles in their bankruptcies and 
did not leave all matters to male relatives or lawyers.  Anne Scott took the very 
public action of publishing a pamphlet challenging the actions of the male 
assignees of her bankrupt estate.  In this study we have also seen bankrupts’ 
wives not being passive ‘victims’ of misfortune but rather taking action on behalf 
of their husbands and families.  Bankruptcy was clearly not a matter that only 
concerned and involved men.  For example, we have seen that a bankrupt’s 
wife, Anne Brickdale, corresponded with and met the commission solicitor while 
her husband was in hiding.  Other wives, again in the absence of their 
husbands, dealt with insistent creditors.  Nevertheless, despite the scarcity of 
evidence either way, the probability is still that many bankrupts’ wives 
experienced bankruptcy privately and unhappily in the confines of their 
diminishing domestic spaces.  Elizabeth Fry’s inner reflections are testimony to 
this aspect of the wider family experience of bankruptcy.  Yet she also entered 
very public spaces where, despite being clearly identified as a bankrupt’s wife 
and suffering some opprobrium for it, she continued her religious and 
philanthropic activities. 
The experience of bankrupts unfolded in space and over time.  This study has 
shown how a variety of traders moved through the domestic and commercial 
spaces they habitually occupied and used, and how they responded to, tried to 
negotiate with, or simply hid from creditors in the spaces that remained 





specific public places (e.g. inns, taverns, coffee houses) we can see how these 
places were used, especially in their roles as fora for the resolution of financial 
relationships and obligations between members of the English middling sort.  
Bankrupts’ experience of these places also changed.  If they had previously 
experienced inns, taverns, and coffee houses as places of refreshment, 
association and sociability, they subsequently experienced them as places of 
process and inquiry with themselves as the objects.  Time was also central in 
bankrupts’ experience.  Bankruptcies were not simply sudden traumatic 
episodes, they were often very protracted experiences, especially if followed 
from the beginning of business and financial difficulties and then through the life 
cycle of the bankruptcy commission to when a final dividend was paid.  
Commission proceedings and the liquidation of a bankrupt estate often 
continued for years and sometimes for decades.  Commissions could exceed 
the lives of all involved and then were visited upon successor generations, 
which gave bankruptcies a somewhat gothic quality. 
In terms of what a trader might expect from their experience of being a bankrupt 
little changed over the whole period of this study (1732–1831).  There were 
adjustments to the bankrupt laws, but these would not significantly alter the 
experience.  When we look at the first case in this study (George Clay, 1739) 
and the final case (John Slade, 1830), and how similar their commissions were 
in proceedings and in the outcomes, we can conclude that both cases may as 
well have taken place in consecutive years for the difference the passage of 
almost a century made.  There were other continuities such as the critical roles 
of friends and family, the centrality of lawyers, and the acrimony between 
creditors and debtors whereby failure to meet obligations continued to be 
judged a breach of trust and a personal and moral failure, rather than the being 
the consequence of misfortunes and an adverse credit environment. 
What happened to the bankrupts of England’s long eighteenth century? Of 
course, in most cases, we do not know because they have left so few traces of 
themselves other than entries in the London Gazette.  Adam Smith declared 
bankruptcy to be the ‘greatest and most humiliating calamity’.981 But to what 
extent was it so?  This study has shown very clearly, but not surprisingly, that 
the long-term anxieties and the sudden shocks sustained by bankrupts and their 
 





families, regardless of the scale of their difficulties and losses, impacted 
negatively on their states of mind and health.  Some bankrupts and their family 
members, until their failures, had never known privations and the absence of 
comforts, and therefore their perceptions of their own misfortune and ‘poverty’ 
were relative. 
The subjects in this study varied greatly in their wealth and connections and this 
influenced their ability to recover from failure.  Some subjects probably still lived 
better after their bankruptcies than other bankrupts ever did before theirs, for 
example Fordyce (after) relative to Brigstock (before).  So even the experience 
of being a bankrupt was never a level playing field.  Nevertheless, on the basis 
of this study, even if bankruptcy did not leave all failed traders in poverty, 
bankruptcy almost guaranteed downward social mobility.  This study did not see 
any bankrupts doing better after their bankruptcies than they were doing before, 
and it was probably the enormity of their fall, rather than the relative poverty or 
‘beggary’ they experienced, that hurt bankrupts the most.  Certainly, the trope of 
the bankrupt in contemporary fiction bore some resemblance to the reality in the 
cases studied here.  But most bankrupts were far more mundane, and the study 
has only shown a few bankrupts going the way of Bunyan’s Mr Badman. 
Despite the relentless pressure and the delays, most bankrupts in this study 
cooperated with their commissions and confronted their circumstances 
repeatedly (the complaining correspondence is testimony to that).  Few took 
their lives or turned fugitive.  Clearly, there was life beyond bankruptcy and 
plenty of failed traders returned to lives that were not impoverished.  However, 
because of the difficulty of accessing new capital, few of the bankrupts in this 
study returned to their old trades.  The more competent traders were not without 
useful experience and they were able to transfer their skills from one sector to 
another.  This shows that bankruptcy forced individuals out of businesses which 
were insufficiently robust, or at which they were insufficiently competent, and 
into new situations which were either salaried employment or trades in which 
there was less opportunity for assuming major risks and therefore better 
chances of survival.  After the experience of bankruptcy, which was often 
lengthy, failed traders were older, and possibly wiser, and therefore less likely to 
engage in the same risk taking or giving and taking excessive credit.  Sadly, not 





Anne and Isaac Scott, Thomas Pyott, and Joseph Brasbridge did, so beyond 
their bankruptcies most subjects fade from view. 
This study has only examined in depth the experience of a couple of dozen 
bankrupts; and the influence and impact of some subjects on this account has 
been greater than that of others.  Hannah Barker has remarked that ‘close 
analysis of individual experiences … naturally raises issues of typicality’.982 So, 
there remains the question of the representativeness of bankrupts’ experience 
as it has been presented in this study.  I do not claim at the end of this thesis to 
have synthesised the experiences of the subjects into a single comprehensively 
representative account of the typically occurring experiences of English 
bankrupts in the long eighteenth century.  However, it is work in progress 
towards that end – more can be achieved with more research.  Now with the 
digitisation and searchability of the pages of the London Gazette a quantitative 
study is a much more viable proposition than it was when Hoppit researched 
bankruptcy in the 1980s.  It is hoped that this study has succeeded in showing 
that a qualitative history of bankrupts can be told, and that scope remains to 
combine these more personal stories of insolvents and bankrupts with the 
bigger data that a quantitative study could provide. 
Notwithstanding the further potential for broadening this research and the 
limitations of this study I argue that although the cases are not many in number 
relative to the totality of traders that became bankrupts, this study has brought 
together the experiences of a diverse group of bankrupts.  Certainly, the study 
has included some notorious London bankrupts like Alexander Fordyce, who 
can only really represent the small and somewhat perverse category of ‘elite 
bankrupts’.  Yet at the same time the study has included cases of obscure 
members of the provincial middling sort.  It is this latter sort of bankrupt who 
would blend seamlessly into any one of the weekly lists of bankrupts that 
graced the pages of the London Gazette over the long eighteenth century.  
However, more crucially for the validity of this study, I maintain that at least 
some elements and aspects from amongst the experiences of all the bankrupts 
I have analysed here, will have been the case for each and every one of the 
 
982 Hannah Barker, ‘Soul, Purse and Family: Middling and Lower-Class Masculinity in 







































Principal Subjects of the Study 
 
Below is a list of the twenty-four bankrupts I use as the principal case studies in 
this thesis; the year entered before the bankrupt’s name is the year of 
bankruptcy.  The location following the name is the place where the bankruptcy 
commission was held.  If the place where the bankrupt traded was different from 
where the commission was held, the locality of trade appears in parenthesis.  
Short biographical information on the principal subjects is provided in appendix 
2.  For other bankrupts who make only brief appearances in this study 
biographies are not provided, instead brief information is provided in the text 
and/or footnotes. 
 
Year  Name of Bankrupt  Commission Held  Trade 
 
1739  George Clay   King’s Lynn   Merchant 
 
1744 Richard Hutchings  Crewkerne (Wilminstone)   Yarn Washer 
           
1752  David Kennedy  Marlborough   Draper 
 
1763  Thomas Pyott983  Hull    Merchant 
 
1767  Ann and Isaac Scott London   Dry Salters 
 
1772  Alexander Fordyce  London   Banker 
 
1774  David Brigstock  Bristol (Carmarthen) Shopkeeper 
 
1775  Thomas Lodge  Farnham (Dogmersfield) Brewer 
 
 
983 Thomas Pyott did not in the end become a bankrupt but is included in this study for reasons 





1783  Joshua James  Bristol    Distiller 
 
1783  Joseph George Pedley Bristol    Brewer 
 
1793  Havilland Le Mesurier London   Merchant 
 
1797  Henry Nantes  London   Merchant 
 
1797  Richard Muilman  London   Merchant984 
 
1797  John Kempster  Highworth (Marston) Corn Dealer 
 
1800  Joseph Brasbridge  London   Silversmith 
 
1805  Edmund Townsend  London   Spirit Dealr 
 
1806  Ann Harding   Bristol              Haberdasher 
 
1808  William James  Bristol (Swansea)  Shopkeeper 
 
1810  ‘Baron’ Von Doornik  London   Soap Manufr 
 
1817  John Latham   Romsey   Brewer 
 
1819  John & Matthew Brickdale Taunton   Bankers 
 
1826  Wakeford Brothers  Andover   Bankers 
 
1828  Elizabeth Fry   Bristol    [wife985] 
 
1830  John Slade   Sherborne   Maltster 
 
 
984 Richard Muilman avoided becoming a bankrupt in law by taking his own life before the 
declaration could be made. 
985 It was of course Joseph Fry, Elizabeth’s husband, who was the bankrupt.  However, as 







Short Biographies of the Subjects 
 
This appendix provides a complement to the discussion of sources in chapter 
one of this thesis; it also locates background information on the subjects in one 
place for ease of consultation.  The extent to which biographical information is 
available on the subjects varies greatly, but in general the greater the scale of 
the bankrupt’s trade, wealth and connections, then the greater the amount of 
information available on them; some major bankrupts feature in the Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography and/or History of Parliament and have lengthy 
entries dedicated to them.  Therefore, where information is substantial only a 
selection of the most relevant content is reproduced here.  Contrastingly, small 
provincial traders usually left few traces behind them, and their entries here are 
correspondingly small.  Where possible dates of birth, marriages and deaths 
have been included, although in several cases it has not been possible to obtain 
this information.  Unless other sources are cited key events and dates have 
been obtained from www.ancestry.co.uk.  For the convenience of the reader 
biographies appear in alphabetical order of surname. 
 
Joseph Brasbridge986 (1744–1832) was an ‘eminent’ silversmith in Fleet 
Street.  He was ‘eccentric in his manners, and singular in his opinions’, he was 
also capable of ‘shrewd observation’, so said one obituary.987 Born in 
Buckinghamshire, the son of a farmer, he moved to London where he married 
the sister of his first business partner, a Mr Slade, in 1771.  A son was born in 
1776, but soon after Mrs Brasbridge died.  She was followed by the son who 
died in around 1784.  This ‘precipitated a crisis in his life and led to the 
dissolution of the partnership and a period of unwise living’.988 With the help of 
‘friends’ he was able to resume business.  In 1788 he married Elizabeth 
Greenhill.989 Brasbridge had two children with Elizabeth but neither child lived 
beyond the early nineteenth century.  Brassbridge had bankruptcy commissions 
 
986 I am grateful to Jonathan Barry for drawing my attention to this case. 
987 Leamington Spa Courier, 17 March 1832, issue 189, p. 4. 






issued against him in 1800, and again in 1804.990 After the death of 
Brasbridge’s son in 1819 he and Elizabeth gave up trade and retired to Herne 
Hill where Brasbridge wrote his autobiography The Fruits of Experience, which 
was published in 1824. 
 
Matthew Brickdale (1735-1831) and John Brickdale (1760-1840) were father 
and son and both became bankrupts in 1819.  They had been partners and 
proprietors of the Taunton Bank in Somerset, which failed in 1816.  Since the 
failure they had been experiencing an accumulation of financial problems and in 
1819 personal bankruptcy could be averted no longer.  The bankruptcy was 
very much a family affair: three generations were affected by debt actions with 
both a father and son being made bankrupts; and various other family members 
being drawn into legal disputes or otherwise negatively affected. 
 
Matthew Brickdale was the son of John Brickdale (d. 1765) a Bristol draper. He 
married Elizabeth Smith, daughter of Thomas Smith of Clifton.  Matthew 
Brickdale was left a fortune, reputably of £100,000 by his father.  He retired 
from trade as a Bristol clothier, woollen draper and undertaker to enter politics.  
He was a Common Councillor for Bristol 1767 – 1784; and he was Member of 
Parliament for Bristol on two occasions, 1768 – 1774 and 1780 – 1790, when 
he opposed Edmund Burke.  He kept a political diary from 1770 – 1774 which 
covered domestic, national and international matters.991 His activity in 
Westminster was not great, but amongst other things he put before Parliament 
bills, such as that to regulate chimney sweepers in 1788.992 
 
Matthew Brickdale thus had an accomplished public profile, not just at 
Westminster but more significantly for this study of his bankruptcy, in his 
parliamentary seat of Bristol and amongst Somerset county society.  His name 
 
990 Kentish Weekly Post or Canterbury Journal, 9 December 1800, issue 2178, p. 3; LG, 5 April 
1806, issue 15907, p. 445.  NB The 1806 Gazette notice makes reference to a commission 
dated 4 December 1804. 
991 Thomas, ‘Brickdale, Matthew’, pp. 115–16; Williams, Parliamentary History of the County of 
Gloucester, p. 128; SRO, DD/X/RON/9, Correspondence etc. relating to the genealogy of the 
Brickdale family.  This last record includes M. E. Roynan, ‘A Brief Biography of Matthew 
Brickdale’ (serialised in a local church periodical), which largely relies on Thomas and Williams 
but also complements with material from SRO.  Roynan compiled the biography while Rector 
of West Monkton in the 1960s. 





could be found on the front page of The Times.  On Monday 10 October 1791 
he was listed amongst the provincial ‘Bankers and Gentlemen in the Country’ 
who would receive subscriptions on behalf of the Veterinary College, London:   
Brickdale’s bank received for Taunton while Baring’s received in Exeter.993 In 
that same year of 1791 there appeared in the Rev. J. Collinson’s The History 
and Antiquities of the County of Somerset an engraving of Matthew Brickdale’s 
country seat in West Monkton near Taunton, which was described as ‘an 
elegant modern building called Court House’.994 In 1793 he was Chairman of 
the meeting called to discuss the building of a canal to link the Devon Exe with 
the Gloucester Severn; his son John also sat on the committee.995 In 1801 a 
clergyman’s letter to the Gentleman’s Magazine listed Matthew Brickdale 
amongst ‘the most respectable gentlemen of the Eastern division of 
Somerset’.996 
 
Brickdale had paid £8,000 for his country estate in 1775, and ‘he spent much 
money laying out the garden and grounds of his residence’ as ‘he had ample 
resources and a family fortune’.   According to M. E. Roynan his chief claims to 
distinction in the locality were his preparations to resist a French invasion, and 
‘his financial ventures which later led to disaster and ruin’.997  He lived to the 
age of 96, and according to W. R. Williams: ‘He died on 8 September 1831, 
having spent enormous sums of money in his electoral contests, which left him 
in reduced circumstances in his old age.’998 Williams did not mention Matthew 
Brickdale becoming a bankrupt, although the bankruptcy in 1819 was widely 
reported at the time.  The three biographies above also omit Matthew and John 
Brickdale’s interests in the Atlantic slave trade and ownership of plantations.999 
 
 
993 The Times, 10 October 1791, issue 2149, p. 1, col. A. 
994 John Collinson, The History and Antiquities of The County of Somerset, 4 vols (Bath, 1791), 
III, p. 454. 
995The Star, 12 January 1793, p.1, col. 4, in L. S. Pressnell, Country Banking in the Industrial 
Revolution (Oxford, 1956), p. 377. 
996 A letter to the Rev. Thomas Bere, Rector of Butcombe, by the Rev. J. Boak, Rector of 
Brockley in the Gentleman’s Magazine (London, 1801), 71, p. 1116. 
997 Thomas, Brickdale, Matthew, pp. 115–16; Williams, Parliamentary History of the County of 
Gloucester, p. 128; SRO, DD/X/RON/9, Roynan, ‘Biography of Matthew Brickdale’. 
998 Ibid. 
999 Brickdale interests in the Atlantic slave trade and plantation ownership are documented in 
SRO, DD/DP/6/26 which contains details of a ‘conveyance by Commissioners to assignees 
of…Hope estate and 90 negroes at St Andrew on Isle of St Vincent’; see also Madge Dresser 
and Andrew Hann (eds), Slavery and the British Country House (Swindon, 2013), pp. 31, 35–





John Brickdale, Matthew Brickdale’s eldest son, was the main protagonist 
during the bankruptcy.  His father’s role and experience matter for several 
reasons, not least his past as a Member of Parliament, but also the advanced 
age at which he had to confront becoming a bankrupt.  However, it was his son 
John who maintained the principal engagement with the commission, the 
creditors, and the lawyers.  The letters written by John Brickdale to many 
different correspondents speak openly of his experience as a bankrupt. 
 
John Brickdale was born on 20 February 1760 and died 28 June 1840.  He 
obtained a B.A. in 1781 after spending three years at Christ Church, Oxford.  
He continued at All Souls, Oxford, and graduated with a Bachelor in Civil Law in 
1784.1000 In 1787 he married Anne, daughter of Richard Inglett Fortescue of 
Buckland Filleigh, Devon.  He would seem to have led a life much less public 
than that of his father and to have dedicated most of his time to the family 
banking house and other businesses (e.g. farms).  L. S. Pressnell described 
John Brickdale as being the ‘active partner’ at the time of the beginning of the 
banking house’s severe troubles in 1816.1001  In 1819, shortly before the 
bankruptcy, he was expected to succeed to the ‘Comptrollership of the 
Customs’ at the port of Bristol.1002 
 
According to L. S. Pressnell the Taunton bank held over £14,000 in Navy bills, 
and £7,750 in Transport bills between 1796 and 1800, which Pressnell 
described as a case of money flowing ‘along rockier channels between lender 
and borrower’.1003 Pressnell does not comment further on the bank’s finances 
until there were problems at the banking house in 1816.  Peace had returned 
that year, but unfortunately for West Country farmers this peace did not bring 
prosperity.  According to Pressnell ‘Taunton had decaying industries, and was 
set in a strongly agricultural background’.  The slump hit the bank hard.1004  
That year Messrs. Bosanquet, Pitt, Anderdon & Co. of London, who kept 
Brickdale’s London deposit, were sending Brickdale’s their account every week.  
This, in the view of Pressnell, ‘may possibly have been sent to a give a constant 
 
1000 Williams, Parliamentary History of the County of Gloucester, p. 128; Catalogue of Graduats 
[sic], entry for ‘Brickdale (John)’, p. 8. 
1001 Pressnell, Country Banking, pp. 121–22. 
1002 Bristol Mercury, 4 October 1819, issue 1540. 
1003 Pressnell, Country Banking, p. 427. 





reminder to the country firm of the wretched state of its London account’.1005  
Bosanquet’s pressure led John Brickdale to protest ‘you see how they catch at 
every […] minutest turn of our account’.  Bosanquet’s in fact had already shown 
a great deal of patience, which allowed the Brickdales to avoid bankruptcy in 
1816.1006 However, bankruptcy could only be held off and finally it was in fact a 
debt owed by Matthew Brickdale to his estate bailiff that triggered the first 
moves to make the Brickdales bankrupts in late 1819.1007 Their commission was 
held at the George Inn in Taunton. 
 
David Brigstock (1747–1825) of Whitland Forge (in the parish of Whitland), 
Carmarthenshire, was a general shopkeeper (he was also sometimes described 
as a mercer and ironmonger) dealing in all manner of goods: wheat, oats, 
potatoes, tobacco and snuff, timber (e.g. logs of mahogany).  His wife, Ann, 
who was already ‘a country shopkeeper’ and had probably been a widow prior 
to marrying Brigstock, had some fifty pounds worth of stock of goods that 
enabled Brigstock to set up in trade.1008 Most of Brigstock’s trading relationships 
were based in Wales.  He employed a younger relative, Jeremiah Brigstock 
(1761-1844). 
 
Some of Brigstock’s creditors had been moving to arrest him, and one did 
succeed in holding him.  These circumstances led Brigstock to seek help in 
being made a bankrupt.  Unfortunately for him he had probably left it too late, 
and the kind of help he wanted was not forthcoming.  Brigstock’s attempts to get 
out of trouble merely got him into more, as he found his letters being exhibited 
at the Quarter Sessions.  Brigstock’s subsequent fate is unclear but by 1812 he 
was renting a ‘messuage or dwelling house’ for £35 p.a. in King Street 
Carmarthen.1009 His commission was held at the Bush Tavern in Corn Street, 
Bristol. 
 
George Clay was a merchant and ship owner in Kings Lynn, Norfolk.  He dealt 
in a variety of commodities including corn, deals, iron and other goods; he was 
 
1005 Ibid., p. 117. 
1006 Ibid., pp. 121–22, 307–08. 
1007 LG, 4 December 1819, issue 17541, p. 2182–83. 
1008 BRO, JQS/P/44, Examinations of witnesses, 14 March 1774: examination of David 
Brigstock, p. 1; receipt for wheat, oats and potatoes is in BRO, 44352/2/1/5. 





also part owner of two ships with William Bagge.  His trading actvities extended 
to London, Rotterdam, Norway and Friedrichstadt in Schleswig-Hostein.  He 
married Mary [Landidg/e or Landitch] (d. 16 Nov. 1741) on 9 July 1714.  While 
living in King’s Lynn he may have rented properties in Tuesday Market Place 
and King Street (a property on King Street was recorded as being ‘in Geo Clays 
use’.1010  Clay appeared in shipping news: on 1 March 1732 sailing from Lynn 
Regis for Norway in the Susanna.1011 There are indications that Clay had 
already been made a bankrupt in 1738 or earlier.1012 It was not unusual for a 
commission to be renewed or a second commission to be issued against a 
trader.  The meetings of the commission issued against him were held at the 
Guildhall, Kings Lynn.  His total debts ascended to around £2,200. 
 
Alexander Fordyce (1729–1789), described by Paul Langford as, ‘That prince 
of bankrupt bankers’, achieved lasting notoriety with his contemporaries for the 
scale and impact of his failure.1013 He is also one of the few eighteenth-century 
bankrupts to be widely known by historians of the period. Fordyce was the 
youngest son of George Fordyce, provost of Aberdeen.  He was initially 
apprenticed in stocking manufacture but moved to London where he worked his 
way up in the banking business.  By 1768 he was a managing partner in the 
bank of Neale, James, Fordyce and Down.  He made a great fortune trading 
stocks and was able to purchase an estate in Scotland and built ‘a fine 
residence’ at Roehampton, Surrey ‘where he entertained in great magnificence’.  
In 1770 he married Lady Margaret Lindsay, the second daughter of the Earl of 
Balcarres.  He also spent considerable sums trying to get elected to the House 
of Commons in 1768 and 1780.1014 
 
His luck broke after sustaining heavy losses from short-selling East India stock 
in 1771–72.  He used the bank’s money to cover his exposure, fell out with his 
partners, and lost the backing of the Bank of England.  Fordyce fled London on 
10 June 1772, and the complete failure of his bank quickly followed.  This bank 
 
1010 NRO, 395, ‘Notes on houses in the Riverside Streets of King’s Lynn and their known owners 
and tenants up to 1849’, pp. 72, 101.  In 1736/7 a George Clay, mariner, was recorded at 14 
Tuesday Market Place. 
1011 ‘Ship News’, Daily Post Boy, 15 March 1732, issue 6881, p.1. 
1012 LG, 18 March 1739, issue 7894, p 4.  It was proposed to make a dividend 26 April 1739 
which would suggest that a commission had probably been taken out in 1738. 
1013 Langford, Polite and Commercial People, p. 421. 





failure initiated a chain reaction of other banking failures, and a financial crisis 
‘considered the worst since the Bubble year of 1720’.  Fordyce surrendered 
before a bankruptcy commission in September.1015 Some disagreement exists 
about the level of his losses or debts, an arithmetic that gets particularly 
complicated where partners in banks are concerned, but figures range from c. 
£150,000 to c. £550,000.1016 As with other London bankrupts his commission 
was held at the Guildhall, but unlike most bankrupts his examinations were 
reported in the press.1017 
 
Elizabeth Fry (1780–1845) the social reformer, was not a bankrupt, but her 
husband Joseph was.  However, it is from Elizabeth’s journals and letters, not 
Joseph’s, that we learn about a wife’s and a family’s experience of bankruptcy.  
Elizabeth Fry is naturally much better known for being a penal reformer and 
philanthropist than for being a bankrupt’s wife.  She was born into a wealthy 
Norwich Quaker family being the fourth child of merchant and banker John 
Gurney (1749–1809).  Elizabeth received a good education but did not progress 
as well as she might as she suffered from her ‘nerves’.1018 She reacted against 
the more secular direction of her well-to-do Quaker family by embracing the life 
of a plain Friend, both in dress and speech.  According to de Haan: ‘Her 
religious belief became the pillar of her life and pervaded all that she did.’1019 
 
She married Joseph Fry (1777–1861) in 1800.  They had eleven children.  Fry 
was from another family of successful Quakers who dealt in wares from the 
colonies; he went into banking in 1808.  In 1809 they began to reside at Plashet 
House in East Ham.  Elizabeth engaged in a variety philanthropic works 
including visiting Newgate prison and endeavouring to improve conditions for 
female prisoners.  From 1818 she travelled the country, both as Quaker 
minister, and for the purposes of visiting prisons to promote her reforms.  In 
1827 she published Observations on the Visiting, Superintendence, and 
 
1015 Ibid. 
1016 See discussions in Langford, Polite and Commercial People, pp. 569–71; Hoppit, Risk and 
Failure, pp. 135–36, and more recently Kosmetatos, ‘Financial Contagion’, passim. 
1017 London Magazine or Gentleman’s Monthly Intelligencer (London, 1772), 41, pp. 431–33. 






Government, of Female Prisoners.1020 The next year after difficulties at the 
bank, Joseph Fry was made a bankrupt. 
 
The bankruptcy has generally received little attention from historians and 
biographers of Elizabeth Fry’s life (de Haan, for example, only gives it four 
lines).  This is not surprising as Elizabeth was not the bankrupt and it was not 
her fault.  Joseph Fry was not a bankrupt for long, and there might seem little 
reason to let the incident overshadow Elizabeth’s positive contributions to social 
reform.  However, another view is possible.  Firstly, like most bankrupts who 
were mostly men, Joseph Fry does not provide us with a record of his 
experience of bankruptcy, but Elizabeth does from the point of view of a wife 
and matriarch.  Secondly, a close reading of Elizabeth’s journal, rather than 
bowdlerized versions such as those edited by her daughters, shows her coming 
to terms with, and reflecting on, the effect of bankruptcy on her family and 
household.  The personal flaws she owns to, and her anxiety for the well-being 
of her family, only show her as human and in no way cast a cloud over this 
episode in her life.  We certainly learn more about the experience of bankruptcy 
for women than we do from the actual women bankrupts included in this 
study.1021 More recent biographies, although still tending to the hagiography, 
have not attempted to gloss over Elizabeth Fry’s experience of money troubles 
within the family, and the inevitable bankruptcy.1022 
 
Joseph Fry received his certificate relatively quickly and Elizabeth returned to 
her philanthropic works in the 1830s and 1840s which, amongst various causes, 
included visiting prisons on the continent and campaigning for the abolition of 
slavery.  She died in 1845 after a stroke.1023 
 
Ann Harding (1781–1851), the daughter of Isaac and Anne Orchard, was 
baptised on 13 May 1781 in the Somerset parish of Walcot St Swithin (now part 
of the city of Bath).  She married Thomas Harding, a haberdasher, on 2 June 
1799 in Bristol, but Harding died in 1803.  Before his death Harding had 
become weighed down by debt and had been in hiding from his creditors.  After 
 
1020 Ibid. 
1021 LRSFB, Diaries of Elizabeth Fry, MS Vol. S267/2; MS Vol. S267/3. 
1022 See Hatton, Betsy, pp. 235–56, and Opperman, While It Is Yet Day, pp. 255–76. 





his death Ann attempted to continue the haberdashery business, but her late 
husband’s creditors continued to pursue their debts and she found herself 
subject to an execution.  Anne became a bankrupt in 1806.  Her commission 
was held at the Bush Tavern, Bristol.1024 
 
Richard Hutchings (will proved 1746) was a yarn washer and lived in the small 
Somerset village of Wilmistone (now Wilminstone) near the country town of 
Crewkerne.  The name was sometimes recorded as ‘Hutchins’.  A 1733 poll 
book and electoral register lists him as a yeoman.  Classifying himself as a yarn 
washer was more likely to have qualified him for bankruptcy under the bankrupt 
laws.  Hutchings was also collector of tythings for Woolmistone.1025  A burial for 
Richard Hutchings was recorded on 22 February 1756 in Crewkerne.  His wife 
Philadelphia was born in 1683 and her burial was recorded in Crewkerne on 10 
May 1780.  Hutchings had two sons, John, and Job (b. 10.08.1710 in 
Woolmistone).  Job was subsequently baptized at the then Presbyterian South 
Petherton Old Meeting House on 22 August 1710.  By 1744 Job lived in nearby 
Clapton and was recorded as a linen weaver.  John moved away and lived 
‘beyond London’.  Hutchings had another son, also called Richard, who entered 
into a bond with his father in 1737.  Job also ‘stood jointly bound’ with his 
father.1026  Richard and Philadelphia also had a daughter named Philadelphia 
(b. 1713/14).1027 
 
His petitioning creditor was Thomazina [Parker?], a widow.  She had lent him 
several sums of money which accumulated to over £200, all of which had been 
outstanding for years; he was also unable to pay other creditors including his 
own attorney.  He was declared bankrupt on 3 April 1744, and his commission 
met at the George Inn in Crewkerne.1028 It is unclear whether he was 
discharged before he died.  It is possible that because of Hutchings the elder’s 
attempts to assign assets to his sons, and his sons also being bound with him 
 
1024 BRO, 44352/2/1/13, Papers re Anne Harding, 1806–1810; for the date of the1806 
bankruptcy, see LG 16 August 1808, issue 16172, p. 1136. 
1025 SRO, DD/MR/107, Bankruptcy records, Richard Hutchings. 
1026 Ibid. 
1027 South Petherton Old Presbyterian Meeting House, baptism records 
<http://www.southpethertoninformation.org.uk/old_meeting_house.htm> [accessed 9 May 
2019]. 





that after his death actions continued against his sons.  Job Huchings has 
£1432 recorded against him, n.d.1029 
 
Joshua James (d. 1795) was baptised by the Lewin’s Mead Society of 
Protestant Dissenters in Bristol, n.d.  According to TNA: ‘The Meeting remained 
Presbyterian until the late eighteenth century, but by the beginning of the 
nineteenth century had changed to Unitarianism, the first reference to this 
change being dated 1816.’1030 James lived ‘in Stoke’s Croft, in the Parish of St 
James, in the City of BRISTOL’ where he operated a distillery.1031 He also 
owned ‘THE very valuable MANOR, or reputed MANOR and ESTATES of 
SOUTHMEAD’ of some three hundred acres in Westbury upon Trym near 
Bristol.1032 Having lost a leg he left his business in the hands of others, but 
matters went badly and he was made a bankrupt in 1785.  His commission was 
held at the Bush Tavern in Corn Street, Bristol. 
 
William James was a shopkeeper in Swansea on the southwest coast of 
Wales.  He became a bankrupt twice in 1808.  A commission was first issued 
against him in April 1808, but it was superseded and a fresh commission was 
awarded in August that year.1033 The ethics of James’s behaviour was much 
criticised by those involved with him.1034 His commission was held at the Bush 
Tavern in Corn Street, Bristol. 
 
John Kempster the younger (c. 1761–1802) was a corn dealer and lived in 
South Marston in the parish of Highworth, Wiltshire. He married Elizabeth Lewis 
on 10 March 1790.  He became a bankrupt in February 1797.1035 The 
proceedings of his commission did not go smoothly and by September 1797 
Kemptser was ‘in Custody for not making satisfactory Answers to certain 
Questions touching his Estate and Effects’ at his hypothetical last 
examination.1036 He was held in Fisherton Anger gaol near Salisbury for some 
 
1029 Ibid. 
1030 BRO, 39461, Lewin’s Mead Unitarian Meeting 1718–1985. 
1031 BRO, 44352/2/1/8, Papers re Joshua James: dwelling-house sale notice and conditions of 
sale, 6 July 1789. 
1032 Gloucester Journal, 1 October 1798, issue 3997, p. 1. 
1033 LG, 16 August 1808, issue 16172, p. 1135. 
1034 BRO, 44352/2/1/14/2, Papers re William James. 
1035 LG, 28 February 1797, issue 13988, p. 225. 





two years before being brought back before the commissioners in November 
1799.  By early 1800 Kemptster was ill.1037 His death followed two years later.  
His commission was held at the King and Queen Inn in Highworth. 
 
David Kennedy was a linen draper in Marlborough, Wiltshire.  He married 
Sarah Morrant on 19 January 1746.   He became a bankrupt in late 1751 or 
beginning of 1752.  In contrast to the two earlier cases above for which largely 
only formal bankruptcy commission records survive, this case is supported, not 
by commission records, but by private correspondence between Kennedy and 
his creditors, or between his creditors.  Kennedy had several creditors in 
London, and their spokesperson and interlocutor with Kennedy was a John 
Stabler, probably John Stabler Esq. ‘an eminent wholesale linen-draper in 
Watling Street’.1038  Kennedy’s principal creditor in Wiltshire, was Robert 
Cooper of New Sarum, another linen draper.1039 His commission was held at 
the Mitre Tavern in New Sarum (Salisbury). 
 
John Latham (1769–1822) was a brewer, spirit merchant and public house 
owner in Romsey, Hampshire.  He was the son of the medical doctor, naturalist 
and “renowned” ornithologist Dr John Latham (1740–1837).1040 Because of 
numerous writings about the learned father, we know more about his bankrupt 
son.  Latham’s wife’s name was Althea, and they had six children one of whom 
was also named John.  He moved to Romsey in the 1790s and bought a 
brewery and followed with a string of purchases of local public houses.  He 
occupied various local offices including those of magistrate, overseer of the 
poor and mayor of Romsey. 
 
 
1037 WRO, 1033/194, Papers re John Kempster’s bankruptcy: James Crowdy to John Kempster, 
14 February 1800. 
1038 Gentleman’s Magazine (London, 1788), 58, Part 1, p. 182, ‘Obituary of considerable 
Persons; with Biographical Anecdotes’; James Peller Malcolm, Londonium Redivivum or an 
Ancient History and Modern Description of LONDON, 2 vols (1803), II, p. 92. 
1039 WRO, 492/280, Bankruptcy of David Kennedy. 
1040 Biographical information on the Lathams can be found in Yolanda Foote, ‘Latham, John 
(1740–1837)’, ODNB (Oxford, 2004); Christine E. Jackson, Ann Datta and R. I. Vane-Wright, 
‘Dr John Latham, F.L.S., and his Daughter Ann’, Newsletter and Proceedings of the Linnean 
Society of London, 29 (2013), 15–30; David Thelwell, ‘The Forgotten Ornithologist’, Romsey & 
District Society News Sheet, issue 111 (2012), 8–10.  NB Foote, in the ODNB, has the 
bankruptcy in 1819 when it was 1817, and has Latham the brewer’s year of death in 1843 
when it was 1822.  I am grateful to local historian Barbara Burbridge for providing me with her 
article on the bankruptcy which contained additional local and historical background: 





Dr Latham also moved to Romsey when he retired in 1796.  He had raised 
money by selling his valuable library and museum of specimens.1041 He soon 
found himself financing his son’s business ventures.  To finance the enterprise 
Latham relied heavily on debt financed by mortgages and loans, with his 
wealthy father lending him £7–8,000.  The ornithologist took on a liability that 
may have exceeded £15,000.  Latham acquired as many as nineteen public 
houses.  Jackson, Datta and Vane-Wright describe Latham as having ‘poor 
business acumen’.  Over the years Dr. Latham kept his son afloat with financing 
from various sources.  The father lost much of his fortune in propping up John, 
whose sister also saw her share of the family trust exhausted.  The sacrifices 
were to no avail as Latham was unable to avoid bankruptcy.1042 His failure was 
made known in Hampshire on 1 December 1817.1043 Only in September of the 
same year he had been elected magistrate for Romsey for the ensuing year.1044  
Now he had debts of £18,307, although according to Burbridge these debts may 
have ascended to £30,000.1045 His commission was held at the White Horse Inn 
in Romsey. 
 
During the proceedings of Latham’s bankruptcy many of Latham’s unsound 
financial practices emerged, especially those connected with his father.  
Unusually Latham appears to have been granted his certificate within two 
months of the bankruptcy.1046 This was not, however, an indicator of a clean 
ending and fresh start for Latham.  Latham took his own life five years later in 
October 1822.1047 Already by 1819 as a result of the losses Dr Latham had 
sustained, he had to sell his large house in Romsey and went to live with his 
daughter in Winchester.  Whatever may have been the stress on Dr Latham, 
unlike his son, he lived to 97. 
 
Havilland Le Mesurier (1758–1806) was born in Guernsey the fifth son of John 
Le Mesurier (1717–1793) the hereditary governor of Alderney.  In the 1770s he 
joined the family merchant house which profited from privateering during the 
 
1041 Foote, ‘Latham, John’, ODNB (Oxford, 2004). 
1042 Jackson, Datta, Vane-Wright, ‘Dr John Latham’, pp. 16–17. 
1043 Salisbury and Winchester Journal, 1 December 1817, issue 4209, p. 1. 
1044 Ibid., 29 September 1817, issue 4200, p. 4. 
1045 Thelwell, ‘Forgotten Ornithologist’, p. 9; Burbridge, ‘Latham Bankruptcy’, pp. 21–32. 
1046 LG, 17 January 1818, issue 17323, p. 140. 





American War of Independence.  He married Elizabeth Dobrée in 1782 and 
went on to establish himself as a member of the Channel Islands community of 
merchants in London.1048 Commercial problems when war broke out with 
France in 1793, were the main cause of his bankruptcy.  He recovered quickly 
from his bankruptcy by finding, with the help of Henry Addington, Viscount 
Sidmouth, a commissariat commission in the army, soon becoming deputy 
commissary-general. After 1795 it seems he became a successful merchant 
and privateer-owner in partnership with his brother Paul based Austin Friars in 
the City of London.1049 
 
His ODNB entry, although mentioning business difficulties, does not actually 
state that he became a bankrupt.  In fact, as a bankrupt, Le Mesurier did not 
leave a great archival imprint behind him, but his brief correspondence with 
Addington in 1793 gives insight into a bankrupt’s fall, and then strategy for 
survival and recovery.  His commission was held at London Guildhall. 
 
Thomas Lodge lived in the Hampshire village of Dogmersfield in the 1770s 
having followed his father, also Thomas, into the local brewing trade.  Lodge the 
elder had also managed the estate of Sir Henry Paulet St John of Dogmersfield 
Park, and Lodge the younger ‘succeeded his Father as Steward and Agent to 
Sir Henry Paulet St John in the Management of his Estates… paying all 
Bills’.1050 This position for Thomas created opportunities that would later lead to 
his demise and he was made bankrupt in 1775.1051  His commission was held at 
the Bush Inn in Farnham, Surrey. 
 
Richard Muilman (later Richard Muilman Trench Chiswell (1735–1797), was 
a merchant banker and antiquary.  His father Peter Muilman and his uncle 
Henry Muilman were Dutch merchants operating from London.  He inherited a 
fortune of £120,000 from his mother’s brother Richard Chiswell along with 
Debden Hall in Essex.  In 1773 he became known as Richard Muilman Trench 
Chiswell.  In 1790 he inherited £350,000 from his father.  That same year he 
 
1048 Meyer, ‘Le Mesurier’. 
1049 Ibid. 
1050 HRO, 15M50/1216/35, Paulet St John’s Case: from Broome for the opinion of James 
Mansfield, June 1776, p. 1. 





was elected MP for Aldborough, Yorkshire.  As an MP and investment agent for 
Mrs Warren Hastings he militated in Parliament against the delays and costs of 
Warren Hastings’ trial.  He was also active in other parliamentary business.1052 
He preoccupied himself with parliament, antiquarianism, travels and estate 
projects such as engaging Henry Holland to rebuild Debden Hall in 1795.1053 
Thus he would seem to have left the management of the house of Richard 
Muilman & Co. largely in the hands of his business partner Henry Nantes 
(biography below) with tragic consequences when the merchant house failed 
with debts in excess of £450,000.  Richard Muilman Trench Chiswell then shot 
himself on 3 February 1797 at Debden Hall.1054 Muilman/Chiswell’s ODNB 
dwells on his philanthropic, antiquarian and travel interests whilst no mention is 
made of the Muilman & Co.’s interests in the Atlantic slave trade and plantation 
ownership (see details under Henry Nantes, below).  Not surprisingly 
Muilman/Chiswell voted against the abolition of the slave trade on 15 March 
1796.1055 
 
Henry Nantes (1764–1836) was born Wilhelm Heinrich Nantes to a family of 
Bremen merchants who subsequently established an office in London.1056 He 
was sent to London at the age of ten and when his father died soon after, he 
was adopted by his uncle, Daniel Nantes, who was already established as a 
merchant in London.1057 In London Nantes was educated by Dr Palmer,1058 a 
non-conformist divine.  Nantes was also in the habit of attending the Dutch 
 
1052 Winifred Stokes, ‘Muilman Trench Chiswell, Richard (c. 1735–97)’, in R. G. Thorne (ed.), 
The History of Parliament: The House of Commons 1790–1820 (1986). 
1053 John H. Appleby, ‘Chiswell, Richard Muilman Trench (1735–1797)’, ODNB (Oxford, 2004). 
1054 Ibid. 
1055 Stokes, ‘Muilman Trench Chiswell, Richard’, in Thorne (ed.), History of Parliament. 
1056 Much of what is known about merchant of German origin Henry Nantes is the result of 
research undertaken by Margrit Schulte Beerbühl, see Schulte Beerbühl, ‘Risk of Bankruptcy 
among German Merchants’, in Gratzer and Stiefel (eds), History of Insolvency and 
Bankruptcy, p. 79; Schulte Beerbühl, Deutsche Kaufleute in London/German Merchants in 
London, pp. 112, 175, 203, 252–53, 368–83, 430; Schulte Beerbühl, Forgotten Majority, pp. 
37, 76 fn.82, 79 fn.150, 114–15, 122 fn.62, 210–24, 242 fn.242. 
1057 See Schulte Beerbühl, The Forgotten Majority, pp. 213, and p. 241 fn.239 for the merchant 
activities of Daniel Nantes (e.g. Russia Company).  He was also in the partnership of Edmund 
Boehm & Co., see LG, 29 December 1804, issue 15767, p. 7); ‘A “history” of the Nantes 
family’ (mid-nineteenth century notebook), private collection of Robert Nantes.  Some of the 
information about Henry Nantes’s early life comes from this short manuscript document.  The 
account is part of a small collection of papers that is notable for its complete omission of any 
reference to Henry Nantes’s bankruptcy or his involvement in the eighteenth-century Atlantic 
slave trade. 
1058 Possibly Samuel Palmer (1741–1813) the independent minister and memorialist, see 






Reform Church in Austin Friars.  He was naturalised British in 1789.1059 In the 
early 1790s various publications list Nantes as residing in Broad Street.1060 In 
1793 in Battersea he married Marianne Voguell, daughter of German merchant 
Henry Voguell.1061 Later in the decade Nantes’s address is given as both 5 
Warnford Court, Throgmorton Street, and Battersea.1062 In Battersea he owned 
Sherwood Lodge, a riverside villa (also known as Sherwood House).1063 
 
Nantes became the partner Richard Muilman Trench Chiswell (biography 
above) in the firm of Richard Muilman & Co.1064 Richard Muilman was much 
preoccupied with his activities as Member of Parliament for Aldborough (1790–
97), his antiquarian interests and with his estate in Essex, and so the 
management of the merchant house was left to Nantes.  By the late eighteenth 
century Muilman and Nantes were running a global trading operation and 
‘owned property and had assets on the islands of San Domingo and Grenada, 
on Long Island, and in South American Demerara, Berbece [Berbice], and 
Buenos Aires’.  They traded in sugar, coffee and wheat, as well as trading with 
the East Indies, North and South America, and the Dutch East India 
Company.1065 Their operations included ownership of slave ships and 
plantations.1066 The provenance of the capital with which Muilman & Co. built up 
its trade seems to have come principally from the Dutch family; it is unclear 
whether Nantes brought any capital of his own to the enterprise, but Schulte 
 
1059 An Act for Naturalizing Henry Nantes’, 24 June 1789, in Journal of the House of Lords 
Volume 38, 1787–1790, 21–30 June 1789 (London, 1767–1830), 459–83, p. 466, British 
History Online <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/lords-jrnl/vol38/pp459-483> [accessed 29 
October 2020]. 
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abode at 46 Old Broad Street along with Richard Muilman: ‘Nantes Henry, Mercht., 46, Old 
Broad-str.  Muilman Richard & Co., Merchts., 46, Old Broad-str.’, in Kent's Directory for the 
Year 1794 (London, 1794); Muilman Richard & Co. are also listed in [Roger Wakefield], 
Wakefield's Merchant and Tradesman's General Directory for London (London, 1794), p. 219. 
1061 Gentleman’s Magazine (London, 1793), 63, Part 2, p. 859. 
1062 Boyle’s City Companion to the Court Guide for the Year 1798 (London, 1798), p. 98.  NB 
Nantes was already bankrupt by the time this was published. 
1063 ‘Battersea Bridge Road to York Road’, in English Heritage, Survey of London (draft), 2013, 
pp. 39–41 
<https://www.ucl.ac.uk/bartlett/architecture/sites/bartlett/files/50.02_battersea_bridge_to_york_
road.pdf> [accessed 29 October 2020]. 
1064 Appleby, ‘Chiswell, Richard Muilman Trench’; Stokes, ‘Muilman Trench Chiswell, Richard’, 
in Thorne (ed.), History of Parliament. 
1065 Schulte Beerbühl, The Forgotten Majority, pp. 213–14.  Berbice is a region along the 
Berbice river in present day Guyana. 
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Beerbühl believes that he was likely to have done so.1067 Failed speculations 
caused the house to break in February 1797 leaving debts of over £450,000 
owed to 753 creditors.1068 
 
Richard Muilman Trench Chiswell took his own life whilst Nantes answered to 
the bankruptcy commission for the causes of the failure and the substantial 
losses sustained.  Sherwood House was sold in the summer of 1797.1069 
Marianne Nantes died in February 1800 in Battersea.1070 Nantes removed to the 
Isle of Man where he lived for a decade and where he would marry on a further 
two occasions (October 1800, June 1810).1071 By the second decade of the 
nineteenth century Nantes had returned to trade on a more modest scale based 
near Bideford in North Devon.1072 However, it is unclear whether Nantes ever 
received his certificate, and the liquidation of his bankrupt estate continued until 
at least the 1860s, long after his death in 1836.1073 
 
Joseph George Pedley (bap. 3 May 1757), ‘a Native of Bristol’, started out in 
his father’s brewing and baking trade in Bristol’s King Street.  In 1779 he began 
making preparations to move into the distilling business.  However, this 
operation proved to be more a cover for fraudulently obtaining goods on credit 
which were sold at a discount for cash, the latter being subsequently secreted.  
He then set fire to his own premises to cover his tracks, following which he 
contrived to be made a bankrupt.1074 His suspicious creditors imprisoned him in 
Bristol’s Newgate from where he escaped, but was subsequently recaptured in 
Newcastle and the affair was widely reported in the national press.1075 His 
escape from Newgate inspired Robert Southey to list the event as one of ‘the 
 
1067 This question is addressed by Schulte Beerbühl in Forgotten Majority, p. 213. 
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remarkables of Bristol’.1076 Pedley went on to spend periods in both the Fleet 
and King’s Bench prisons having been committed and discharged several 
times.  After sixteen and a half years in the King’s Bench in 1797 he petitioned 
parliament for his release under an Insolvent Debtors Bill. 
 
Thomas Pyott (c.1738–1804) differs from most of the bankrupts in this study in 
that he did not, in the end, become a bankrupt.  However, he was constantly on 
the brink of it.  Pyott was, in his own words, ‘bred up to the profession of a 
Merchant’ in Hull.  After having been apprenticed in the timber trade, he carried 
on the business of wine merchant exporting to the Caribbean and North 
America.1077 In 1760 he married his first cousin Anne, daughter of Charles Pyott 
of Canterbury, and granddaughter of Sir Richard Sandys of Northborne Court, 
Kent.1078 Pyott was also related to the Burdett family of Bramcote, his mother 
being the sister of Sir Robert Burdett.  With his widowed mother he had a 
somewhat estranged relationship after she remarried and became Mrs 
Delabene. 
 
His ‘fortune’ was ‘a third share in the north Brewhouse in Hull’, and he also 
accumulated capital from other sources.  He tells us that in setting up home in 
Hull he took a house in the high street.  He furnished it and procured ‘Plate, 
China…a Post Chaise and Horses, all of which cost £1,000, and then 
contemplated to what use to put his capital.  Alert to the ‘danger and hazard’ 
caused by the then state of war that existed, as well as ‘the many misfortunes 
Foreign Trade was liable to’ he thought it prudent to choose a trade that 
depended on ‘home consumption’.  He chose the wine trade believing that it 
was the only business in which his ‘Relations could give me the least 
assistance’.  He commenced at Christmas 1760.1079 Bankruptcy was his 
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constant fear, and he only narrowly escaped it.  When he got into difficulties he 
clung to the belief and expectation that well-connected ‘friends’ would rescue 
him. 
 
Although some of his trade correspondence is held by the William L. Clements 
Library, the collection used for this study is held at Senate House Library, 
London (Archives and Manuscripts) in one bound volume.  The papers and 
autobiographical memoirs cover the years 1763 to 1786 and were ‘compiled for 
circulation amongst family and friends’.1080 
 
Anne Scott (d. 1795) a widow, and her son Isaac (b. 1737) were trading as 
merchants and dry-salters in Cousin Lane, Upper Thames Street, London in the 
1760s when financial problems hit.  Because Ann and her family believed that 
they had been wrongly made bankrupts and that they had been cheated by the 
assignees of their estate, Anne published a pamphlet which set out the alleged 
wrong-doing and sought to defend their reputation.  The account of their 
bankruptcy is mostly supported by this single printed source rather than archival 
records.  Anne’s other sons were George and Daniel, and although they were 
not made bankrupts they were deeply involved in the defence of the family’s 
interests.  Anne also had two daughters about whom, in contrast to her sons, 
we learn little from the pamphlet.1081 
 
The business they ran was, according to Anne, ‘upon a very reputable 
Footing’.1082 However, in 1765 according to Anne, their house was misled in a 
business deal and deprived of an expected profit.  This gave rise to litigation, 
during which considerable damage was done publicly to the credit of the Scott 
household.  It emerged that a letter had been written which alleged their 
‘Connections were very bad’ and they would ‘soon be inevitably ruin’d’.1083 The 
Scotts won the suit, plus a further one for defamation caused by the letter, but 
their house still failed.  The cause of failure, according to Anne, was the 
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irreparable damage done to her credit and the practical consequences that 
ensued: they could not get bills discounted and they could only buy goods with 
endorsed notes or cash.  Add to this bad luck, the ‘Failure of a House abroad’, 
and Messrs. Scott’s demise was inevitable.  Anne’s son Isaac, who had 
managed the firm and who saw that the house could not meet its liabilities, fled 
to Cassell in French Flanders on 27 March 1767.  Soon after he was arrested 
and held at the suit of various English creditors.1084 From this point there began 
a saga of imprisonment, coercion, and attempted extradition.  The Scott version 
maintained that, despite pressure, Isaac would not agree to prefer one creditor 
over another.1085 
 
At this stage it does not appear that Isaac Scott was a bankrupt.  In his early 
correspondence with principal creditors (published in the pamphlet) there was 
talk of ‘a handsome Composition’.1086 The creditors’ agents, who were confining 
Scott in Cassell, continued unsuccessfully to persuade him to return to England, 
meanwhile a commission had been taken out against him.  Not unlike David 
Kennedy, Scott found himself addressed by principal creditors acting as de 
facto spokesmen for ‘the generality of the Creditors’.1087 Another creditor, 
James Clark, sought to apprise Scott of the fact that the first commission issued 
against him had already been superseded, whilst another against him and his 
mother was in train.1088 Mrs Scott had been prevailed upon by the creditors to 
‘commit a voluntary Act of Bankruptcy’ (my italics).  There ensued a very bitter 
correspondence between bankrupts and assignees. 
 
The fact that the Scotts wished to tell their own story in detail means that we are 
provided with a wealth of contextual and explanatory information, not usually 
available with most cases.  The language found in the pamphlet is considerably 
more hyperbolic than that which I have typically encountered in manuscript 
form, and at times it would seem to bear more in common with an eighteenth-
century novel than an account of an insolvency dispute; yet in parts it does 
descend into legalese suggesting the involvement of lawyers in its authorship.  
 
1084 Scott, Case of Anne and Isaac Scott, pp. 6–7. 
1085 Ibid., pp. 7–8. 
1086 Edward Hague to Isaac Scott, n.d. April 1767, in Scott, Case of Anne and Isaac Scott, p. 14. 
1087 James Clark to Isaac Scott, 21 April 1767, in Scott, Case of Anne and Isaac Scott, p. 16. 





However, these bankrupts were not creations of fiction; they appear as 
bankrupts in the London Gazette, and a dispute about their assets was heard 
before Lord Mansfield at the Guildhall in 1768.  Clearly aspects of the case 
were exemplary for the legal profession as the case is cited in several late 
eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century legal texts.  Isaac’s arrest on 
the continent also provoked a flurry of bilateral engagements over issues of 
extradition.  Regardless of the financial and legal complexities of the case this 
case is significant as it is one of the few examples of bankruptcy in which we 
hear the voice of a bankrupt, or a member of their family, at length speaking of 
their experience.  The principal source (the printed pamphlet) sits very 
differently when placed alongside the conventional progress of a bankruptcy as 
documented in commission records.  In the absence of surviving commission 
records, the pamphlet still leaves many lacunae as basic information about 
structure and proceedings is missing, and key stages are omitted. 
 
John Slade (b. 1793), originally from Wiltshire, became a maltster, brewer, and 
common carrier in Sherborne, Dorset, in the 1820s.  He first set up in 
partnership with his brother Thomas Slade.  They bought malting and brewing 
premises for £1,300.  It is not clear where this money came from, but a family 
source is probable.  John and Thomas Slade were equal partners, but the 
partnership did not last long with John buying Thomas out the next year.  Slade 
may then have tried to manage without family financial support.  He borrowed 
£2,000 secured against the premises and plant from Robert Davy, ‘Gentleman’ 
of Ringwood, which he probably used to buy out Thomas.  He soon began to 
experience financial difficulties.  He had borrowed too much, had got involved 
with horse breeding and racing, and had not paid what he owed the Excise.  
Finally, in 1830 when his sister took out an execution against him, he sought the 
protection of a bankruptcy commission as his only way to avoid inevitable 
imprisonment.  However, he did not surrender to the commission and was 
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Edmund Townsend was first bankrupted in 1793 while a wine and brandy 
merchant in Chepstow, Monmouthshire.1090 Then after trading as a wine and 
cider merchant in Covent Garden in London he was again bankrupted in 1805 
by, he claimed, the malicious actions of others.1091 Following his 1805 
bankruptcy he managed to get his assignees removed and recommenced his 
trade in Covent Garden in 1808.1092 However, matters did not go well as the 
following year he was being held in the King’s Bench and was seeking his 
release under the act for the relief of insolvent debtors.1093 It is unclear whether 
he was ever discharged as a bankrupt, but the proceedings in his 1805 
bankruptcy dragged on until at least 1824.1094 
 
From around 1811 he was involved in long bitter disputes with the assignees of 
his estate over the financial position he had been left in personally.  Over the 
years he sought attention for his predicament through publishing pamphlets, 
petitioning, and writing letters to the press about the sufferings of his family and 
the injustices done to him.  In February 1818 Sir Samuel Romilly presented one 
of Townsend’s petitions to parliament on the bankrupt laws.1095 Townsend also 
endeavoured to provide ‘advice and services to Merchants, Manufacturers or 
Traders, whose affairs may be in any manner deranged’, which he advertised at 
the Antigallican Coffee House, Threadneedle Street.1096 In 1822 he published A 
View of the Injurious Effects of the Present Bankrupt System.1097 In March 1825 
Townsend was still petitioning parliament about the injustices of the bankrupt 
laws.1098 The following year his daughter Elizabeth, who he had much sought to 
protect during the years of privation and who had long been ill, died aged 
twenty-two in Somer’s Town ‘in a consumption and great distress’.1099 
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Regard to Property and Public Morals: with Remarks on the Lord Chancellor’s Late Bills, 2nd 
edn (London, 1822). 
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William Everhard Marcus Von Doornik, ‘commonly called Baron Von 
Doornik’, was a soap manufacturer with a royal patent.  He styled himself as a 
ground-breaking inventor and discoverer of new washing products.1100 He 
claimed to have invented a type of soap ‘whereby linens, &c. may be as 
effectually cleansed with Sea or Hard Water … as … with Soft Water’.1101 
It was also blessed with the virtue that ‘it never chaps the hands, but renders 
the skin soft and delicate’.1102 He was, however, also indicted for having ‘literally 
stunk out the inhabitants of Whitechapel Fields, East London, ‘by boiling bones, 
– the putrid carcases of dead horses, – stinking horns and hoofs, – and thus 
assembling a compound of all villainous smells’.1103 Between 1803 and 1810 
Von Doornik would appear to have had several financial problems including 
being bankrupted at least twice. 
 
Joseph Wakeford (b. c.1791), William Wakeford (b. c.1797) and Robert 
Wakeford (b. c.1799) took over the running of The Old Andover Bank in 
Andover, Hampshire, after the death of their father William Steele Wakeford 
(1753–1819).  By the late eighteenth century, the banking business was well 
established, although William Steele Wakeford still continued to trade as a linen 
and woollen draper.  He was also an agent for Sun Fire Insurance and involved 
in financing canal building.  Success meant that in 1801 he bought ‘the 
extensive manor of East Tytherley from Lord Rolle’ which included a park and 
fine house.1104 Joseph and William were taken into the partnership in the years 
1811 and 1813 respectively.  William Steele’s youngest son Robert became a 
partner in 1817.  Meanwhile, financial difficulties had been developing and 
attempts had been made to sell the East Tytherley estate in 1816.  After William 
Steele’s death the Old Andover Bank was ‘in the hands of three young men … 
who lacked the experience to cope with the economic difficulties of post-war 
England’.1105 Financial difficulties continued and the East Tytherley estate was 
finally sold in 1821.  Proceeds from the sale took until 1823 to come through, 
which enabled them to meet the demands of their London agents but not to 
meet other accumulating liabilities.  The bank staggered on for another couple 
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of years, but by 1826 their London agents would no longer tolerate the state of 
Wakefords’ account with them or honour their notes.1106 The bank closed its 
doors and in March 1826 the brothers became bankrupts.  Their commission 
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